JUDGMENT S.K. KATRIAR, J. - Defendant no.1 and the heir of defendant no.2 are the appellants against a judgment of reversal. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.5.1992, passed by the learned 6th Additional District dudge, East Champaran, Motihari, in Title Appeal No. 28 of 1980/120 of 1992 (Basudeo Mistri & Ors. Vs. Baijnath Choubey), whereby the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs was allowed, the judgment and decree dated 6.5.1980, passed by the learned Munsif, Motihari, East Champaran, in Title Suit No.4 of 1976 (Basudeo Mistri & Ors. Vs. Baijnath Choubey), was set aside, and the suit was decreed. We shall go by the description of the parties occurring in the plaint. 2. The plaintiffs case in brief is that one Sheobaran Mistri was the grand father of plaintiff no.1 and 2. Sheobaran Mistri had two sons, namely, Bharat Mistri and Saryug Mistri. Bharat Mistri had one son, Basdeo Mistri (Plaintiff no.1), and one daughter, Jago Devi (plaintiff no.5). Bharat Mistri died leaving behind Basdeo mistri, Jago Devi, and his wife, Mostt. Ramrati (plaintiff no. 4). Saryug Mistri had one son, Ramagya Mistri (plaintiff no.2), and the latter (Ramagya Mistri) had one son, Raghunath Mistri (plaintiff no.3). Further case of the plaintiffs is that Sheobaran Mistri had a brother, Rambaran Mistri. The latter died leaving behind a son, Jhulan Mistri. He (Jhulan Mistri) also died long ago leaving behind only one son, Kapildeo Mistri (defendant no. 4) Further case of the plaintiffs is that Sheobaran and Rambaran had his uncle, Akaloo Mistri. The latter (Akaloo Mistri) died leaving behind his wife, Mostt. Kabutari. In other words, the plaintiffs and defendant no.4 are members of the branch of one Sheobaran Mistri and Rambaran Mistri. After the death of Sharat Mistri, plaintiff no. 1, 4 and 5 succeeded him and came in possession of his properties. 2.1 Further case of the plaintiffs is that C.S. plot no. 2181 belonged to the ancestor of the defendant no.1 and 2. The ancestor of defendant no.1 and 2 orally sold for a consideration of Rs. 15/- a portion of C.S. Plot no. 2181 to Rash Bihari Ojha and Fagu Ojha who came in possession of the same. 2.1 Further case of the plaintiffs is that C.S. plot no. 2181 belonged to the ancestor of the defendant no.1 and 2. The ancestor of defendant no.1 and 2 orally sold for a consideration of Rs. 15/- a portion of C.S. Plot no. 2181 to Rash Bihari Ojha and Fagu Ojha who came in possession of the same. They sold the said portion of C.S. Plot No. 2181 to Sheobaran Mistri, vide sale deed dated 17.3.1914, and since then Sheobaran Mistri has been coming in possession of the same Sheobaran Mistri and Rambaran Mistri were members of the joint family. Further case of the plaintiffs is that out of C.S. Plot No. 2181, R.S. Plot No. 7560 and 7561 have been carved out, and R.S. plot no. 7560 was recorded in the R.S. Khatian in the name of Sheobaran Mistri and Rambaran Mistri. 2.2 Sheobaran Mistri and Julan Mistri sold R.S. Plot No. 7560 along with other land to Raghunath Mistri (plaintiff no.3), vide sale deed dated 7.2.1948 who came in possession of the same. The same day Sheobaran Mistri and Jhulan Mistri also executed a sale deed for an area of 5 dhurs out of R.S. Plot No. 7560 in favour of plaintiff no.1 (Basdeo Mistri) who also came in possession of the aforesaid land. Thus the plaintiffs claim 10 dhurs of land out of R.S. plot no. 7560 by way of purchase further case of the plaintiffs is that the plaintiffs got 4 dhurs of land out of R.S plot no. 7560 by way of survivorship. The plaintiffs thus claim that they came in possession of entire area of 14 thurs of land appertaining to R.S. Khesara no. 7560 who constructed marai, fixed had and khunta over the same. 2.3 Further case of the plaintiffs is that the defendant's first set started making trouble with the possession of the plaintiffs over R.S. Plot no.7560, as a result of which proceeding under 144 Cr.P.C. was started which was ultimately converted u/s 145 proceeding which was decided against the plaintiffs, vide order dated 10.12.1975. Emboldened by the order, defendant first set dispossessed the plaintiffs from schedule 2 land. The plaintiffs asserted that defendants first set has neither title nor any concern with the suit land and order of 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding is illegal and ineffective. 3. Defendant no.1 contested the suit. Emboldened by the order, defendant first set dispossessed the plaintiffs from schedule 2 land. The plaintiffs asserted that defendants first set has neither title nor any concern with the suit land and order of 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding is illegal and ineffective. 3. Defendant no.1 contested the suit. His case In short is that the plaintiffs have no concern with the suit land, neither the ancestors of the plaintiffs had any concern with the same. The R.S. Survey entry in the name of Sheobaran Mistri and Rambaran Mistri is wrong and the story of oral sale of the part of C.S. Plot No. 2181 by the ancestor of the defendants first set with Rash Bihari Ojha and Fagu Ojha is false who had never come in possession of any part of C.S. Plot No. 2181, either on the basis of sale deed or on any other basis. The further case of defendant no.1 is that the plaintiffs can not acquire any right and title by virtue of the sale deeds dated 7.2.1948. The ancestor of the defendants first set remained in possession of C.S. Plot No. 2181. The alternative case of the defendant is that they have acquired title by way of adverse possession. 4. The learned trial Court framed the following issues:- (i) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (ii) Whether plaintiff have got any valid cause of action for the suit? (iii) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? (iv) Have the plaintiffs got the title over the suit land? (v) In the story of plaintiffs possession over the suit land and dispossession of the plaintiffs by the defendants first set on 15.12.1975 or on any date is correct? (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree? (vi) To what other relief or relief if any plaintiff is entitled? 5. The parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. The learned trial court found as follows: (i) Fagu Ojha and Rash Bihari Ojha did not have title and possession over the suit land. (ii) The Jamabandi stands in the name of the defendants with regard to the suit land. The R.S. entry in the name of Rambaran and Sheobaran with regard to the suit land is wrong. (iii) The Plaintiffs have failed to prove their possession over the suit land. They have also failed to prove the case of dispossession. (ii) The Jamabandi stands in the name of the defendants with regard to the suit land. The R.S. entry in the name of Rambaran and Sheobaran with regard to the suit land is wrong. (iii) The Plaintiffs have failed to prove their possession over the suit land. They have also failed to prove the case of dispossession. (iv) The plaintiffs are also not entitled for a decree or any other relief what - so - ever. The order dated 10.12.1975, passed by the learned Executive Magistrate in 145 Cr. P.C. Proceeding is not illegal and ineffective. (v) The suit is fit to be dismissed. 6. The plaintiffs appeal has been allowed by the impugned judgment. The learned Court of appeal below has found as follows:- (i) R.S. entry will prevail and certainly this point gives benefit to the case of the Plaintiffs on the point of title and possession. (ii) The Plaintiffs have successfully proved their title over the suit land. (iii) The Plaintiffs have successfully proved their possession over the suit land and their recent dispossession by the defendant, and the oral evidence on this point on behalf of defendant is not reliable and acceptable. Hence this appeal at the instance of the defendants. 7. The following substantial questions of law have been framed for adjudication in this appeal:- (i) Whether or not a decree can be passed against a dead person? (ii) Whether the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court is sustainable in view of the alleged erroneous construction put on the sale deeds (Ext.2 series). 8. Learned counsel for the defendants (appellants) submits that the impugned judgment and decree are fit to be set aside on the ground that it was passed against a dead person, namely, Agnidev Choubey, who died during the pendency of the appeal but his heirs were not substituted. It appears to me that he was a defendant and died during the pendency of the Title Appeal on 17.6.1986. Hearing of the appeal commenced on 13.4.1992. The plaintiffs had filed an application on 1.5.1992, praying there in to expunge the name of the deceased and be exempted from substituting his heirs. Matter was adjourned to 2.5.1992 to enable the defendants to file reply to the same. The appeal was thereafter heard on 2.5.1992, 4.5.1992, 5.5.1992 and 6.5.1992 and remained part - heard. The plaintiffs had filed an application on 1.5.1992, praying there in to expunge the name of the deceased and be exempted from substituting his heirs. Matter was adjourned to 2.5.1992 to enable the defendants to file reply to the same. The appeal was thereafter heard on 2.5.1992, 4.5.1992, 5.5.1992 and 6.5.1992 and remained part - heard. The arguments concluded on 7.5.1992 and the judgment was reserved, which was delivered on 20.5.1992. The order - sheet of the learned lower appellate Court records that the decree was prepared and notified on 2.6.1992. As per the order dated 6.6.1992, no objection was raised and the decree was sealed and signed. The order - sheet dated 22.8.1992 records that the plaintiffs (respondents herein) had filed an application for correction in the decree which was kept on record, the same was moved on 24.8.1992 on which date the learned Court of appeal below noted that the defendants had not filed any reply - objection to the aforesaid application dated 1.5.1992 and, therefore, the two applications were allowed and the decree was directed to be amended. 9. It is thus manifest that the plaintiffs had filed the application for expunging the name of the deceased (Agnidev Choubey) during the pendency of the appeal where in it was stated that the deceased had never appeared nor filed a written statement and, therefore, they should be exempted from impleading his heirs. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs (respondents herein) has rightly submitted that the case is covered by the• provisions of Order 22, Rule 4(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is set out herein below for the facility of quick reference:- "O.XXII R.(4) The Court whenever it thinks fit, may exempt the plaintiff from the necessity of substituting the legal representatives of any such defendant who has failed to file a written statement or who, having filed it, has failed to appear and contest the suit at the hearing; and judgment may, in such case, be pronounced against the said defendant not with standing the death of such defendant and shall have the same force and effect as if it has been pronounced before death took place." 10. The estate of the deceased was through out represented by Baijnath Choubey, who is appellant no.2 herein. Furthermore, the deceased had left behind only one "heir, namely, his daughter, Mostt. Sharda Kuer, who is appellant no.1 herein. The estate of the deceased was through out represented by Baijnath Choubey, who is appellant no.2 herein. Furthermore, the deceased had left behind only one "heir, namely, his daughter, Mostt. Sharda Kuer, who is appellant no.1 herein. IN that view of the matter, the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court reported in 1983 PLJR 470 (Nathmal Khandelia Vs. Srimatl Janki Devl and Others), relied on by the learned counsel for the defendants (appellants), is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 11. Learned counsel for defendant no.1 (appellant herein) next submits that the learned trial Court considered the entire evidence exhaustively, both oral and documentary, and found that the plaintiffs have not been able to prove their story of oral sale in favour of the vendors of the plaintiffs, and further found that they had failed to prove the possession of their vendors. He, therefore, submits that the learned trial Court rightly concluded that in the absence of title and possession of the vendors, the purchasers (plaintiffs) can not have title. He has further submitted that the sale deed (Ext. 2 series) in favour of the plaintiffs contradict their case based on oral sale. He also submits that the discussion of the issue in the impugned judgment is unsatisfactory. He further submits that a finding contrary to the documents on record or arrived at after ignoring the material evidence, does not bind anybody. He relies on the judgments reported in AIR 1968 SC 466 (Smt. Sonawati and others Vs. Sri Ram and another) and AIR 2000 SC 426 (Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) by Lrs.). He lastly submits that the plaintiff must stand on their own legs and prove their own case rather than relying on the infirmities in the defendants case. 11.1 I do not feel the necessity of discussing the elaborate submissions advanced on behalf of defendants (appellants herein) because the same are entirely in the realm of appreciation of evidence. It is trite law that the findings of facts recorded by the first appellate Court, being the 9 last Court of facts, binds the High Court in second appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held as follows in its judgment in the case of R. Ramachandra Ayyar Vs. It is trite law that the findings of facts recorded by the first appellate Court, being the 9 last Court of facts, binds the High Court in second appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held as follows in its judgment in the case of R. Ramachandra Ayyar Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar, 1963 (3) SCR 604 , where the court observed as follows:- "But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusion of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court. How ever erroneous the said conclusion may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council observed, however. gross or inexcusable the error may seen to be there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error." "11. The same view was taken in two earlier decisions of this Court in the case of Pittaabhiramaswamy Vs. Hanymayya, AIR 1959 SC 57 and Rarubha Singh Vs. Achal Singh, AIR.1961 SC 1097. 12. learned counsel for the plaintiffs (respondents) rightly. submits that no substantial question of law seems to arise for the consideration of this Court in this appeal. In the case of Santosh Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001 (2) BLJ 179 (supra), the Supreme Court has explained as to what should constitute a substantial question of law in a second appeal. Paragraph 14 of the Judgment is illuminating and is set out herein below for the facility of quick reference. "A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law 'involving in the case' there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by Court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point re1ised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. An entirely new point re1ised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stage and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." I had the occasion to follow the same in my judgment reported in 2003(3) PLJR 100 = 2004 (1) Bihar Law Judgments 341 (Sheo Chand Chaudhary @ Sheochan Chaudhary Vs. Adalat Hussain & Ors.). 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with cost throughout.