JUDGMENT : J.R. Vora, J. 1. to 3. xxx xxx xx 4. To reach to a subjective satisfaction that the bootlegging activities of the detenue were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health, the Detaining Authority must rely upon cogent material indicating that the activities of the detenue directly or indirectly were causing or were likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. 5. In the present case, to reach to the above subjective satisfaction, the Detaining Authority as above-stated relied upon two types of materials. While undertaking this exercise to reach to a subjective satisfaction about the disturbance of the public order, the Detaining Authority must draw a line between "breach of law and order" and "breach of public order". Now referring to the solitary criminal case filed against the detenue under the Bombay Prohibition Act and the investigation papers as placed on record, it is clear that this case is filed against the detenue on the ground that she was dealing in liquor. Therefore, merely filing of a criminal case, must not have any bearing on the question of maintenance of public order. At the most, this may be a breach of law for which the detenue may be tried and may be punished, if found guilty, but surely the act constituting the offence cannot be said to have affected the even tempo of the life of the community. 6. Again, to reach to a subjective satisfaction that the alleged activities of the detenue were prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and public health, it would be necessary for the Detaining Authority to consider fall out, reach and the impact of the activities of the detenue and, thereafter, come to the conclusion that whether potentiality of the alleged activities of the detenue was capable of disturbing the public order. Two incidents narrated by the witnesses through in-camera statements and taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority appears to be more individual disputes then to involve society at large or disturbing the even tempo of the life of the community. Two incidents narrated by the witnesses through in-camera statements and taken into consideration by the Detaining Authority appears to be more individual disputes then to involve society at large or disturbing the even tempo of the life of the community. The potentiality, fall out, reach and impact of the activities complained of in two in-camera statements even from the bare reading, do not disclose capability to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community or society at large or section of the society. True it is that the witnesses have employed certain phrases in their statements, but those phrases cannot carry out the case of the witnesses to the extent of maintenance of public order. No widespread danger, alarm, fear, etc. could be inferred from the statements of the witnesses even after taking them on their face value. These were the incidents at the most could be taken care of by general law and may be breach of law and order, but no breach of public order as envisaged by the PASA Act. 7. In the matter of Ashokbhai Jivraj @ Jivabhai Solanki v. Police Commissioner, Surat & Ors., reported in 2000 (1) G.L.H. 393 , wherein after considering many decisions of the Apex Court, the Division Bench of this Court has observed in paragraphs No. 21 and 22 as under. "21. The Division Bench, following the above cases, observed that in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the selective phrases in the statements would not take out the case from maintenance of law and order to that of maintenance of public order and as power of detention could not be used for maintenance of law and order, but only for public order, the order of detention made in such circumstances could not be upheld." Again, in Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner of Police and others, 1995 (2) GLR 1268 (S.C.), the Supreme Court considered the relevant decisions on point including the decision in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1979 (1) SCC 98 and held that stray incidents would not affect "public order" and order of detention cannot be passed in such cases. "22. So far as the cases against the detenu are concerned, they have already been registered. They were against persons mentioned therein which is stated in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority. "22. So far as the cases against the detenu are concerned, they have already been registered. They were against persons mentioned therein which is stated in the grounds of detention by the detaining authority. Regarding two statements, having taken into account the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 and reiterated from time to time including the decisions referred to by us herein above, the case falls under the maintenance of "law and order" and not "public order". The subjective satisfaction arrived by the detaining authority, therefore, cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law. Since in the facts and circumstances, an order of detention could have been passed by the detaining authority for maintenance of "public order", the order deserves to be quashed and is hereby set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith unless required in any other case. Appeal is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs." 8. Therefore, having gone through the facts of the present case entirely, it clearly appears that the facts of the present case are squarely covered by the above decisions of this Court in the case of Ashokbhai Jivraj and a subjective satisfaction arrived at by the Detaining Authority in respect of disturbance of public order by the alleged activities of the detenue cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law. The order under challenge, therefore, is required to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. xxx xxx xxx. Application Allowed.