P. S. NARAYANA, J. ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ON 8-12-1997, this Court admitted the second appeal while framing the following substantial questions of law: ( 3 ) IS the Appellate Court justified in decreeing the suit for injunction after finding that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit Plot No. 23 as on the date of filing of the suit? 2. Whether the Court can grant such decree under Order 41 Rule 33 c. P. C. under which Appellate Court has the power to pass any decree which ought to have been passed? in CMP No. 5264/97, the interim suspension granted on 30-4-1997 had had been extended until further orders. 3. Anken Nancharamma, respondent in the second appeal, as against the judgment made in O. S. No. 286/87 on the file of I additional District Munsif, Machilipatnam, which was received by transfer and numbered as O. S, No, 158/87 on the file of district Munsif, Bantumilli, filed A. S. No. 12/ 90 on the file of I Additional District Judge, krishna, Machilipatnam. The suit was filed by the plaintiff as against the appellants herein, defendants in the suit, for declaration of title and consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their men, followers from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiff and for costs of the suit. ( 4 ) THE case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint is as hereunder: the plaintiff was assigned the plaint schedule house site measuring three cents at Nageswararaopet, Bantumilli by the tahsildar, Bantumilli on 11-11-1980. As the plaintiff is a landless poor agricultural coolie, she was given possession of the said site subsequently within two-three weeks. The government acquired the land of one tanamala Tirupathaiah, took possession, demarcated plot-wise and after issuance of d-Form Patta, handed over the site and the plaintiff has since been in possession and enjoyment of the same raising a thatched house within six months of the assignment and delivery by the Government. Later the thatched house had fallen due to cyclone and other climatic conditions and the same dilapidated. Later, the plaintiff raised a small hut for keeping her belongings, dung-cakes etc. The plaintiff submitted that the 1st defendant had encroached upon the adjacent site on the West. Later the thatched house had fallen due to cyclone and other climatic conditions and the same dilapidated. Later, the plaintiff raised a small hut for keeping her belongings, dung-cakes etc. The plaintiff submitted that the 1st defendant had encroached upon the adjacent site on the West. Later since few days i. e. , first week of July 1987, he had been trying to encroach upon the plaintiffs site. Despite several demands not to make encroachment attempts and persuasions of elders in the village like Sri Ede Krishnamurthy s/o. Nagesa, Eranki Eswara Rao s/o. Viraswami, Pedagadi Annachari of nageswaraopet, the 1st defendant with the active assistance of 2nd defendant and others had been threatening to occupy the plaint schedule site. The defendants wield good influence and man-strength in the village. They are not law-abiding people. The plaintiff is a widowed agricultural coolie and also vendor of dung cakes and she has no money or manpower to oppose the defendants. Hence the suit is filed for protection of her rights in the plaint schedule site. ( 5 ) THE defendants filed a written statement denying all the allegations inclusive of the allegation that the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule property. It was specifically pleaded that the plaintiff is not in possession of Plot No. 23 which was allotted to her as per the Assignment order and she is not in occupation of Plot no. 23. The plaintiff is living in the village nageswaraopet itself which is about one furlong from the two plots. The 1st defendant is in occupation of Plot No. 7 whereas the 2nd defendant is in occupation of Plot No. 12. The Plot No. 12 is situated to the West of Plot No. 23 which is said to be the plot allotted to the plaintiff. But as already submitted the plaintiff is not in occupation of the said Plot No. 23. It should be noted that the plaintiff intentionally omitted to give the number of the plot in the schedule. The allegation that the defendants attempted to encroach into the site of the plaintiff and in spite of persuasions of elders ede Krishna Murthy, Eranki Eswara Rao and Pedagadi Annachari and threatening to occupy the plaint schedule site is not correct. It should be noted that the plaintiff intentionally omitted to give the number of the plot in the schedule. The allegation that the defendants attempted to encroach into the site of the plaintiff and in spite of persuasions of elders ede Krishna Murthy, Eranki Eswara Rao and Pedagadi Annachari and threatening to occupy the plaint schedule site is not correct. There was no mediation nor persuasion by the so called elders and they are not the elders selected but they are close associates of the plaintiff. The allegation that after the collapse of the house which was said to have been raised by the plaintiff due to cyclone the plaintiff raised a small hut for keeping her belongings, dung-cakes etc. shows that the plaintiff is not residing in the said site. Further the cyclone was in the year 1997 but the house sites were allotted in 1980 and this fact itself is sufficient to conclude that the plaintiff is not in possession of the plaint schedule property. Since the plaintiff is not in possession of the plaint schedule property by the time of filing of the suit, the suit for injunction itself is not maintainable and the suit is liable to be dismissed in limine. The allegation that the defendants are interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property is not correct. As already submitted the plaintiff is not in possession of the plaint schedule property, under the guise of the injunction order, the plaintiff with the aid of police, attempted to trespass into the site of the 2nd defendant and attempted to remove the hut etc. , and due to timely intervention of elders the same was prevented. The plaintiff had no bona fides in filing the suit. ( 6 ) BEFORE the Court of first instance, the following Issues were settled: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and injunction as prayed for? 2. To what relief ? before the Court of first instance, PW-1 to pw-3 and DW-1 to DW-4 were examined. Exs. A-1 to A-3 and Exs. B-1 to B-5 and exs. C-1 and C-2 were marked. The Court of first instance, on appreciation of the oral evidence, ultimately dismissed the suit, with costs. 2. To what relief ? before the Court of first instance, PW-1 to pw-3 and DW-1 to DW-4 were examined. Exs. A-1 to A-3 and Exs. B-1 to B-5 and exs. C-1 and C-2 were marked. The Court of first instance, on appreciation of the oral evidence, ultimately dismissed the suit, with costs. Aggrieved by the same, the unsuccessful plaintiff preferred A. S. No. 12/ 90 on the file of I Additional District Judge, krishna, Machilipatnam and the appeal was allowed and aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal was preferred by the defendants. ( 7 ) THE Appellate Court at Para-8 framed the following Points for consideration: 1. Whether the appellant-plaintiff is entitled for declaration and injunction as prayed for? 2. Whether the lower Court committed any material irregularity in dismissing the suit which warrants the interference of this Court? the report of the Commissioner and the other documentary evidence had been discussed at length. In the light of the findings recorded by both the Courts, there is no serious controversy that by virtue of ex. A-1, dated 11-11-1980, patta was granted to the plaintiff for the schedule site by the tahsildar, Bantumilli. Ex. A-2 is the sketch and Ex. A-3 is a copy of pattadars issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer, Bantumilli. The evidence of PW-1 to PW-3 also, available on record. The defendants relied upon the evidence of DW-1 to DW-4 and exs. B-1 to B-5 - D-Form pattas and also house-tax receipts. Exs. C-1 and C-2 are the Commissioner s plan and Commissioner s report. The Counsel for the appellant had pointed out to certain findings recorded by the Appellate Court and would contend that in the light of the findings, there cannot be a decree for perpetual injunction. At Para-17, the Appellate Court observed as hereunder: "pw-1 to PW-3 categorically deposed that plot No. 23 is allotted to PW-1 under Ex. A- 1. In view of the admission of PW-1, the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3, the appellant-plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property cannot be accepted. By the date of the filing of the suit, the appellant-plaintiff is not in possession and enjoyment of the property, at the same time the tide to the property is vested with PW-1 and she is entitled for declaration, possession. By the date of the filing of the suit, the appellant-plaintiff is not in possession and enjoyment of the property, at the same time the tide to the property is vested with PW-1 and she is entitled for declaration, possession. The plaintiff-appellant fails to establish that she is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property by the date of filing of the suit, but as seen from the evidence of PW-1 to pw-3, immediately after granting of assignment, PW-1 took possession of the same and raised a hut and used the same for sometime for keeping her belongings, dung cakes etc. Taking advantage of the helplessness of the appellant-plaintiff the defendants-respondents encroached into the schedule property as deposed by her about 10 years back i. e. , 8 years prior to filing of the suit. So there is no prima facie case in favour of the appellant-plaintiff as she is not in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property by the date of filing of the plaint. As the title of the plaintiff- appellant is established by cogent, evidence exs. A-1 to A-3 coupled with the evidence of PW-1 to PW-3, clearly and clinchingly proves that she is the owner of die property and the land covered by Ex. A-1 was delivered to her she raised a hut, as evidenced from Ex. A-2 and the evidence. Hence she is entitled for the declaration and for possession. " ( 8 ) HAVING observed that the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and for possession and having recorded such findings, the relief of perpetual injunction could not have been granted. It is also pertinent to note that there is no plea of adverse possession taken by the defendants and there appears to be some confusion relating to the identity of the property as well. Be that as it may, in the light of Ex. A-1, the relief of declaration of title granted in favour of the plaintiff, respondent in the second appeal, cannot be found fault. It is needless to say that having recorded a finding that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property as on the date of suit, the relief of perpetual injunction cannot be granted. A-1, the relief of declaration of title granted in favour of the plaintiff, respondent in the second appeal, cannot be found fault. It is needless to say that having recorded a finding that the plaintiff was not in possession of the property as on the date of suit, the relief of perpetual injunction cannot be granted. It is needless to say that the relief of possession had not been prayed for and the pleadings may have to be suitably amended in this regard praying for the relief of possession too. It is also pertinent to note that the additional Court fee in this regard also may have to be paid. In the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances, on a careful scrutiny of the findings recorded by the appellate Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the relief of perpetual injunction granted by the Appellate Court in favour of the respondent in the second appeal/plaintiff, cannot be sustained. Order 41 Rule 33 C. P. C. dealing with power of Court of Appeal reads as hereunder : "the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parries may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees: provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under Section 35-A, in pursuance of any objections on which the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. " it is no doubt true that the object of the rule is to enable the Appellate Court where its decision interferes with, modifies or extends the decision of lower Court to give effect to that decision by interfering, if necessary, even with the rights and liabilities of those who are not in fact appealing from the decision of Trial Court. While explaining the object of Order 41 rule 3 C. P. C. , in V. Ramakrishna v. Smt. N. Sarojini and others, 1992 (2) ALT 35 , it was held that Order 41 Rule 33 c. P. C. enables the Appellate Court to do complete justice between the parties and its terms are very wide and in a proper case it gives ample discretion to pass any decree or make any order to prevent ends of justice being defeated. The object of Order 41 rule 33 C. P. C. is to enable the Appellate court to do complete justice between the parties and if the justice of the case may require, to pass any decree or order which ought in law to have been passed by the trial Court but not passed by it. The rule further empowers the Appellate Court to make whatever order or decree seems fit not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between the respondents and respondents and filing or non-filing of appeal or Cross-Objections does not bar the Appellate Court in passing a decree in favour of the respondents if the question raised properly arise out of judgment of the lower Court and the parties are before the Appellate Court, though may be in a different capacity. This rule has been couched in such a way that it gives wide discretion to the Appellate Court to consider any objection against any part of the judgment or decree of the lower Court and empowers the Court to vary or reverse the same in order to avoid inconsistent, contradictory and unworkable decision. However this broad proposition would be subject to certain limitations like the operation of the provisions of Limitation Act, Court fee Act and the other statutes alike and therefore these aspects cannot be totally ignored. ( 9 ) HERE is a case where the Appellate court having recorded a finding relating to possession in negative, had granted the decree for perpetual injunction in favour of the respondent herein/plaintiff. ( 9 ) HERE is a case where the Appellate court having recorded a finding relating to possession in negative, had granted the decree for perpetual injunction in favour of the respondent herein/plaintiff. In view of the fact that only the finding relating to declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff is being confirmed, the matter is remanded to the Appellate Court for the purpose of affording opportunity to both the parties to either let in further evidence or to suitably amend the pleadings praying for appropriate reliefs in this regard if they are so advised. In the light of the aforesaid peculiar facts and circumstances, the matter is remanded to the Appellate Court for the limited extent specified supra. ( 10 ) THE second appeal is accordingly partly allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.