Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 404 (BOM)

Brijmohan Kisansingh Pardeshi v. State of Maharashtra

2005-03-23

S.P.KUKDAY

body2005
JUDGMENT:- The petitioner has impugned order of conviction and sentence; passed against him in Summary Case No.203/ 1987 convicting him of the offence punishable under sections 279 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing him to suffer RI for one month and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- on each count, in default, to suffer RI for 15 days on each count. The sentences were to run concurrently. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present proceeding are that on intervening night of 8th and 9th June, 1987, PW-1 Ankush was driving SRPF van bearing Registration' No.2379 on Aurangabad Nagar Road. He was going to Pune from Jalna, so as to bring newly recruited trainee officials. Bhimshankar (PW2), Mohammed Sayyad and Mohd. Abdullah, were travelling by this van. After crossing Kalewadi, the van came up to the bridge on Aurangabad road. From the opposite direction one truck was crossing the bridge. Therefore, Ankush stopped his vehicle near the bridge. While the vehicle was standing, ST Bus bearing Registration No.MWQ 6023 driven by the petitioner gave a dash to the said van from the back side. On account of the impact of the collision, the van went ahead and crashed the parapet wall of the bridge. The front portion of driver's seat and rear p0l1ion of the van was damaged. Front left side portion of the bus was also damaged. The passengers of SRPF van sustained injuries. On receipt of information regarding the incident, Pamer Police swung into action. Head Constable Bhimshankar Potdar (PW-2) and others were taken to Shirur Police Station. They were treated at Shirur Government Dispensary. As the incident had taken place within the jurisdiction of Pamer Police Station, a message was telephonically communicated to Pamer Police. As a result, Head Constable Bhausaheb Kasar and others, went to the scene of occurrence, conducted enquiries and found that Brijmohan Kisansingh (petitioner) was driving the ST Bus. Spot Panchanama (Exh.18) was prepared in the presence of witnesses. After enquiry, it was found that the incident took place on account of rash driving of the S.T. Bus by the petitioner. Thus, Head Constable Sonkar lodged a report of the 'incident, on behalf of the State. Spot Panchanama (Exh.18) was prepared in the presence of witnesses. After enquiry, it was found that the incident took place on account of rash driving of the S.T. Bus by the petitioner. Thus, Head Constable Sonkar lodged a report of the 'incident, on behalf of the State. On the basis' of this report offence punishable under Sections 279, 427 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code, and the offence punishable u/s. 112 read with Section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act, was registered. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed. 3. At the conclusion of trial, learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Pamer convicted the petitioner of the offence punishable under sections 279 and 427 of the IPC and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment as stated earlier. 4. Being aggrieved the petitioner preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No.61/1992 in the Court of Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar, Learned Sessions Judge, confirmed the order of conviction and sentence dismissing the appeal by his order dated 18-2-1998. These orders are impugned in the present Revision. 5. Shri. Gopal Navandar, h/for Shri. V. P. Latange, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings recorded by the lower Courts are perverse and. therefore, liable to be set aside. According to the learned counsel, there is no evidence on record to show that the vehicle was being driven negligently or rashly. It is further contended that inferences drawn by the trial Court are not based on evidence. According to learned counsel, in view of these infirmities, the findings recorded by the lower Courts are perverse and deserve to be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned APP has taken the Court through the relevant portion of the evidence. Reference is made to the Panchanama of the scene of occurrence, to show the nature of impact. According to learned APP, if the evidence of witnesses and the conditions of the vehicle are taken into consideration, it can be seen that both the lower Courts were justified in recording the finding that petitioner was rash or negligent in driving the vehicle and has caused damage to the SRPF van. Learned APP submitted that having regard to the evidence on record, this is not case a where the High Court should interfere with the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Judge and confirmed by the lower Appellate Court. 7. Learned APP submitted that having regard to the evidence on record, this is not case a where the High Court should interfere with the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Judge and confirmed by the lower Appellate Court. 7. The prosecution case is that Ankush (PW-1) was taking light SRPF van bearing Registration No.2379 from Jalna to Pune, to bring newly recruited trainee officials. After he passed Kalewadi, the Driver Ankush came to the bridge and found that a truck was crossing the bridge. He, therefore, stopped his vehicle on the other side of the bridge. While vehicle was stationary, Bus bearing Registration No.MWQ 6023 driven by the petitioner gave a dash from the back side. On account of the impact, the van was propelled forward and crashed against the parapet wall of the bridge suffering damage to "the front portion: the seat of the Driver was also broken on account of the impact; the rear portion of the van was damaged. The passengers as well as the Driver suffered mental trauma. This evidence of Driver Bhaskar is not in dispute. The incident in question is admitted by the petitioner. 8. The trial Court has convicted the petitioner for his rash and negligent act and for causing damage to SRPF vehicle. The Appellate Court has confirmed these findings. It appears that the concept of rashness and negligence are not properly understood. Rashness and negligence do not co-exist. Similarly, the concept of rashness or negligence does not require element of mens rea. Thus, it would be pertinent to refer to the concepts of rashness and negligence before turning to the merits of the case. Rashness consists of doing an act with the knowledge that disastrous consequences are likely to ensue, but with the confidence that such consequence can be avoided by taking proper precautions. Rashness consists in taking a calculated risk; whereas negligence involves lack of care and caution. The terms "negligence" and "rashness" are considered by the courts in catena of judgments, it is, by now, well established that negligence connotes want of proper care and rashness conveys an idea of recklessness and doing an act without due consideration. Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that sufficient precautions are taken to avert the catastrophe. Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that sufficient precautions are taken to avert the catastrophe. Culpable negligence consists in acting without consciousness that the illegal and mischievous consequences may follow. In both· the circumstances, the driver does not exercise the caution incumbent upon him. In case of negligence, the imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. It is, therefore, obvious that a person cannot be convicted of driving the vehicle rashly find negligently, as is done by the lower Appellate Court, he can be convicted of either rash or negligent act. 9. Turning to the merits, it can be seen that the oral evidence refers to the incidents which took place after the impact. Conclusion regarding rashness are based on the factual data provided by the Panchanama of the scene of occurrence. The Panchanama of the scene of occurrence shows that ST, Bus gave a dash' to the SRPF van by the left side of the Bus. The impact of the collision was such that the van was propelled and crashed against the parapet wall, sustaining damage to the front portion. The impact was such that wooden seat of the Driver, one of the side planks and the wooden planks of the chassis were broken. The damage caused speaks for itself. It is apparent that the ST Bus was travelling at a high speed so much so that on impact it propelled the stationary vehicle with sufficient force and caused considerable damage to the rear portion. The fact that left side portion near the head light had come in contact with stationary vehicle shows that the petitioner was trying to overtake the vehicle and while doing so, had not slowed down the vehicle. During the course of his examination petitioner explained that the SRPF vehicle was in front of the ST Bus for considerable period. The driver was not giving side and he was trying to overtake the vehicle. According to petitioner, tail lamps of the SPRF van were not working. Therefore, he could not get knowledge that the vehicle has stopped near the bridge and this has resulted in causing the accident. Both the lower Courts have rightly rejected this explanation. The driver was not giving side and he was trying to overtake the vehicle. According to petitioner, tail lamps of the SPRF van were not working. Therefore, he could not get knowledge that the vehicle has stopped near the bridge and this has resulted in causing the accident. Both the lower Courts have rightly rejected this explanation. When one is driving a vehicle on the Highway, that too during the night, the driver is not only to keep an eye on the vehicle which is ahead of him but also on the vehicles which are coming from the opposite direction. The petitioner must have had knowledge of the fact that the truck is crossing the bridge and, therefore, ought to have slow down the Bus. Evidence on record proves beyond doubt driving of the petitioner was rash and, on account of his rash driving, life and personal safety of the persons traveling by SRPF vehicle was endangered. Both the lower Courts have, therefore, rightly come to the conclusion that offence punishable u/s.279, IPC is proved. In this view of the matter, contention of learned counsel for petitioner that the finding recorded by lower Courts on this point are rash, cannot be sustained. 10. So far as offence punishable u/s.427, IPC is concerned, it can be seen that the Appellate Judge has considered this aspect but came to the conclusion that knowledge of the likelihood of the resultant loss or damage is sufficient and, therefore, offence punishable u/ s.427 of the IPC, is established. It is not possible to subscribe to such a theory. Mens rea is an essential ingredient of offence of mischief, whereas means rea is not an ingredient of the concept of rashness or negligence. In the present case, it can be seen that the occurrence has taken place on account of rash driving of the petitioner. However, it is also obvious that the petitioner did not intend to cause damage to the SRPF vehicle. He was taking a calculated risk, with a hope that the untoward consequences can be avoided by taking sufficient precaution. However, on account of his miscalculation, the incident took place. It is, therefore, clear that there was no intention to cause damage to the SRPF vehicle nor was there any knowledge that his act would result in causing such a loss or damage. However, on account of his miscalculation, the incident took place. It is, therefore, clear that there was no intention to cause damage to the SRPF vehicle nor was there any knowledge that his act would result in causing such a loss or damage. In this view of the matter, it is 'apparent that there is absence of mens rea and, therefore, ingredients of the offence punishable u/s.427, IPC are not satisfied. The Apex Court had an occasion to deal with this controversy in the matter of State of Gujarat Vs. Haidarali Kalubhai reported in AIR 1976 SC 1012 . Dealing with this aspect their Lordships observed in Para 10 of the report: "10. Section 304-A by its own definition totally excludes the ingredients of section 299 or section 300, I.P.C. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing of an act was likely to cause a person's death are ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge as described above is the direct motivating force of the act complaint of, Section 304-A has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide." Thus, mens rea is not an ingredient of an offence punishable under section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Similar view is taken by Rajasthan High Court in the matter of State of Rajasthan Vs. Navratanmal reported in 2002 Cri.L.J. 348. In that case, during the course of an accident; a cow was killed. Accused was, therefore, charged for having committed an offence punishable u/s.429 of the IPC. The trial Court acquitted the accused of the offence punishable u/s.429, IPC. Considering this aspect, learned Judge observed in para No.14 of the report that mens rea of causing an accident is absent, therefore, the finding of acquittal for offence punishable u/s.429, IPC recorded by the trial Court deserves to be confirmed. 11. In the present case also as the mens rea is absent, offence punishable u/s.427 cannot be held to be proved. The findings recorded by the learned Magistrate in this behalf and confirmed by the Appellate Court will have to be quashed and set aside. 12. In the result, Revision deserves to be allowed partly by modifying the order of conviction and sentence. The order of conviction and sentence in respect of offence punishable u/s.427 of the IPC deserves to be quashed and set aside. 12. In the result, Revision deserves to be allowed partly by modifying the order of conviction and sentence. The order of conviction and sentence in respect of offence punishable u/s.427 of the IPC deserves to be quashed and set aside. However, order of conviction in respect of offence. punishable u/ s.279, IPC deserves to be confirmed. 13. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is sentenced to suffer RI for one month and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. According to learned counsel petitioner has already undergone imprisonment for 21 days. Considering passage of time and the fact that the conviction in respect of one of the offence is now set aside, the sentence be reduced to the imprisonment already undergone and fine may be increased. 14. Learned APP submits that appropriate orders to meet the ends of justice should be passed. Considering the fact that conviction and sentence in respect of offence punishable under Section 427, IPC is set aside and passage of time, submission of learned counsel f9r,petitioner deserves to be accepted. The Revision is, therefore, partly allowed. The order of conviction and sentence in respect of offence punishable u/s. 427 of the IPC is quashed and -set aside. The order of conviction and sentence in respect 0f offence punishable u/s. 279 of the IPC is confirmed. The order of sentence is modified. The sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone and the fine is increased to Rs.3,000/-. The tine of Rs. 1,000/- deposited in respect of offence punishable u/s.427, IPC be adjusted during recovery of the balance amount. Remaining amount of Rs.1,000/- should be deposited in lower Court on or before 24th April.2006. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms. Revision partly allowed.