Judgment Hemant Gupta, J. 1. The appellant was working as a Secretary with the Sukhanand Coop. Agricultural Service Society Limited (hereinafter to be referred as "the Society"). On 20-08-1979, the Society terminated his services. The appellant raised an industrial dispute as contemplated under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Act"). In pursuance of such reference, the Labour Court vide award dated 14-02-1986 found the appellant guilty of embezzlement and, thus, the services of the workman were rightly terminated. The writ petition challenging the said award of Labour Court was dismissed on 23-03-2001. 2. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the services of the appellant were not terminated on the ground of embezzlement of funds of the Society. Therefore, it is not open to the management to rely upon another misconduct before the Labour Court to support the order of termination of services of the appellant. Reliance was placed upon Sukhmander Singh v. Kothe Warring Co-op. Agri. Service Society Ltd., 1992(1) S.L.R. 619. 3. Reference to the Labour Court was to the following effect:- "Whether termination of services of Sh. Gursewak Singh workman is justified and in order? If not, to what relief/exact amount of compensation is he entitled?" 4. In pursuance of such reference, it was the stand of the management in the written statement that the services of the appellant were terminated as he remained absent from duty for the period from 13-07-1979 to 16-07-1979 and that he has embezzled huge funds of the Society. In support of such plea of embezzlement of funds, the management relied upon the awards Exhibits M35, M36 and M37 rendered by the arbitrator. 5. The Labour Court upheld the order of termination, inter alia, on the ground that the amounts mentioned in the awards were embezzled by the workman and as such his services were rightly terminated. Such finding has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge as well. 6. 5. The Labour Court upheld the order of termination, inter alia, on the ground that the amounts mentioned in the awards were embezzled by the workman and as such his services were rightly terminated. Such finding has been affirmed by the learned Single Judge as well. 6. The Labour Court in exercise of powers conferred under Section 11 -A of the Act is entitled to examine the legality of the termination order and if the order of discharge or dismissal is found not justified, while setting aside the same, direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Even in the case where the order of termination is found defective on one or the other ground, it is open to the management to adduce evidence to justify the order of dismissal before the Labour Court. 7. In R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer and Anr., (1997)1 Supreme Court Cases 9, Supreme Court relying upon the decision of the Constitutional Bench in P.H. Kalyani v. Air France, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1756, found that the defect found in the domestic inquiry is nullified by proof of misconduct on the basis of evidence adduced before the Labour Court so that there is no ground available for the Labour Court to set aside the order of punishment. It was held to the following effect:- "8. The above extract from Kalyami which contains the ratio of the decision clearly indicates that the above observations in Gujarat Steel are not in conformity with Kalyami. In Kalyani it was held that the defect found in domestic inquiry is nullified by proof of misconduct on the basis of evidence adduced before the Labour Court so that t here is no ground available for the Labour Court to set aside the order of punishment. The question before the Labour Court is whether the order of punishment should be set aside on any ground and when the Labour Court ultimately reaches the conclusion that even though the inquiry was defective, there is material to justify in the punishment awarded, it rejects the challenge to the order of punishment which continues to operate. The question before the Labour Court is whether the order of punishment should be set aside on any ground and when the Labour Court ultimately reaches the conclusion that even though the inquiry was defective, there is material to justify in the punishment awarded, it rejects the challenge to the order of punishment which continues to operate. It is not as if the order of punishment becomes effective only on rejection of the challenge to its validity. Unless set aside by a competent court on a valid ground, the order of punishment made by the employer continues to operate. The operation of the order of punishment made by the employer does not depend on its confirmation by the Labour Court to make it operative. Unless set aside by a competent authority, the order of punishment made by the employer continues to be effective. Obviously this is the ratio of the decision in Kalyani" 8. Still later, Hon ble Supreme Court in Director, State Transport, Punjab and Anr. v. Gurdev Singh and Anr., (1998)2 Supreme Court Cases 159, upheld the order of termination when the Labour Court on the basis of evidence led before it found that the action of the management was justified in terminating the services of the workman on the ground of serious misconduct of embezzlement of funds. Such finding was returned after t he Labour Court found that t he domestic inquiry w as d efective. The Court found that if an employee is terminated as a result of domestic inquiry which is found defective by the Labour Court and if the Labour Court on evidence led before it, upholds the decision of the termination of the workman, the termination would relate back to the date of original order of termination and would not operate from the date of award of the Labour Court. Further, Hon ble Supreme Court in Engineering Laghu Udyog Employees Union v. The Judge, Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal and Anr., 2003(8) Services Law Reporter 569, after considering the entire case law, held that once on the basis of evidence brought on record in the domestic inquiry or by reason of additional evidence, the employer makes out a case justifying the order of dismissal, such order of dismissal can be given effect from the date of passing of the order of punishment alone and not from the date of the award. It was held to the following effect:- "Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") confers a wide power upon the Labour Court, Tribunal or the National Tribunal to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen. While adjudicating on a reference made to it, the Labour Court, Tribunal or the National Tribunal, as the case may be, if satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, while setting aside the same, direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Thus, only in a case where the satisfaction is reached by the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, that an order of dismissal was not justified, the same can be set aside. So long as the same is not set aside, it remains valid. But once whether on the basis of the evidence brought on record in the domestic inquiry or by reason of additional evidence the employer makes out a case justifying the order of dismissal, we fail to understand as to how such order of dismissal can be given effect to only from the date of the award and not from the date of passing of the order of punishment..." 9. In Sukhmander s case (supra), it was not pointed out that the Labour Court, even if the domestic inquiry has been found to be defective, can reappreciate evidence to return a finding of misconduct either on the basis of evidence already led or on the basis of additional evidence produced before the Labour Court in terms of the provisions of Section 11 -A of the Act. Even the judgments explaining the scope of powers of Labour Court under Section 11-A of the Act were not brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the said view cannot be sustained in view of the binding precedents of the Supreme Court referred to above. 10. Consequently, we do not find any merit in the present appeal which is dismissed with no orders as to costs.