Judgment – By means of this petition, moved under article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioner/tenant has sought writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and order dated 26-03-1990 (in RC case No. 06/1982) passed by the Prescribed Authority, Nainital and judgment and order dated 22-11-1985 (RC App. No. 26/1985) passed by III Additional District Judge, Nainital. 2. Brief facts of the case as narrated in writ petition, are that petitioner is a tenant in the shops in question bearing No. 7 and 8 in ground floor of Tourist Hotel, Bhowali, on rent at the rate of Rs. 1200/- per year. Original landlord of said shops was Sri Nand Kishore (since dead) father of the respondent No. 1 Jag Mohan Chandra Pandey. The respondent NO.1 moved an application (Rent Control Case No. 06/1982) under Section 21 (1) (a) of U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, for release of the shops in the year 1982, on the ground that he needs the shops for opening restaurant and dining Hall. It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner, himself was running restaurant In the shop in question. It is also alleged that respondent No.1 was not alone to inherit property of Sri Nand Kishore and can not be said to be sole landlord. The petitioner filed written statement and contested the application for release of the shops before the Prescribed Authority pleading that neither the respondent No. 1 is sole owner nor his need is bonafide and nor is there greater comparative hardship in his favour. By way of amendment in written statement it is further stated that during pendency of proceeding respondent No. 1 has got constructed big room in which his requirement of dining hall can be fulfilled. It is also pleaded by the petitioner (tenant) that need of the landlord' can be got fulfilled from other shops No. 3 and 4 also. The Prescribed Authority, after taking evidence of parties and hearing them, not only found need of the landlord (respondent NO.1) as genuine and bonafide but also gave the finding that there is greater hardship in his favour as against the tenant. Aggrieved by said order, the tenant (petitioner no. 1) prepared Rent Control Appeal No. 26 of 1985, under Section 22 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. Aggrieved by said order, the tenant (petitioner no. 1) prepared Rent Control Appeal No. 26 of 1985, under Section 22 of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. However, after hearing the parties, respondent NO.2 (III Additional District Judge) dismissed the same vide his order dated 26-03-1990. Hence this writ petition by the challenging both the orders passed by authorities below on the ground that the said authorities committed gross Illegality In holding need of the landlord bonafide and the accepting his case of greater hardship. It is also alleged in the writ petition that the respondent No. 1 was not sole owner. The petitioner further alleged in the writ petition that the courts below have erred in law by ignoring the Commissioner's report. During the pendency of writ petition both petitioner Sri Ram Chandra Kapil and respondent No. 1 Sri Jag Mohan Chandra Pandey died and their widows got substituted on the basis of said development. Subsequently it is stated by way of amendment that substituted respondent had failed to plead her need as required under Clause (7) of Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Lastly It is pleaded that the petitioner's restaurant has earned good-will and can not be shifted elsewhere.. . '. 3. The respondent No. 1 filed counter affidavit in which it has been stated that concurrent findings of fact of courts below can not be interfered with by this Court in. its writ jurisdiction. It is reiterated that the respondent No. 1 needs shop No. 7 and 8 in the ground floor as his tourist Hotel is not running well for want of a "restaurant and dining hall with it. It is further stated In the 'counter affidavit that petitioner does not require shops in question as he is running fair price shop elsewhere. It is also stated by answering respondent that one son of the petitioner (tenant) is running bakery, another a betel shop, third Is in the army, fourth doing business of sale of newspapers. Apart from this It is alleged in the counter affidavit, that petitioner owns three storeyed house in which he has let out one shop to some third person. The answering respondent filed copies licenses of business being run by the petitioner and his sons, as annexures to the counter affidavit. Apart from this It is alleged in the counter affidavit, that petitioner owns three storeyed house in which he has let out one shop to some third person. The answering respondent filed copies licenses of business being run by the petitioner and his sons, as annexures to the counter affidavit. It has been denied by the respondent No. 1 that he was not the owner, rather It is stated that Tourist Hotel In the ground floor of which shops in question exist, after death of Sri Nand Kishore is recorded in the name of answering respondent as owner and landlord which has fallen in his share. It Is also alleged by the landlord that petitioner got delayed proceedings before Prescribed Authority for years and thereafter lingered proceedings before appellate court for further similar period. It is denied that there is any other vacant shop or Hall in which landlords need can be fulfilled. Amended pleas in the writ petition are denied In additional counter affidavit by' the substituted' respondent No. 1/1 and reiterated the contents of the counter affidavit filed by her deceased husband. " 4. In the rejoinder affidavit contents of para 9 and 10 of the counter affidavit are admitted which relate to the averments that the different business being run by the sons of the petitioner and also to the effect that petitioner owned a three storeyed house, of which one shop is letout by him. In the additional rejoinder affidavit in substance, the earlier averments are reiterated. 5. I heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. From copy of written statement (Annexure 4 to the writ petition), it is clear that the petitioner admits his status of tenant. It is also admitted in said written statement that the respondent No. 1 is landlord of the shops in question but It is not admitted that he is sole owner of the shops. However, for the purposes of proceedings under U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, only the relationship of landlord and tenant Is relevant and not the full or half ownership of the landlord. Section 3 (j) of said Act defines the 'landlord' and provides that said expression means a person to whom rent is payable in relation to a building and includes agent of such person. Section 3 (j) of said Act defines the 'landlord' and provides that said expression means a person to whom rent is payable in relation to a building and includes agent of such person. Therefore, In view of what has been admitted in para 1 and 2 of the written statement filed before Prescribed Authority, there is no doubt that the Sri Ram Chandra Kapil (petitioner) was tenant and Sri Jag Mohan Chandra Pandey (respondent no. 1) was the landlord in respect of the shops in question. 7. As to the bonafide need of landlord and greater comparative hardship in his favour in concerned, there is concurrent findings of fact of both the courts below. It is settled principle of law that the High Court in its exercise of writ jurisdiction, should not interfere with such finding of fact unless the same are perverse or totally against the record, which is not the case here. Both the authorities below after discussing evidence on record have given the finding that not only the need of the landlord was genuine and bonafide but also greater hardship in his favour as against the tenant. There is nothing on the record on the basis of which this court can gather that said findings are perverse or against the evidence on record. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner drew attention of this Court clause (7) of Section 21 of U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972. [U.P. Act 13 of 19721 and argued that where during the pendency of an application under clause (a) of sub section (1) the land lord dies. his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application further on the basis of the their own need in substitution of need of the deceased. In the opinion of this court, this argument does not help the petitioner (tenant) in the present case for the reason that the death of landlord has not taken place during the 'pendency' of the application moved under Section 2Hl)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. The application could have been said to be pending only during the period it was being heard either by the Prescribed Authority or by the appellate court. These are the only two forums provided for pendency of the application moved under aforesaid Act. The application could have been said to be pending only during the period it was being heard either by the Prescribed Authority or by the appellate court. These are the only two forums provided for pendency of the application moved under aforesaid Act. The death in the present case has taken place during the pendency of writ petition moved under article 226 of Constitution of India which is not a proceeding under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Eviction) Act. 1972. The case of Kedar Nath Agarwal Vs. Dhanraji Devi J.T. 2004(9) SC 113, referred by Learned Counsel for the petitioner, do not help the petitioner as in said case, death of land lord has taken place during the pendency of appeal (not during writ petition), as such substituted heir does not require now to show her fresh need. 9. On behalf of the petitioner, it is also contended that in view of the fact that respondent No. 1 Jag Mohan Chandra Pandey has died, the need of the land lord no more exists, as his widow (respondent No. 1/1) can not be said to have need to open restaurant and dining hall. In the opinion of this Court, the contention is again misconceived. The widow of deceased landlord has inherited rights of her husband. Apart from this she has filed additional counter affidavit claiming same bonafide need. Had it been a case where during pendency of the application before Prescribed Authority or the appellate court. the subsequent event had taken place, it could have been said that though the rights are required to be determined as it existed on the day application was moved but still in exceptional case subsequent event could have been seen if the same materially affecting the case, but in the present case death of landlord has taken place during pendency of writ petition and his widow got substituted by petitioner in place of her husband. Moreover from evidence on record it is clear she was not housewife and was running fruit mart in the another shop in the same building when her husband was looking after the tourist hotel. In such circumstances such subsequent event can not defeat the fate of release application of landlord. Moreover from evidence on record it is clear she was not housewife and was running fruit mart in the another shop in the same building when her husband was looking after the tourist hotel. In such circumstances such subsequent event can not defeat the fate of release application of landlord. If this is permitted every tenant would do his best to delay the disposal of such cases so that the proceedings u/s 21(l)(a) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 get frustrated. In this case Prescribed Authority could dispose of release application after several years. Tenant thereafter preferred appeal and once again it took similar years further time in its disposal. Now for last more than fifteen years this writ petition is pending. Can it be said that in Twenty three years period no subsequent event would have taken place? It is in these circumstances that in Gaya Prasad Vs Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604, the apex court has held that subsequent event should not be considered. The case law Shakuntala Bai Vs Narayan Das JT 2004 (Suppl. 1) S.C. 538, referred by the petitioner does not help him for the reason that in said case, High Court was hearing second appeal and against that apex court heard the matter in Civil Appeal, but in the present case this court is hearing the matter In exercise of Its writ jurisdiction. 10. For reasons as discussed above, the writ petition Is liable to be dismissed, and Is dismissed. However, In the interest of justice, the petitioners are allowed two months time from today to vacate the shops In question. No order as to costs.