JUDGMENT A.K. Patnaik, J.— This is an appli-cation filed under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Cr.P.C.”) for cancellation of the bail granted to Srimati Prabasini Kar by the learned Special C.J.M. (CBI), Bhubaneswar under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. in connection with RC No. 8/S/2000-Cal under Sections 120-B, 292, 342, 354, 363, 376 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code (for short “the IPC”). 2. The facts briefly are that the petitioner Sri Prasanta Kumar Das filed a writ petition in OJC No. 13305 of 1999 praying for investigation into the Balasore Sex Scandal case in which it was alleged that a Physical Training Instructor of Balasore was luring young girls from Balasore on false pretence for high officials. The High Court passed orders on 9.5.2000 for investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short, “CBI”) into the said case and pursuant to the said order passed by the High Court, the CBI registered an F.I.R. in the aforesaid case treating the petitioner Sri Prasanta Kumar Das as the informant. Srimati Prabasini Kar who was working as a Physical Training Instructor in Balasore was arrested by the CBI in course of investigation on 14.3.2001 but was released on bail by the Special C.J.M. (CBI), Bhubaneswar by order dated 16.7.2001 on a petition filed by her under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. for non-filing of charge sheet by the CBI within the statutory period of 120 days. 3. Mr. M.S. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the language of Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. would show that the person released on bail under Section 167(2) Of the Cr.P.C. shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purpose of that Chapter and Section 437(3) in Chapter XXXIII provides that the Court may impose any condition which the Court considers necessary but the order dated 16.7.2001 of the learned Special C.J.M., CBI, Bhubaneswar would show that no such condition for bail was actually imposed by the Court. He pointed out that Srimati Prabasini Kar who has been placed under suspension by the State Government with the headquarters at Baripada, is actually residing at Balasore and is threatening witnesses and trying to gain them over by various tactics. He pointed out that Srimati Prabasini Kar who has been placed under suspension by the State Government with the headquarters at Baripada, is actually residing at Balasore and is threatening witnesses and trying to gain them over by various tactics. In this context, he referred to the allegations in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition as well as the First Information Report dated 30.10.2004 lodged by Harapriya Barik, the victim girl herself, and her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 8.10.2004 as well as the First Information Report dated 8.10.2001 lodged by Ashok Kumar Tarai, the husband of Harapriya Barik. He cited a decision of this Court in Sri Pitambar Swain v. Ainthu alias Ashok Kumar Sahu and another1, for the pro-position that bail granted to the accused can be cancelled if it was granted illegally and/or improperly by wrong and arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion and if the accused abuses his freedom by violating the conditions imposed in the bail order or tampers with the prosecution evidence or commits such illegal or criminal acts which would make his freedom undesirable. He vehemently submitted that since the bail order was granted to Srimati Prabasini Kar illegally and improperly and she has-abused her freedom and tampered with the pro-secution evidence, this Court should cancel the bail granted in her favour. 4. In reply to the aforesaid sub-mission, Mr. Debasis Panda, learned counsel for Srimati Prabasini Kar, the opposite party No.2, submitted that the petitioner Sri Prasanta Kumar Das has no locus standi to move for cancellation of bail and the CBI or the victim girl Harapriya Barik has not filed any application before the Court for cancellation of bail. He submitted that the use of the word “may” in Section 437(3) of the Cr.P.C. indicates that the Court may or may not impose any condition for bail and therefore the order of the Special C.J.M., CBI, Bhubaneswar dated 16.7.2001 granting bail to Srimati Prabasini Kar cannot be held to be illegal or improper merely because no condition was imposed by the said bail order. He further submitted that by virtue of the deeming provision in Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., a bail order passed under Section 167(2) has been equated with a bail order passed under Chapter XXXIII of the Cr.P.C. and therefore such a bail order passed under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. can only be cancelled in the same manner in which a regular bail order passed under Chapter XXXIII can be cancelled. He submitted that law is well settled that a regular bail order can be cancelled if by reason of supervening circumstances it would be no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom during the trial granted by the bail order and in support of this submission cited the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Bijayaketan Mohanty v. State of Orissa2. He submitted relying on the show-cause filed by the opposite party No. 2 - Srimati Prabasini Kar that the allegations against Srimati Prabasini Kar in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the petition as well as in the F.I.R. dated 30.10.2004 and the statement of Harapriya Barik recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 8.12.2004 as well as the F.I.R. dated 9.10.2004 of Ashok Kumar Tarai, the husband of Harapriya Barik, are totally false. He cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the State through the Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi3, wherein it has been held that the burden rests on the State in an application for cancellation of bail to prove preponderance of probability that the accused is attempting to tamper or has tampered with witnesses and submitted that mere allegation made by the petitioner in the petition for cancellation of bail or mere allegation made in the F.I.R. filed by Harapriya Barik or in her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. is not enough for the Court to cancel the bail. Mr. S.K. Padhi, learned counsel appearing for the CBI, submitted that for ensuring a fair trial the Court has powers to cancel a bail granted in favour of the accused. 5. The language used in Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. makes it abundantly clear that every person released on bail under Section 167(2) shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purpose of that Chapter. 5. The language used in Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. makes it abundantly clear that every person released on bail under Section 167(2) shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purpose of that Chapter. Therefore, while releasing an accused on bail, the Court may impose conditions in exercise of powers under Section 437(3) of the Cr.P.C. But merely because the learned Special C.J.M., CBI has not imposed any such conditions while granting bail, the grant of bail cannot be considered as a totally illegal or arbitrary exercise of judicial discretion warranting can-cellation of the bail granted more than three years back. 6. In Sri Pitambar Swain v. Ainthu alias Ashok Kumar Sahu and another (supra), there were materials before the Additional Sessions Judge to show the involvement of the accused in that case in the unusual death of his wife and yet the Additional Sessions Judge granted bail to the accused and on these facts the Court held that the learned Additional Sessions Judge committed a serious impropriety and illegality in granting bail to the accused persons by order dated 30.4.1988 and also thereby hampered the investigation and accordingly cancelled the bail on 9.9.1988. But in the present case, the facts are entirely different. The bail has been granted more than three years back on 16.7.2001 and at this stage, it will not be proper for this Court to cancel such a bail granted more than three years back on the ground that no conditions were imposed in the bail order though this Court can now impose some conditions to ensure fair trial of the case. 7. In the State through the Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi (supra), the Supreme Court has indicated the circumstances in which the Court would exercise jurisdiction under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. to cancel a bail granted to an accused person. Paragraph 24 of the said judgment as reported in the A.I.R. is quoted herein below : “24. Section 439 (2) of the Criminal P. C. confers jurisdiction on the High Court to Court of Sessions to direct that any person who has been released on bail under Chap. XXXIII be arrested and committed to custody. The power to take back in custody of an accused who has been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection. XXXIII be arrested and committed to custody. The power to take back in custody of an accused who has been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care and circumspection. But the power, though of an extra-ordinary nature, is meant to be exercised in appropriate cases when, by a preponderance of probabilities, it is clear that the accused is interfering with the course of justice by tampering with witnesses. Refusal to exercise that wholesome power in such cases, few though they may be, will reduce it to a dead letter and will suffer the Courts to be silent spectators to the subversion of the judicial process. We might as well wind up the Courts and bolt their doors against all than permit a few to ensure that justice shall not be done.” It will be clear from the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court that the power to take back in custody an accused who has been enlarged oh bail has to be exercised with great care and cir-cumspection and is meant to be exercised in appropriate cases when, by a preponderance- of probabilities, it is clear that the accused is interfering with the course of justice by tampering with witnesses. In this case, though some allegations have been made in the petition alleging that Srimati Prabasini Kar is tampering with witnesses, those allegations have not been substantiated by material particulars giving specific instances as to how Srimati Prabasini Kar has been tampering with witnesses and the dates on which the witnesses were tampered. After a long gap of about three years, First Information Reports dated 9.10.2004 of Sri Ashok Kumar Tarai and dated 30.10.2004 of Harapriya Barik have been lodged and the statement of Harapriya Barik has been recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. on 8.10.2004 for the purpose of showing that attempts are being made to tamper with the witnesses. After considering all materials before us and after applying the test of prepon-derance of probabilities, we are unable to hold that Srimati Prabasini Kar is actually tampering with the witnesses in this case. 8. After considering all materials before us and after applying the test of prepon-derance of probabilities, we are unable to hold that Srimati Prabasini Kar is actually tampering with the witnesses in this case. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to cancel the bail granted in favour of Srimati Prabasini Kar by order dated 16.7.2001 passed by the Special C.J.M., CBI, Bhubaneswar in S.P.E. No.3 of 2000, but we direct that Srimati Prabasini Kar will continue on bail subject to the conditions that she will not enter into Balasore Town (where Harapriya Barik is living) till the trial is over, except for the purpose of transit to other places after giving prior intimation to the Superintendent of Police, Balasore and that she will also not tamper with any of the witnesses in this case and the CBI, the local police and the witnesses may bring to the notice of the trial Court any case of tampering by Srimati Prabasini Kar and the trial Court will then consider the question of cancellation of bail of Srimati Prabasini Kar on the basis of all materials placed before it. 9. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the Criminal Misc. Case stands disposed of. Lower Court records be sent back immediately. M.M. Das, J.—  I agree. Petition dismissed. 1. 66 (1988) CLT 820. 2. 54(1982) CLT 229.