JUDGEMENT Surjit Singh, J: The respondent is a corporate body, wholly controlled and owned by the Government of India. The petitioners are the citizens of India. They were employed by the respondent as Peon-cum-Messengers, initially on ad hoc-cum-contract basis. Petitioner No.1 was so employed in the year 1989, while petitioner No.2 was appointed in the year 1988. They were paid certain amounts of money by way of consolidated salary. Later on a decision was taken by the Management Board of the respondent to fill up 52 vacancies, including some posts of Peons-cum-Messengers, on regular basis. The two writ petitioners, applied for appointment of regular basis. They were interviewed and were recommended for appointment and appointment letters were accordingly issued to them in April, 1991. The appointment letters are Annexures P-4 and P-4/A. As per these appointment letters, the writ petitioners were appointed, in regular pay scale of Rs.1100-20-1400 plus allowances. They were ordered to remain on probation for a period of six months each, which was extendable for a further period of six months. However, the petitioners were to be presumed to be on extended period of probation, until written orders of confirmation were issued. Increments were not to be released pending confirmation. 2. In spite of having been appointed in regular pay scale and on regular basis, in accordance with the rules pertaining to recruitment and promotions, formulated by the respondent, vide appointment orders Annexures P-4 and P-4/A, the writ petitioners were not paid pay and allowances based on regular pay scale. Both of them were paid a consolidated salary of Rs.1500/- each. They filed a writ petition being CWP No. 133 of 1988, on 8.2.1998 in this Court, seeking the issuance of direction to the respondent to pay salary and allowances according to regular pay scales. During the pendency of the writ petition, on being approached by some of the other 52 candidates, selected along-with the writ petitioners and situated similarly as the writ petitioners, High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, Punjab & Haryana High Court and Delhi High Court delivered some judgments. The Punjab & Haryana High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur gave verdicts in favour of the persons, similarly situated as the writ petitioners, while the High Court of Delhi gave a verdict favourable to the respondent. 3. The Punjab & Haryana High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur gave verdicts in favour of the persons, similarly situated as the writ petitioners, while the High Court of Delhi gave a verdict favourable to the respondent. 3. When the earlier writ petition No. 133 of 1998 came up for hearing on 18.9.2003 in this Court, the writ petitioners were allowed to withdraw the same with liberty reserved to them to file a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action, after examining the judgments of the aforesaid High Courts. But to their dismay, the respondent, soon after the withdrawal of the writ petition, terminated their services. The orders of the termination, inter alia stated that reasons for termination, which are as follows- "I) Petitioners appointment was illegal & void due to misusing the official capacity by the concerned NFL officials who violated the recruitment rules by not issuing a notice to the Employment Exchange, by not issuing a press advertisement, no step was taken to reserve any post for ST/SC/Ex-serviceman/Handicapped persons and while there was ban on recruitment. ii) The decision to terminate petitioners service was taken after reviewing the matter in its entirety. iii) Petitioners would be entitled to the payment of gratuity. iv) Petitioners are not entitled for the payment of retrenchment compensation under ID Act, 1947, yet compensation u/s 25 F of the said Act be paid to them as an abundant caution." 4. With the aforesaid averments, the petitioners have now approached this Court for quashing the orders of their termination and also for issuance of a direction to the respondent to pay them the salary in the regular pay scale from the dates of their joining the service, pursuant to the appointment letters Annexure P-4 and P-4/A. 5. The action of termination of their services is alleged by the petitioners to be illegal, contrary to recruitment rules and arbitrary and hence liable to be quashed. The action of the respondent in not paying the salary in the regular pay scale and not releasing the increments, is also alleged to be arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the recruitment rules, in terms of which the appointment letters Annexure P-4 and P-4/A, have been issued to the writ petitioners. 6. Respondent has contested the claim. The action of the respondent in not paying the salary in the regular pay scale and not releasing the increments, is also alleged to be arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the recruitment rules, in terms of which the appointment letters Annexure P-4 and P-4/A, have been issued to the writ petitioners. 6. Respondent has contested the claim. It has not denied that initially the petitioners were appointed on ad hoc/ daily wage basis in the year 1988 and 1989. The contention of the respondent is that the appointments of the two petitioners, through letters Annexures P-4 and P-4/A. were illegal and contrary to the rules of recruitment, inasmuch as there was ban on recruitment at the relevant time, the vacancies were never advertised, no reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes candidates was made and the two officers of the respondent, namely D.S. Kanwar (the then General Manager) and R.K. Khanna (the then Deputy Manager) unauthorisedly and in contravention of the recruitment rules, made the appointments. It is alleged that the copies of the appointment orders were not sent to the Finance & Accounts Wing of the respondent and the said Wing never authorized payment of any salary in the regular pay scale to the" petitioners. It is alleged that the copies of the appointment letters were purposely not sent to the said Wing, because if such copies were sent, illegality committed by the aforesaid two officers would have come to light and the services of the petitioners would have been terminated immediately. Also, it is alleged that the petitioners kept on getting the consolidated salary of Rs.1500/- upto the year 1988, when they filed the earlier writ petition and laid claim for payment of salary in the regular pay scale. By then said D.S. Kanwar, General Manager and R.K. Khanna, Dy. Manager had ceased to be in the service of the respondent. 7. It is also alleged that the dispute, raised by the petitioners, is an industrial dispute, pure and simple and hence an alternative and for more efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners and, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. Also, it is alleged that the respondent has not committed breach of any statutory duty and for this reason also the writ petition is not maintainable. Plea of delay and latches has also been taken. Also, it is alleged that the respondent has not committed breach of any statutory duty and for this reason also the writ petition is not maintainable. Plea of delay and latches has also been taken. Further, it is alleged that the earlier writ petition was with respect to the claim for salary, based on regular pay scale, but in the present writ petition a new claim, viz, quashing of orders of termination, has been included and thus the petitioners have introduced a new cause of action and, therefore, they cannot take benefit of the order of this Court, granting liberty to the petitioners to file a fresh petition, on the same cause of action. 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the record. 9. Admitted facts are that the petitioners were initially appointed as ad hoc/ daily waged Peons-cum-Messengers by the respondent in the years. 1988 and 1989. The fact is categorically stated in the writ petition and not denied even generally by the respondent. It is also the admitted case that in April, 1991 letters, appointing the petitioners in the regular pay scale on probation, were issued. The dispute is that these letters were issued illegally to two officers of the respondent by misusing their position and the appointments were bad because:- (a) No requisitions were sent to the Employment Exchanges nor was any advertisement sent to the press; (b) No. reservation was made for Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes, Ex-serviceman, Handicapped persons etc. (c) One of the petitioners was 32 years of age when the appointment letter was issued, through the maximum age limit was 30 years at the relevant time as per rules, and (d) There was a ban on recruitment and hence the appointments could not have been made. 10. We proceed to take up the aforesaid grounds on which the appointments are alleged to be illegal, one by one. Ground (a) 11. Copy of the alleged Recruitment Rules been placed on record, which is Annexure R-2. Rule 1.5 pertaining to sources of recruitment says, vide clause (f), that recruitment by transfer, selection and or promotion from amongst the existing employees of the Company shall also be a source of recruitment. Ground (a) 11. Copy of the alleged Recruitment Rules been placed on record, which is Annexure R-2. Rule 1.5 pertaining to sources of recruitment says, vide clause (f), that recruitment by transfer, selection and or promotion from amongst the existing employees of the Company shall also be a source of recruitment. The petitioners, as already stated, were admittedly working as Peons-cum-Messengers on ad hoc basis with the respondent and, therefore, they could have been selected and recruited on regular basis, under clause (f) of Rule 1.5. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were duly interviewed and selected. Therefore, it cannot be said that their recruitment was not in accordance with the Recruitment Rules, because no requisition was sent to the Employment Exchange or no advertisement was got published in any newspaper etc. Ground (b) 12. The ground is too vague to be taken note of. It is not explained as to how many posts of Peons-cum-Messengers were filled up, when the two writ petitioners were appointed, vide letters Annexures P-4 and P-4/A and how many of them were required to be reserved for the categories of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Ex-serviceman etc. and it is also not stated that no person from the reserved categories was recruited Ground (C) 13. It is admitted case of the parties that before being appointed, vide letter Annexures P-4 and P-4/A, the two petitioners had been appointed on ad hoc basis in the years 1988 and 1989. Their recruitment was made by way of selection from amongst the working employees, in accordance with clause (f) of Rule 1.5 as already noticed. Therefore, the condition of age, as contained in Rule 18.1 of Annexure R.2, was not applicable, because the Rule itself says that the age limit is applicable only in case of direct recruitment. More-over, no material has been placed on record in support of the allegation that the maximum age limit was 30 years. Rule 18.1 says that the maximum age limit will be such as prescribed in Appendix-B. Appendix-B to the Rules has not been placed on record and no reason for withholding the same has been put forward. In any case, the petitioners were to get the benefit of the period, they had already served under the respondent, in the matter of calculation of their age. In any case, the petitioners were to get the benefit of the period, they had already served under the respondent, in the matter of calculation of their age. It is alleged that petitioner Santosh Kumar was 32 years of age when the appointment letter was issued. He had already been working with the respondent for about three years, when the appointment letter was issued. Now, if three years period is excluded from his age, at the time of issuance of the appointment letter, which is alleged to be 32 years, he cannot be said to be over-age and hence ineligible on this count. Ground (D) 14. The respondent has taken the plea that vide decision dated 19.4.1989, copy Annexure R.1 a complete ban had been imposed on recruitment, in the Marketing Division in any category of posts. Admittedly, the petitioners were recruited in the Marketing Divisions, vide letters Annexures P-4 and P-4/A. A reading of Annexure R-1 shows that though a ban has been imposed on recruitment in the Marketing Division, yet due to exigencies of work, recruitment could be made with the approval of D (F) /MD. In the present case, the recruitment was made, after obtaining approval from GM (M) / M.D., as is made out from Annexure P-3, a confidential writing, dated March, 4, 1991. 15. Learned counsel, representing the respondent, submitted that there was no vacant post against which the petitioners or similarly situated persons, could have been appointed. There is no material in support of this contention of the respondent. In the order of termination of the services of the petitioners also, which a Annexures P-17 and P-17/A, there is no mention that there were not vacant posts against which the petitioners could have been appointed, though a number of other grounds for treating their appointments as illegal and void, as noticed here-in-above, have been mentioned. 16. As a result of the above stated position, the plea of the respondent that the appointments of the petitioners were contrary to and in violation of the recruitment rules and hence illegal and void, cannot be accepted. 17. Plea of the respondent that the appointments were made in a clandestine since manner and that the copies of the appointment letters were not sent to the Finance & Accounts Wing of the respondent, can also not be accepted. 17. Plea of the respondent that the appointments were made in a clandestine since manner and that the copies of the appointment letters were not sent to the Finance & Accounts Wing of the respondent, can also not be accepted. The appointment letters purport to have been endorsed to the Deputy Manager (Finance & Accounts). No affidavit of Deputy Manager (Finance & Accounts) and for that matter of any other employee of the respondent, working in that Wing, has been filed in support of the plea that the copies of the appointment letters were not sent to the their Wing. Not only this, there is a communication dated 6.6.1991, copy Annexure P-7, written by one Sham Sunder, Assistant Area Manager to R.K. Khanna, Dy. Manager (P&IR), with copies endorsed to Deputy Manager (Finance & Accounts) as also the petitioners that on account of non-issue of employee numbers, salary was not being disbursed to the petitioners and that such numbers be issued at the earliest. Now, when a copy of this letter was sent to the Finance & Accounts Wing by the Area Manager Shri Sham Sunder, who is not alleged to be in league with said Shri R.K. Khanna or Shri D.S. Kanwar, who allegedly made the appointments unauthorised and in violation of the recruitment rules, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to say, twelve years after issuance of the letters of appointment that the copies of such appointment letters were not sent to the Finance & Accounts Wing, to keep the alleged unauthorized appointments a secret. 18. The above stated position apart, neither it is alleged nor is there any material on record, suggesting that the writ petitioners were party to their alleged unauthorized appointments by Shri D.S. Kanwar and Shri R.K. Khanna, two officers of the respondent. Now, if some employees / officers of the respondent had made appointments unauthorizedly, as alleged by the respondent, though the material on record, as already noticed, does not support such an allegation, the petitioners, who played no role in their alleged unauthorized appointments, cannot be shunted out, after a long period of twelve years. 19. Now, if some employees / officers of the respondent had made appointments unauthorizedly, as alleged by the respondent, though the material on record, as already noticed, does not support such an allegation, the petitioners, who played no role in their alleged unauthorized appointments, cannot be shunted out, after a long period of twelve years. 19. It may be out of place to notice some judgments delivered by different Courts in the matters taken to such Courts by some of the other 52 employees, who were recruited along-with the writ petitioners, allegedly, in an unauthorized manner (by the above-named two officers) and in violation of the recruitment rules. One Kulbhushan Singh, who too and in violation of the recruitment rules. One Kulbhushan Singh, who too had been recruited as Peon-cum-Messenger, filed a suit in a Civil Court of Jagadhri, seeking mandatory injunction to the respondent and some of its officers to confirm him and to release the full salary, including increments, DA. House Rent Allowance etc. That suit was decreed, vide judgment, copy Annexure P-11, and the appellate Court confirmed that decree, vide judgment copy Annexure P-11/A. Second appeal filed by the respondent, was dismissed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court, vide judgment copy Annexure P-11/B, and the S.L.P. filed by the respondents was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court, vide order dated 20.2.2001, copy Annexure P-11/C. 20. One Balwinder Singh, recruited as a Junior Steno-Clerk, also filed a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Sirsa, seeking declaration that he was a regular employee and mandatory injunction, directing the respondent and some of the employee to give him all the benefits, available to a regular employees. That suit was also decreed, vide judgment dated 12.12.2000, copy Annexure P-12. 21. One Rajesh Kumar Bhardwaj, recruited as Junior Field Assistant, approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court Indore Bench, by filing a writ petition in the year 1995, seeking issuance of the a writ of mandamus to the respondent to pay the salary in the pay scale, along-with all allowances, instead of a consolidated amount of Rs.1800/- That writ petition was allowed, vide judgment dated 12.9.1996, copy Annexure P-9, and S.L.P. filed against the said judgment, was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court, vide order Annexure P-9/A. 22. Yet another person, named Somvir Singh, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature Jabalpur, seeking payment of salary in the pay scale, together with allowances in terms of the letter of appointment, because he too was being paid certain consolidated amount of money. That petition was also allowed vide judgment dated 22.2.2002, copy Annexure P-14. On the S.L.P. filed by the respondent, notice has been issued and interim order of stay passed. 23. In all the aforesaid cases, the appointments have been held to be valid and the contention of the respondent that the same are illegal or unauthorized or have been made in a clandestine manner, has been turned down. 24. Some of the similarly situated persons, numbering eleven, filed a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, seeking similar relief as the persons in the aforesaid cases. The respondent in that case also took the plea that the appointments were illegal and void. The Delhi High Court has up-held the plea. It did not follow the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court and some decision of the Rajasthan High Court and the decree passed by the Civil Court, with the observation that they did not create a binding precedent. The Delhi High Court noticed the decision regarding ban on recruitment, copy Annexure R-1, and held that in view of this decision of ban, no appointment could have been made. It appears from a reading of the judgment that the confidential note dated March 4, 1991, copy Annexure P-3, had not been brought to the notice of the Court. A already noticed, ban order dated 19.4.1989, Annexure R-1, though impose complete ban on recruitment, at the same time it says that if some recruitments are to be made due to exigencies of work, the same can be made with the prior approval of D(F)MD. The recruitment were made, after obtaining prior approval of M.D. and G.M. (M), vide note Annexure P-3. The note clearly records that (02 vacancies were there in the Marketing Division due to which great difficulty was being experienced in running the affairs of that Division and so a decision was taken to fill up 52 vacancies by appointing the candidates, whose applications were pending, after holding interview and satisfying that they possessed the requisite qualifications, experience etc. The note clearly records that (02 vacancies were there in the Marketing Division due to which great difficulty was being experienced in running the affairs of that Division and so a decision was taken to fill up 52 vacancies by appointing the candidates, whose applications were pending, after holding interview and satisfying that they possessed the requisite qualifications, experience etc. Now, when this note Annexure P-3 had not been brought to the notice of the High Court, the decision of that Court cannot be of any help to the respondent. 25. When there are decisions by several Courts, some of which have even attained finality, holding that the appointments of some of the 52 persons, appointed along-with the writ petitioners, were lawfully and valid, the propriety demands that this Court should also give the verdict in favour of the petitioners, to avoid conflicting decisions, on questions of facts, in respect of the similarly situated persons. 26. Learned counsel for the respondent stated that only remedy available to the petitioners was to have approached the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, inasmcuh as the dispute, raised by him, is an industrial dispute. In our considered view, the allegation made by the respondent that the appointments of the writ petitioners were illegal and void, negatives the contention that the dispute raised by the writ petitioners is an industrial dispute. If the appointments of the petitioners were illegal and void, as alleged by the respondent, how can it (respondent) be heard to say that the dispute is between a workman and an employer, pertaining to the retrenchment of the workman or the non-payment of full salary of the workman and hence required to be determined by the Industrial Tribunal. 27. The aforesaid position apart, there is a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees Association Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange vs. Union of India and another, (1997) 6 SCC 723), wherein it has been held as follows, vide para 11; "11. It is, therefore, clear that there have been two streams of thinking simultaneously in the process of development to give protection to the employees of the Corporation. Its actions are contradicted as an instrumentality of the State and the rules are made amenable to judicial review. Where there exits no statutory or analogous rules/instructions, the provisions of the Act get attracted. Its actions are contradicted as an instrumentality of the State and the rules are made amenable to judicial review. Where there exits no statutory or analogous rules/instructions, the provisions of the Act get attracted. The employees are entitled to avail of constitutional remedy under Article 226 or 32 or 136, as the case may be. The remedy of judicial review to every citizen or every person has expressly been provided in the Constitution. It is a fundamental right of every citizen. In the absence of statutory/administrative instruction in operation, the remedy of reference under Section 10 of the Act is available. Therefore, two streams, namely, remedy under the Act by way of reference and remedy of judicial redressed by way of proceedings under Article 226 or a petition filed before the Administrative Tribunal to the aggrieved persons, are coexisting. If the doctrine laid in Bangalore Water Supply Board case [(1978(2) SCC 213] is strictly applied, the consequence is catastrophic and would give a carte blanche power with laissez faire legitimacy which was buried fathoms deep under the lethal blow of Article 14 of the Constitution which assures to every person just, .air and reasonable procedure before terminating the services of an employee. Instead, it gives the management/employer the power to dismiss the employee/workman with the one months notice or pay in lieu thereof, and / or payment of retrenchment compensation under the Act. The security of tenure would be in great jeopardy. The employee would be at the beck and call of the employer, always keeping his order of employment in a grave uncertainty and in a fluid like Damocles sword hanging over the neck. On the other hand, if the interpretation of providing efficacious remedy under Article 226 gives protection to the workman / employee the speedy remedy under Article 226/ Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. They would protect the employee/ workman from arbitrary action of the employer subserving the constitutional scheme and philosophy. The Court would, therefore, strike a balance between the competing rights of the individual and the State / agency or instrumentality and decide the validity of action taken by the management. Necessarily, if the service conditions stand attracted, all the conditions laid therein would become applicable to the employees with a fixity of tenure and guarantee of service, subject to disciplinary action. Necessarily, if the service conditions stand attracted, all the conditions laid therein would become applicable to the employees with a fixity of tenure and guarantee of service, subject to disciplinary action. His removal should be in accordance with the just and fair procedure envisaged under the rules or application of the principles of natural justice, as the case may be, in which even the security of tenure of the employee is assured and the whim and fancy and vagary of the employer would be deterred and if unfair and unjust action is found established it would be declared as an arbitrary, unjust or unfair procedure. On the other hand, if the finding is that there exist no statutory rules or certified standing orders exist or they are not either made or are inapplicable, the remedy of reference under Section 10 of the Act would always be available and availed of as it is an industry and the indicia laid in Bangalore Water Supply Board case [(1978) 2 SCC 213] gets attracted." 28. In the present case, it is the respondents own case that there are recruitment rules and that the appointment had been made in violation of those rules. Now, if recruitment rules are there and also rules pertaining to disciplinary action are there, because in the rules, copy Annexure R-2, there, is a mention of such rules, and the petitioners as per their letter of appointments, Annexure P-4 and P-4/A, have been appointed in accordance with the rules, the dispute raised by the respondent cannot be said to be an industrial dispute, in view of the above quoted declaration of law by the Hon is Supreme Court. 29. Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the dispute is an industrial dispute and the Industrial Tribunal has the jurisdiction to resolve the same, that would not by itself take away the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Learned counsel for the respondent did not agree to this view, when a query was put to him by the Court, during the course of hearing of the matter. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others vs. Zakir Hussain (2005) 7 SCC 447] he urged that the Industrial Tribunal alone had the jurisdiction in the matter. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others vs. Zakir Hussain (2005) 7 SCC 447] he urged that the Industrial Tribunal alone had the jurisdiction in the matter. The Honble Supreme Court has held in the aforesaid judgment, vide paras 22 and 23, that the respondent, who had been appointed as a Conductor, purely on ad hoc basis, for a period of two years and his appointment was governed by the Standing Orders of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Workshop Employees and the terms of his appointment, the only remedy available to him (the respondent) was by way of reference under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. In that case, the respondent had filed a suit under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a Civil Court and it was in that context that the Honble Supreme Court held that the only remedy, available to the respondent, was by way of reference, under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 30. In this case the petitioners have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. A question, whether there is any restriction or limitation in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in a matter where the dispute is cognizable by the Industrial Tribunal, came up for consideration before the Honble Supreme Court in U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. and other vs. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Smgh, [(2004) 4 SCC 268). The Honble Supreme Court, after noticing a portion of its judgment in Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke, [(1976) 1 SCC 496, per which Civil Court jurisdiction, in respect of an Industrial dispute is barred, observed as follows, vide para 12; "12. Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain the proceedings relating to an Industrial Disputes and may not be read as a limitation on the Courts powers under Article 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong case indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statue, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner." 31. We are of the considered view that this is a very strong case, for deviating from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy, can avail of the process as provided in that statue and in no other manner, within the meaning of law declared by that Honble Supreme Court in para 12 of the U.P. State Bridge Corporations case (supra). Why do we hold so? The petitioners were initially appointed as ad hoc/ daily waged Peons. In the year 1991 they were appointed on regular basis in regular pay scale. However they were not paid pay and allowances according to regular pay scales, but only consolidated amount of Rs.1500/- per month paid to each of them. The poor petitioners continued to get the aforesaid consolidated amount of money till the year 1998, when the benefit of pay revision, on the basis of 5th Pay Commission Report, was implemented with retrospective effect, i.e. 1 1.1996. It is a matter of common knowledge that there had been substantial increase in the salary of the employees working in Central Government Offices and public sector undertakings, owned and controlled by the Central Government. The respondent is also a Company, owned and controlled by the Central Government, and, therefore, it can legitimately be presumed that the employees of the respondent also got the benefit of the aforesaid pay revision. But the petitioners were not given any benefit even after such pay revision. This appears to have resulted in a strong feeling of injustice and discrimination, besides severe heart burning. Therefore, the petitioners approached this Court seeking payment of salary in accordance with the terms and conditions of their appointment letters. 32. The petitioners stood definitely discriminated in the matter of payment of salary. The deprivation of pay to them in terms of their appointment letters also meant violation of their right of equal pay for equal work. Besides, non-payment of full wages to them amounted to depriving them of their livelihood, though partially. 32. The petitioners stood definitely discriminated in the matter of payment of salary. The deprivation of pay to them in terms of their appointment letters also meant violation of their right of equal pay for equal work. Besides, non-payment of full wages to them amounted to depriving them of their livelihood, though partially. These facts and circumstances, in our considered view, make out a very strong case to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person, who insists upon such remedy, can avail of such process as provided in that statute and in no other manner, meaning thereby that this is a fit case for this Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 33. In the same case, i.e U.P. State Bridges case (supra), in para 17 the Honble Supreme Court has held as follows; "17.........Doubtless the issue of alternative remedy should be raised and decided at the earliest opportunity so that a litigant is not prejudiced by the action of the Court since the objection is one in the nature of a demurrer. Nevertheless even when there has been such a delay where the issue raised requires the resolution of factual controversies, the High Court should not, even when there is a delay, short-circuit the process for effectively determining the facts........." 34. In the present case the writ petitioners were appointed in regular pay scale in the year 1991. No question of facts requiring inquiry are involved. The writ petitioners approached this Court by way of writ petition in the year 1998, seeking that they be paid salary and allowance, as per the terms and conditions of their appointment letters and the rules. They felt the need after so long a time, because in the year 1996 pay structure of all the Government servants and the servants of public sector undertakings were revised and substantial increase in the wages / pay scales took place. The matter remained pending in this Court till 2003, when the petitioners withdrew the writ petition with liberty to file a fresh writ petition on the same cause of action, because by then decisions of some Courts, with respect to the same controversy, raised by some other similarly situated employees, came to be rendered and the petitioners wanted to modify their writ petition in accordance with such decisions. The respondent, within a few days of the withdrawal of the said writ petition, terminated their services, vide Annexures P-17 and P-17/A These orders are dated 24.9.2003. Immediately thereafter, i.e. in October, 2003, the petitioners again approached this Court by filing the present writ petition. The present writ petition can legitimately be assumed to be the continuation of the earlier writ petition of the year Iy98 for the limited purpose of seeing whether the petitioners have beer, prejudiced by the delay on the part of the Court in not deciding the question, raised by the respondent that the petitioners should have approached the Industrial Tribunal and the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked, in the light of the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in U.P. State Bridge Corporations case (supra), as reproduced here-in-above. For seven years the matter can be said to have been pending in this Court, if the pendency of the earlier writ petition, which was allowed to be withdrawn, with liberty reserved to the petitioners, to file a fresh one on the same cause of action, is also taken into account. This seven years period can definitely be said to have prejudiced the writ petitioners. 35. In Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and others [(2003) 2 SCC 107), the Honble Supreme Court held as follows, vide para 7: "7. So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of the compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (I) where the writ petition weeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice: (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool Corpn. V. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 Contingencies. (See Whirlpool Corpn. V. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 Contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the petitioners dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, we feel that the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need to initiating arbitration proceedings." 36. The facts of the case were that the appellant had been appointed as a dealer in petroleum products by the respondents. There was an agreement in writing, which provided for the settlement of disputes by arbitration. Appellants dealership had been cancelled. He approached the High Court, without resorting to the arbitration clause. High Court dismissed the writ petition observing that the remedy available to the appellant was to seek arbitration of the dispute. The Honble Supreme Court accepted the appeal holding that when the dealership of the appellant, which was his bread and butter, came to be terminated, for an irrelevant and non-existent cause, the High Court itself should have granted the relief instead of driving him to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings. 37. As a sequal to the above discussion, we allow this writ petition, quash the orders dated 24 9.2003, copies Annexures P-17 and P-17/A, terminating the services of the petitioners and also direct the respondent: (a) To treat the petitioners as continuing in service. (b) To treat them as regular appointees to the posts of Peons-cum-Messengers in terms of appointment letters Annexures P-4 and P-4/A, and to pay them salary and the allowances in accordance with the regular pay scales, including the revised pay scales, right from the date of issuance of the aforesaid appointment letters, and (c) To give them the benefit of increments right from the year 1991, after confirming them in the aforesaid posts, if they are otherwise eligible for confirmation. 38. 38. We also direct the respondent to pay the arrears of salary and allowances, in accordance with the aforesaid directions, within a period of two months, failing which interest at the rate of 9% per annum shall also be payable to the petitioners and the interest would be calculated from the date when the salary and allowances became due to the petitioners every month, in accordance with the terms of their letters of appointment Annexures P-4 and P-4/A. We also direct the respondent to pay Rs.5,000/- to each of the petitioners by way of costs. 39. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.