ORDER This petition is directed against the judgment dated 11-4-2000 passed by the XXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for CBI Cases, Bangalore, in Special Case No. 100 of 1997, whereby the Special Judge discharged the respondent-accused for offence punishable under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 8, 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. The brief facts leading to this case are that during 1994 the complainant was working as a casual worker in P and T Department, R.M.S., Bangalore. On 10-5-1994 he lodged a complaint against the respondent-accused on the allegation that he had induced him to pay a sum of Rs. 8,000/- for getting a permanent job in the department. Accordingly, he was sent with an interview letter and was interviewed on 28-5-1993. The said sum was paid by the complainant prior to getting the interview letter. But after the interview neither the complainant has not got any appointment order nor the respondent-accused returned the money with interest as agreed to by him. Inspite of repeated requests and demand respondent failed to pay the same. 3. Ex. P. 2, the complaint dated 10-5-1994, was lodged by the another complainant on the allegations that the respondent cheated him and also played fraud and he promised to secure an appointment in P and T Department and directed him to pay the amount through one Xavier of S.D. Sorting Canteen, Race course. Accordingly he paid the amount but the respondent failed to fulfill the assurance of getting an appointment. When asked regarding the appointment and return of the amount finally the respondent threatened the complainant. 4. The complaint, Ex. P. 7, alleges that during the period from 5-111992 to 29-9-1993 respondent was working as Assistant Superintendent in Bangalore, T.D. Sorting Division, and during 30-9-1993 to 20-2-1995 he was working in Bangalore City RMS. While functioning as Assistant Superintendent, RMS, during May 1993 and March 1994 the accused accepted Rs. 2,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- from five persons by giving false promise to secure job for them as extra department agents in RMS, Bangalore Sorting Division and thus cheated them for the said amount. 5. The complainant in Ex. P. 11 alleged that she paid a sum of Rs. 7,000/- to the accused for securing job to her son Bodhraj. 2,000/- to Rs. 20,000/- from five persons by giving false promise to secure job for them as extra department agents in RMS, Bangalore Sorting Division and thus cheated them for the said amount. 5. The complainant in Ex. P. 11 alleged that she paid a sum of Rs. 7,000/- to the accused for securing job to her son Bodhraj. But the respondent-accused has not secured the job for her son or returned the amount received from the complainant. 6. On the basis of the complaint Ex. P. 7-CBI registered a case in their police station in Crime No. RC.19(A)/96 against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 420 of the !PC and Sections 7, 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After investigation the charge-sheet has been filed before the Special Judge, Bangalore. After appearance and after hearing both parties the learned Special Judge framed the charge against the respondent accused for the aforesaid offence. The respondent-accused denied charges and claimed to be tried. Therefore in order to prove the charges levelled against the respondent-accused the prosecution in all examined 14 witnesses and got marked 31 documents and Exhibited D. 1 and D. 2. But after hearing final arguments of both parties the learned Special Judge framed two points as under: (i) Whether the prosecution proves that the order of sanction Ex. P. 31 to prosecute the respondent-accused has been issued by the Competent Authority and it is in accordance with the requirements of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? (ii) Whether the prosecution proves beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offences punishable under Section 420 of the IPC and under Section 13(1)(a) and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) and Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988? The learned Special Judge, after considering the evidence of P.W. 14 and Ex. P. 31 answered the Point No. (i) in the negative by holding that P.W. 14 has no jurisdiction to accord sanction to prosecute the respondent. But as far as Point No. (ii) is concerned it is observed that it does not survive for consideration therefore the petitioner has come up with this petition. 7. Heard the learned Standing Counsel for the CBI Sri Ashok Haranahalli and the learned Advocate for the respondent. 8. But as far as Point No. (ii) is concerned it is observed that it does not survive for consideration therefore the petitioner has come up with this petition. 7. Heard the learned Standing Counsel for the CBI Sri Ashok Haranahalli and the learned Advocate for the respondent. 8. During the course of the argument Sri Ashok Haranahalli contended that the offence alleged against the respondent-accused while he was working as an Assistant Superintendent in Bangalore, T.D. Sorting Division and in Bangalore RMS cheated several casual workers and others and received huge amount by giving false assurance that he will secure the permanent appointment in the P and T Department. Since he could not secure the appointment to the complainants as promised by him they filed complaint before the official superiors against the respondent. But Ex. P. 11 came to be lodge before the CBI accordingly, it was registered in R.C. No. 19(A)/96 against the respondent for the aforesaid offences and issued FIR Ex. P. 25. Therefore, the petitioner-prosecution examined the complainants and other relevant official witnesses who have deposed on oath before the Court against the respondent about the receiving of the amount by the respondent with false promise that he will secure the jobs and in case he failed to secure the jobs he will return the amount with interest therefore the aforesaid complainants inspite of requests and demands the complainant respondent failed to repay the amount. Hence the CBI has rightly placed sufficient legal evidence on record to prove that respondent has dishonestly induced the complainants to secure the job and cheated them. Hence, the Trial Court has totally ignored all the material evidence and discharged the respondent on the ground that P.W. 14-Smt. Shantha, Director of Postal Services for South Karnataka, who had accorded sanction to prosecute him. It is further contended that while the respondent was working at Mangalore under the jurisdiction of P.W. 14 sanction was accorded as per Ex. P. 31 by P.W. 14 therefore the finding of the Trial Court that the prosecution has failed to produce materials as on the date of according sanction the respondent was working within the jurisdiction of P.W. 14. P. 31 by P.W. 14 therefore the finding of the Trial Court that the prosecution has failed to produce materials as on the date of according sanction the respondent was working within the jurisdiction of P.W. 14. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that as on the date of the offence the respondent was working in Bangalore but as on the date of the sanction respondent was working at Mangalore therefore the Trial Court totally not considered this aspect and utterly failed in discharging the accused. It is submitted that as per the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court it is for the respondent-accused to show that at the relevant point of time he was working at Mangalore. Therefore, the impugned order under challenge is liable to be set aside and requires to be remanded to the Trial Court with a direction to the Trial Court to hear the arguments. 9. In support of his contention the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State through Anti-Corruption Bureau, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay v. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani, wherein the Supreme Court held that: "The law presumes - and the Court must also presume until the contrary is established - that such authority will act fairly and objectively and will accord sanction only where he is satisfied that the charge(s) against the public servant requires to be enquired into by a Court". In another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivendra Kumar v State of Maharashtra, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed at para 11 that: "" The prosecution is not intended to be an absolute and unqualified immunity against criminal prosecution. In a case where it is seen that a sanction order has been passed by an authority who is competent under the law to represent the State Government, the burden is heavy on the party who challenges the authority of such order to show that the authority competent to pass the order of sanction is somebody else and not the officer who has passed the sanction order is question". He also relied on another decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of P. Prathapachandran and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation, Ernakulam and Others, wherein the Kerala High Court held that: "Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), Section 19(1)(c) - Sanction to prosecute - Delegation of powers by appointing authority - Competency of delegated authority to grant sanction on relevant date - Point of time relevant is time when Court is called upon to take cognizance of offence and not alleged date of commission of offence". Hence the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the order under revision is incorrect and illegal and the same is liable to be set aside and the matter to be remitted back to the Special Judge. 10. On the other hand the learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the accused has been discharged after full dressed trial. Therefore, the question of remand to the Trial Court does not arise. It is submitted that there is delay in lodging the complaint. Therefore sanction accorded by P.W. 14 is without any jurisdiction and the Trial Court has rightly discharged the accused by disbelieving the evidence of P.W. 14. In support of his contention he has relied on three decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court in (1) Mulla K.B. v. State of Karnataka; (2) Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh and (3) Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, and prayed for dismissal of the revision petition. 11. Having heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for both parties the point that arises for consideration and decision is whether the order of discharge of the accused is illegal and incorrect, if so whether it calls for interference? 12. It is undisputed that during 1993-94 respondent herein was working as Assistant Superintendent, S.D. Sorting, Bangalore City R.M.S. He is stated to have collected amounts from various persons by assuring that he would get permanent jobs and thereby he cheated those persons. Ultimately a case came to be registered on the basis of the complaint. It is seen that as on the date of the order of sanction, Ex. P. 31, issued by P.W. 14, respondent was working at Mangalore. This fact has not been seriously disputed by the respondent. Ultimately a case came to be registered on the basis of the complaint. It is seen that as on the date of the order of sanction, Ex. P. 31, issued by P.W. 14, respondent was working at Mangalore. This fact has not been seriously disputed by the respondent. It turn it is contended by the respondent that the prosecution has not produced any documents to show that he was working at Mangalore during 1997 when Ex. P. 31 was issued. Of course the learned Special Judge discharged the respondent only on a point that P.W. 14 was not the Competent Authority to sanction. According to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act it is for the respondent-accused to prove as on the relevant date when the order of sanction issued by P.W. 14 he was not working in Mangalore but he was working at Bangalore and he was working under the jurisdiction of P.W. 14, who was working as Director of Postal Services for South Karnataka. Of course P.W. 14 admitted in her evidence that Bangalore City R.M.S. was no under her jurisdiction but as on the date of commission of offence the respondent was working in Bangalore City R.M.S., T.D. Sorting Division but the investigating agency sought her sanction while the respondent was working at Mangalore within the jurisdiction of P.W. 14. 13. I have gone through the contents of the order Ex. P. 31 and the evidence of P.W. 14 The burden lies on the respondent-accused to show that as on the relevant date of order of sanction accorded by P.W. 14 he was not working under her. But the materials placed on record clearly indicates that the petitioner was working under P.W. 14 as on the date of according sanction for prosecution, therefore, she was Competent Authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court that P.W. 14 had no jurisdiction to accord sanction is incorrect and illegal which calls for interference. Considering the fact that the prosecution has placed sufficient materials that full dressed trial, by examining the prosecution witnesses, the Trial Court ought to have considered and answered even point No.2. But without considering the evidence placed on record through P.Ws. Considering the fact that the prosecution has placed sufficient materials that full dressed trial, by examining the prosecution witnesses, the Trial Court ought to have considered and answered even point No.2. But without considering the evidence placed on record through P.Ws. 1 to 13 on merits, simply discharged the accused without considering the fact that as on the date of according sanction the petitioner was working under P.W. 14 at Mangalore. The Trial Court ought to have answered point No. 2 also, but has failed to do so. Hence the order under challenge is liable to be set aside as incorrect and illegal. 14. According revision petition is allowed and the matter is remanded to the Trial Court with a direction to dispose of the case in accordance with law after giving opportunity to both parties. However, the observations, if any, made by this Court in this case shall not come in the way of disposing of the matter before the Trial Court on merits.