BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, J. ( 1 ) : This first miscellaneous appeal is at the instance of a plaintiff in a suit for recovery of possession on forfeiture of a lease and is directed against the Order No. 86 dated 4th September, 2004 passed by the learned Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Suit No. 1580 of 1996 thereby allowing an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the code of Civil Procedure by rejecting the plaint. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-appellant filed the aforesaid suit thereby praying for recovery of khas possession of the suit premises as described in schedule of the plaint on the basis of a registered deed of lease dated 5th March, 1985 executed by one manicklal Mullick, since deceased, as lessor and the defendant No. 1 as lessee for 99 years commencing from first day of January, 1962. According to the plaintiff, the original lessor died on 9lh June, 1968 thereby bequeathing his properties including the suit premises to his three sons namely, plaintiff and proforma defendant Nos. 2 and 3 in equal share. The said Will was duly probated and the aforesaid three persons stepped in the shoes of the original lessor and subsequently, on the offer of the heirs of the original lessor, the defendant No. 1 agreed to apportion the rent to them. ( 3 ) IN the plaint it is further alleged that the defendant No. 1 violated various conditions mentioned in the lease deed and as such, a notice under section lll (g) of the Transfer of Property Act was served at the instance of the plaintiff upon the defendant No. 1. In paragraph 10 of the plaint it is further stated that as the other two lessors, namely, proforma defendant Nos. 2 and 3 had expressed their unwillingness to join with the plaintiff in the present suit, they have been made proforma defendants. In paragraph 10 of the plaint it is further stated that as the other two lessors, namely, proforma defendant Nos. 2 and 3 had expressed their unwillingness to join with the plaintiff in the present suit, they have been made proforma defendants. ( 4 ) AFTER entering appearance in the suit, the defendant No. l filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure thereby praying for rejection of the plaint on the allegation that although the suit is based on the allegation that the lease of the property had been determined for breach of express condition, yet the plaintiff in the plaint did not refer to any notice served by the plaintiff upon the defendant No. 1 specifying particulars of the breaches complained of and requiring the defendant No. 1 to remedy the breaches notwithstanding the fact that the alleged breaches complained of are capable of being remedied. It is further alleged that the plaintiff not having stated anything about service of any such notice and actually no such notice having been given, the suit was barred by law and as such, the plaint filed by the plaintiff was liable to be rejected. ( 5 ) THE learned Trial Judge on consideration of the materials on record came to the conclusion that the plaint did not disclose a clear right to sue and that the drafting of the plaint had created an illusion of a cause of action against the defendant No. 1 and according to the learned Trial Judge, such a litigation should be nipped in the bud by following the principles laid down by the Supreme court in the decisions in the case of T. Arivandandam vs. T. V. Satyapal and anr. , reported in AIR 1977 SC 2421 . Accordingly, the learned Trial Judge rejected the plaint. ( 6 ) BEING dissatisfied, the plaintiff has come up with the present appeal, ( 7 ) MR. Banerjee, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant vehemently contended before us that while rejecting the plaint under the provision of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned trial Judge adopted a procedure not permissible in law. Mr. Banerjee, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant vehemently contended before us that while rejecting the plaint under the provision of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned trial Judge adopted a procedure not permissible in law. Mr. Banerjee contends that the learned Trial Judge while arriving at his finding that there was no cause of action for filing the suit could not take into consideration various documents which could be taken note of only at the time of hearing of the suit if those documents were admitted into evidence in accordance with law and his client was given opportunity to rebut such evidence. Mr. Banerjee, thus, prays for setting aside the order impugned. ( 8 ) THE aforesaid contention of Mr. Banerjee is seriously disputed by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant No. 1. Mr. Roy Chowdhury, however, fairly concedes that there was no necessity of looking into various documents for the purpose of rejection of the plaint. He, however, submits that even if those documents were not taken into accounts, simply on the basis of averments made in the plaint the suit was not maintainable. Mr. Roy Chowdhury points out that the plaintiff himself having admitted that there are three landlords after the demise of the original lessor and two of them were not willing to join as co-plaintiff, such fact itself is sufficient for rejection of the plaint because tenancy is one and indivisible and one of the landlords without the concurrence of the other two, could not maintain a suit for eviction on the ground of forfeiture. ( 9 ) THE learned advocate appearing on behalf of the proforma defendant Nos. 2 and 3, however, at this stage has supported the plaintiff and contended that although his clients were not willing to join the plaintiff at the time of institution of the suit, they are now prepared to support the claim of the plaintiff. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the only question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether one of the three landlords can maintain a suit for eviction of a tenant when other two landlords are not willing to join as plaintiff in a suit for eviction on the ground of forfeiture of a lease of 99 years. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the only question that falls for determination in this appeal is whether one of the three landlords can maintain a suit for eviction of a tenant when other two landlords are not willing to join as plaintiff in a suit for eviction on the ground of forfeiture of a lease of 99 years. ( 11 ) IT is now settled law that in a suit for eviction of a lessee on the ground of breach of terms of the lease, interest of 16 annas landlord must be represented. If two of the landlords were not willing to file any suit for eviction against the lessee, one of the co-sharer/landlords cannot maintain a suit for eviction on the ground of forfeiture when tenancy is one and indivisible. The moment plaintiff has admitted in the plaint that the other two brothers were not willing to join as plaintiff, it is impossible to conclude that even at the instance of one of the co-sharers-landlords, such suit is maintainable. ( 12 ) WE are quite conscious of the position of law that one of the co-sharers can maintain a suit for eviction of a rank trespassers without impleading other co-sharers as party to litigation but the reason behind such principle is that the plaintiff/co-sharer was acting for the benefit of other co-sharers against a rank trespasser and after getting possession he would hold the same as trustee for the benefit of the other co-sharers; but such principle is not applicable in case of eviction of a tenant who is in possession of the property on the basis of contractual relation with all the landlords and the other landlords than the plaintiff were not complaining violation of any of the terms of the lease and at the same time, were not willing to evict such tenant. Our aforesaid view finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of India Umbrella manufacturing Co. and Ors. vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla, reported in AIR 2004 sc 1321 where the Apex Court on consideration of all the earlier decisions of the said Court made the following observations:"having heard the learned Counsel for the parties we are satisfied that the appeals are liable to be dismissed. It is well-settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. It is well-settled that one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction of a tenant in the property generally owned by the co-owners. (See Sri Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and Ors. , 1976 (4) SCC 184 ; dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and Ors. , 2002 (6) SCO 16. This principle is based on the doctrine of agency. One co-owner filing a suit for eviction against the tenant does so on his own behalf in his own right and as an agent of the other co-owners. The consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant and the suit was flied in spite of their disagreement. In the present case, the suit was filed by both the co-owners. One of the co-owners cannot withdraw his consent midway the suit so as to prejudice the other co-owner. The suit once filed, the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the suit and the entitlement of the co-owners to seek ejectment must be adjudged by reference to the date of institution of the suit: the only exception being when by virtue of a subsequent event the entitlement of the body of co-owners to eject the tenant comes to an end by act of parties or by operation of law. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 13 ) WE therefore, find that the plaint is liable to be rejected only on the ground that the plaintiff having admitted in the plaint that the other lessors than the plaintiff refused to join as co-plaintiff in the suit, a suit for eviction of a lessee in respect of the tenanted property is not maintainable at his instance. Once at the time of filing of the suit, the other co-landlords refused to join hands with the plaintiff, they cannot now after the rejection of the plaint change their mind and pray for adding themselves as co-plaintiffs in the present appeal where we are called upon to decide whether the learned Trial Judge rightly passed the order impugned. ( 14 ) WE, thus, affirm the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial judge, although we are not approving the other reasons assigned by the said court. ( 14 ) WE, thus, affirm the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the learned Trial judge, although we are not approving the other reasons assigned by the said court. It is needless to mention that rejection of this plaint will not stand in the way of plaintiff and the proforma defendants in maintaining a fresh suit if they intend to join together and can prove cause of action against the defendant no. 1 for eviction. ( 15 ) WITH the above observation, this appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances, there will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.