BISWAS, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application by State (the appellants) for reconsideration and clarification of order dated September 10th, 2003 modifying (on an application by FCI, a respondent in the appeal as well as in the writ petition) the order dated January 8th, 2003 disposing of the mandamus appeal. ( 2 ) THE learned single judge allowed the writ petition (filed by the first respondent in the appeal in 1989) by judgement and order dated July 16th, 2001 quashing the disciplinary proceeding initiated in 1988 and directing State and fci to pay all benefits (with interest at the rale of 14% per annum) to the writ petition who was already retired in 1988 as an employer of State working on deputation in FCI. ( 3 ) BY order dated January 8th, 2003 the division bench directed State and-FCI to share the liability, on account of retiral benefits and interest payable thereon, in proportion to their respective pension liabilities. Feeling dissatisfied fci took out an application contending that since by issuing a letter dated July 26th, 2001 State had already taken responsibility for setting the writ petitioner's pension, gratuity, commutation value, etc. , the order should be reviewed to relieve it of the obligation to pay a portion of the liability. ( 4 ) ON contest, contention of FCI was accepted; the application was disposed of by the order dated September 10th, 2003. As a result, State became solely liable to pay all benefits with interest. ( 5 ) STATE now wants us to reconsider its case and clarify the order dated September 10th, 2003 for ordering that the interest liability is not to be borne by it, but by FCI. Its case is that since FCI is to be blamed for the delay in settling the writ petitioner's retiral benefits, it is unjust to ask it to pay interest running into a few lakhs. ( 6 ) IT is therefore clear that what State now wants us to do is not merely to review the order dated September 10th, 2003, but also to review and upset the order dated January 8th, 2003 finally disposing of the appeal. ( 6 ) IT is therefore clear that what State now wants us to do is not merely to review the order dated September 10th, 2003, but also to review and upset the order dated January 8th, 2003 finally disposing of the appeal. ( 7 ) TO my mind, for us, to be lenient regarding forms and procedures in such a case as this, will tantamount to encouraging abuse of process of Court at the instance of State that possesses and controls apparently a self replenishing till. If we go by the nomenclature, statements, and prayer of this application, we cannot but hold that by it State wants us to reopen an already disposed of mandamus appeal. This is simply not permissible. ( 8 ) AS was held by the apex Court in State of U. P. v. Brahm Datta sharma, AIR 1987 SC 943 , with a view to ending confusion and chaos, and bringing finality to the proceeding, a finally terminated writ proceeding is not to be reopened on a miscellaneous application filed for the purpose. I think, the proposition equally applies to the finally terminated proceeding of a mandamus appeal arising from the order finally terminating the writ proceeding. ( 9 ) WE are left to ourselves to ascertain if this is an application for review of the order dated September 10th, 2003 either. I would confess that I could not persuade myself into reading and accepting it as such. ( 10 ) BEREFT of a single ground asking for review, it sneaked in the pile of miscellaneous applications on January 21 st, 2004, and finally surfaced before us through an assignment; it, again, came unaccompanied by an application for condonation of delay though filed after thirty days; when these were must to make it an entertainable application for review of the order dated September 10 th, 2003. ( 11 ) I do not think that in view of the existing positions of law [reference may be made to chapter-x of the appellate side rules and the Division Bench decision of this Court in Sisir Kumar Bandyopadhyay v. The State of W. B. and ors. , reported at (2002)2 Cal LJ 336], these requirements for maintaining a review application should be ignored in this case. , reported at (2002)2 Cal LJ 336], these requirements for maintaining a review application should be ignored in this case. Should we, then, treat this as an application for review, to my mind, we should unhesitatingly dismiss it as not maintainable being not in from and barred by time. ( 12 ) DURING hearing Bhattacharya, J. drew the Counsel's attention to the provisions in Order 47, Rule (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. His lordship's query about maintainability of this application, seeking, in disguise, review of an order, presumably, made on review of the original order disposing of the appeal, met only with a feeble reference to Section 141 of the Code. ( 13 ) THAT we said was no answer worth consideration, since not only the underlying principle, hut even the application of the provision itself to writ proceeding is not forbidden by Section 141 of the code. We told her also about rule 53 of the writ rules of this Court, indicating the scope of application of provisions of the Code to writ proceedings according to requirement. ( 14 ) THAT the previous application leading to the order dated September 10th, 2003 was filed by FCI, and not by State, in my opinion, would also provide no immunity to this application. What Order 47, Rule (9) of the code prohibits, inter alia, is entertainment of an application for review of an order made on review; identity of party is irrelevant. ( 15 ) THE matter thus raises the question if there is reason to exercise our inherent power. Admittedly, liability on account of interest element was not imposed on State for the first time by the order dated September 10th, 2003. Had it been the case, I think, we should have thought of ignoring the defects in forms and the mandates of procedures and exercised our inherent review power, as a Court of plenary jurisdiction, for preventing miscarriage of justice, or setting right a patent error, should there be one. ( 16 ) THE uncertain liability first imposed by the learned single Judge was made certain by the Division Bench in its order dated January 8th, 2003, which remains accepted by State. Hence for mere increase in the extent of the liability, it cannot now say that FCI, since it is to be blamed for the delay, is to pay the whole of the interest amount. Hence for mere increase in the extent of the liability, it cannot now say that FCI, since it is to be blamed for the delay, is to pay the whole of the interest amount. This is thus what emerges on consideration of the present case of the State even on merits. For these reasons I am minded to dismiss this application without ordering costs against State. I order accordingly.