JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. : Whether the principle of ‘No work, No pay’ can be stretched to an employee who was made to retire form service prematurely thereby not being in a position to discharge his duties, is the moot question for consideration in this Writ application. The petitioner, an erstwhile employee of GRIDCO, Orissa, Ltd. has filed this Writ application inter alia praying for quashing the portion of the letter dated 20th March, 1999 (Annex¬ure-15) issued by the GRIDCO intimating that he would not be entitled to salary and allowances for the period form 1st June, 1997 till the date of his rejoining the service on the principle of ‘No work, No pay’. The petitioner seeks issuance of direction to GRIDCO pay his back salary for the period form 1.6.1997 to 22.3.1999 and admissible allowances with 18% interest thereon. 2. The dispute has a chequered career, inasmuch as this is the second Writ application filed by the petitioner, the earlier one being OJC No.451 of 1998 disposed of by this Court on 18th November, 1998. The opposite party-GRIDCO, it is alleged, on certain frivolous grounds ordered on 31st May, 1997 for premature retirement of the petitioner by unilaterally changing his date of birth form 26th March, 1943 to 1st June, 1939 in the service records. The real date of birth of the petitioner as per his Ma¬triculation Certificate and as would be apparent form the service records was 26th March, 1943. Being aggrieved by the said prema¬ture retirement order, the petitioner filed several representa¬tions and ran form pillar to post for justice, but all his ef¬forts ended in vain. He was therefore constrained to approach this Court. In its counter affidavit to that Writ application the GRIDCO took the stand that the date of birth of the petitioner as re¬corded in the gradation list being 1st June, 1939, the said date was taken by the authorities as the actual date of birth of the petitioner and accordingly the authorities superannuated the petitioner form service by order dated 31st March, 1999 and thus the order was just and proper. The aforesaid stand of the GRIDCO was strongly repudiated by the petitioner. 3. The aforesaid stand of the GRIDCO was strongly repudiated by the petitioner. 3. After considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and being satisfied that GRIDCO had acted illegally in unilaterally changing the date of birth of the petitioner at the fag end of his service career, this Court allowed the Writ appli¬cation and directed the Grid Corporation to reconsider the matter within four weeks form the date of receipt of the order with further direction to pass all consequential orders if required. 4. GRIDCO having adopted dilly dally tactics in complying with the aforesaid directions of this Court, the peti¬tioner was constrained to bring the said fact to the notice of this Court by filing a petition which was numbered as M.C.16718 of 1998 with a prayer to pass necessary orders to prevent further harassment to him. It appears that by order dated 19th February, 1999 passed in Misc. Case No. 16718/98 arising out of the aforesaid OJC No.451/98 this Court directed the GRIDCO to comply with the direction issued earlier in letter and spirit positively within four weeks form the date of the order, i.e. 19th February, 1999. 5. While the matter stood thus, GRIDCO by the impugned order dated 20th March, 1999 (Annexure-15) intimated the peti¬tioner that his date of birth was accepted to be 26th March, 1943 and he was directed to report before the Chief Engineer, Telecom¬munication, GRIDCO for further action. The said order stipulated the following clauses :- “(i) You shall not be entitled to claim salary and allowances for the period form 01.6.97 till the date of your joining in GRIDCO on the principle of no work no pay. (ii) The above period shall be treated as continuity in service for the purpose of the terminal benefits like pension, gratuity, etc. (iii) On joining in GRIDCO, your pay will be fixed taking into consideration the annual increments which you would have earned during the aforesaid period, and (iv) As regards your leave eligibility, the aforesaid period shall be counted for the purpose of E.L./Half Pay leave.” Being aggrieved by clause (i) as quoted above, the petition¬er has approached this Court once again. 6. 6. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, though the date of birth of the petitioner was 26th March, 1943 as would be evident form voluminous records available with the authorities, the latter illegally, in order to harass him, prema¬turely retired him taking his date of birth to be 1st June, 1939. The said unilateral decision, according to the petitioner, was unjust, illegal and mischievous with an avowed oblique motive of putting an end to the service of the petitioner. It was further submitted that in consonance with the direction of this Court, the authorities of GRIDCO examined all the documents including the Matriculation Certificate of the petitioner and his past service records and arrived at the conclusion that the real date of birth of the petitioner was 26th March, 1943. Thus the action of GRIDCO prematurely retiring the petitioner form service was contrary to law and was an act tainted with malice. It was fur¬ther submitted that the petitioner was kept out of service for the period form 1st June, 1997 till 2nd March, 1999 and, as such, he was entitled to receive his arrear salary and other financial and consequential incentives of service for the said period. Denuding the petitioner of such benefits applying the principle of ‘No work, No pay’ was unjust, illegal and contrary to law. 7. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of GRIDCO taking the stand that relying on the entry made in the gradation list the petitioner was made to retire form service bona fide. But then as the petitioner raised objection, the matter was en¬quired into and due to non-availability of his original Matricu¬lation Certificate, his correct date of birth could not be ascer¬tained. Thus there was neither any mala fide nor any malice is attributable to the opposite parties. It was further submitted that in consonance with the direction of this Court in the earli¬er Writ application, i.e. OJC No.451/98, the matter was re-en¬quired and considering all the materials on record the consequen¬tial order was passed. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the petitioner inter alia disputing the averments made in the counter-affidavit. 8. In course of hearing, Mr. Nanda, learned counsel ap¬pearing for the petitioner, strenuously took this Court through the materials available on record and the order of this Court in the earlier Writ application. The endeavour of Mr. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the petitioner inter alia disputing the averments made in the counter-affidavit. 8. In course of hearing, Mr. Nanda, learned counsel ap¬pearing for the petitioner, strenuously took this Court through the materials available on record and the order of this Court in the earlier Writ application. The endeavour of Mr. Nanda all along was to prove that GRIDCO for reasons best known to it exhibited a step-motherly attitude towards the petitioner and tried to harass him during his service career. Having not suc¬ceeded to do so, a novel way was adopted and the petitioner was unceremoniously thrown out of service by illegally superannuating him. Such action, according to Mr. Nanda, clearly reveals the mala fide of the authorities. He further submitted that the date of birth of the petitioner, as would be evident form his Matricu¬lation Certificate was 26th March, 1943. The service book of the petitioner and other documents also revealed the same date, but then the authorities giving a go-by to all these authenticat¬ed documents tried to rely upon the alleged date of birth said to have been mentioned in the provisional gradation list which was apparently an error, and on that basis put an end to the service of the petitioner prematurely. Such action having been done with ulterior motive, and for no fault of the petitioner, he is enti¬tled to receive his full arrears salary and other service incen¬tives form the date of his illegal premature retirement till the date when his retirement on superannuation on the basis of his correct date of birth, i.e. 26th March, 1943. 9. Mr. R. K. Rath, learned counsel appearing for GRIDCO, at the other hand forcefully submitted that the allegations made by the petitioner are unjust. The authorities had absolutely no malice against him. The petitioner failed to produce his original Matriculation Certificate and the authorities while preparing the gradation list had no way out but to rely on the date of birth of the petitioner as mentioned in his passport which was an authen¬ticated document. The allegation as to mala fide of the authori¬ties is not correct and should not be accepted. The petitioner failed to produce his original Matriculation Certificate and the authorities while preparing the gradation list had no way out but to rely on the date of birth of the petitioner as mentioned in his passport which was an authen¬ticated document. The allegation as to mala fide of the authori¬ties is not correct and should not be accepted. The petitioner in fact had not discharged any work during the disputed period, he is not entitled to any arrears salary applying the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and therefore there is no reason to interfere with the order Annexure-15. 10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties patiently. I have also noted the submissions carefully, perused the materi¬als meticulously including the order of this Court in the earlier Writ application, i.e. OJC No.451/98, and considered the matter diligently. The Matriculation Certificate issued by the Board of Secondary Education, Orissa clearly reveals the date of birth of the petitioner to be 26th March, 1943. The same was also reflect¬ed in his service book and other documents maintained by GRIDCO. The official passport was issued to the petitioner on the basis of the particulars submitted by the authorities including his date of birth and the same reflected the correct date of birth of the petitioner as 26th March, 1943. In spite of such overwhelming materials available on record if GRIDCO for some reason or other entertained any doubt or wanted to change the date of birth of the petitioner, it was not open to it to do so unilaterally with¬out giving an opportunity to the petitioner to explain the same. As it appears, GRIDCO without initiating any proceeding, without conducting an enquiry or asking the petitioner to show his cause, sou motu changed his date of birth and prematurely superannuated him. Such action violates the principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 11. Be that as it may, in consonance with the direction of this Court in the earlier Writ application, the authorities probed into the matter and came to the conclusion, as would be evident form Annexure-15, that the correct date of birth of the petitioner was 26th March, 1943. Thus the order superannuating the petitioner prematurely was unjust and illegal. The petitioner was all along discharging his duties. He had never absconded form duty. Thus the order superannuating the petitioner prematurely was unjust and illegal. The petitioner was all along discharging his duties. He had never absconded form duty. At the other hand, GRIDCO restrained him form discharging his duties by retiring him prematurely. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Randel Kumar Goel & others, reported in 2004 (2) SCC 193 , observed that ‘No work, No pay’ principle shall not be attracted in the cases where employees had been out of their jobs for no fault of their own. 13. The petitioner having been prevented to discharge his duties for no fault of his, the principle of ‘No work, No pay’, cannot be attracted to his case. The GRIDCO having unilaterally changed the date of birth of the petitioner and later-on accept¬ing the date of birth as originally recorded in the service book of the petitioner as his correct date of birth, as per Annexure-15, cannot take the plea that the petitioner is not entitled to salary for the period he was deprived of the opportunity to continue in his service. Such a plea is contrary to the princi¬ples of natural justice and equity. 14. In the aforesaid scenario, I am not impressed by the contention advanced on behalf of GRIDCO. The normal rule of ‘No work, No pay’ would not be applicable to the case of the peti¬tioner. it was not a case where the petitioner had remained away form his service or declined to work. Thus he could be deemed to be in service till he attained his age of superannuation, taking his date of birth to be 26th March, 1943. Accordingly he was entitled to his salary and other incentives of service for the period form the date he was made to retire and the date when his superannuation would have been due on the basis of his date of birth being 26th March, 1943. 15. Law is well settled that a party for his own fault cannot deprive another of his legitimate claim. This Court finds that the petitioner who was a bona fide/permanent employee of GRIDCO was unjustly made to suffer for all these years for no fault of his. He had to approach this Court not once, but twice. 15. Law is well settled that a party for his own fault cannot deprive another of his legitimate claim. This Court finds that the petitioner who was a bona fide/permanent employee of GRIDCO was unjustly made to suffer for all these years for no fault of his. He had to approach this Court not once, but twice. Even the direction of this Court in the earlier Writ application was not complied with promptly for which he was constrained to move this Court again. In the aforesaid scenario this Court feels that the petitioner would be entitled to interest on his arrear salary and other emoluments form the due date till payment. 16. The Writ application is allowed. This Court quashes Clause (i) stipulated in Annexure-15 and the opposite parties are directed to pay the petitioner within three months his arrear salary, and the other incentives flowing out of his service to which he would have been entitled had he continued in service during the period form 1st June, 1997 to 22nd March, 1999 on the basis of his actual date of birth as accepted by GRIDCO later-on. I further direct the GRIDCO to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the arrears dues of the petitioner form 1st June, 1997 till the date of payment. Application allowed.