L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under section 96 of CPC is filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff in O. S. No. 73 of 1995, on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, nizambad. During the pendency of the appeal, the sole appellant died, and his legal representatives were brought on record. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as arrayed in the suit. ( 2 ) THE suit was filed for the relief of declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-, lying with the Additional Judicial First Class magistrate, Nizamabad, in STC No. 1204 of 1988, in preference to the defendants. He pleaded that on 6-9-1988 at about 3 a. m. , the police of III Town Nizamabad, came to his house, together with the sub-Inspector of Bodhan Town Police Station and a party of six constables. The police are said to have taken away the cash of rs. 21,800/- from the almirah, and thereafter, took him to the Police Station. It was alleged that at the Police Station, the plaintiff was forced to arrange a sum of rs. 3,00,000/-, with a threat that he will be remanded to the custody as a terrorist, in which case, he would not even get bail. After narrating certain incidents, which are said to have taken place while he was in custody, he stated that he ultimately arranged a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-, by september 1988, after borrowing the amounts from his partners, raising hand loans, and encashing his FDRs. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff alleged that soon after he paid the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/-, the police brought the Defendants 1 to 8 and husband of Defendant No. 9, and a false case, being STC No. 1204 of 1988, was booked under the Gaming Act. He stated that though the entire amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- was paid by him, it was shown in the proceedings, in that case, as though a sum of Rs. 5,000/- alone was recovered from him and that rest of the amount was seized from the Defendants 1 to 8 and husband of defendant No. 9. ( 4 ) STC No. 1204 of 1988 ended in acquittal, with a direction that the amount said to have been seized from the respective parties shown therein, shall be refunded to them. The plaintiff filed Criminal Appeal no. ( 4 ) STC No. 1204 of 1988 ended in acquittal, with a direction that the amount said to have been seized from the respective parties shown therein, shall be refunded to them. The plaintiff filed Criminal Appeal no. 93 of 1993, in the Court of Sessions judge, Nizamabad, asserting that the entire amount has to be refunded to him. The criminal Appeal was dismissed, leaving it open to work out his remedies in accordance with law. Thus, he filed the suit. ( 5 ) THE defendants filed a common written statement, denying the allegations of the plaintiff. They pleaded that the police seized different amounts from them and plaintiff, when they were playing Matka, and the allegation that the amount belongs to the plaintiff alone, is false. They raised the plea of limitation and the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties. The Trial court dismissed the suit, through its judgment dated 15-10-1990. ( 6 ) SRI M. Raja Malla Reddy, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submits that his client had adduced clinching evidence to establish his claim, and the Trial Court dismissed the suit, without proper appreciation of the same. He contends that the suit ought not to have been dismissed, on the ground of limitation, for the reason that the plaintiff has been asserting his rights from the date of his parting with the amount, in one forum or the other. He submits that even while dismissing the criminal appeal, the learned Sessions Judge permitted the plaintiff to prosecute his remedies, and in that view of the matter, the right of the plaintiff was intact. The learned Counsel further submits that the Trial Court erred in ignoring the oral and documentary evidence and recording a finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the entire amount belongs to him. ( 7 ) SRI S. Satyam Reddy, learned counsel for the defendants, on the other hand, submits that the plaintiff came forward with the plea, raised by him in the suit, with a view to grab the entire amount which was seized from the defendants. He submits that if really the amount was paid by the plaintiff, or seized from him, in the year 1988, nothing prevented him from filing the suit immediately, and it was only in the year 1995 that the suit was filed. He submits that if really the amount was paid by the plaintiff, or seized from him, in the year 1988, nothing prevented him from filing the suit immediately, and it was only in the year 1995 that the suit was filed. He contends that the pendency of STC or the Criminal Appeal filed against it cannot have the effect of shifting the starting point of limitation. He also submits that the proceedings in STC no. 1204 of 1988 were initiated under an enactment before a Court of law, and it is impermissible for the plaintiff either to plead or lead evidence contrary to the same. ( 8 ) ON the basis of the pleadings before it, the Trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw Rs. 3 lakhs in preference to the defendants from the Additional j. F. C. M. , Nizamabad? (2) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is hit by the principles of res judicata as contended by the defendants? (3) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming Rs. 3 lakhs? (4) Whether there is any privity of contract between the plaintiff and defendants? (5) Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit? (6) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (7) To what relief? additional Issue: whether the suit is within the period of limitation? ( 9 ) TO establish his plea, the plaintiff examined himself as PW. 1, his wife as pw. 5, and three other witnesses as PWs. 2, 3 and 4, and marked Exs. A-1 to A-21. On behalf of the defendants, DWs. 1 to 4 were examined and Exs. B-1 to B-4 were marked. The Court has also taken on record Exs. C-1 to C-4 and X-1. ( 10 ) OF the seven issues framed by it, the Trial Court answered Issues 2 to 6 in favour of the plaintiff, but answered issue No. 1 and additional issue against him. Under Rule 22 of Order 41 CPC, it is permissible for a respondent in an appeal to attack the findings recorded against him, even while supporting the ultimate judgment. In view of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal: (1) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (2) Whether the suit for mere declaration without the consequential relief is maintainable? In view of the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal: (1) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (2) Whether the suit for mere declaration without the consequential relief is maintainable? (3) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? (4) Whether the plaintiff proved that the entire amount, which is the subject-matter of STC No. 1204 of 1988, was recovered from him alone? ( 11 ) THE plaintiff pleaded that he paid a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- on 15-9-1988 to the police, when he was pressurized to do so, while under police custody. The suit was filed on 5-12-1995. Since the suit was filed for the relief of declaration, the relevant provision of the Limitation Act would be article 58. If the relief is treated as the one for the recovery of specific movable property, the provision would be Article 69. Either way, the period of limitation is three years, and the starting point, is the date on which the right to sue had accrued to the plaintiff. Admittedly, the suit is filed beyond three years. It is pleaded on behalf of the plaintiff that the period, during which STC No. 1204 of 1988 and Crl. Appeal no. 93 of 1993 were pending, deserves to be omitted, and the starting point of limitation would be the date of dismissal of the criminal appeal. ( 12 ) THIS Court finds it difficult to accept the contention of the plaintiff. The benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall be available to a party if only the remedy was prosecuted with due diligence, but in a different forum. Section 14 of the limitation Act is very clear in this regard. One of the important requirements is that the prosecution must be of "civil proceedings" and not the proceedings of any other category. The proceedings in STC No. 1204 of 1988, or in Crl. Appeal No. 93 of 1993, cannot be said to be civil proceedings. The supreme Court held that the benefit under section 14 of the Limitation Act is not available even in respect of proceedings before Tribunals. The proceedings in criminal Courts stand on a far remote footing. The proceedings in STC No. 1204 of 1988, or in Crl. Appeal No. 93 of 1993, cannot be said to be civil proceedings. The supreme Court held that the benefit under section 14 of the Limitation Act is not available even in respect of proceedings before Tribunals. The proceedings in criminal Courts stand on a far remote footing. Even assuming that the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings does not matter in this regard, it is to be noticed that the plaintiff was not prosecuting any proceedings, but was only defending himself. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation act, in respect of the period, during which the proceedings were pending in the Criminal courts. ( 13 ) SRI M. Raja Malla Reddy, learned counsel for the plaintiff, placed reliance upon the judgment of Patna High Court in nunumani Devi v. Ram Saran Kumar, air 1984 Patna 29, in support of his contention that the starting point for computing the limitation for civil cases can be the closure, or termination of corresponding criminal proceedings. The subject-matter of that case was a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, preceded by proceedings under Section 145 of the code of Criminal Procedure. The matter was governed by the old Code of Criminal procedure. It was not in dispute that the unsuccessful party in the proceedings under section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure was conferred with the right to seek appropriate remedy before the Civil courts. The controversy was as to whether dismissal of a revision by the High Court, in limini, had the effect of extending the starting point of limitation for filing of the suit, from the date of rejection of the proceedings by the District and Sessions judge. The principle laid down therein had absolutely no application to the instant case. Therefore, the suit was barred by limitation, and the finding recorded by the trial Court on the relevant issue deserves to be upheld. ( 14 ) THE suit was filed for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw the entire amount lying to the credit of STC no. 1204 of 1988. No further relief is prayed for. Therefore, the suit was barred by limitation, and the finding recorded by the trial Court on the relevant issue deserves to be upheld. ( 14 ) THE suit was filed for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to withdraw the entire amount lying to the credit of STC no. 1204 of 1988. No further relief is prayed for. It is true that proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act prohibits a court from granting the relief of declaration, where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than mere declaration, omits to do so. In the instant case, at the first blush, the prayer appears to be one of simple declaration, and not for any other consequential relief. However, there is an intrinsic further relief in the declaration itself, namely, the one to enable the plaintiff to withdraw the entire amount. Further the judgment of Orissa High Court in neelamani Sahu v. Khetrabasi Sahu, AIR 1954 Orissa 37, relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, squarely applies to the facts of the case. It was held that where the declaration is sought in respect of property, which is lying in the Court, it is not necessary for the party to pray for any consequential relief. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in deo Kuer v. Sheo Prasad Singh, AIR 1966 SC 359 . A Division Bench of this court in Jangam Pompaiah v. H. Hanumantha Reddi, AIR 1959 AP 126 , held that if the necessary circumstances have been set out in the plaint, there is no bar for the Court to grant the relief which has not been asked for, if the circumstances justify the same. Therefore, this point is answered in favour of the plaintiff. ( 15 ) THE defendants raised a specific plea in their written statement that the suit is defective for non-joinder of necessary parties. According to them, the question as to whether the entire amount was seized or taken from the plaintiff alone, can be decided, if only the concerned police officials are made parties, and that no such officials were impleaded. In its judgment, the Trial Court took the view that since the police did not make any claim for the amount in question, they were not necessary parties to the present suit. In its judgment, the Trial Court took the view that since the police did not make any claim for the amount in question, they were not necessary parties to the present suit. ( 16 ) THIS Court is of the view that the Trial Court did not approach the issue from the proper perspective. To be treated as a necessary party to a suit, it is not essential that such a party should have an independent claim of his own. Necessary party is the one, in whose absence there cannot be any effective adjudication. Persons, whose acts or omissions have given rise to the cause of action in a suit, would certainly, be necessary parties, since the court would be handicapped from "effectually and completely to adjudicate" upon the matter, in their absence. It is not in dispute that the amount in question was recovered or taken by the police. The plaintiff asserted that the entire amount was taken from him, in the manner indicated in the plaint. The proceedings in STC no. 1204 of 1988 disclose that the police have recovered different amounts from the plaintiff and defendants. The only persons, who can speak or state about this fact, are the concerned police. The plaintiff did not plead that he had lent or pass on different amounts to defendants or that the latter have forcibly taken the amounts from him. There is no privity of contract between him and the defendants. In that view of the matter, it was necessary and essential for the plaintiff to have impleaded the police officials, who gained the custody of the amount in question. Therefore, the suit was defective for non-joinder of necessary parties. ( 17 ) COMING to the entitlement of the plaintiff, it needs to be seen that there is any amount of contradiction of versions presented by him on the one hand, and his wife, PW. 5, on the other hand. The documentary evidence, namely, the representation made by PW. 5 to the director, ACB, marked as Ex. A-5, and the petition in Crl. M. P. No. 2551 of 1988 filed by her in the Court of Additional judicial First Class Magistrate, Nizamabad, marked as Ex. A-2, do not at all support the plea of PW. i. While PW. l pleaded that he paid the amount on 15-9-1988, PW. 5 to the director, ACB, marked as Ex. A-5, and the petition in Crl. M. P. No. 2551 of 1988 filed by her in the Court of Additional judicial First Class Magistrate, Nizamabad, marked as Ex. A-2, do not at all support the plea of PW. i. While PW. l pleaded that he paid the amount on 15-9-1988, PW. 5 referred to such fact in E. x. A. 2, which was filed on 13-9-1988. A perusal of Ex. A5 discloses that the amount of Rs. 3,00,00/- is said to have been demanded on 6-8-1988, whereas, PW. 1 stated in the plaint that such a demand was made at a later point of time. The other evidence in the form of exs. A-7, A-8, A-11 3tc. , are hardly of any use to buttress the contention of PW. l. ( 18 ) ONE important aspect in this regard is that PW. 5 filed Crl. M. P. No. 2552 of 1988 on 13-9-1988, complaining that her husband has been taken into wrongful custody. Acting on the same, the concerned court appointed an Advocate Commissioner and issued a Search Warrant. The report submitted by the Advocate Commissioner, on the next day, reads as under: "i have received the warrant yesterday i. e. 13-9-1988 at late hours. As the petitioner was not present to accompany me to identify the alleged confine, I could not go to P. S. Town-Ill, Nizamabad to execute the warrant. Today in the morning I asked the Advocate for the petitioner about the petitioner. The advocate has informed that the petitioner is fell ill, as such she is not in a position to accompany me to P. S. Town-Ill to identify the confine, therefore, today also I could not execute the warrant. " therefore, it is difficult to take the statements of PW. 1 and PW5 on their face value. ( 19 ) THE defendants have also relied upon the statement recorded from PW. 1, in stc No. 1204 of 1988, wherein he is said to have confessed that he was indulging in the game of Matka and that a sum of rs. 5,000/- was seized from him. It is difficult to attach any evidentiary value to that statement. ( 19 ) THE defendants have also relied upon the statement recorded from PW. 1, in stc No. 1204 of 1988, wherein he is said to have confessed that he was indulging in the game of Matka and that a sum of rs. 5,000/- was seized from him. It is difficult to attach any evidentiary value to that statement. The statement no doubt deserves protection under Section 40 of the Evidence act, but, it cannot be said to be final word on the ownership of the properties covered by it: The reason is that, a Criminal Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide the rights of the parties, vis-a-vis the property before it (see Makkena Subba Naidu v. State of A. P. , 2002 (1) ALD (Crl.) 624 (AP) = 2002 (2) ALT (Crl.) 44 (AP) ). ( 20 ) ON an overall appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, it is clear that pw-1 failed to establish that the entire amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- was recovered from him. Even according to the averments in the plaint, he paid the amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- on 15-9-1988. His subsequent conduct in not initiating any proceedings before any courts discloses that his contention is not true, or that he parted with the said amount willingly, and the suit amount is different from it. ( 21 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.