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2005 DIGILAW 434 (GAU)

Bijoy Krishna Roy v. State of Tripura

2005-06-03

R.B.MISRA

body2005
JUDGMENT R.B. Misra, J. 1. Heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. U.B. Saha, learned Senior Government Advocate assisted by Mr. P. Dutta, learned Counsel for the Respondents. 2. In this petition a prayer has been made for issuance of writ of mandamus directing the Respondents to show cause as to why University Grants Commission (in short UGC) scale of pay with effect from 1.1.1973 to the Petitioner with all incidental monitory benefits may not be extended to the Petitioner with a further prayer directing the Respondents to allow the Petitioner to be in service in his capacity of Physical Instructor (Selection Grade) in the M.B.B. College even after the expiry of three months of extension given to him on 1.5.1995. 3. In fact on the same issue for same cause this Court vide a judgment and order dated 31.7.2002 was pleased to dismiss the Smti. Seuli Roy v. State of Tripura and other, Civil Rule No. 119 of 1996 for which no writ appeal was preferred this Court has also vide judgment and order dated 20.4.2004 had dismissed the Smti. Pranati Modak (Saha) v. State of Tripura and another, Civil Rule No. 307 of 1998 for same and similar relief against which it appears no writ appeal is pending for adjudication. 4. At the very outset it has been submitted by Mr. U.B. Saha, learned Senior Government Advocate for the Respondents, that the Petitioner has no case as the cause could be squarely covered by the above two decisions, therefore the cause in the present writ petition does not survive as after filing the response/counter-affidavit in reference to the show cause, the first prayer of the Petitioner automatically goes away, however when the Petitioner was retired on 3.2.1995 as a Physical Instructor and extension for three months was given upto 31.5.1995 only, however, in the meantime, the Petitioner preferred the present Civil Rule on 28.4.1995, so the second prayer also becomes nonest. In these circumstances by efflux of time the cause of action does not survive and the Civil Rule has become infructuous. 5. However, keeping in view that two earlier decisions have been given by this Court, this Court is also adjudicating and deciding this writ petition on similar terms. 6. It appears that the Petitioner was serving in the post of Physical Instructor (Selection Grade) in the pay scale of Rs. 5. However, keeping in view that two earlier decisions have been given by this Court, this Court is also adjudicating and deciding this writ petition on similar terms. 6. It appears that the Petitioner was serving in the post of Physical Instructor (Selection Grade) in the pay scale of Rs. 1700-3980/- and was being posted in M.B.B. College, Agartala, West Tripura under the Director, Higher Education. He is having a Master degree in Physical Education and acquired Postgraduate Diploma in Physical Education from Calcutta University. Initially the Petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher and posted to Inspectorate of School, Sadar-B thereafter he was appointed as a Physical Instructor on 2.12.1970 and posted at Charipara H.S. School and from there he was transferred to M.B.B. College, Agartala where he joined on 1.12.1973. After some time he joined to the post of Youth Coordinator, Nehru Yuba Kendra at Manipur in May, 1986 on deputation from where he was reverted back on 17.4.1989, since then he has been serving at M.B.B. College Agartala as Physical Instructor. The post of Physical Instructor is a common cadre post and as such a Physical Instructor can be transferred to any establishment in School/College under the Education Department, Government of Tripura. In the year 1973 UGC scale was extended to the Teachers and Lecturers of Education Department of State of Tripura, however, UGC scale was not extended to the Petitioner, therefore, the present writ petition filed by the present writ Petitioner. 7. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner he was treated as a Teacher, however, was not given UGC scale whereas Assistant Teachers in the same College were given UGC scale. The Petitioner has been discriminated vis-a-vis the Assistant Teachers, Lecturers of Schools and Colleges of State of Tripura. 8. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. 8.1. In view of the decision of T. Shantharam v. State of Karnataka and other, AIR 1995 SC 1123 , where the Petitioner while working in Ministerial cadre of Revenue Department was holding higher post in the Department of Food on deputation and had satisfactorily worked for 32 years in those circumstances repatriation of Petitioner to parent department was held not justified. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondents' the facts and circumstances of the above case is different and distinguishable and not applicable to the present case. 8.2. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondents' the facts and circumstances of the above case is different and distinguishable and not applicable to the present case. 8.2. In view of the decision of this High Court (Division Bench) in The State of Tripura v. Ramendra Nath Day, 2001 (1) GLR 54, the writ appeal of the State Government was dismissed with directions to the State Government to consider the case of the writ Petitioner for granting of scale recommended by University Grants Commission in facts and circumstances where the writ Petitioner was undisputedly an M.A. (Classical Vocal) Music and M.A. in Bengali B.Ed and Sangeet Visharad. And was working as a Teacher in the Education Department which was discriminated vis-a-vis other teachers who were granted. UGC, scale in those circumstances treating him as a teacher writ Petitioner's prayer was considered in a peculiar facts and circumstances. 9. On the other hand, it has been argued by Sri U.B. Saha, learned Senior Government Advocate. 9.1. The Petitioner had never challenged the Notification dated 31.3.1989 which excluded the Petitioner at relevant time from the U.G.C. pay scale. The Petitioner had submitted his representation along with others before the Vice Chancellor of Tripura University and he had never approached before this Court earlier seeking any direction and for the disposal of his representation. However, when Smti. Seuli Roy and Suniti Modak working as a Physical Instructor had approached this Court by way of filling the Civil Rule No. 119 of 1996 and Civil Rule No. 307 of 1998 for same cause, the above petitions were dismissed by this Court on 31.7.2002 as well as on 21.4.2002 respectively. 9.2. Mr. U.B. Saha, learned Sr. G.A. for the State Respondents draws my attention to the judgment dated 31.7.2002 passed by this Court in Seuli Roy v. State and other, C.R. 119 of 1996 to show that the facts of the present case are similar to the facts of that case. The facts of Seuli Roy's case (supra) are that she was also initially appointed as a substitute assistant teacher and on completion of certificate course of Physical Education, she was appointed as a Physical Instructor in 1971 and was posted to Women's college, Government of Tripura by the order dated 7.3.75 issued by the Director of Education. The facts of Seuli Roy's case (supra) are that she was also initially appointed as a substitute assistant teacher and on completion of certificate course of Physical Education, she was appointed as a Physical Instructor in 1971 and was posted to Women's college, Government of Tripura by the order dated 7.3.75 issued by the Director of Education. She also completed her graduation in Arts in 1974 and obtained her Master degree in Bengali in 1980. She also obtained post graduate diploma course in Physical Education. She obtained National Institute of Sports Certificate in 1982. Subsequently, it was also her claim that she had been undertaking various activities of programme and performance in that college and also it is the duties and functions of Physical Instructor of that college. She accordingly claimed that she was entitled to be paid the pay scale of UGC this Court after carefully examining the pleadings of both the parties recorded the following findings: (I) The Petitioner has never been appointed against any vacant post of Physical Instructor of any colleges rather, she was substantially a Physical Instructor of School. (II) She has not acquired the qualification prescribed by the UGC for appointment to the post of Physical Instructor in college and that the services as Physical Instructor has been simply in a college. (III) She is not the graduate in Physical Education and as such acquiring of post graduate diploma or certificate in Physical Education does not arise. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, this Court took the view that the Petitioner was not entitled to the same scale of pay of lecturer of a Government College and to dismiss the writ petition. To my mind, there is no materials to distinguish the instant case from Seuli Roy's case (supra). I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in the said case. 9.3. The code of conduct for teachers of educational Institution in Tripura being applicable to the Physical Instructor/Demonstrator does not mean that they are all Teachers and UGC scale was to be extended to them. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in the said case. 9.3. The code of conduct for teachers of educational Institution in Tripura being applicable to the Physical Instructor/Demonstrator does not mean that they are all Teachers and UGC scale was to be extended to them. No Physical Instructor of any of the School or College was ever granted the UGC pay scale and the code of conduct was for maintenance of academic discipline in the educational Institution irrespective of working under the order of transfer or under order of deputation were covered under the purview of Code of conduct. The Petitioner is Physical Instructor could have been transferred to any School or College and he will remain as a Physical Instructor. Since all College of Tripura are Government Institutions and all College Teachers are Gazetted Officers, the only mode of recruitment to the post of a College Teacher is direct recruitment through selection by the Public Service Commission, but the Physical Instructors were not appointed through selection by the Public Service Commission as they are not Gazetted employees of the Government. The Physical Instructors transferred/posted to Colleges did not discharge duties equivalent to those of College teachers and their jobs in Schools are exactly the same as their jobs in the Colleges whereas the Assistant Teachers deputed to Colleges had to take classes at higher level than they did in School. Therefore the Physical Instructor cannot be treated at par with the Assistant Teachers in School or Colleges. However, after examining the case of the Petitioner the benefit of extension of UGC could not be given to the Petitioner by the State Government. 9.4. In Union of India v. P.V. Hariharan and another, 1997 (3) SCC 568 it has been held by the Supreme Court that particular pay scale cannot be granted by the Court or Tribunal for this purpose reliance has been made in para 5, which reads: Quite often the Administrative Tribunals are interfering with pay scales without proper reasons and without being conscious of the fact that fixation of pay is not their function. It is the function of the Government which normally act on the recommendations of a Pay Commission. Change of pay scale of a category has a cascading effect. It is the function of the Government which normally act on the recommendations of a Pay Commission. Change of pay scale of a category has a cascading effect. Several other categories similarly situated, as well as those situated above and below, put forward their claims on the basis of such change. The Tribunal should realize that interfering with the prescribed pay scales is a serious matter. The Pay Commission, which goes into the problem at great depth and happens to have a full picture before it, is the proper authority to decide upon this issue. Unless a clear case of hostile discrimination is made out, there would be no justification for interfering with the fixation of pay scales. Sometime orders have been passed by Single Members and that too quite often Administrative Members, allowing such claims. These orders have serious impact on the public exchequer too. It would be in the fitness of things if all matters relating to pay scales, matter asking for a higher pay scale or an enhanced pay scale, as the case may be, on one or the other ground, are heard by a Bench comprising at least one Judicial Member. 9.5. The Apex Court in Sita Devi and other v. State of Haryana and other, reported in (1996) 10 SCC has held that a person claiming parity in pay scales should establish that his qualification, duties and functions are similar to those of the persons with whom he claims parity. In Chandigarh Administration v. Anita Sood (Smt.) and other reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 613, the Apex Court also held that teaching assistants cannot be granted pay scales of lecturers on the ground that they teach same subjects to same/similar students as being done by the lecturers. Again, whether the duties of auxiliary nurse/mid-wife and status of nurse might overlap and in the absence of the staff nurse, auxiliary nurse/mid-wife might be required to carry out some of the functions of the staff nurse and whether the auxiliary nurse/mid-wife does not have the requisite qualification for appointment as staff nurse, the Apex Court, in Central Hospital v. Savita S. Bodke and other reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 439 held that the direction for payment of the salary of staff nurse to an auxiliary nurse/mid-wife was unjustified. In the instant case also, apart from claiming that the Petitioner takes regular classes in Physical Education, the Petitioner has not been able to establish that she has the same qualification of the post of lecturer of the college concerned with whom she claims parity. 9.6. In Para 8(A) of Padmasundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2002 SC 1334 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterance are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case and said Lords Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537. Circumstantial flexibility, one addition or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. 10. According to Mr. U.B. Saha, learned Senior Government Advocate as below: 10.1. The principle of equal pay for equal work is not always easy to apply. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organizations, or even in the same organization. In Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) and other v. Union of India and other, 1988 (3) SCC 91 , the Supreme Court explained the principle of equal pay for equal work by holding that differentiation of pay scales among Government servants holding the same posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a valid differentiation. The same amount of physical work may entail different quality of work, some more sensitive, some requiring more tact, some less-it varies from nature and culture of employment. It was further observed that judgment of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the posts and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent would be a value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the Court. 10.2. It was further observed that judgment of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the posts and the degree of reliability expected of an incumbent would be a value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the Court. 10.2. In Harbans Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 (4) SCC 459 it was held that a mere nomenclature designating a person as a carpenter or a craftsman was not enough to come to a conclusion that he was doing the work as another carpenter in regular service. A comparison cannot be made with counterparts in other establishments with different managements or even in the establishments in different locations though owned by the same management. The quality of work, which is produced, maybe different, even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of equal pay for equal work requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job requires may differ from job to job. 10.3. In Harbans Lal's Case (supra) and Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Choudhury, (1995) 5 SCC 210 , the daily rated workmen were entitled to be paid minimum wages admissible to such workmen as prescribed and not the minimum in the pay scale applicable to similar employees in regular service unless the employer had decided to make such minimum in the pay scale applicable to the daily rated workmen. 10.4. In Secretary, Finance Department v. West Bengal Registration Service Association, AIR 1992 SC 1203 , it was observed: It is well settled that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the executive and not the judiciary and therefore, ordinarily Courts will not enter upon the task of job evaluation which is generally left to expert bodies. 10.5. In Dr. 10.5. In Dr. Bajrang Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. 1997 (3) AWC 1476, a Division Bench of this Court observed: From the conspectus of views taken in the aforementioned decided cases, the position is clear that to substantiate a claim of higher scale of pay/salary on the basis of the principle equal pay for equal work the Petitioners will have to establish that they are equally placed in all respects with the person or persons whose scale of pay/salary they claim. They must allege and prove, that the mode of recruitment, eligibility, qualifications prescribed, the nature of duties, responsibilities discharged and the service rules, if any, applicable to the two posts are similar. They cannot succeed in the case merely by showing that they have been discharging the same duties which are being discharged by persons holding the other class of posts. The above decision has been approved by a Full Bench of this Court in Ajai Kumar Jaitly v. State of U.P. (1999) 1 UPLBEC 388 . 10.6. In Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India JT, 1994 (1) SC 574, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that the nature of work may be more or less the same but the scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. 10.7. In State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj and other, (2003) 6 SCC 123 : 2003 AIR SCW 3382, the Supreme Court pointed out that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not always easy to apply. There are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organisations or even in the same organisation. In State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, (supra), the Supreme Court observed that a scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily wager, he holds no post, hence he cannot be compared with the regular and permanent staff for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay for equal allowances. Equal pay for equal work is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scale and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. Equal pay for equal work is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scale and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. In Tilak Raj (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the claim of equal pay for equal work by a daily wager quay the regular and permanent staff are not tenable. Since the daily wager holds no post and scale of pay is attached to a definite post, however, the State Government was directed to ensure that minimum wages are prescribed for daily wagers and the same to be paid to them. While reversing the judgment of 2002 (2) SCT 349 (P&H), it was held in Tilak Raj (supra) as below: A scale of pay is attached to a definite post and in case of a daily wager, he holds no posts. The Respondent workers on daily wages in Haryana Roadways cannot be held to hold any posts to claim even any comparison with the regular and permanent staff for any or all purposes including a claim for equal pay and allowances. To claim a relief on the basis of equality, it is for the claimants to substantiate a clear cut basis of equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination before becoming eligible to claim rights on a par with the other group vis-a-vis an alleged discrimination. No material was placed before the High Court as to the nature of the duties of either categories and it is not possible to hold that the principle of equal pay for equal work is an abstract one. However, the Appellant-State has to ensure that minimum wages are prescribed for such workers and the same is paid to them. 'Equal pay for equal work' is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scale. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. 10.8. In State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that the principle of equal pay for equal work requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula. 10.8. In State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that the principle of equal pay for equal work requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job requires may differ from job to job. It must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. The Supreme Court further observed that the principle of equal pay for equal work has no mechanical application in every case of similar work. In service matters merits and experience could be the proper basis for classification. The same view was expressed in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Vikram Chaudhary, (1995) 5 SCC 210 . 10.9. In State of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, (1996) 11 SCC 77 , the Supreme Court observed that daily rated workmen could neither be equated with regular employees for the purpose of wages nor could they claim the minimum pay scale of the regular employees. In paragraphs 10 and 11, it was noted as under: (10) The Respondents, therefore, in the present appeals who are employed on daily wages cannot be treated as on a par with persons in regular service of the State of Haryana holding similar posts. Daily rated workers are not required to possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers, nor do they have to fulfill the requirement relating to age at the time of recruitment. They are not selected in the manner in which regular employees are selected. In other words the requirements for selection are not as rigorous. There are also other provisions relating to regular service such as the liability of a member of the service to be transferred, and his being subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the authorities as prescribed, which the daily-rated workmen are not subjected to. They cannot therefore, be equated with regular workmen for the purposes for their wages. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed. (11) The High Court was, therefore, no right in directing that the Respondents should be paid the same salary and allowances as are being paid to regular employees holding similar posts with effect from the dates when the Respondents were employed. Nor can they claim the minimum of the regular pay scale of the regularly employed. (11) The High Court was, therefore, no right in directing that the Respondents should be paid the same salary and allowances as are being paid to regular employees holding similar posts with effect from the dates when the Respondents were employed. If a minimum wage is prescribed for such workers, the Respondents would be entitled to it if it is more than what they are being paid. 10.10. In state of Orissa v. Balram Sahu and other, (2003) 1 SCC 250 , the Supreme Court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of Jasmer Singh (supra). 10.11. In State Bank of India and another v. M.R. Ganesh Bahu and other, JT 2002 (4) SC 129: (2002) 4 SCC 456: (2002) UPLBEC 1680, the Supreme Court observed that the principle of equal pay for equal work must depend upon the nature of work done and it cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. The functions may be the same but the responsibilities make a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion, which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. The Supreme Court in Para 16 has expressed that: The principle of equal pay for equal work has been considered and applied in many reported decisions of this Court. The principle has been adequately explained and crystallized and sufficiently reiterated in a catena of decisions of this Court. It is well settled that equal pay must depend upon the nature of work done. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions maybe the same but the responsibilities made a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. Functions maybe the same but the responsibilities made a difference. One cannot deny that often the difference is a matter of degree and that there is an element of value judgment by those who are charged with the administration in fixing the scales of pay and other conditions of service. So long as such value judgment is made bona fide, reasonably on an intelligible criterion which has a rational nexus with the object of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. The principle is not always easy to apply as there are inherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by different persons in different organizations, or even in the same organization. Differentiation in pays scales of persons holding same posts and performing similar work on the basis of difference in the degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality would be a valid differentiation. The judgment of administrative authorities concerning the responsibilities which attach to the post, and the degree or reliability expected of an incumbent, would be a value judgment of the authorities concerned which, if arrived at bona fide, reasonably and rationally, was not open to interference by the Court. 10.12. In State of Tamil Nadu v. M.R. Alagappan JT, 1997 (4) SC 515, the Supreme Court observed that the Deputy Agricultural Officers cannot be given the same pay scale as the Agricultural Officers although they may be substantially discharging the same type of duties and their place of work may be interchangeable. The Deputy Agricultural Officers are recruited by promotion from the lower category of Assistant Agricultural Officers. They remain non-gazetted employees in the subordinate service while the Agricultural Officers are directly recruited to a gazetted service. The qualifications are different and though substantially they carry out the same type of work and duties, the important assignments are exclusively entrusted to Agricultural Officers. 10.13. In Chandigarh Administration v. Anita Sood, 1995 (Supp.) 3 SCC 613, the Supreme Court observed that even though the lecturers may be teaching the same subject as Professors the quality and standard of teaching by a Professor is bound to be a much higher standard than that of a lecturer and hence, a lecturer cannot claim the same pay scale as a Professor. Similarly, Teaching Assistant is a different class of Teacher as compared to Lecturer. 10.14. Similarly, Teaching Assistant is a different class of Teacher as compared to Lecturer. 10.14. In State of West Bengal v. Manirujjaman Mullik and other, (1996) 10 SCC 56 , the Supreme Court observed, that where the method of appointment, the source of recruitment, etc. are different the principle of equal pay for equal work will not apply. 10.15. In State of West Bengal v. D.K. Mukherjee, AIR 1995 SC 1889 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that even though the duties performed by the Inspectors in two grades may be the same no fault can be found with the classification, since the classification in the cadre on the ground of selection based on merit is permissible. 10.16. In State of Haryana v. Surendra Kumar, (1997) SCC 633, the Supreme Court observed that the daily wagers were appointed on contract basis and hence they cannot have any right to a post as such until they are duly selected and appointed, or they are able to manage to have the posts interchanged, they cannot become entitled to the same pay scale, which the regular clerks are holding by claiming that they are discharging their duties as regular employees. The very object of selection is to test the eligibility and then to make selection in accordance with the rules. Since, the Respondents recruitments were not made in accordance with the rules they cannot claim equal pay. 10.17. In Union of India v. P.V. Hariharan JT, 1997 (3) SC 569, the Supreme Court observed, that the Tribunals are often interfering with pay scales without proper reason and without being conscious of the fact that fixation of pay is not their function. It is the function of the Government which normally acts on the recommendation of a Pay Commission. Change of pay scale of a category has a cascading effect. Several other categories similarly situated, as well as those situated above and below will put forward their claims on the basis of such change. The Tribunal should realise that interfering with the prescribed pay scale is a serious matter. The Pay Commission goes into the problem at great depth and it is the proper authority to decide upon the issue. Very often the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is also being misunderstood and misapplied freely revising and enhancing the pay scales across the board. 10.18. The Pay Commission goes into the problem at great depth and it is the proper authority to decide upon the issue. Very often the doctrine of equal pay for equal work is also being misunderstood and misapplied freely revising and enhancing the pay scales across the board. 10.18. In State of U.P. v. Ramashraya Yadav, AIR 1996 SC 1188 , the Supreme Court observed that the employees appointed to temporary posts are not entitled to pay scale equivalent to the regular employees. 10.19. In Union of India v. Dharampal, (1996) 4 SCC 195 , the Supreme Court gave of approval to the scheme framed by the authorities for regularization of daily-rated workers/casual workers and held Daily rated workers/casual workers who are not regularized and work is taken from them, are entitled to minimum of scale of pay prescribed for that post and in addition to that, they are also entitled to 60% of the D.A. on Punjab Pattern which is being followed in all others cases. 10.20. In A. Krishnamacharyulu v. Dr. Venketshwar Hindu College (Engineering), 1997 (3) SCC 571 , the Supreme Court was considering the doctrine of equal pay for equal work in respect of parity claimed by teachers, who were imparting education in non-Government Institutions with the teachers of Government Institutions. The ratio of the decision in that case is that teachers, who impart education, get an element of public interest in performance of their duties and the element of public interest calls for regulating the conditions of services of those employees in juxtaposition with a Government employee. 10.21. To enforce his submissions, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners placed credence on a decision in The Dharwad District PWD Literate Daily Wage Employees' Association and other v. State of Karnataka and another, 1990 (2) SLR 43 and State of U.P. v. Putti Lal, (2002) 2 UPLBEC 1595 (SC). In Putti Lal's case, the Supreme Court has directed to consider the case of regularization according to the relevant prevailing rules and for payment of minimum of the pay scale as applicable to their counter part in the government until services of such daily wage employees are regularized. In Putti Lal's case, the Supreme Court has directed to consider the case of regularization according to the relevant prevailing rules and for payment of minimum of the pay scale as applicable to their counter part in the government until services of such daily wage employees are regularized. The other decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel are Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar, AIR 2001 SC 706 ; Jayanta Biswas v. University of Calcutta and other, (2001) 1 UPLBEC 74 and Daily Rated Casual Labour Employed under P and T Department through Bhartiya Dak Tar Majdoor Manch v. Union of India and other AIR 1987 SC 2342 , to hammer home the submissions foretasted. 10.22. In State of West Bengal and other v. Pantha Chatterjee and other, (2003) 6 SCC 469 , the Supreme Court was seized of the claim Part Time Border Wing Home Guards vis-a-vis regular Boarder Wing Home Guards of the West Bengal and the Border Security Force personnel. In the matter, it was claimed that the part time Border Wing Home Guards were performing similar duties and discharging same responsibilities. It was contended in the petition that the part time Boarder Wing Home Guards are entitled to the honorarium and they are to be paid only as and when their services are required and utilised. It was further claimed in opposition in that case, that their appointment was not to exceed for a period of more than three months except in cases where it was recommended otherwise by the authorities of the Border Security Force. It was noticed by the Supreme Court that duties of the permanent Border Wing Home Guards and part time Border Wing Home Guards are the same and performed under the same situation and circumstances but there has been disparity in their emoluments and other facilities, necessities for performing their duties. In the background of the facts of that case, it was held by the Supreme Court that the part time Border Wing Home Guards cannot be treated as volunteers engaged in casual nature of work so as to be termed as part time staff of Government of West Bengal and as such they cannot be treated differently from the permanent staff and are to be accorded parity with them. 10.23. In U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India and other (1987) Suppl. 10.23. In U.P. Income Tax Department Contingent Paid Staff Welfare Association v. Union of India and other (1987) Suppl. SCC 668, the Supreme Court having regard to the principles as laid down in P and T Department case aforestated, gave following relief in the ultimate analysis. We accordingly allow this writ petition and direct the Respondents to pay wages to the workmen who are employed as the contingent paid staff of the Income Tax Department throughout India, doing the work of Class IV employees at the rates equivalent to the minimum pay in the pay scale of the regularly employed workers in the corresponding cadres. 10.24. In Jaipal and other etc. v. State of Haryana and other etc. (1998) 3 SCC 354, the Supreme Court held it to be a constitutional obligation to ensure equal pay for equal work where the two sets of employees discharge similar responsibilities under similarly working conditions. According to Dhirendra Chamoli (supra) casual workers could not be denied same emoluments and benefits as admissible to temporary employees on the premises that they had acquiesced to the employment with full knowledge of their disadvantage. In Grih Kalayan Kendra Workers' Union v. Union of India and other, (1991) 1 SCC 619 , the Supreme Court has held that though on facts no discrimination was found but the principle of equal pay for equal work was upheld and recognized where all were placed similarly and discharging same duties and responsibilities irrespective of casual nature of work. This right had been held to have assumed status of a fundamental right of equality in Articles 14 and 16. In Daily Rated Casual Labour through Bhartiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch v. Union of India and other (1988) 1 SCC 122 , the substance of what was held by the Supreme Court was that right of daily rated casual workers in the P and T Department was recognized and they were directed to be paid in minimum of the scale as was admissible to the regular workers as both discharged similar work and responsibilities. 10.25. 10.25. In Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology and other v. Manoj K. Mohanty, (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1755 the Supreme Court relying on the decisions in Jasmer Singh (supra), M.R. Ganesh Babu (supra) and Pradip Kumar Dey (supra) has held that the writ Petitioner employed in the university on temporary basis as a typist continued for more than five years with an artificial break while working as Junior Assistant was not entitled for regularisation by applying principle of equal pay for equal work and in the said case the Supreme Court in para 11 observed as under: 11. This Court in Union of India and other v. Pradip Kumar Dey, (2000) 8 SCC 580 : JT 2000 (S-2) SC 449, after referring to various decisions dealing with the similar question in Para 8 has held thus: In our considered view, the Division Bench of the High Court was not right and justified in straightway giving direction to grant pay scale to the Respondent when there was no material placed before the Court for comparison in order to apply the principle of equal pay for equal work between the radio operators of CRPF and the radio operators working in civil side in the central water commission and the directorate of police wireless. In the absence of material relating to other comparable employees as to the qualifications, method of recruitment, degree of skill, experience involved in the performance of job, training required, responsibilities undertaken and other facilities in addition to pay scales, the learned Single Judge was right when he stated in the order that in the absence of such material it was not possible to grant relief to the Respondent. No doubt, the directorate of CRPF made recommendations to the Pay Commission for giving higher pay scales on the basis of which claim is made by the Respondent for grant of pay scale. The factual statements contained in the recommendation of a particular department alone cannot be considered per se proof of such things or then cannot be themselves vouch for the correctness of the same. The said recommendation could not be taken as a recommendation made by the Government. Even otherwise a mere recommendation did not confer any right on the Respondent to make such a claim for writ of mandamus. 10.26. The said recommendation could not be taken as a recommendation made by the Government. Even otherwise a mere recommendation did not confer any right on the Respondent to make such a claim for writ of mandamus. 10.26. The Allahabad High Court (DB) in State of U.P. and other v. U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad Shramik Sangh and other, (2004) 1 UPLBEC 77 has held that writ Petitioners while working as daily wagers for several years could not claim same pay scale as regular Class III employees nor other benefits admissible to other regular employees and for regularisation the daily wagers have to face regular selection in accordance with the rules as they cannot be regularised without such selection, and in said case this Court in para 47 has held as under: 47. No doubt in certain decisions the Courts have given directions for regularising daily wagers or casual/temporary employees but in our opinion such directions do not amount to a precedent vide Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Raja Balwant Singh College, 2003 (1) ESC 424; Delhi Administration v. Manoharlal, AIR 2002 SC 3088 , etc. What is a binding precedent is a principle of law, which has been laid down in a decision of the Court and a mere direction without laying down any principle of law not a precedent. A case is an authority for what it actually decides vide Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana AIR 1990 SC 781 ; Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P. AIR 1983 SC 1246 (Para 29); Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44 (Paragraphs-9 and 10); M/s. Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab and other, AIR 1985 SC 218 , etc. Everything in a decision is not a precedent vide State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh, 1999 SCC 1080. 10.27. Treating unequals unequally does not violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution in view of M.P. Oil Extraction and another v. State of M.P. and other, (1997) 7 SCC 592 . 10.28. Everything in a decision is not a precedent vide State of Punjab v. Baldeo Singh, 1999 SCC 1080. 10.27. Treating unequals unequally does not violate the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution in view of M.P. Oil Extraction and another v. State of M.P. and other, (1997) 7 SCC 592 . 10.28. Granting of special pay-scale and upgradation of particular cadre train to the economic aspects and policy decision of State and organization and scope of judicial review is limited and circumscribed unless the policy decision is absolutely capricious, unreasonable and arbitrary and based on mere ipse dixit of the executive authority or is violative of any constitutional or statutory mandate, the Court's interference is not called for as observed by the Supreme Court in M.P. Oil Extraction and another v. State of M.P. and other, (1997) 7 SCC 592 . The relevant extract of para-41 reads as below: The executive authority of the State must be held to be within its competence to frame a policy for the administration of the State. Unless the policy framed is absolutely capricious and, not being informed by any reason whatsoever, can be clearly held to be arbitrary and founded on mere ipse dixit of the executive functionaries thereby offending Article 14 of the Constitution or such policy offends other constitutional provisions or comes into conflict with any statutory provision, the Court cannot and should not outstep its limit and tinker with the policy decision of the executive functionary of the State. This Court, in no uncertain terms, has sounded a note of caution by indicating that policy decision is in the domain of the executive authority of the State and the Court should not embark on the unchartered ocean of public policy and should not question the efficacy or otherwise of such policy so long the same does not offend any provision of the statute or the Constitution of India. The supremacy of each of the three organs of the State i.e., legislature, executive and judiciary in their respective fields of operation needs to be emphasized. The power of judicial review of the executive and legislative action must be kept within the bounds of constitutional scheme so that there may not be any occasion to entertain misgivings about the role of judiciary in outstepping its limit by unwarranted judicial activism being very often talked of in these days. The power of judicial review of the executive and legislative action must be kept within the bounds of constitutional scheme so that there may not be any occasion to entertain misgivings about the role of judiciary in outstepping its limit by unwarranted judicial activism being very often talked of in these days. The democratic set-up to which the policy is so deeply committed cannot function properly unless each of the three organs appreciate the need for mutual respect and supremacy in their respective fields. 10.29. The Supreme Court following Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 has observed in Mansukhlal Vithalidas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, (1997) 7 SCC 622 in respect of exercise of power under Article 226 by the High Court and under Article 32 by the Supreme Court that the Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made, particularly as the Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted, it will be substituting its own decision which itself may be fallible. The duty of the Court is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its concern should be, (i) whether the decision making authority exceeded its powers; (ii) committed an error of law; (iii) committed a breach of the rules of natural justice; (iv) reached a decision which no reasonable Tribunal would have reached; or (v) abused its power. 11. According to the learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Petitioner could not demonstrate what is his legal right and how he is being discriminated and how the Petitioner is entitled to the protection of the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution. According to the Respondents the Petitioner is not similarly situated in comparison to the Assistant Teachers and Teachers of the School and Colleges therefore treating unequals, unequally cannot be in derogation to the Article 14 of the Constitution. 12(1). It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. 12(1). It is settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the Court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. Vide Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1988 SC 2181 ; M/s. Larsen and Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and other AIR 1998 SC 1608 , National Building Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan and other AIR 1998 SC 2779 ; Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and other (1999) 1 SCC 141 ; Chitra Kumari v. Union of India and other AIR 2001 SC 1237 ; and State of U.P. and other v. Chandra Prakash Pandey AIR 2001 SC 1298 . 12(2). In Atul Castings Ltd. v. Bawa Gurvachan Singh, AIR 2001 SC 1684 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: The findings in the absence of necessary pleadings and supporting evidence cannot be sustained in law. Similar view has been reiterated in Vithal N. Shetti and another v. Prakash N. Rudrakar and other, (2003) 1 SCC 18 . 12(3). In Re: Sanjiv Datta (1995) 3 SCC 619 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also observed as under: Some members of the profession have been adopting perceptibly casual approach to the practice of the profession as is evident from the filing of incomplete and inaccurate pleadings, they do not realize the seriousness of these acts and omissions. They not only amount to the contempt of the Court but do positive disservice to the litigants and create embarrassing situation with Court leading to avoidable, unpleasantness and delay in disposal of matters. This augurs ill for the health of our judicial system. 12(4). In Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh and another, AIR 1963 SC 146 , Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of proper assistance to the Court by the lawyer, there is no obligation on the part of the Court to decide the case, for the simple reason that unless lawyer satisfies the Court that there is some balance in his client's favour to alter the situation, the Court is not able to decide the case. It is not for the Court itself to decide the controversy. It is not for the Court itself to decide the controversy. The Court observed as under: He (counsel) cannot just raise objections in his memorandum of appeal and leave it to the appellate Court to give its decision on those points after going through the record and determining the correctness thereof. It is not for the appellate Court itself to find out what the points for determination can be and then proceed to give a decision on those points. 12(5). While deciding the said case, Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance upon judgment of Privy Council in Mst. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus, AIR 1921 PC 55 wherein it had been observed as under: In every appeal it is incumbent upon the Appellants to show some reason why the judgment appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the circumstances are considered to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. Their Lordships are unable to find that this duty has been discharged. 12(6). In T.C. Mathai and another v. District and Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 614 , Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: The work in a Court of law is a serious and responsible function. The primary duty of a Court is to administer justice. Any lax or wayward approach, if adopted; towards the issues involved in the case, can cause serious consequences for the parties concerned. In the adversary system which is not being followed in India, both in civil and criminal litigation, it is very necessary that the Court gets proper assistance from both sides. 12(7). The Rajasthan High Court in Bhola Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 Raj. 242 held as under: The quality of the judgment depends upon the assistance rendered at the Bar. The Judge cannot take the entire responsibility of laying down a correct law unilaterally without any assistance of the learned members of the Bar. The Judge cannot afford to retire from chamber and sit in the library and find out the case law on the issues involved in every case and what is the occasion to do anything in a case where the pleadings are so vague as the petition itself cannot be entertained. 12(8). The Judge cannot afford to retire from chamber and sit in the library and find out the case law on the issues involved in every case and what is the occasion to do anything in a case where the pleadings are so vague as the petition itself cannot be entertained. 12(8). In D.P. Chadha v. Triyugi Narain Mishra and other, (2001) 2 SCC 221 the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: Mutual confidence in the discharge of duties and cordial relations between Bench and Bar smoothen the movement of the chariot. As responsible officers of the Court, as they are called-and rightly, the counsel have an overall obligation of assisting the Courts in a just and proper manner in the just and proper administration of justice. A lawyer must not hesitate in telling the Court the correct position of law when it is undisputed and admits of no exception. This obligation of a counsel flows from the confidence reposed by the Court in the counsel appearing for any of the two sides. A counsel, being an officer of the Court, shall apprise the Judge with the correct position of law whether for or against either party. 12(9). The Court determines an issue on applying its minds on the facts/pleadings taken by the parties and submissions made on their behalf on legal as well as factual issues. In absence of any factual foundation laid by the party concerned, and in absence of proper legal assistance on its behalf it is neither desirable nor possible for the Court to adjudicate upon as to whether the order impugned is worth sustainable in law. The party has to place whole case before the Court and challenge properly the correctness of the order impugned. 13. This Court also affirms the view taken by this Court in Smt. Pranati Modak (Saha) v. State of Tripura, W.P. (C) No. 307 of 1998. 14. The Petitioner has been recruited by different source and the responsibility, reliability and confidentiality in respect of the Petitioner is different to that of the lecturers, who were recruited by the Commission. For claiming equal pay for equal work the Petitioner could not demonstrate that he was holding the same post and performing similar work in respect of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality. For claiming equal pay for equal work the Petitioner could not demonstrate that he was holding the same post and performing similar work in respect of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality. A comparison and claim for equal pay for equal work cannot be made with counterparts in other establishments with different managements or even in the establishment in different locations though owned by the same management. It is well settled that equation of posts and determination of pay scales is the primary function of the executive and not of the judiciary, therefore, ordinarily the Court shall not enter upon to take the job of evaluation, which is generally left to the expert bodies. The Petitioner could not establish that he was equally placed in all respects with the others or persons, whose scale of pay/salary he claims. The claim of equal pay for equal work is a concept, which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between the group of employees claiming identical pay scale and other group of employees. The claim of equal pay could also not be judged mere on the volume of work when the mode of appointment and source of recruitment are different. As a policy measure of the State Government depending upon the recommendation of the Pay Commission or expert bodies or Samta Committee reports the claim of equal pay for equal work is considered by the State Government. Any change of pay scale of a category may create wide ramification and may have a cascading effect because persons of several other categories who on the ground of being similarly situated might put forward their claims on the basis of such change and allocation of pay scale. The Petitioner is amongst unequal in all respects to the lecturers and teachers of State of Tripura, therefore refusing to grant him the UGC scale is not illegal. 15. In view of the discussions and observations made above, this writ petition is devoid of merits and hereby dismissed. However, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.