Judgment H.R. Panwar, J.-By this criminal revision petition under Section 397, CrPC, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 011.2004 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offence), Jodhpur (for short, "the trial Court" hereinafter), whereby the application for recalling the order taking cognizance and quashing the proceedings, as also the application under Section 259, CrPC seeking conversion of summons case into a warrant case, were dismissed. Aggrieved by the order impugned, the petitioners have filed the instant revision petition. 2. Briefly stated, the facts relevant and necessary for the decision of this revision petition, are that respondent No. 2 M/s. Dhanpati Steels Ltd. filed a complaint against the petitioners under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (for short "the Act") on 01.05.1998 alleging therein that the respondent No. 2 is a registered partnership firm. The petitioners issued a cheque, which, on presentation before the bank, was dishonoured. It has further been alleged that despite notice, as envisaged under Section 138 of the Act, the petitioners failed to make payment of the cheque amount to the complainant-respondent No. 2 and, therefore, the respondent-complainant filed a complaint against the petitioners under Section 138 of the Act. The trial Court recorded the statement of the complainant under Section 200, CrPC, took cognizance of the offence against the petitioners and issued the process for their appearance on 05.06.1998. On 012.1998, a Power was filed on behalf of the petitioners by their Counsel, who undertook to present the petitioners in the Court on the next date. It appears that on subsequent dates, the petitioners did not appear and one after the another, applications were moved seeking exemption of personal appearance of the petitioners before the Court, which were dismissed and non-bailable warrants were issued. The petitioner No. 2 was arrested and produced before the Court on 10.12.1998 and released on bail. Subsequently, on various dates, petitioner No. 2 again failed to put-in appearance and consequently his bail bonds were forfeited and proceedings under Section 446, CrPC were initiated. On 26.06.2000, an application was filed by the petitioner seeking discharge from the offence, which came to be dismissed on 18.07.2000. Subsequently, on various dates, petitioner No. 2 again failed to put-in appearance and consequently his bail bonds were forfeited and proceedings under Section 446, CrPC were initiated. On 26.06.2000, an application was filed by the petitioner seeking discharge from the offence, which came to be dismissed on 18.07.2000. Thereafter, on various counts, the petitioner No. 2 failed to appear before the trial Court and application seeking exemption from personal appearance were moved, which were dismissed, bail bonds were forfeited and again proceedings under Section 446, CrPC were initiated against the petitioners. Those impugned orders were challenged by way of filing a revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge No. 3, Jodhpur, both of which had been dismissed vide order dated 211.2000. The petitioner carried this matter up to this Court by way of filing a petition under Section 482, CrPC, which was registered as S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 893/2002. The said petition was allowed by this Court with certain conditions. It is relevant to note that the order taking cognizance was challenged by the petitioners by way of filing a revision petition under Section 397, CrPC before the Additional District Judge No. 3, Jodhpur, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 211.2000, against which the petitioners filed S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 16/2001 before this Court seeking quashing of the proceedings, which stood dismissed by this Court vide order dated 14.09.2001. Now, again, by the instant criminal revision petition, apart from other reliefs, the petitioners seek the relief to dismiss the criminal case instituted on the complaint filed by the complainant-respondent No. 2. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Public Prosecutor and the Counsel appearing for respondent No. 2. 4. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the complaint was filed on behalf of the firm by one of its partners, viz. Chanchal Mal Mehta, who was authorised by the partners of the firm to file the complaint against the petitioners. The authorisation letter reveals that there were three partners including Shri Chanchal Mal Mehta. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, respondent No. 2 M/s. Dhanpati Steels Ltd. was having six partners. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that there are only three partners, viz. The authorisation letter reveals that there were three partners including Shri Chanchal Mal Mehta. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, respondent No. 2 M/s. Dhanpati Steels Ltd. was having six partners. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 contended that there are only three partners, viz. Chanchal Mal Mehta, Yogendra Mehta and Smt. Pushpa Mehta and he has shown me the Certificate issued by the Registrar wherein three persons have been shown as the partners of the respondent firm. Indisputably, Chanchal Mal Mehta was authorised to file the complaint on behalf of the remaining two partners and these partners have authorised Chanchal Mal Mehta to file the complaint and, therefore, the complainant is competent to file the complaint. It has further been contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that Sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act provides that no suit to enforce a right arising from the contract shall be instituted in any Court by or on behalf of the firm by any party unless the firm is registered and the person are shown in the register as partners of the firm. It has further been contended that the trial Court fell in error in not converting the instant summon case on a complaint into a warrant case. It has further been contended that there is no debt or other liability legally enforceable and according to him, the Explanation to Section 138 of the Act provides that debt or other liability must be legally enforceable. According to him, there is no debt or liability which is legally enforceable and, therefore, the complaint as such deserves to be quashed. 5. Learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has contended that the debt or liability legally enforceable is the subject matter to be proved by leading evidence and, therefore, at this stage, it cannot be concluded, without there being a trial of the case, that there exists no debt or liability legally enforceable. It has further been contended that no such document was relief upon by the petitioners and if at all they have to rely on certain documents in his defence then the stage is not at the time of framing the charge but the petitioners can produce such documents at the stage of defence and not at the stage of charge. It has further been contended that no such document was relief upon by the petitioners and if at all they have to rely on certain documents in his defence then the stage is not at the time of framing the charge but the petitioners can produce such documents at the stage of defence and not at the stage of charge. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has relied on a decision of Three Judge Bench of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, JT 2004 (10) SC 303. 6. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 7. This case has a chequerred history and right from filing of the complaint, the petitioners have not allowed the complaint to proceed. At the beginning, after service of summons, instead of appearing before the Court below, the petitioner No. 2 chose to appear through his Counsel and absented himself and despite the undertaking given by the Counsel, the petitioner failed to appear. However, his presence was secured by warrant of arrest. After having been enlarged on bail, the petitioner No. 2 again remained absent from the Court on various counts and the bail bonds were forfeited and proceeding under Section 446, CrPC was initiated against him. Petitioner No. 2 has made certain attempts seeking quashing of the proceeding and approached this Court by way of filing an application under Section 482, CrPC, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 14.09.2001. Thereafter the case could not proceed for one reason or the another and ultimately the petitioner No. 2 filed an application under Section 259, CrPC for converting the case from summons case into the warrant case and also sought recalling of the order taking cognizance and sought discharge on the ground that there was no debt or liability legally enforceable and also sought discharge on the ground that the complaint is barred by Sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. At the out-set, it may be stated that Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act deals with the effect of non-registration of the partnership firm. At the out-set, it may be stated that Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act deals with the effect of non-registration of the partnership firm. No doubt, Sub-section (2) of Section 69 bars a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract unless the firm is registered and partners sued or being sued have been shown as partners of the firm. The case in hand is not a suit but a criminal complaint filed by the firm on the ground that the cheque issued by the petitioner, when presented to the bank, was dishonoured and despite notice, as envisaged under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, the petitioner failed to make payment of the amount and, therefore, on accruing the cause of action, the complaint was filed for a criminal liability. Moreso, it is purely a question of fact which has to be decided at the trial of the case as to whether the partners of the firm stood registered with the Registrar of Firms or not, is a matter of evidence and according to the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2, the firm stands registered with the Registrar of Firms, Jodhpur. 8. The Honble Supreme Court, in M.M.T.C. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. & Anr., 2002 (1) SCC 234 , held that the only eligibility criterion prescribed by Section 142 for maintaining a complaint under Section 138 is that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This criterion is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant company. The Apex Court further held that even presuming that initially there was no authority, still the company can, at any stage, rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. The complaints could thus not have been quashed on that ground. 9. The Apex Court further held that even presuming that initially there was no authority, still the company can, at any stage, rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. The complaints could thus not have been quashed on that ground. 9. So far as certain documents, which learned Counsel for the petitioners seek to produce and rely upon before the charge, are concerned, this controversy stands concluded by a Three Judge Bench decision of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Orissa vs. Devendr Nath Pandis case (Supra), wherein the Honble Supreme Court held as under:- "If any document is necessary or desirable for the defence of the accused, the question of invoking Section 91 at the initial stage of framing of a charge would not arise since defence of the accused is not relevant at that stage. When the Section refers to investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceedings, it is to be borne in mind that under the Section a police officer may move the Court for summoning and production of a document as may be necessary at any of the stages mentioned in the Section. In so far as the accused is concerned, his entitlement to seek order under Section 91 would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. When the Section talks of the document being necessary and desirable, it is implicit that necessity and desirability is to be examined considering the stage when such a prayer for summoning and production is made and the party who makes it whether police or accused. If under Section 227 what is necessary and relevant is only the record produced in terms of Section 173 of the Code, the accused cannot at that stage invoke Section 91 to seek production of any document to show his innocence." 10. The petitioners, earlier also, sought quashing of the proceeding by way of filing S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 16/2001 before this Court, which came to be dismissed on 14.09.2001. Again, the petitioners seek quashing of the proceeding though the order dated 14.09.2001 passed by this Court has become final. 11. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in MMTC Ltd.s case (Supra), the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners deserves to be rejected on merit. 12. Again, the petitioners seek quashing of the proceeding though the order dated 14.09.2001 passed by this Court has become final. 11. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in MMTC Ltd.s case (Supra), the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners deserves to be rejected on merit. 12. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the revision petition and it is dismissed accordingly. The stay petition also stands dismissed.