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2005 DIGILAW 452 (KAR)

CHENNACHARI v. S. SAROJA

2005-07-08

D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR

body2005
ORDER Writ petition at the instance of the tenant who though survived an eviction petition that had been filed by the landlord as against him invoking the provisions of provisos (a), (b), (c) and (f) to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short, 1961 Act') was stumped by an order passed by the Revisional Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 5(1) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (for short, 1999 Act') in terms of the order dated 22-9-2003 impugned in this writ petition and who had been directed to vacate and hand over the premises in question, are before this Court questioning the competence and the jurisdiction of the Revisional Court to pass an order of this nature. 2. The brief facts leading to the above petition not in dispute are that the father of the petitioners was a tenant under the father of the respondents in respect of the premises bearing No. 1131/11, F-20, situated at Manandavadi Road, Mysore measuring an extent of 40 ft. x 120 ft, which was being used by the tenant to run a timber depot in the premises, The premises in question had been leased as a vacant land, It is in respect of such premises the landlord had filed an eviction petition under the provisions referred to above under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, the provisions being one which enabled the landlord to seek eviction of a tenant for the reason that the tenant was in arrears of rent; that the tenant erected permanent structure on the premises without the permission of the landlord; that the tenant has unlawfully sublet the premises etc. The Trial Court, i.e., the Court to which the eviction petition presented under the provisions of the 1961 Act, in terms of Order dated 23-6-1995 passed in H.RC. No. 294 of 1989 dismissed the petition negativing the grounds urged by the petitioners for seeking eviction. 3. One development was that the landlord had died and his legal heirs had pursued the eviction petition even before the Trial Court. The legal heirs preferred a revision petition under Section 50 of the 1961 Act in RR No. 68 of 1996 before the Court of II Additional District Judge, Mysore. During the pendency of this revision petition, two things happened. The legal heirs preferred a revision petition under Section 50 of the 1961 Act in RR No. 68 of 1996 before the Court of II Additional District Judge, Mysore. During the pendency of this revision petition, two things happened. One is that the tenant died on 18-2-1997 and the other is that the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 also died, in the sense, it was repealed and succeeded by the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. After the death of the respondent-tenant in the rent revision petition, legal heirs of the tenant had been brought on record in place of the deceased tenant. The Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 came into force with effect from 31-12-2001. It was after these two events that the revision petitioners came up with an application under Section 5 of the 1999 Act contending that the premises in question is required to be vacated and handed over to the petitioners, inasmuch as, the period of five years had elapsed after the death of the tenant and the respondents were no more the tenants of the premises after the expiry of the period of five years from the date of the death of the original tenant though they were the legal heirs of the original tenant. 4. The application was opposed and in terms of the impugned order, learned District Judge of the Revisional Court having allowed the application purporting to be in view of the provisions of Section 5 of the 1999 Act, in turn allowed the revision petition itself in part, held that the representatives of the deceased tenant are liable to be evicted under Section 5 of the 1999 Act and accordingly directed them to hand over possession of the schedule premises to the revision petitioners within six months from the date of passing of the order. It is under such circumstances, the present writ petition is preferred. 5. Petition was admitted on 22-1-2004. Rule was issued. Respondents have entered appearance and even the lower Court records had been called for in terms of the Order dated 25-11-2004. 6. It is under such circumstances, the present writ petition is preferred. 5. Petition was admitted on 22-1-2004. Rule was issued. Respondents have entered appearance and even the lower Court records had been called for in terms of the Order dated 25-11-2004. 6. In the interregnum, the petitioners came up with an application under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for restitution of possession pleading that after the Revisional Court allowed the revision petition and as there was no stay of such order etc., that order has been executed and the petitioners have been thrown out of the premises and that the landlord has taken possession of the premises; that the petitioners are put to great injury and hardship etc.; that certain documents had been concocted for the purpose of dispossessing the petitioners; that many articles and merchandise of the petitioners were still lying in the premises; that the petitioners have not actually been totally dispossessed etc., and in such circumstances, sought for direction to the respondents to put the petitioners back into possession of the premises. 7. The application having been listed for orders and objections having been filed, the matter being adjourned from time to time and at one point of time, the parties also having explored the possibilities of settlement which did not fructify, the matter is taken up for disposal itself with the consent of learned Counsel appearing for the parties and is fully heard today. 8. The one and only ground urged in the writ petition is that the Revisional Court has acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned order, that the very provisions of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 is not applicable to the premises in question; that the rent revision, namely, R.R. No. 68 of 1996 stood abated by operation' of law as on 31-12-2001; that no proceedings remained before the Revisional Court thereafter and therefore the Revisional Court could not have passed any order much less an order allowing the revision petition and for directing the eviction of the petitioners from the premises in question. 9. Respondents have filed their objections. 9. Respondents have filed their objections. The preliminary objection is raised contending that the writ petition is not maintainable; that the petitioners should have preferred a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; that what was let out was only a vacant site; that the provisions of the 1999 Act very much applied to a vacant premises or a vacant site irrespective of its measurement or area; that the embargo under Section 2(3)(g) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 is not attracted to exclude the applicability of the Act to the premises; that such a contention having not been raised before the Revisional Court, cannot be permitted to be raised before this Court and accordingly prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. I have heard Sri Sanjay Gowda, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri T.N. Raghupathy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents. 11. Submission of Sri Sanjay Gowda, learned Counsel for the petitioners is straight and simple. Learned Counsel draws the attention of the Court to the relevant provisions of the Act, namely, Section 2(3)(g) of the 1999 Act. Section 2 is a provision concerning the extent and applicability of the Act. Learned Counsel points out that sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act comprises of the various situations and circumstances where under the provisions of the Act are not applicable. Sub-section (3) is couched in the negative language and states that 'nothing contained in this Act shall apply .... '. The relevant sub-clause, for the purpose of this writ petition to which attention is drawn is clause (g) of sub-section (3) of Section 2, reads as under: "2. Application of the Act.-x x x (3) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply.- xxx (g) to any premises used for non-residential purpose but excluding premises having a plinth area of not exceeding fourteen square metres used for commercial purpose". Elaborating his submission, learned Counsel for the petitioners draws my attention to the definitions section.- Section 3 of the 1999 Act, where under the word 'premises' is defined in Section 3(i), which reads thus: "3. (i) 'Premises' means.- (i) a building as defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purpose". 12. Elaborating his submission, learned Counsel for the petitioners draws my attention to the definitions section.- Section 3 of the 1999 Act, where under the word 'premises' is defined in Section 3(i), which reads thus: "3. (i) 'Premises' means.- (i) a building as defined in clause (a); (ii) any land not used for agricultural purpose". 12. Submission is that the word 'premises' includes a building within the meaning of this expression under Section 3(a) as also any land so long as it is not used for agricultural purpose. Submission is that what had been leased in favour of the petitioners was a vacant land, which comes within the SCOpf\ of sub-clause (ii) of clause (i) of Section 3 of the 1999 Act i.e., the premises means any land not used for agricultural purpose and therefore the vacant land leased to the petitioners is a 'premises' . 13. Sri Sanjay Gowda, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that when this understanding of the word 'premises' is incorporated into Section 2(3)(g) of the 1999 Act, it has to be held that the provisions of the 1999 Act are not applicable to a premises even if it is a vacant land used for non-agricultural purposes, but nevertheless, regarding a premises having a plinth area of not exceeding 14 square metres and is for commercial purpose. Submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that while the applicability of the 1999 Act is excluded in respect of a premises of the nature of vacant land if the user is for non-residential purpose, nevertheless, under the exception, it can be brought within the application of the 1999 Act, if it contains a building with a plinth area of less than 14 sq. mtrs. Learned Counsel submits that as the premises leased in favour of the tenant did not contain any building with any plinth area, but it was only a vacant land, the exception carved out in clause (g) of sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the 1999 Act is not applicable to the present case and therefore the Act does not apply to the premises which had been let out to the petitioners. 14. 14. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that the effect of this provision when read in conjunction with sub-section (3) of Section 70 of the 1999 Act, is to render a proceeding pending before the Court in respect of such premises to which the 1999 Act is not applicable, to abate automatically. Submission is that as on the date when the 1999 Act came into force, the rent revision petition which had been filed under Section 50 of the 1961 Act and which was pending before the Revisional Court, stood abated i.e., the proceedings lapsed and nothing more was pending before the Court thereafter. It is for this reason, learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that entertaining of the application by the Revisional Court made by the revisional petitioners under Section 5 of the 1999 Act and passing of an order in terms of the impugned order dated 22-9-2003 is an order without jurisdiction. Submission is that when there was no proceedings pending before the Court in terms of the operation of the provisions of Section 70(3) of the 1999 Act, and the Court did not have any jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter as provided for under the 1999 Act, passing of any order adverse to the interests of the petitioners thereafter is an act without authority of law and without jurisdiction; that the impugned order is a nullity in law, requires to be quashed and the petitioners can, for such purpose, definitely invoke jurisdiction of this Court even under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, assuming that any other provision is available, submission is that even assuming that a petition under Section 115 could have been filed, the present situation is one which calls for interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction also. 15. Learned Counsel for the petitioners also submits that the 1999 Act being a special enactment and the Court being a Court for the purpose of the 1999 Act, it is a Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the 1999 Act and if so, it cannot be construed as a Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of this expression as it occurs under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the petitioners are justified in bringing the matter before this Court invoking the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India u Mysore Paper Mills Limited, Bhadravathi, Shimoga District. 16. Learned Counsel submits that the respondents having taken advantage of an order passed without jurisdiction and which is nullity in law and thereafter having sought to effectuate that order by way of execution proceedings and the petitioners having been dispossessed from the premises, it is just and proper to set aside the order and also direct the respondents to restore the possession of the premises in favour of the petitioners, as a natural follow-up and consequence of allowing this petition. Learned Counsel for the petitioners therefore prays that this petition is to be allowed and the impugned order quashed and the respondents be ordered to put the petitioners back in possession of the premises in question. 17. Sri Raghupathy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents, countering such submissions, has firstly raised a preliminary objection. The preliminary objection is that this Court should not entertain a petition under Article 266/277 of the Constitution when the petitioner could have very well-availed the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of CPC; that the order passed by the Revisional Court even under Section 47 of the 1999 Act, which is corresponding to Section 50 of the 1961 Act, is by a Court subordinate to the High Court, as without any dispute, the Additional District Judge at Mysore is a Judge presiding over a Court subordinate to the High Court and even under the provisions of the 1999 Act, the Tribunal for the purpose of the Act, and even the Revisional Court is a Civil Court, as is obvious from the remedy of filing a revision petition under Section 115 of the CPC assuming that it is aggrieved by an order. In support of such submission, the learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of our High Court in the case of Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar. 18. In support of such submission, the learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the Full Bench decision of our High Court in the case of Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar. 18. Sri Raghupathy, learned Counsel for the respondents, submits that it is the consistent practice of this Court to decline exercise of writ jurisdiction whenever an aggrieved person has an alternative statutory remedy and more so when such remedy is available before this Court itself, the aggrieved person is relegated to avail of such remedy rather than entertaining a writ petition and therefore, this petition should be dismissed relegating the petitioners to avail the remedy under Section 115 of the CPC. 19. Submitting with regard to the merits of the matter, Sri Raghupathy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the premises is a vacant land without any building, with reference to which any plinth area can be measured, nevertheless, the provisions of the 1999 Act are applicable, inasmuch as the applicability of the Act, if one examines the same from the angle of Section 2(3)(g) of the 1999 Act can be taken as to all such premises wherein the plinth area does not exceed 14 sq. mtrs. though used for commercial purpose. Submission is that the 1999 Act is applicable even in respect of a commercial premises, which is not having any plinth area in the sense that the plinth area is zero which is less than 14 sq. mtrs. To understand the provision in this manner, learned Counsel for the respondents draws my attention to the very language of clause (g) of Section 2(3) and submits that the entire 'clause (g) is to be read as a whole as it is not punctuated or divided; that the applicability of the 1999 Act should be understood as covering all residential premises irrespective of the plinth area and commercial premises with plinth area of not more than 14 sq. mtrs. and if such understanding is to be applied, the 1999 Act will be applicable to all those premises when used for non-residential purposes and the plinth area is less than 14 sq. mtrs. and only when its plinth is more than 14 sq. mtrs., the 1999 Act is not applicable. Submission is that the 1999 Act becomes not applicable only when the plinth area exceeds 14 sq. mtrs. and not otherwise. mtrs. and only when its plinth is more than 14 sq. mtrs., the 1999 Act is not applicable. Submission is that the 1999 Act becomes not applicable only when the plinth area exceeds 14 sq. mtrs. and not otherwise. Learned Counsel for the respondents draws supports for such submission from the decision of this Court viz., Saptagiri Complex, Bangalore v Bhupathi Naidu1. Referring to para 19 of this decision, learned Counsel for the respondents points out that the observation is that where the plinth area is more than 14 sq. mtrs. and therefore the Act is not applicable. 20. The other decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondents is in the case of M. Mohan Bhat v K Vishwanath Kamath. Submission here again is that the Court has to lay stress on the words 'plinth area' for the purpose of holding as to whether the 1999 Act is applicable or not and therefore the examination of the question of applicability of the Act can only be with reference to a building having a plinth area of more than 14 sq. mtrs., in which event, the 1999 Act does not apply and if it is less than 14 sq. mtrs., the Act applies. Here again, I am afraid that reliance placed on the decision is totally misconceived, as the decision is not at all an authority to hold that the 1999 Act is made applicable to all premises so long as the plinth area does not exceed 14 sq. mtrs. This decision rendered in the context of the plinth area in an existing building being either within 14 sq, mtrs. or more than 14 sq. mtrs. The present situation is not one such, as there is no building at all and there is no plinth area. The decision is of no assistance to further the case canvassed on behalf of the respondents. 21. To say that if the plinth area is more than 14 sq. mtrs. and the Act is not applicable is begging the question. In fact, the decision is not an authority at all for the proposition propounded by the learned Counsel for the respondents. The proposition is that the 1999 Act is not applicable only when the plinth area exceeds 14 sq. mtrs., and not otherwise. mtrs. and the Act is not applicable is begging the question. In fact, the decision is not an authority at all for the proposition propounded by the learned Counsel for the respondents. The proposition is that the 1999 Act is not applicable only when the plinth area exceeds 14 sq. mtrs., and not otherwise. This is an argument to be rejected on the face of it, as the applicability of the Act is not at all made vis-a-vis plinth area and likewise non-applicability, but the plinth area is used with reference to a building and the situation where such building is in existence and used for commercial purpose and not that the 1999 Act is made applicable or not made applicable, depending upon the existence of a building with a plinth area less than 14 sq. mtrs. and a building with a plinth area of more than 14 sq. mtrs. 22. As is rightly contended by Sri Sanjay Gowda, leamed Counsel for the petitioners, the word 'premises' is not one to be understood with reference to the plinth area, which again is an expression that comes into play only when there is a building below or above 14 sq. mtrs. plinth area, but is to be understood on the very definition as in Section 3(i). Section 3(i) makes it very clear that any land not used for agricultural purpose, is a premise within the meaning of the 1999 Act. Non-applicability of the 1999 Act is with reference to any premises used for non-residential purpose. An exception is carved out here by excluding non-applicability of the land to a 'premises' having plinth area not exceeding 14 Sq. mtrs. That means it is only when a premises within it a building with a plinth area of less than 14 sq. mtrs., non-applicability of the 1999 Act is avoided, in the sense the Act again becomes applicable to it. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn my attention to the different situations and circumstances when the 1999 Act is made not applicable, as envisaged in clauses (a) to (h) of Section 2(3) of the 1999 Act; that the Legislature has consciously referred to the words 'building', 'premises' and to 'any tenancy', as and when the occasion needed and has maintained a conscious distinction amongst these words which are again defined under the Act itself. A premises and a building are not one and the same. 23. The existence of plinth area even under a common understanding is always with reference to a building and not with reference to any vacant land. A premises can be either a building or a vacant land. It may be a building with land also. In the present situation, we are only concerned with a land, as there is no dispute between the parties as to what was leased out was a vacant land. There was no building. If there is no building, there is no plinth area. If there is no plinth area and if it is only a vacant land, then in respect of a premises used for commercial purpose, the Act is not applicable in terms of Section 2(3)(g) of the 1999 Act. 24. Though Sri Raghupathy, learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of M.K. Salpekar v Sunil Kumar Shamsunder Chaudhari and Rajendra Nath Kar v Gangadas, in the context of interpretation of a sentence or phrase in a statute with or without punctuation and manner of understanding such provisions, I am afraid, these decisions are of no relevance for the present case. The provisions are quite straight and simple and when read in the light of the definition clause, one is not left with any doubt that in respect of a premises, which is in the nature of vacant land and used for non-residential purpose, the 1999 Act is not applicable, in terms of Section 2(3)(g) read with Section 3(i)(ii) of the 1999 Act. 25. Rules of interpretation are called in aid when there is ambiguity in the statutory provisions, when there is a need and scope for interpretation to bring clarity to the statutory provision or when a situation demands to give effect to the real object and purpose of the Act. 25. Rules of interpretation are called in aid when there is ambiguity in the statutory provisions, when there is a need and scope for interpretation to bring clarity to the statutory provision or when a situation demands to give effect to the real object and purpose of the Act. Though in this context the learned Counsel for the respondent has drawn by attention to the statement of objects and reasons to the 1999 Act, and has submitted that the stress laid here is about the need for the change in law with reference to building, it does not necessarily mean that even when there is no building and the provision does not speak of a situation without building then also, the relevant statutory provision should be understood as one intended for a building and one involving a building. The statement of objects are only a guide and if any ambiguity or doubt arises. But when the statute itself is clear, the question of calling in aid external agencies does not arise. What matters ultimately is what the law as it states and not what is intended or what was in mind earlier. However, in the present case, there is no conflict or ambiguity of such nature, as the Legislature has very clearly indicated as to what situation and to what premises the Act is applicable and to which premises the Act is not applicable. There is no ambiguity in understanding the word 'premises'. The word 'premises' itself is not defined and if the submissions and interpretations as is sought to be placed by the learned Counsel for the respondents in respect of the provisions of Section 2(3)(g) of the 1999 Act are to be accepted, it will only amount to doing violence to the statutory provisions and giving a different meaning and definitions to the word 'premises' contrary to what is actually defined in the Act itself in terms of Section 3(i)(ii) of the 1999 Act. It will only amount to rewriting the statutory provisions, which is neither the function of the Court nor is it necessary. 26. Sri Raghupathy, learned Counsel for the respondents has made one another submission that having regard to the view this Court has taken in the case of Mohd. It will only amount to rewriting the statutory provisions, which is neither the function of the Court nor is it necessary. 26. Sri Raghupathy, learned Counsel for the respondents has made one another submission that having regard to the view this Court has taken in the case of Mohd. Shabbir v State of Maharashtra, and if I am to take a view that is contrary to this view, then the matter should be referred to a Division Bench rather than deciding the case here. Learned Counsel for the respondents also submits that where a case involved interpretation of some of the statutory provisions of considerable importance and application to a large number of cases, it is a matter of practice of this Court to refer such matters to a Division Bench so that a wider debate may ensue and that the Court may have the assistance of large number of Counsel etc. 27. In the first instance, the submission proceeds on the premise that there is certain proposition as submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent in the decisions, which have been referred to and relied upon. I do not find any such proposition as is sought to be propounded by the learned Counsel for the respondents having been laid down in either of the two decisions. On the contrary, the decisions are not supportive of the proposition and if at all can be held to lay down a proposition at variance to the submissions. So far as the practice of referring matters to a larger Bench is concerned, while there is no guarantee that participation of a large number of Counsel necessarily adds to the quality of the debate, I do not find any such need or necessity in the present case, as the provisions that have come up for consideration are quite simple, straight and understandable on a mere reading of them. It is not necessary to complicate things when it can be resolved rather easily, conveniently and expeditiously. Therefore, the request of the learned Counsel for the respondents is rejected. 28. It is not necessary to complicate things when it can be resolved rather easily, conveniently and expeditiously. Therefore, the request of the learned Counsel for the respondents is rejected. 28. In the circumstances and as discussed above, I find that the order passed by the Revisional Court, which is under challenge in this writ petition, is one without jurisdiction, is an order passed when no proceedings in the eye of law were pending before the Court, as the revision petition that had been preferred under Section 50 of the 1961 Act stood abated in terms of Section 70(3) of the 1999 Act on and after the 1999 Act came into force. The learned revisional Judge was not enabled to pass any orders more so for varying the order that had been passed by the Rent Control Court in terms of order dated 23-6-1995. The order dated 23-6-1995 could not have been varied or modified in any manner by the Revisional Court on and after 31-12-2001 and an order passed without jurisdiction is an order which is nullity in the eye of law and calls for being quashed. 29. Though the learned Counsel for the petitioners had raised a preliminary objection regarding exercise of writ jurisdiction, I find, on the other hand, a compelling need to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as the Article is meant for supervising the functions of all Courts and Tribunals in the State, in the sense to keep the subordinate Courts and Tribunals within their bounds. Whenever it is noticed that a Court or Tribunal within the State has exceeded its jurisdiction, acts without jurisdiction or in a patently illegal manner, it is the duty of the High Court to correct it to ensure that the Court or the Tribunal acts within its bounds and it matters very little as to in which jurisdiction this is achieved. 'Whether it is achieved in the revisional or writ jurisdiction, it matters not much. The procedure cannot be given grater weightage than the substance of the matter. In fact, while there is no embargo on the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in respect of such matters, it is only a matter of prudence when effective alternative statutory remedy by way of appeal is available, the Court refrains from exercising the writ jurisdiction. In fact, while there is no embargo on the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India in respect of such matters, it is only a matter of prudence when effective alternative statutory remedy by way of appeal is available, the Court refrains from exercising the writ jurisdiction. While the availability of a revisional jurisdiction is not always considered to be an efficacious remedy and even though the learned Counsel for the respondents would like to point out that the Full Bench having taken the view in the context of as to what can be construed as a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 115 of the CPC, the question docs not really arise in the present case, as I am fully satisfied that the present is a fit case for exercising jurisdiction even under Article 227 of the Constitution, notwithstanding the availability of other remedies etc. 30. The only other question that remains is as to what should happen on the quashing of the impugned order. It is not in dispute that the respondents have derived advantage under the impugned order by implementing the same and dispossessing the petitioners from the premises in question and are in possession of the premises as of now and that is how during the pendency of the petition the petitioner had come up with an application for restoring the possession to them etc. 31. Though certain technical objections are raised on the scope and applicability of Section 144 of the CPC and as to whether it should be filed separately and before the Court of first instance etc., I am of the view that when once this Court finds that the Revisional Court had acted without jurisdiction in passing the impugned order and the respondents have derived the benefit under such order, the position ante should be restored at the earliest. No person can be permitted to take advantage of an order, which is a nullity in the eye of to the detriment of an aggrieved complaining person. If the impugned-order deserves to be quashed as one without jurisdiction, necessarily relief should be extended to the petitioners, who have been dispossessed under such illegal order, in the course of implementing the order. The power of this Court under Article 227 is wide enough for such purpose also. 32. If the impugned-order deserves to be quashed as one without jurisdiction, necessarily relief should be extended to the petitioners, who have been dispossessed under such illegal order, in the course of implementing the order. The power of this Court under Article 227 is wide enough for such purpose also. 32. In the result, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned order is quashed and the respondents are hereby directed to restore the possession of the premises in question to the petitioners within a period of one month from today. Rule made absolute. Parties to bear their respective costs.