A. K. GANGULY, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has been filed by Food Corporation of india (hereinafter called F. C. I.) and its officers impugning a Judgment and order dated 17. 8. 2000 passed by a learned Judge of the Writ Court. Similar nine appeals have been by F. C. I. and others against the same judgment. All these appeals were heard together and are disposed of by the common Judgment delivered in this case. ( 2 ) THE material facts of this case that the writ petitioners in the connected writ petitions were appointed to the posts of typists on relaxed norms of speed and purely on temporary basis for a period not exceeding one year. The person so appointed was required to appear in a speed test within one year from the date of joining. Further terms of such appointment were if the person concerned qualified in that speed test as per the F. C. I. (Staff) Regulation 1971, the person would be appointed on a regular basis. But in case the person fails to qualify the said skill test, his/her service will be terminated without assigning any reason or notice and without completion of one year. ( 3 ) THE fact that such appointment is purely temporary in nature has been emphasised more than once in the appointment letter. ( 4 ) IT is not in dispute that after appointment the writ petitioners failed to qualify themselves in the speed test. Their appointments were therefore terminated in terms of the Clause in the appointment letter. No grievance has been made before us that there was any fault or inaccuracy or error in assessing the performance of the petitioners in the speed test. ( 5 ) SEVERAL points were urged before the learned Trial Judge and which appear from the Judgment under appeal. ( 6 ) BEFORE the learned Trial Judge a grievance was made by the writ petitioners that terms of the appointment letter were unreasonable and harsh and that the writ petitioners should not have been subjected to the second skill test as the writ petitioners were appointed on relaxed norms for encouraging appointment of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled tribes and OBC candidates in accordance with the Government policy. It was also contended by the writ petitioners that they had to sign on the dotted lines and they had no meaningful choice in the matter. It was also contended by the writ petitioners that they had to sign on the dotted lines and they had no meaningful choice in the matter. In this case reliance was placed on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojonath ganguly, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571 . The learned Trial Judge did not accept the aforesaid grievance made on behalf of the writ petitioners and the learned Judge held that there was no illegality or irrationality on the part of F. C. I. in putting terms for further suitability test. The learned Judge also held that F. C. I. in the advertisement stipulated maximum speed of 40 words per minute as a minimum requirement conforming to its own regulation and at any point of time no assurance was given to the writ petitioners for relaxed norms or standards. The learned Judge found that F. C. I. was generous to extend a concession to the writ petitioners by departing from its own policy and as such it was unfair on the part of the writ petitioners to take advantage of such concession and then complain about the same. The learned Judge also noted that nowhere F. C. I. represented that such concession will continue. Apart from that the learned Judge held that once writ petitioners have accepted the terms and conditions of appointment and acted upon the same, it must be presumed that they have been satisfied with those terms or else they could have come and complained against those terms. The learned Judge also held that the writ petitioners appeared in the second suitability test so they cannot contend to the contrary. The principles in the case of Brojonath are therefore not attracted in the facts of this case. ( 7 ) IN this appeal no cross-objection has been filed by the writ petitioners against those findings of the learned Judge. Therefore, the finding of the learned Judge on the aforesaid point has been accepted by them. All those findings of the learned Judge are in favour of F. C. I. and as appellant, F. C. I. has obviously not challenged those findings. Therefore, the finding of the learned Judge on the aforesaid point has been accepted by them. All those findings of the learned Judge are in favour of F. C. I. and as appellant, F. C. I. has obviously not challenged those findings. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for F. C. I. on the other hand, has challenged various findings of the learned Judge where the learned Judge held that even though the appointment was made temporary but still then inquiry for dismissal was necessary as the order of dismissal was stigmatic. The learned Judge held that the writ petitioners were dismissed on the ground of unsuitability and such finding will definitely affect the future prospects of the writ petitioners. So it was incumbent upon F. C. I. to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. The learned Judge also held that the impugned orders, against the writ petitioners being stigmatic, such orders could not have been passed without holding an inquiry or giving an opportunity to the writ petitioners. The learned Judge came to the conclusion that the letter of appointment, issue by F. C. I. , amounts to an appointment on probation. The learned Judge also found that the time of one year, which is given in the appointment letter is not rigid. The learned Judge also held that their appointment was for a limited period and it was an appointment with the right to be regularised and therefore, it was an appointment on probation. As such, the learned Judge held that the appointments have been made under Regulation 15 of F. C. I. Staff Regulations, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulation") and the writ petitioners are entitled to the protection provided under Regulation 15. The said regulation speaks of 30 days prior notice of termination or one month's salary in lieu of notice before effecting termination. Since the said statutory protection was not followed in this case, the learned Judge held that the impugned termination orders were passed in violation of regulation 15 and those orders were held to be arbitrary and mala fide. The learned Judge therefore quashed the impugned orders of termination ancl directed the F. C. I. authorities to reinstate the petitioners in their respective posts and directed the F. C. I. authorities to pay 50% of the salaries to the petitioners from the date of resumption of their duties. The learned Judge therefore quashed the impugned orders of termination ancl directed the F. C. I. authorities to reinstate the petitioners in their respective posts and directed the F. C. I. authorities to pay 50% of the salaries to the petitioners from the date of resumption of their duties. The learned Judge also held that the petitioners shall be subjected to a further test within 6 months from the date of reinstatement and in the event the petitioners are found suitable they shall be regularised and confirmed in the services. However, if the candidates are found unsuitable then he/she may be terminated after holding an inquiry and after giving an opportunity of being heard. The writ petition was allowed to the extent aforesaid. ( 9 ) CHALLENGING the aforesaid finding of learned Judge the learned counsel for F. C. I. submitted that the learned Judge erred in law by holding that the impugned order of appointment was one under clause 15 of the said Regulation. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel urged by referring to Regulation 15 that every person, who is appointed to any post in the said corporation under sub-clause (a) of clause (i) of Regulation 7 shall be required to be on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment. The learned counsel submitted that the appointments of the writ petitioners were not made under sub-clause (a) of clause (i) of Regulation 7. The learned counsel further submitted that sub-clause (a) of clause (i) of regulation 7 shows that regular appointment in the services of corporation, in accordance with the modes specified in column 4 of the table set out in the appendix-1 are to be made by way of (a) Promotion; (b) Direct recruitment and (c) Transfer on deputation. The learned counsel by referring to the orders of appointment stated that those orders clearly show that that those appointments were purely temporary in nature and made on relaxed norms and those were not appointments in accordance with the modes prescribed in column 4 of the appendix-1. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel submitted that from a perusal of the terms of the appointment letter it is clear that such appointments were made in accordance with Regulation 7 (3) and clause (c) of the said Regulation. ( 11 ) THE learned counsel submitted that from a perusal of the terms of the appointment letter it is clear that such appointments were made in accordance with Regulation 7 (3) and clause (c) of the said Regulation. Clause 7 (3) of the Regulation says, "notwithstanding anything contained in this Regulation, appointment may be made to any post in the corporation on ad hoc basis" and clause (c) provides "on a purely temporary basis for a period not exceeding one year". ( 12 ) READING the aforesaid clauses namely clause 7 (3) (c) of the said regulation, this Court is of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is correct that appointments of the petitioners were made in terms of clause 7 (3) (c) of the said Regulation and not under Regulation 15. This Court is coming to the conclusion that the appointments of the petitioners are not regular appointment in terms of regulation 7 (i) (a) nor are such appointments made by way of promotion or direct recruitment or by way of transfer on deputation. Therefore, clause 15 of the said Regulation has no application in the present case. We are constrained to take the view that the learned Trial judge has possibly misconstrued the provision of clause 15 of the said regulation in its application to the facts of this case. ( 13 ) SINCE this Court holds that clause 15 does not apply to the appointments of the petitioners as they are not regularly appointed under sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Regulation 7, the petitioners are not required to be on probation. We therefore cannot uphold the finding of the learned Judge that the writ petitioners on appointment must be treated to be on probation. ( 14 ) LOOKING at the order of termination, it is difficult for this Court to hold that the same fastens a stigma on the writ petitioners. The recitals contained in a termination order are mostly about the terms of employment offered to the writ petitioners. ( 14 ) LOOKING at the order of termination, it is difficult for this Court to hold that the same fastens a stigma on the writ petitioners. The recitals contained in a termination order are mostly about the terms of employment offered to the writ petitioners. The relevant clause relating to termination is as follows :" (ii) This appointment is made on relaxed norms of speed, hence he/she is appointed purely on temporary basis for a period not exceeding one year and he/she is required to appear in the speed test within one year from the date of his/her joining and if he/she qualifies in the skill/speed test with the requisite speed as per the f. C. I. (Staff) Regulation, 1971 he/she may be appointed on regular basis. In case he/she could not qualify the said skill test his/her services will be terminated without assigning any reason any notice and without waiting for completion of the tenure of one year. " ( 15 ) THE termination order has been passed as the petitioners failed to qualify in the speed test. The fact that the writ petitioners failed to qualify in the speed test has not been contested by the writ petitioners. In the entire body of the termination order even the word 'unsuitable' has not been used. It is also nobody's case that the order is couched innocuously but the attending circumstances bring out the stigma. No such argument was advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners. ( 16 ) ON behalf of the writ petitioners a very passionate argument was advanced urging that the Court should insist that the F. C. I. must adopt a very relaxed norm in dealing with the case of the writ petitioners who are members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. It was urged that adopting such a relaxed norm is in accord with the Constitutional goal. It was also argued that speed as per F. C. I. (Staff) Regulation 1971 is 40 words per minute. So no relaxation was granted. This argument was negatived by the learned Trial Judge and the learned Judge held that F. C. I. was generous in offering relaxed terms of appointment to the writ petitioners and once the writ petitioners accept employment on those terms, they cannot turn round and complain. So no relaxation was granted. This argument was negatived by the learned Trial Judge and the learned Judge held that F. C. I. was generous in offering relaxed terms of appointment to the writ petitioners and once the writ petitioners accept employment on those terms, they cannot turn round and complain. These findings of the learned Judge cannot be assailed before the Appeal Court by the writ petitioners who did not either file any appeal or cross appeal against these findings of the learned Judge. ( 17 ) MR. Moitra, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners, however, referred to Government of India's Office Memorandum dated 17. 10. 86. That was a Memorandum for relaxation of Educational qualification of scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. Mr. Moitra referred to Clause (ii) of the Memorandum, which is as follows :" (ii) In case of direct recruitment through an examination or an interview, the selecting authority shall determine the minimum standard for purpose of selection at the examination or at the interview". ( 18 ) THE said Clause does not at all help the case of the writ petitioners. ( 19 ) MR. Moitra also referred to a Supplementary affidavit which was affirmed and filed in Court in the course of hearing the appeal. That affidavit shows that an advertisement was inserted by the F. C. I. , the appellant for recruiting typists of and for persons belonging to Scheduled caste and Scheduled tribe category, 30 words per minute speed is required. This Court fails to appreciate the relevance of this notification issued by F. C. I. to the facts of the present case. It has already been noted that the terms of employment offered by F. C. I. in this case has been approved by the learned single Judge and there is no cross appeal. Therefore a subsequent advertisement by F. C. I. Cannot alter the points at issue in this appeal. ( 20 ) MR. Moitra also argues that the concerned advertisement, which is relevant, in this case binds F. C. I. The relevant advertisement shows that the required speed for the typists is 40 words per minute. So this advertisement binds the writ petitioners also and any argument to the contrary cannot be accepted by this Court. ( 20 ) MR. Moitra also argues that the concerned advertisement, which is relevant, in this case binds F. C. I. The relevant advertisement shows that the required speed for the typists is 40 words per minute. So this advertisement binds the writ petitioners also and any argument to the contrary cannot be accepted by this Court. ( 21 ) THE impugned orders of termination were also assailed by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners on the ground that prior to the passing of the said order no opportunity of hearing was given to the writ petitioners. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mazharul Islam Hashmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. , reported in (1979)4 SCC 537 . In that case employees were terminated in violation of the norms laid down in government circulars. The government circulars laid down that before determination of unsuitability of the personal hearing should be afforded. But the said norms were not followed. Therefore the Supreme Court held that since that opportunity was not afforded the impugned orders were quashed. The factual position is totally different here. There is no such circular as the one in the case of Mazharul Islam. Apart from that from the terms of appointment itself notice was given to the writ petitioners that they will have to qualify in the test within one year and failing which their services will be terminated. Admittedly the writ petitioners failed to qualify and their services were terminated. Therefore the writ petitioners had full notice of what was required of them. ( 22 ) THE other decision, which was cited on this point, was rendered in the case of Mohd. Rashid Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh and, Ors. , reported in 1979 (1) SCC 596 . In the case of Mohad Rashid Ahmed (supra)factual background was totally different. In that case it was held by the apex Court that by virtue of fiction contained in Rule 6 (2) (iv) of Uttar pradesh Palika (Centralised) Service Rules, 1966, the services of the appellant stood finally absorbed on 31st March, 1967 and the State government failed to pass necessary order before that date and subsequent amendment to the rules did not affect the vested right of the appellants on being absorbed. The Supreme Court held that in the background of these facts the subsequent order of termination passed by the State Government was vitiated as the appellant was not given any opportunity of being heard. In the instant case, it cannot be argued and it has not been argued by the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that the service of the writ petitioner stood absorbed. So the ratio in the case of Mohad. Rashid Ahmed (supra) has no application to the facts of this case. ( 23 ) RELIANCE was also placed on the Judgment in the case of Union carbide Corporation v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in AIR 1992 SC 248 . A question of hearing was considered in that case against the background of Mass Tort action. This Court is unable to appreciate the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the factual background of the present case. The facts of the present case do not have the remotest similarity to the facts in the case of Union Carbide (supra ). ( 24 ) RELIANCE was also placed on the Judgment in the case of V. P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2000 SC 1080 . In that case the services of probationers were terminated as the probationer "failed in the performance of his duties administratively and technically. " The learned Judge of Supreme Court held that termination of services of the probationer, with the aforesaid finding, is stigmatic in nature. Such an order of termination cannot be passed without giving the probationer an opportunity of hearing. Here again, the factual distinction is very clear. In this case the Court has already come to conclusion, for the reasons discussed above, that writ petitioners were not appointed on probation. So, the entire argument which has been built up on the basis that the writ petitioners were appointed on probation, is misconceived. Apart from that in the instant case the order of termination does not contain any recital which is comparable to the ones which are found in the case of V. P. Ahuja (supra) and which have been quoted above. So there is no question of giving any hearing to the writ petitioners. Apart from that in the instant case the order of termination does not contain any recital which is comparable to the ones which are found in the case of V. P. Ahuja (supra) and which have been quoted above. So there is no question of giving any hearing to the writ petitioners. ( 25 ) IN this case, this Court can refer to the Judgment of the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Jagadish Mitra v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in AIR 1964 SC 449 . The learned Judges of the Supreme Court made the position clear by saying that an appropriate authority terminating the service of a temporary servant possesses two powers; (a) it can discharge the temporary employment purporting to exercise its power under the terms of the contract or the relevant Rules. In such a case it would be a straight forward and direct case of discharge and nothing more; and (b) the authority can also act under its power to dismiss a temporary servant and make an order dismissal. In such a case Article 311 will apply. It would be true that in this case Article 311 will apply but the concept of reasonable opportunity would have applied if any order of dismissal had been passed. But the order of termination which has been passed in this case was passed in terms of clauses in the order of appointment so it was termination in terms of the contract between the writ petitioner and the FCI. Such an order of termination cannot be termed as dismissal or an order of termination with a stigma. As such the question of following the principle of natural justice and giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing does not apply. ( 26 ) FOR these reasons discussed above the appeal has to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The Judgment and order of the learned Judge of writ Court dated 17th August, 2000 is set aside. The writ petition is also dismissed. For Analogous Appeals several other appeals were filed by F. C. I impugning the aforesaid judgment and order. Since all the appeals arise out the aforesaid judgment of the learned Judge of the Writ Court and which is now set aside, all the appeals being Appeal Nos. The writ petition is also dismissed. For Analogous Appeals several other appeals were filed by F. C. I impugning the aforesaid judgment and order. Since all the appeals arise out the aforesaid judgment of the learned Judge of the Writ Court and which is now set aside, all the appeals being Appeal Nos. FMA 1636 of 2003, FMA 1632 of 2003, FMA 1631 of 2003, FMA 1629 of 2003, FMA 460 of 2001, FMA614 of 2004, FMA 1633 of 2003, FMA 461 of 2001 and FMA 462 of 2001 are allowed. There will be no order as to costs. If urgent xerox certified copy of this Judgment is applied for, the same may be given to the parties as early as possible. Writ petition dismissed