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Karnataka High Court · body

2005 DIGILAW 456 (KAR)

B. ASHWIN KUMAR v. MYSORE CITY CORPORATION

2005-07-12

HULUVADI G.RAMESH

body2005
( 1 ) THIS second appeal is by the plaintiffs being aggrieved by the concurrent findings of both the Courts below in dismissing the suit filed by them in O S No 936 of 1996 on the file of Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mysore and confirming the same in RA No 125 of 1998 by the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mysore by orders dated 28-2-1998 and 7-8-2000 respectively. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs in a suit filed before the Civil Court have sought for a declaration that the demand of ground rent, debris removal charges and drainage charges is unauthonsed and without sanction of law, which came to be insisted on the plaintiffs to pay along with the licence fee for issuance of building licence and they have also sought for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant-Corporation to issue building licence in respect of L W No 4695 of 1993-94 by charging reasonable licence fee The plaintiffs have sought for the licence to construct apartments consisting of 14 flats in the vacant site of one gowramma, the mother of the plaintiffs It is stated that when they applied for necessary licence to start the construction, an endorsement was issued on 1-3-1994 by the defendant-Corporation to pay a sum of Rs 20,212/- and thereafter, as the plan reqxiired some modification the plaintiffs took back the plan from the defendant and the same was submitted on 16-9-1995 Subsequently, after dragging the matter for one year the Engineering department sent the plan to the Town Planning authority who issued an endorsement dated 21-9-1996 asking the plaintiffs to pay Rs. 930/- The same was paid under protest Once again, the Engineering department of the defendant-Corporation prepared an endorsement demanding Rs 53,000/- during August 1996 and the same was not issued to the plaintiffs and further in the month of November 1996 the rate was revised and an endorsement was issued on 22-11-1996 demanding a sum of Rs 78,600/- for issuance of licence, which includes licence fee Rs 8,450/-, ground rent Rs 1,500/-, debris removal charges rs 39,200/- and drainage charges of Rs 29,450/- According to the plaintiffs, under the statute, the defendant-Corporation is not authorised to collect other charges other than the licence fee of Rs 8,450/- The said suit was contested by the defendant-Corporation stating that the collection of the said fees is as per the decision taken by the defendant in the resolution No 64 of 1993-94, dated 27-4-1993 and as per the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and thereby it has tried to justify the action taken and also contended that the suit itself is not maintainable Based on the above pleadings, the Trial Court has framed as many as six issues and ultimately, it has dismissed the suit holding that the suit is not maintainable and that the defendant-Corporation is authorised to collect the fees as per Section 299 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act. As against it, an appeal was preferred before the Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), mysore in R. A. No. 125 of 1998. On reappreciation of the evidence, the learned Judge has dismissed the appeal filed by the plaintiffs. Hence this second appeal. ( 3 ) AT the time of admission of this appeal, this Court on 18-4-2001 had raised the following substantial question of law for consideration: "whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there was any sanction of law to raise a demand of Rs. 78,600/- for grant of permission under Section 301 of the Karnataka Municipal corporations Act, 1976?" ( 4 ) HEARD the Counsel for the respective parties on the substantial question of law raised. 78,600/- for grant of permission under Section 301 of the Karnataka Municipal corporations Act, 1976?" ( 4 ) HEARD the Counsel for the respective parties on the substantial question of law raised. ( 5 ) AT the outset, it is the submission of the learned Counsels for the appellants that, in the absence of any empowering provision under the statute the defendant-Corporation was not authorised to collect any such charges for the ground rent, for removal of debris and for drainage connection although, they may be entitled to collect the licence fee as is provided under the Act. In this regard, the Counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon the rulings in A. V. Laxman v State of karnataka , Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority v Sharadkumar jayantikumar Pasawalla and Others , Doctors' Forum (Registered), puttur, Dakshina Kannada District v Town Municipal Council, Puttur, dakshina Kannada District and Another, and Karnataka State Road transport Corporation v State of Karnataka, to standby his contention and further submitted that even according to Section 443 of the karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, it refers to collection of fees only, in the form of licence fee and it does not empower the defendant-Corporation to collect the fees on other heads either by way of resolution or on any other aspect without there being sanction of law. ( 6 ) PER contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent-Corporation has submitted that the Corporation is empowered under the law not only to collect the licence fee but also some other fees or charges towards the object it has got to be achieved such as, the service to be rendered in future i. e. , as a condition precedent to issue licence, removal of debris left out, at the behest of the corporation etc. , and also the ground belonging to the Corporation will also be utilised for dumping the materials at the time of construction, so also, on the completion of construction naturally and necessarily there has to be a drainage connection to the apartments that will be put up and thereby the services of the Corporation would be utilised and the same is imposed by virtue of resolution passed by the Corporation in the meeting held during the year 1993-94, which is subject to revision annually or by annually and further submitted that in this regard the very Corporations Act authorises the Corporation to collect such fees as is essential. She also tried to rely upon the ruling in K. T. Appanna v corporation of the City of Bangalore, to contend that the bye-law is not necessarily required, if it is the resolution of the Corporation, such fees would be collected and further submitted that in the catena of decisions of the Apex Court it has distinguished and held the Act of Corporation in imposing the fees as permissible and in support of her argument, she has also relied upon the rulings in Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others v Mohd. Yasin; City Corporation of Calicut v Thachambalath sadasivan and Others; Secunderabad-Hyderabad Hotel Owners' association and Others v Hyderabad Municipal Corporation and another ; B. S. E. Brokers' Forum, Bombay and Others v Securities and exchange Board of India and Others, Corporation of Calcutta and another v Liberty Cinema and Municipal Council, Madurai u R. Narayanan. Further referring to Section 443 (2) of the Karnataka municipal Corporations Act, it is submitted that the relevant provision for collection of fees is not the one under Section 301 of the Act as pointed out before the Courts below, but it is one under Section 443 which authorises collection of licence fee in general at the rate per unit basis and since the licence was sought for to put up construction of 14 apartments on the rate per unit/square basis, the Corporation has charged the same fee as the resolution is passed in that regard by the corporation which forms the basis for the imposition/collection of the charges in addition to licence fees. Further submitted that in view of the ratio laid down in the catena of decisions, it is not beyond the purview of the Corporation to collect such fees as it is authorised by such resolution and it is also very well-recognised by the Division Bench decision of this court that not necessarily there should be a bye-law. ( 7 ) ARTICLE 265 of the Constitution of India refers to, Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law, which reads thus: "no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law". ( 8 ) BOTH the Courts below referring to Sections 299 and 301 of the karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, held that the Corporation was entitled to issue demand notice asking for payment of licence fee and other charges. However, it would be appropriate to quote Section 299, which reads thus:"if any person intends to construct or reconstruct a building, he shall send to the Commissioner an application in writing for permission to execute the work together with a site plan of the land, ground plan, elevations and sections of the building, a specification of the work and such other documents as may be prescribed". Section 301 provides for, period within which the Commissioner has to grant or refuse to grant permission to execute the work. Both these provisions referred to, only provides for an application to be submitted for the purpose of issuance of licence and it is for the commissioner to act upon whether to grant or refuse the licence within the time stipulated and within the stipulated period if no such licence is granted, then it has to go before the standing committee on the application by the applicant seeking for an approval. Section 303 provides for, grounds on which approval or permission to construct building may be refused. ( 9 ) IN the instant case, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that Section 299 or 301 of the Karnataka municipal Corporations Act are not relevant provisions insofar as collection of licence fee is concerned and rather Section 443 is the enabling provision which provides for the collection of licence fees and other fees. It would be appropriate to quote Section 443 of the Act which reads thus:"443. It would be appropriate to quote Section 443 of the Act which reads thus:"443. General provisions regarding licences registrations and permissions.- (1) Every licence or permission granted under this Act or any rule or bye-law made under it shall specify the period, if any, for which and the restrictions, limitations and conditions subject to which the same is granted and shall be signed by the Commissioner. (2) (a) Save as otherwise expressly provided in or may be prescribed under this Act for every such licence or permission fees shall be paid in advance on such units and at such rates as may be fixed by the Corporation: provided that not more than one fee shall be levied in respect of any purpose specified in more heads than one of Schedule X if such heads form part of a continuous process of manufacture and the fee so charged shall not exceed the highest fee chargeable in respect of any of the said purposes. (b) The Corporation may compound for any period not exceeding three years at a time with the owner of any mill or factory for a certain sum, to be paid in lieu of the fees payable in respect of such mill or factory. (c) Every order of the Commissioner or other municipal authority granting or refusing a licence or permission shall be published on the notice board of the Corporation". ( 10 ) OF course, reading of Section 443 makes out that the Corporation is entitled to collect such fees in issuance of licence or permission as is authorised by the Act by way of enacting the rule or bye-law. Further, it is also seen that Section 443 provides for provisions regarding licences, registrations and permissions. The word licences in general refers to the licence to construct the house in addition to other types of licences which are being issued by the Corporation in respect of manufacturing units as is provided under Schedule X of the Act. What is prohibited under proviso is only not more than one fee shall be levied in respect of any purposes specified in more heads than one of Schedule X which is referable to manufacturing units. The same cannot be imported to hold that the Corporation cannot impose and collect fees than for licences. What is prohibited under proviso is only not more than one fee shall be levied in respect of any purposes specified in more heads than one of Schedule X which is referable to manufacturing units. The same cannot be imported to hold that the Corporation cannot impose and collect fees than for licences. As per Clause II it is empowers Corporation to fix the fees and to collect the fees in advance on such units and at such rates. Such unit refers to in the context not necessarily to the units like the manufacturing units or to the house for which the licence fee is collected to grant permission. It also extends to such units for which the Corporation extends its services or in the alternative there would be benefit in the form of quid pro quo extended by the Corporation on collection of such fees on such units. In this context, it refers to the utilisation of the drainage on such construction of the house by discharge of effluence, waste water and also utilisation of the ground of Corporation for dumping the material for construction and also the debriment. Further, the removal of debriment by the Corporation to maintain the cleanness of the city thereby, extending the service for such removal of waste on the above items/units on which fees has been fixed is with a definite purpose for the service rendered or to be rendered and that the collection of fees as is demanded is on the pro rata basis having regard to the extent of the construction the plaintiffs are undertaking. ( 11 ) AT this juncture, it is the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants that although Section 443 is indicative of issuance of licence etc. , it is only restricted to collection of licence fees and also referable to items mentioned in Schedule Xi. e. , on manufacturing units as provided under Schedule X and not to the licence fee in respect of the construction of house and also on other items and submitted further that Chapter XV deals with the regulation of the buildings. , it is only restricted to collection of licence fees and also referable to items mentioned in Schedule Xi. e. , on manufacturing units as provided under Schedule X and not to the licence fee in respect of the construction of house and also on other items and submitted further that Chapter XV deals with the regulation of the buildings. As such, Section 443 contemplated under Chapter XXI is not referrable to licence fee in respect of construction of the houses and also not to any other fees as is issued in the demand notice issued by the respondent-Corporation, as it is not backed by law or bye-law for that matter. ( 12 ) IN the decision in A. V. Laxman's case, referring to the levy of water cess and ring road surcharge by the BDA, this Court has held that it is well-settled principle of law that no tax or duty or cess can be levied or collected except by the authority of law. Any fees or cess or whatever may be imposed i. e. , levied by virtue of an executive order is invalid in law. The planning authority could not support its action of levy and collection of water cess and ring road surcharge under any statutory provision without deriving support from the executive order. ( 13 ) IN the decision in Doctors' Forum's case, referring to Section 256 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, in the said case wherein levy of cess on nursing home was challenged on the ground that Municipality has no authority of law to impose such licence fee. In the said context, in the representation made by the petitioner not to impose such licence fee where there is no authority of law, the Municipality replied requesting the petitioner to pay the licence fee and to assist them in the development of municipal area and thereafter, it issued a notice as per section 256 (a) and (b) calling upon the petitioner to secure the licence in order to run the clinic and nursing home and in default of which appropriate action would be taken. Section 256 (a) provided for premises not to be used for certain purposes without licence. Section 256 (a) provided for premises not to be used for certain purposes without licence. In the said context, this Court has observed that the municipality is purported to have acted under Section 256 and imposed the licence fee and imposition of licence fee for the use of the premises is for the purpose enumerated in Part I of schedule XIII wherein, the use of the premises in dangerous to life, health or property or likely to cause nuisance. Stating that it is not the case of the municipality that running clinics and nursing homes in any premises is either dangerous to life, health or property or likely to cause nuisance, held that no fee or any tax shall be levied except with the authority of law and what is permissible under Part I of Schedule XIII is only as indicated above and the schedule is silent in respect of clinics and nursing homes and any imposition of fee against them is without authority of law. ( 14 ) IN the decision in Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority's case, the Apex Court has held thus:"in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee Such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. Delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. Since there is no express provision in the Gurajat Town Planning and Urban Development act, 1976 for imposition of fee and the State Government has not delegated any such power to the Development Authority to impose fees for development, the regulations framed for such imposition of fees and the demands made therefore are wholly unauthorised and illegal". ( 15 ) IN the decision in K. T. Appanna's case, referring to Municipal corporations Act, a Division Bench of this Court has held that Section 297 fixes the licence and there is no other provision under the Act save section 385 (2) which provides for a prescription of fee for that licence. ( 15 ) IN the decision in K. T. Appanna's case, referring to Municipal corporations Act, a Division Bench of this Court has held that Section 297 fixes the licence and there is no other provision under the Act save section 385 (2) which provides for a prescription of fee for that licence. Section 367 of the Act authorises bye-laws to be made for various purposes, it does not enumerate the prescription of fee for a licence under Section 297 as one of the purposes for which the bye-law could be made for that purpose. If that be the position and Section 385 (2) is the only section which authorises the fixation of fees and sub-section says that fee may be fixed by the Corporation, what is more than perfectly manifest would therefore be that fixation of fee for a licence under section 297 is what may be made by the Corporation in the exercise of power conferred under Section 385 (2) and that it may so fix the fee by passing a resolution to that eifect. ( 16 ) IN the decision in City Corporation of Calicut's case, the Apex court has held thus. "it is thus well-settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that' those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee is satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee". ( 17 ) IN the decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi's case, it is held thus:"what do we learn from these precedents? We learn that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee, though broadly a tax is a compulsory exaction as part of a common burden, without promise of any special advantages to classes of tax payers whereas a fee is a payment for services rendered, benefit provided for privilege conferred. We learn that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee, though broadly a tax is a compulsory exaction as part of a common burden, without promise of any special advantages to classes of tax payers whereas a fee is a payment for services rendered, benefit provided for privilege conferred. Compulsion is not the hall-mark of the distinction between a tax and a fee. That the money collected does not got into a separate fund but goes into the consolidated fund does not also necessarily make a levy a tax. Though a fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. Further, neither the incidence of the fee nor the service rendered need be uniform. That others besides those paying the fees are also benefited does not detract from the character of the fee. In fact, the special benefit or advantage to the payers of the fees may even be secondary as compared with the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Nor is the court to assume the role of a cost accountant. It is neither necessary nor expedient to weight too meticulously the cost of the services rendered etc , against the amount of fees collected so as to evenly balance the two A broad correlationship is all that is necessary Quid pro quo in the strict sense is not the one and only true index of a fee, nor is it necessanly absent in a tax" ( 18 ) IN the decision in Corporation of Calcutta, the Supreme Court has held thus"section 443 of the Act provides that no person shall without a licence granted by the Corporation keep open any cinema-house for public amusement. It, however, does not say that any fee is to be paid for the licence But sub-section (2) of Section 548 says that for every licence under the Act, a fee may, unless otherwise provided, be charged at such rate as may from time to time be provided In 1948 the Corporation had fixed the scale of fees on the basis of the annual valuation of the cinema-houses made by a method which does not appear on the record The respondent had under these sections obtained a licence for its cinema-house and had been paying a licence fee calculated on the aforesaid basis the fee so calculated was Rs. 400/- per year"further, it has held in para (8) that Section 548 does not use the word 'fee', but it uses the words 'licence fee' and those words do not necessarily mean a fee in return of service In fact, in our constitution, fee for licence and fee for service rendered or contemplated have different kinds of levy The former is not entitled to be a fee for service rendered Further, in para (31), it is observed thus "the portion in the judgment in Union of India and Others v M/s bhanamal Gulzarimal Limited and Others, AIR 1960 SC 475 (1960)2 SCR 627 , quoted in the preceding paragraph will show that the validity of the guidance required to make delegation of power good cannot be judged by a stereotyped rule With respect, we entirely agree with this view The guidance furnished must be held to be good if it leads to the achievement of the object of the statute which delegated the power The validity of the power to fix rates of taxes delegated to the Corporation by Section 548 of the act must be judged by the same standard Now there is no dispute that all taxes, including the one under this section can be collected and used by the Corporation only for discharging its functions under the Act The Corporation, subject to certain controls with which we are not concerned, is an autonomous body It has to perform various statutory functions It is often given power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be performed For all this it needs money and its needs will vary from time to time with the prevailing exigencies Its power to collect tax, however, is necessarily limited by the expenses required to discharge those functions It has, therefore, where rates have not been specified in the statute, to fix such rates as may be necessary to meet its needs That, we think, would be sufficient guidance to make the exercise of its power to fix the rates valid. The case is as if the statute had required the corporation to perform duties A, B and C and give power to levy taxes to meet the costs to be incurred for the discharge of these duties and then said that, "provided, however, that the rates of the taxes shall be such as would bring into the Corporation's hands the amount necessary to defray the costs of discharging the duties". We should suppose, this would have been a valid guidance. We think the Act in the present case impliedly provides the same guidance: See Section 127 (3) and (4 ). It would be impracticable to insist on a more rigid guidance. In the case of a self-governing body with taxing powers, a large amount of flexibility in the guidance to be provided for the exercise of that power must exist. It is hardly necessary to point our that, as in the cases under Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, so in the case of a big municipality like that of Calcutta, its needs would depend on various and changing circumstances. There are epidemics, influx of refugees, labour strikes, new amenities to be provided for, such as hospitals, schools - and various other such things may be mentioned - which make it necessary for a colossal municipal Corporation like that of Calcutta to have a large amount of flexibility in its taxing powers. These considerations lead us to the view that Section 548 is valid legislation. There is sufficient guidance in the Act as to how the rate of the levy is to be fixed". ( 19 ) IN the decision in Municipal Council's case, referring to Article 265 of the Constitution, it is held that that the authority to justify levy of fee must render some special service to the category from whom the money is exacted and the total sum so collected must have a reasonable correlation to the cost of such services. Where the dual basic features are absent, the authority cannot legally claim from the licensee under the label 'fee'. ( 20 ) THE validity of the licence required for delegation of power cannot be judged by a stereo typed rule. The guidance furnished must be held to be good if it leads to the achievement of the object of the statute which delegated the power. ( 20 ) THE validity of the licence required for delegation of power cannot be judged by a stereo typed rule. The guidance furnished must be held to be good if it leads to the achievement of the object of the statute which delegated the power. The Corporation, subject to certain controls, has to perform various statutory functions. It is often given power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be performed. For all this, it needs money and its needs will vary from time to time with the prevailing exigencies. Its power to collect tax, however, is necessarily limited by the expenses required to discharge those functions. It has therefore, where the rates are not specified in the statute, right to fix such rates as may be necessary to meet its needs. ( 21 ) THE ratio laid down in the above cited decisions relied upon by the counsel for the appellant, refers to a specific provision based on which the licence fee could be collected i. e. , the authority to justify levy of fee must render some special service and it must have a reasonable correlation to the cost of such services. Otherwise the authority cannot legally claim under the lable 'fee'. Even in the decision in Ahmedabad urban Development Authority's case, it is held the power of imposition of fees by the delegating authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fees. Further, as early as in the year 1963 itself, referring to the requirement of law or sanction of law so far as collection of fees is concerned, the Division bench of this Court has held that in the absence of any specific provision or statute or by way of bye-law to collect or impose licence fee, a resohition by the Corporation is enough. The question is whether the resolution passed by the Corporation stands the test of delegated legislation. What is being argued is that Section 443 specifically provides for collection of only licence fee and it does not permit collection of any such fees as is indicated with reference to drainage charges, ground rent charges and removal of debris charges. Of course, even the bye-law was not there at the relevant point of time. What is being argued is that Section 443 specifically provides for collection of only licence fee and it does not permit collection of any such fees as is indicated with reference to drainage charges, ground rent charges and removal of debris charges. Of course, even the bye-law was not there at the relevant point of time. Whether the resolution passed by the Corporation is in the form of delegated legislation or not is the question and in this regard the Division Bench of this Court has held that not necessarily there should be a bye-law. It is enough that even based on the resolution such a fee could be collected. ( 22 ) IN the decisions referred to above so far as collection of fees is concerned, it may not necessarily be on quid pro quo basis. Further, it is noticed that discretion is left to the Corporation/bodies to collect such fees as is necessary for development and maintenance of the corporation. In Calcutta Corporation's case referred to above, in para (31) the Apex Court has held that the Corporation has to perform various statutory functions. It is often given power to decide when and in what manner the functions are to be performed. To perform such functions it needs money and its needs will vary from time to time with the prevailing exigencies. Its power to collect tax, however, is necessarily limited by expenses required to discharge those functions. Therefore, its rates have not been specified in the statute. ( 23 ) THERE is no provision in the Act except under Section 385 (2) which is analogous to Section 443 of the present Act to collect fees other than licence fee. In the decision reported in K. T. Appanna's case, referring to the said section under the old Act, this Court has held that it provides for prescription of fees for licence. Section 367 of the Act had authorised bye-laws to be made for various purposes and it does not enumerate the prescription of a fee for licence under Section 297 as one of the purpose for which the bye-law could be made for the purpose. Section 367 of the Act had authorised bye-laws to be made for various purposes and it does not enumerate the prescription of a fee for licence under Section 297 as one of the purpose for which the bye-law could be made for the purpose. If that be the position, Section 385 (2) is the only section which authorises the fixing of fee and the sub-section says that fee may be fixed by the corporation, what is more perfectly manifest would therefore be that fixing of fee for a licence under Section 297 is what may be made by the corporation in exercise of power conferred under Section 385 (2) and that it may so fix the fee by passing a resolution to that effect ( 24 ) SECTION 385 (2) of the old Act has provided for the Corporation to exercise its power to fix the fees by passing a resolution Here the resolution is to be passed by the elected body based on the enabling provision under Section 443 of the new Act, such resolution is necessarily in the form of a delegated legislation Although the word 'resolution' does not specifically indicate a subordinate legislation, the extended meaning of delegated legislation also refer to such resolutions under such circumstances, the resolution passed by the Corporation forms the basis for the Corporation authorities to exact fees on such vanous items In this context, in the case on hand, by way of a resolution, the Corporation referring to the nature of the unit and its extent and also on the basis of utility of service by the plaintiff on such construction, discharging filth to the drainage and also accrual of debns on taking up such construction and utilisation of land belonging to the corporation for construction purpose, has fixed the rates In the circumstances, having regard to the fact that plaintiff had applied for permission for construction of fourteen plots, calculating the rates on a pro rata basis for each unit, the Corporation has fixed the rates and directed the plaintiff to pay the fees for vanous purposes, essentially the service is being extended in the form of drainage to release filth, water and also for future utilisation of land of the Corporation to store material and for removal of debris that would be accximulated after construction The fixation of such fees in addition to the licence fee, cannot be held to be without any basis and the resolution of the corporation which is in the form of a delegated legislation, enables the corporation authorities to collect such fees As such, the argument of the counsel for the appellant that there is no sanction of law cannot be accepted In view of the above discussion, the substantial question of law raised has to be answered in favour of the respondent However, if such rates fixed if found to be on higherside and exorbitant and unreasonable the same may be challenged before the appropnate forum as provided under the Act ( 25 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed Parties to bear their own costs However, the respondent-Corporation shall collect the fees as per the demand notice issued and to issue licence without resorting to charge at revised rates having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and also in view of the fact that the matter was under judicial scrutiny for all these years since 1996. --- *** --- .