L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANT No. 1 in O. S. No. 279 of 2003 on the file of the Court of the Junior Civil judge at Nuzvid is the petitioner. The suit was filed by the first respondent. Respondents 2 and 3 are defendants 2 and 3 in the suit. ( 2 ) THE first respondent was lessee of about Ac. 14. 00 of agricultural land belonging to the petitioner-temple since the year 1992. The petitioner served a notice on 01 -04-2003 calling upon the first respondent to vacate the land stating that by operation of section 82 of the A. P. Charitable and Hindu religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short "the Act"), the lease stood terminated. The first respondent filed the suit for the relief of perpetual injunction. He also filed I. A. No. 610 of 2003 for temporary injunction. Initially, an order of ex parte temporary injunction was passed on 18-08-2003. ( 3 ) THE petitioner filed a counter-affidavit in the I. A. stating that the lease in favour of the first respondent stood terminated and on receipt of the notice, he handed over the possession of the land on 05-04-2003. It was also pleaded that the auction of leasehold rights over the suit schedule property was conducted on 01-05-2003 and respondents 2 and 3 emerged as successful bidders therein. Taking these pleadings into account, the trial Court dismissed the I. A. , through an order dated 20-10-2003. ( 4 ) THE first respondent filed C. M. A. No. 34 of 2003 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, nuzvid, aggrieved by the dismissal of the I. A. He also filed I. A. No. 1270 of 2003 in the c. M. A. The lower appellate Court allowed i. A. No. 1270 of 2003 and granted temporary injunction pending the disposal of the C. M. A. Hence this C. R. P. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner, sri P. Sreenivas, submits that the lease in favourof the first respondent stood terminated by operation of Section 82 of the Act and that there was no basis for him to continue in the land. He contends that the first respondent vacated the land on 05-04-2003 and respondents 2 and 3 were inducted into possession as a result of the auction conducted on 01-05-2003. He contends that the first respondent vacated the land on 05-04-2003 and respondents 2 and 3 were inducted into possession as a result of the auction conducted on 01-05-2003. The learned counsel submits that there was no justification for the lower appellate Court in granting temporary injunction that too pending the c. M. A. , after hearing both the parties. To the same effect are the arguments of sri A. P. Venugopal appearing for respondents 2 and 3. ( 6 ) SRI Sreerama Krishnamurthy, the learned counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner did not follow the procedure stipulated under law for eviction of the first respondent and the lower appellate Court had only ensured that the first respondent be not evicted contrary to law, He further contends that the first respondent continues to be in possession of the suit schedule property and that the assertion as to delivery of the possession on 05-04-2003 is not true. ( 7 ) THE uncertainty as to the applicability of the provisions of the A. P. (Andhra Area) tenancy Act to the lands held by religious institutions was put at rest by a recent judgment of the Supreme Court. It was held that the provisions of the said Act do not apply to the lands held by the religious institutions. Section 82 of the Act was suitably amended and provided for automatic termination of existing leases in respect of the agricultural lands held by religious institutions. Rules were also framed to enforce the statutory termination of leases. It was in this context that the first respondent was issued a notice requiring him to vacate the land. The petitioner categorically asserts that the first respondent delivered possession on 05-04-2003. Thereafter, the leasehold rights were put to auction and respondents 2 and 3 emerged as successful bidders. ( 8 ) THE first respondent filed the suit for perpetual injunction and obtained an exparte order of temporary injunction. Once the trial court was informed of the developments that took place since 01 -04-2003 and the purport of the provisions of the Act, it dismissed the i. A. In thec. M. A. ,thefirst respondent filed an i. A. The lower appellate Court did not choose to grant any exparte injunction in the I. A. It ordered notice to the petitioner herein. Elaborate submissions were made. M. A. ,thefirst respondent filed an i. A. The lower appellate Court did not choose to grant any exparte injunction in the I. A. It ordered notice to the petitioner herein. Elaborate submissions were made. Since the C. M. A. was directed against an order passed in an application under Order XXXIX rule 1 C. P. C. the lower appellate Court ought to have disposed of the C. M. A. itself, once it heard the parties extensively. However, it has chosen to pass an order in the I. A. and kept the C. M. A. pending. Such a course of action does not accord with the settled procedure. ( 9 ) THE lower appellate Court had undertaken extensive discussion on two aspects viz. , payment of rents from time to time by the first respondent and non-initiation of proceedings before the competent authority under Section 83 of the Act. It proceeded on the assumption that even if the first respondent is to be treated as an encroacher, in view of the statutory termination of lease, he could have been evicted only through proceedings initiated under Section 83 of the act. It failed to add ress itself to the categorical assertion made by the petitioner that the first respondent delivered possession on 05-04-2003. The necessity to initiate proceedings under Section 83 of the Act would arise if only the erstwhile lessee continues to be an encroacher. Before recording the finding that the proceedings under Section 83 of the Act ought to have been initiated, the lower appellate Court was required to satisfy itself that the assertion on the part of the petitioner that the first respondent delivered possession on 05-04-2003 is factually incorrect. No such finding is discernible from the order under revision. ( 10 ) APART from these factual aspects, the courts below failed to notice an important provision of the Act. Section 151 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any suits on any matters, for adjudication of which, a provision is made. Admittedly, specific provisions are contained in the Act to deal with the grant of lease and termination thereof. Therefore, the maintainability of the suit itself becomes doubtful, in view of the bar contained under section 151 of the Act. Admittedly, specific provisions are contained in the Act to deal with the grant of lease and termination thereof. Therefore, the maintainability of the suit itself becomes doubtful, in view of the bar contained under section 151 of the Act. At any rate, the auction was conducted and successful bidders were inducted into possession months before the suit itself came to be filed. There was no occasion or basis for grant of an injunction in favour of the first respondent. ( 11 ) THEREFORE, the CRP is allowed and the order under revision is set aside. No costs.