JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. By this writ petition, the Petitioner has prayed for setting aside and quashing of an order by which his representation for change of date of birth, recorded in service book, has been rejected. 2. As per the averments made in the writ Petitioner, the Petitioner applied for the post of Lower Division Assistant (LDA) under the Respondents and in consideration of his suitability, he was appointed as such, way back in 1973. According to the Petitioner he had submitted, along with application, his school and matriculation certificates showing his age. 3. After the initial appointment of the Petitioner as LDA, he was further promoted to the higher ranks and finally earned his promotion as Head Assistant. According to the Petitioner, he could come to know in the recent past that he would retire from service w.e.f. 31.07.2005 on purported attainment of the age of superannuation. The Petitioner asserts that his actual date of retirement from service is 31.05.2009. 4. Further statement made in the writ petition is that after coming to know about the pre-mature retirement, he approached the office to ascertain the date of birth recorded in the service book and to his shock and surprise he could learn that the same was recorded, in the service book, as 21.04.1971 instead of 01.05.1951. 5. According to the Petitioner, he was not shown the service book as is required to be shown at periodical intervals. Placing reliance on the age recorded in the HSLC certificate, it is the case of the Petitioner that the date of birth ought to have been recorded as per the age recorded in the certificate. The representation submitted by the Petitioner to correct the date of birth was considered by the Respondents and has been rejected by the impugned order, dated 20.04.2005. The impugned order, dated 20.04.2005 reads as follows: Office of the Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council :: Jowai office order No. 867 of 2005 dated Jowai, the 20th April 05 In the matter of a representation for correction of the date of birth of an employee. Pursuant to the representation dt. 1.3.04 of Shri N. Dhar, Head Assistant, Political Department seeking permission to correct his date of birth, steps were taken to carefully examine the matter in hand based on the available records. Pursuant to the representation dt. 1.3.04 of Shri N. Dhar, Head Assistant, Political Department seeking permission to correct his date of birth, steps were taken to carefully examine the matter in hand based on the available records. Verification from his service Book proved that on 1974 Shri N. Dhar himself in his own handwriting has furnished all the requisite particulars at page 1 of his service book disclosing all his date of birth as on 21.7.47. Since it has been well established that Shri N. Dhar, in his own handwriting, has voluntarily disclosed at page 1 of the service Book his date of birth and all other bio-data as required therein which have also been duly accepted by the competent authority. And since through out these past 30 years, the Office has been made to accept and rely on these information which have been considered as document of truth, the Executive Committee, Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council, Jowai finds no sufficient grounds to consider his representation at this belated stage. His date of birth which he himself has voluntarily disclosed and recorded as on 21.7.47 is taken as correct for all intent and purpose. His representation stands accordingly disposed of. Sd/- S. Pd Secretary, Executive Committee, Jaintia Hills Autonomous District Council, Jowai. 6. The Respondents have filed their counter affidavit denying the contention raised in the writ petition, it is the difinite stand of the Respondents that the Petitioner joined the service of the Respondents as LDA declaring his date of birth of as 21.07.1947 and as a token of acceptance of the entries made in the service book including the entry relating to the date of birth, the Petitioner put his signature in the service book. The Respondents have brought on record the document by which the Petitioner applied for loan to the Meghalaya Co-operative Apex Bank Limited declaring his age as 51 years in June, 1995. It is the case of the Respondents that as per the own declaration of the Petitioner made in the said document, the Petitioner has attained the age of 61 years in June, 2005, which is much beyond the age of superannuation. 7. Mr. A.S. Siddique, learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the date of birth of the Petitioner ought to have been recorded as per the age recorded in the HSLC certificate. 7. Mr. A.S. Siddique, learned Counsel for the Petitioner argued that the date of birth of the Petitioner ought to have been recorded as per the age recorded in the HSLC certificate. He submitted that at no point of time, the Petitioner was intimated about the date of birth recorded in the service book. 8. Countering the above argument made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. K.S. Kynjing, learned senior counsel, assisted by Mr. K. Sunar, learned Counsel for the Respondents made submissions in tune with the stand in the counter affidavit. Learned Counsel for the Respondent have also produced the relevant records. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and the materials on record including the records produced by the Respondents. 10. As per the records produced by the Respondents, the Petitioner was first appointed way back in 1972 by order No. 418 , dated 10.11.1972. His service book was opened on 22.04.1974 recording his date of birth as 21.07.1947 and as a token of acceptance of such an entry including the other entries made in the service book, the Petitioner put his signature and finger impressions on 22.04.1974. 11. The Petitioner continued in his service on the basis of the aforesaid entry relating to his date of birth made in the service book. On the basis of such an entry, relating to his date of birth, the retirement of the Petitioner by way of attaining the age of superannuation falls on 31.07.2005. However, on the basis of the age recorded in the HSLC certificate, he was 20 years 10 months as on 1st March, 1972 and it is the case of the Petitioner that his actual date of birth is 01.5.1951 as per the age recorded in the HSLC certificate and on that basis, his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation falls on 31.05.2009. 12. At no point of time, the Petitioner made any grievance in respect of the date of birth recorded in his service book. At the time of making the representation in the year 2004 (01.03.2004), at the fag end of his service career, the Petitioner had rendered about 32 years of service and during this period, there was not even a whisper on the part of the Petitioner that his date of birth was recorded wrongly in the service book. At the time of making the representation in the year 2004 (01.03.2004), at the fag end of his service career, the Petitioner had rendered about 32 years of service and during this period, there was not even a whisper on the part of the Petitioner that his date of birth was recorded wrongly in the service book. 13. As per the provisions of SR 8(C), no alteration in the date of birth should be allowed except in very rare cases where a manifest mistake has been made and that in no case request for change in the date of birth of a Government servant made within three years of his actual superannuation should be entertained and also that such change can only be made only upon satisfaction after enquiry that the previous date was incorrect. 14. In the instant case, the Petitioner made the request for change of date of birth at the fag end of his service career and, thus, as per the prohibition made in the provisions of SR 8(C), the request made by the Petitioner even otherwise also, cannot be entertained as the same was made within three years of his superannuation. 15. In the case of Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy as reported in AIR 1997 SC 2055 , the Apex Court held that it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of the date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing authority for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. The Apex Court in that case held that the principle of estoppel would apply and the authorities concerned would be justified in declining to alter the date of birth. The Apex Court emphasized that such mistake must be bonafide resulting in wrong recording of date of birth at the time of appointment. Same is not the case here. The Petitioner upon declaration of his date of birth as 21.07.1947 got employment under the Respondents and continued in his service for long 32 years on that basis when he raised the dispute relating to the same. In this connection the observations of the Apex Court in paragraph 25 and 26 are quoted below: 25. The Petitioner upon declaration of his date of birth as 21.07.1947 got employment under the Respondents and continued in his service for long 32 years on that basis when he raised the dispute relating to the same. In this connection the observations of the Apex Court in paragraph 25 and 26 are quoted below: 25. In matters relating to appointment to service various factors are taken into consideration before making a selection or an appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that which is later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to assess suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more nature and, therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation, it would be against public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned. This being so, we find it difficult to accept the broad proposition that the principle of estoppel would not apply in such a case where the age of a person who is sought to be appointed may be a relevant consideration to assess his suitability. 26. In such a case, even in the absence of a statutory rule like Rule 16-A the principle of estoppel would apply and the authorities concerned would be justified in declining to alter the date of birth. 26. In such a case, even in the absence of a statutory rule like Rule 16-A the principle of estoppel would apply and the authorities concerned would be justified in declining to alter the date of birth. If such a decision is challenged the court also ought not to grant any relief even if it is shown that the date of birth, as ordinarily recorded, was incorrect because the candidate concerned had represented a different date of birth to be taken into consideration obviously with a view that would be to his advantage. Once having secured entry into the service, possibly in preference to other candidates, then the principle of estoppel would clearly be applicable and relief of change of date of birth can be legitimately denied. 16. In the instant case, the Petitioner entered the service of the Respondents way back in 1972 and got the date of birth recorded as 21.07.1947 and never made any grievance against the same throughout his long service career. It was only upon the alleged information gathered by him in the year 2004; he made representation for alteration of his date of birth in the service book. The fatal effect of Petitioner in seeking correction of the date of birth has been reiterated in the case of Chief Medical Officer v. Khadeer Khadri as reported in (1995) 2 SCC 82 and Union of India v. R.S. Sarma, as reported in (1996) 7 SCC 421 . 17. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abdul Khalique Laskar v. All Assam Public Health Employees Association as reported in (2003)2 GLT 241 referring to the aforesaid provisions of SR 8 as per which no request for change of date of birth is to be entertained within the period of 3 years before the original date of superannuation, held the change made to be illegal and affirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. In the case of State of Assam v. Daksha Prasad Deka reported in (1970) 3 SCC 624 , the Apex Court held that the date of compulsory retirement under FR 56 (a) must be determined on the basis of the service record and not on what the Respondent claimed to be his date of birth, unless the service record is first corrected consistently with the appropriate procedure. (Emphasis is supplied). 18. (Emphasis is supplied). 18. Having noticed the aforesaid factual as well as legal aspect of the matter, I have no hesitation to hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to continue in his service beyond 31.07.2005. The claim made by the Petitioner for change of date of birth cannot be entertained on all counts, i.e., delay and latches, prohibition made in SR 8(C) and the estoppel and acquiescence operating against the Petitioner in view of his clear endorsement of the recorded date of birth in the service book. 19. The Respondents rightly rejected the representation made by the Petitioner by the impugned order, dated 20.04.2005. In the order, it has been noted as to how the Petitioner at the fag end of his service career made the representation for correction his date of birth. Upon verification of his service book, it was found that way back in 1974; the Petitioner himself in his own handwriting furnished all the requisite particulars at the first page of his service book disclosing also his date of birth as 21.07.1947. The impugned order also reflects that throughout the service career up to the date of passing of the impugned order, the Respondents have been made to accept and rely on the information furnished by the Petitioner. 20. I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order, dated 20.04.2005, which is fully in conformity with the principles involving correction of date of birth. 21. For the foregoing reasons and discussions, the writ petition fails. There shall be no order as to costs.