JUDGEMENT Deepak Gupta, J. - This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act (for short the Act) is directed against the order of the Workmens Compensation Commissioner, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner), dated 26.3.2001 in case No. 15 of 1995 whereby he has dismissed the claim petition filed by the claimants. 2. The claimants, who are the widow, minor daughter and parents of deceased Raju, filed a claim petition claiming compensation under the Act. According to them the deceased was employed with respondent Partap Singh and Mohinder Singh for breaking of stones in their mines. If is further the case of the appellant that on 9.8.1995 at about 8.30 a.m. a huge stone fell done and hit the head of the petitioner while he was working in the mines. He received a head injury and was immediately taken to the Primary Health Center, Kamrau. The doctor at the P.H.C. referred him to the Civil Hospital at Paonta Sahib. While he was being taken to Paonta he died as a result of the injury sustained by him. 3. The respondents contested the claim of the claimants. According to them they are not running any mines and the deceased was not employed with them. They further alleged that a false case has been filed with a view to grab money from them. The Commissioner after recording the evidence and hearing the arguments came-to the conclusion that the claimants have failed to establish that the deceased was employed with the respondents. The claimants have failed to prove that any relationship of employer and employee existed between the respondents and the deceased and, therefore, rejected the claim petition. The Commissioner was mainly swayed by the fact that there was no FIR recorded nor any postmortem report had been filed and further that there was nothing to show that the respondents were carrying on the business of extraction of lime stones. 4. I have heard Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Dua, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Counsel for the respondents. 5. At the very outset I may deal with the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Bimal Gupta, Advocate, that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed as such. In this behalf Mr. Gupta has referred to a number of authorities including United India Insurance Co. 5. At the very outset I may deal with the preliminary objections raised by Mr. Bimal Gupta, Advocate, that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed as such. In this behalf Mr. Gupta has referred to a number of authorities including United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chanchala Devi and another, 2005 ACJ 777; Manoj Kumar Behera v. Dilip Kumar Dass, 1994(1) AC 50; M/s. Chowgule and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Felicidade Rodrigues, 1970 Goa 127; Smt. Rajiyabi Cosman Sayi and another v. M/s. Mackinon Machinazie and Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1970 Bombay 278; Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Maku Mabakul Khan and another, 1999 ACJ 666; Manager Sericulture Filatures, Jammu v. Shri Mansa Ram and others, 1976 LIC 957; M/s. Shantaram Govind Kamat v. Rama Ragunath Amonkar, 1976 LIC 220. In my opinion I need not refer to all these judgments because I have dealt with this question with specific reference to the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, JT 2005(7) SC 630 in FAO No. 64 of 2001 decided on 27th September, 2005. 6. It is no doubt true that an appeal under Section 30 of the Act only lies on a substantial question of law. However, total misreading and mis-appreciation of evidence would also amount to raising a substantial question of law. 7. Various High Courts have repeatedly held that if the Commissioner under the Act does not consider the evidence in its true perspective and in a proper manner, this by itself gives rise to a substantial question of law. Reference may be made to the observations of the Apex court in Rajeshwari v. Puran Indoria, JT 2005(7) SC 630 wherein the Apex Court while dealing with the similar expression substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC has observed as follows.- "7. It is true that it is in consonance with public policy, to curtail a right of appeal (that to, a second appeal) so as to ensure that a litigation attains finality as early as possible. At the same time, it has all so to be ensured that justice, according to law is made available to the litigant who approaches the Court. At the same time, it has all so to be ensured that justice, according to law is made available to the litigant who approaches the Court. Our experience, as lawyers and Judges of High Courts shows that more often than not, first appellate courts, simply, mechanically, reiterate what is stated by the trial Court and confirm findings of fact rendered by the trial Court without making an independent reappraisal of the pleadings and the evidence in the case as they are bound to do as courts of appeal. But even in such cases, the High Courts find it difficult to interfere, though, they do interfere, when the injustice caused to the litigant is so apparent that the same could not be overlooked and the judgment under appeal allowed to pass muster. There have also been occasions when the High Courts had felt compelled to interfere, notwithstanding the limitation imposed by the wording of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and on occasions such decisions have been interfered with by this Court, on the ground that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After all, the purpose of the establishment of courts of justice is to render justice between the parties. It is necessary to unduly curtail the jurisdiction of the High Courts, either under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure or under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in that context ? Of course, the High Courts have to act with circumspection while exercising these jurisdictions. Certainly, it is for the Parliament to take into account all the relevant aspects. We are making these observations only with a view to highlight the position that has emerged in the light of the amendments to Sections 100 and 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they are now obtaining." 8. It is thus clear that the main duty of the court is to see that justice is done between the parties. The present appeal is a first appeal and, therefore, the scope of the expression substantial question of law must be given wider meaning. 9. In the present case I find that the Commissioner has not at all appreciated the evidence led by the parties in the correct perspective. The present appeal is a first appeal and, therefore, the scope of the expression substantial question of law must be given wider meaning. 9. In the present case I find that the Commissioner has not at all appreciated the evidence led by the parties in the correct perspective. The approach of a Commissioner under the Act has to be liberal and in case two views are possible then the view favourable to the worker should be taken. This is a social welfare legislation and it must be construed and interpreted accordingly. In fact in the present case the Commissioner has not given any reasons whatsoever to discard the statements of the witnesses of the claimants. The order is devoid of any reasoning in this regard and hence this is another reason for me to reappreciate the evidence. 10. In the present case the first question to be considered is whether the deceased on the date of the accident was working with the respondents and whether he suffered injuries during the course of his employment. 11. PW-1 Dr. Anil Verma who at the relevant time was posted at P.H.C. Kamrau states that Raju, who was injured, was brought to him at about 8.30 p.m. with a serious head injury. The patient was unconscious. The condition of the patient was critical and, therefore, he referred the patient to Civil Hospital at Paonta Sahib. All this is recorded in his OPD register, copy of which is Ex.PA. In cross-examination he has stated that since the patient was unconscious, obviously some person must have brought him to the dispensary, but he was unable to give the name of such person. 12. PW-2, Dhian Singh is the father of the deceased. He was not present at the time of the accident. He, however, is categorical in his statement that the deceased had been employed by the respondents for breaking stones in the lime stone mine of the respondents. 13. PW-3, Gulab Singh states that he is a co-worker of deceased Raju. According to him he, Raju and some other labourers were working in the Khajiar Lime Stone Mine belonging to the respondents near the Mandir. All of a sudden a heavy stone fell down and hit the head of Raju who became unconscious. Raju was immediately rushed to the P.H.C. Kamrau from where he was referred to Civil Hospital, Paonta. According to him he, Raju and some other labourers were working in the Khajiar Lime Stone Mine belonging to the respondents near the Mandir. All of a sudden a heavy stone fell down and hit the head of Raju who became unconscious. Raju was immediately rushed to the P.H.C. Kamrau from where he was referred to Civil Hospital, Paonta. According to this witness the respondents had reached the spot and they organized the truck in which Raju was to be taken to Paonta. However, Raju died on the spot. This witness further states that he had only gone up till Kamrau and had not gone in truck to Paonta. This witness has clearly stated that he as well as the deceased were employees of the respondents. 14. PW-4 Basti Ram is also a co-worker. He has supported the statement of PW-3. He further states that the truck for taking Raju from Kamrau to Paonta was arranged by the respondents. He also traveled in the said truck. However, since Raju died on the way, the body of Raju in the same truck was taken to his native village. The respondents were also travelling in the truck. He further states that in his presence the respondents had handed over Rs. 2,000/- to PW-2 for the funeral expenses of the deceased. 15. PW-5 has proved the date of birth of the deceased to be 1.2.1973. 16. The respondents have examined Pratap Singh respondent who states that he does not own any mine either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family. He further states that he had never employed the deceased. 17. PW-2, Zalam Singh states that he is the Pradhan of Mining Association and according to him, both Pratap Singh and Mohinder Singh, do not own any mine in Kamrau area. In cross-examination he admits that he does not know who are the employees of the various mine owners. 18. PW-3 Meet Singh is a Mining Contractor. He also states that the respondents have no mine in their name. He admits that Pratap Singh is related to him being his nephew and that Mohinder Singh in his grand son. His evidence cannot be relied upon since he is closely related to the respondents. 19. The version given by the claimants is supported by the contemporaneous evidence. He also states that the respondents have no mine in their name. He admits that Pratap Singh is related to him being his nephew and that Mohinder Singh in his grand son. His evidence cannot be relied upon since he is closely related to the respondents. 19. The version given by the claimants is supported by the contemporaneous evidence. There is no doubt about the fact that Raju received a head injury. This fact is proved by the doctor, PW-1. He dies as a result thereof. How did he receive this head injury. This is the question which needs decision. PWs 3 and 4 have stated that deceased Raju received head injury while working on the mine of the respondents and he was extracting stones. According to both of them one big stone fell down and hit Raju, They also stated that they were co-workers along with Raju in the mine being run by the respondents, but after his death they stopped working there. There is no reason to disbelieve the statements of these witnesses. It is not shown that they are either closely related to the claimants or that they have any enmity towards the respondents. Why would these persons tell lies. If Raju had not died while breaking the stones at the mine, what prevented the respondents from leading evidence to show as to in what circumstances Raju met with an accident. 20. Why would be claimants have falsely involved the respondents in the case. They are poor rustic villagers and there is nothing on record to show that they had any ill-will or enmity towards the respondents. The area to which the claimants belong to is a remote area of Himachal. The petition before the Commissioner was filed on 19.10.1995, i.e. within two months after the accident. The Commissioner has relied upon the fact that he FIR had not been lodged and no postmortem was conducted. From the evidence, it is apparent that from the dispensary at Kamrau, Raju was being taken in a truck to a hospital at Paonta. On the way he died. The truck was turned back and the body of the deceased taken to his native village. Therefore, there was no occasion for either lodging an FIR or for conducting the postmortem. 21 The respondents only relied upon the fact that as per them: there is no mining lease granted in their, favour. On the way he died. The truck was turned back and the body of the deceased taken to his native village. Therefore, there was no occasion for either lodging an FIR or for conducting the postmortem. 21 The respondents only relied upon the fact that as per them: there is no mining lease granted in their, favour. They have not examined any official from the Industries Department or from the State Geologist Department to show who are the persons to whom mining leases have been given in the area in question and that there was no mining lease in favour of the respondents. They have only led evidence of private persons and not of any official witnesses. Even otherwise in my opinion even if they were indulging in illegal mining, them also that will not absolve them of their liability towards their workman. From the statements of PWs 2 to 4 the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the deceased was employed for breaking and extraction of stones at the mine by the respondents. The contrary finding of the Commissioner is based on total mis-appreciation and misreading of evidence and is accordingly set aside. 22. The next question which arises is with regard to the quantum of compensation payable to the claimants. The accident in question occurred on 9.8.1995. It is well settled law that the rights of the parties get fructified on the ate of the accident and compensation has to be assessed as per the law existing on the said date. The evidence on record shows that the deceased was getting wages of Rs. 2,000/- per month. However, as per the law existing on 9.8.1995 the maximum wages which could have been taken into consideration for assessing the compensation were only Rs. 1,000/- per month. The subsequent amendments made w.e.f. 15.9.1995 and 8.12.2000 cannot be brought to the aid of the claimants. 40% of the maximum wages have to be multiplied by the relevant factor. The age of the deceased on the date of the accident was 22 years and, therefore, the relevant factor is 221.37. The compensation payable to the claimants works out to Rs. 88,548/-. On this amount the claimants shall also be held entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum w.e.f 9.9.1995, i.e. one month after the date of the accident till deposit of the amount in this court. 23. The compensation payable to the claimants works out to Rs. 88,548/-. On this amount the claimants shall also be held entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum w.e.f 9.9.1995, i.e. one month after the date of the accident till deposit of the amount in this court. 23. Ms. Jyotsna Rewal Due, learned Counsel for the claimants, has also contended that the penalty should be awarded in the present case since the respondents have failed to deposit the amount of compensation within one month after the date of accident. I find that in the original claim petition no prayer for penalty was made and no issue in this regard was struck. Penalty cannot be imposed without giving opportunity of hearing to a person on whom the penalty is sought to be imposed. Therefore, in my view penalty straightaway cannot be imposed. However, in case the respondents fail to deposit the amount of compensation and interest within a period of 4 weeks from today they shall be liable to pay penalty to the extent of 50% on the awarded amount i.e. Rs. 4,274/-. Penalty, if paid, shall be paid only to Ms. Manisha. 24. It would be pertinent to mention that during the pendency of the proceedings Champa Devi had re-married and father Dhian Singh had died. The present appeal has been filed only by daughter Manisha and mother Surmi. Therefore, the amount of compensation is apportioned as follows;- 1. Ms. Manisha, daughter = Rs. 60,000/- 2. Surmi; mother = Rs. 28,548/- 25. In view of the above discussion the appeal is allowed and the order of the Commissioner is set aside. The respondents shall also pay costs of the present proceedings which are" assessed at Rs. 3,000/-.