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2005 DIGILAW 467 (AP)

K. Raja Gopal v. M. Venkatappa

2005-06-08

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2005
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner challenges the order passed by the Court of Principal Senior Civil Judge, chittoor in an application filed under section 144 read with 151 C. P. C. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts, in brief, are as under: the petitionerfiled O. S. No. 111 of 1988 in the said Court for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale. The suit was decreed ex parte on 06-04-1990. The petitioner filed E. P. 18 of 1991 for execution of the sale deed. The sale deed was executed by the Court itself. In E. P. No. 45 of 1992, possession of the suit schedule property was delivered on 03-02-1993. ( 3 ) THE respondents filed I. A. No. 7 of 1993 under Order 9 Rule 13 C. P. C. stating that the ex parte decree was obtained fraudulently. The I. A. was rejected. They approached this court and ultimatley the ex parte decree, dated 06-04-1990, was set aside and the suit was directed to be tried afresh. The suit was renumbered as O. S. No. 768 of 2002. Respondents filed I. A. No. 651 of 2004 under section 144 C. P. C. for redelivery of the suit schedule property. The petitioner resisted the application by raising several objections. Placing reliance upon the Judgment of the supreme Court and taking into account the various developments in the matter, the trial court allowed the I. A. Subsequently, the suit was dismissed on 16-10-2004. The petitioner filed A. S. No. 182 of 2004 in the Court of the i Acditional District Judge, Chittoor, and the same is pending. ( 4 ) SRI Bussa Rajendra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was delivered the possession of the property, on the process of execution of the decree and he cannot be directed to redeliver the possession, particularly when the appeal preferred by him is pending. He contends that the petitioner parted with the consideration for the suit schedule p/operty and tt ie situation cannot be compared to the other instances where Section 144 C. P. C. can ta invoked. He contends that the petitioner parted with the consideration for the suit schedule p/operty and tt ie situation cannot be compared to the other instances where Section 144 C. P. C. can ta invoked. ( 5 ) SRI K. G. Krishna Murthy, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand submits that once an ex parte decree is set aside, a right accrues to the respondents, who lost possession on the strength of the ex parte decree, to seek restoration. He contends that even if any subsequent developments have taken place in favourof the petitioner. Section 144 C. P. C. needs to be given full effect to. He placed reiiance upon the judgment of the Supreme court in Binayakswain v. Ramesh Chandra1. ( 6 ) THE short question that falls for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition is as to whether the respondents are entitled to by restored possession of the suit schedule property. It is a matter of record that the suit was initially decreed exparteand possession of the property was delivered to the petitioner, through execution. The respondents filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 C. P. C. and ultimately the ex parte decree was set aside. It is not necessary to refer to the various proceedings that resulted in such a situation or thereafter. ( 7 ) SECTION 144 C. P. C. mandates that wherever a decree or an order passed in a suit is modified or set aside, the party, who suffered the consequences of such decree or order, shall be restored to the same position which, he would have occupied, but for such a decree. For this purpose the Court is conferred with the power to pass appropriate orders, for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation, mesne profits etc. , to ensure that such a restitution is brought about. Sub-section (2) thereof prohibits institution of any suits for such relief. ( 8 ) THE respondents filed I. A. No. 651 of 2004 under Section 144 C. P. C. The trial court allowed I. A. on 05-07-2004. Few months thereafter, the suit itself came to be dismissed. , to ensure that such a restitution is brought about. Sub-section (2) thereof prohibits institution of any suits for such relief. ( 8 ) THE respondents filed I. A. No. 651 of 2004 under Section 144 C. P. C. The trial court allowed I. A. on 05-07-2004. Few months thereafter, the suit itself came to be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE purport of Section 144 C. P. C. , particularly, in the context of the developments subsequent to setting aside the decree, or order under which possession was taken, was considered by the Supreme Court in binayak Swain s case (1 supra ). The subject matter before the Supreme Court was a suit for money. It was initially decreed ex parte at appellate stage. The defendant filed an application under Section 144 C. P. C. for restitution of the property, that was sold in the execution on the strength of the ex parte decree. In the meanwhile, the suit was decreed, after remand. The trial Court allowed the application for restitution. But, the same was set aside by the High Court on taking the view that since the suit was ultimately decreed, the defendant is not entitled for restitution of the property which was earlier sold in execution. ( 10 ) IN the context of the broad facts stated above, the Supreme Court held as under: "the principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a decree, the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit who received the benefit of the erroneous decree to make restitution to the other party for what he has lost. This obligation arises automatically on the reversal or modification of the decree and lecessarily carries with it the right to restitution of all that has been done under the erroneous decree; and the court in making restitution is bound to restore the parties, so far as they can be restored, to the same position they were in at the time when the Court by its erroneous action had displaced them from. " ( 11 ) AS to the impact of the decree that was subsequently passed in the suit,. " ( 11 ) AS to the impact of the decree that was subsequently passed in the suit,. Their lordships observed as under: "it is true that the suit was eventually decreed after remand on August 27, 1954 by judgment of the High Court, but we are unable to accept the argument of the respondents that the execution of sale held under the previous ex parte decree which was set aside by the High court, is validated by the passing of the subsequent decree and therefore the appellant is not entitled to any restitution. " extensive reference was made to the judgments of the Privy Council and other high Courts in support of these conclusions. ( 12 ) THE trial Court followed this principle and allowed the I. A. The instant case stands on the footing, which is inferior to the one before the Supreme Court. The reason is that the suit ultimately came to be dismissed after the ex parte decree was set aside. ( 13 ) VIEWED from any angle, this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the order under revision. The Civil Revision petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.