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2005 DIGILAW 467 (KAR)

T. L. KUMARASWAMY v. JOHN MENEZES

2005-07-18

N.S.VEERABHADRAIAH

body2005
( 1 ) THE short question that arise for consideration in this revision is as to whether an eviction petition filed under Section 21 (l) (h) of the kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961 corresponding to Section 27 (2) (r) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 be dismissed as premature on the ground that after the purchase of the schedule property the petition was filed within a period of one year. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are as follows.- the landlord Sri T. L. Kumaraswamy initiated eviction proceedings under Section 21 (l) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 in respect of the schedule premises against the tenant Sri John Menezes on the ground that the premises is required for bona fide use and occupation. The respondent-tenant having entered appearance filed objections pleading that the eviction petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed under Section 70 (2) (b) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. ( 3 ) THE learned Judge of the Court of Small Causes recorded a finding that the landlord purchased the schedule premises under the sale deed dated 18-10-2000 whereas, the eviction petition is filed on 27-3-2001 within a period of one year and therefore, the eviction petition is not maintainable and came to be dismissed invoking Section 70 (2) (b) of the karnataka Rent Act, 1999. It is this order which is questioned in the present revision petition. ( 4 ) IT is an admitted fact that the schedule property in question was purchased by the landlord under the sale deed dated 18-10-2000 and that the eviction petition came to be filed on 23-7-2001. It is clear that after the purchase of the property the eviction petition came to be filed under the provisions of the old Act seeking eviction of the tenant under section 21 (l) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. It is pertinent to note that there was no bar under the Kamataka Rent Control Act to present an eviction petition within a period of one year from the date of purchase. The bar to file an eviction petition is incorporated in the karnataka Rent Act, 1999. ( 5 ) SECTION 27 (2) (r) reads thus:"27. It is pertinent to note that there was no bar under the Kamataka Rent Control Act to present an eviction petition within a period of one year from the date of purchase. The bar to file an eviction petition is incorporated in the karnataka Rent Act, 1999. ( 5 ) SECTION 27 (2) (r) reads thus:"27. Protection of tenants against eviction.- (2) The Court may, on an application made to it in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely.- (r) that the premises let are required, whether in the same form or after reconstruction or rebuilding by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation: provided that where the landlord has acquired the premises by transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of such premises shall lie under this clause unless a period of one year has elapsed from the date of the acquisition". ( 6 ) THAT it is this proviso which prevents the landlord from presenting an eviction petition within a period of one year from the date of purchase. When it is clear that the property in question was purchased before the commencement of the new Act and that the eviction petition is filed before the commencement of the new Act, that insofar as the presentation of the eviction petition is governed under the old Act and there was no bar for such presentation. ( 7 ) SIMILAR question came up for consideration while considering under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in the case of Narsingh Das Tapadia v Goverdhan Das Partani and another1. At para 10 of the judgment, the Court observed as follows.-"mere presentation of the complaint in the Court cannot be held to mean that its cognizance had been taken by the magistrate. At para 10 of the judgment, the Court observed as follows.-"mere presentation of the complaint in the Court cannot be held to mean that its cognizance had been taken by the magistrate. If the complaint is found to be premature, it can await maturity or be returned to the complainant for filing later and its mere presentation at an earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed. Again this Court in D. Lakshminarayana reddy v V. Narayana Reddy, AIR 1976 SC 1672 : 1976 Cri. L. J. 1361 (SC), dealt with the issue and observed (para 14): what is meant by 'taking cognizance of an offence' by the magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190? This expression has not been defined in the Code. But from the scheme of the code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a Court only when the Court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c.) of Section 190 (1 ). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted and the nature of the preliminary action, if any taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of section 190 (l) (a ). If instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigating or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156 (3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence". If instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigating or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156 (3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence". ( 8 ) APPLYING the same principles to the facts of this case which stands on the same pari materia, I am of the opinion that the eviction petition could not have been dismissed as not maintainable or premature. ( 9 ) IT is relevant to note that the eviction petition was filed on 23-7-2001. The impugned order came to be passed on 9-9-2003. Even if the Court were to have taken into consideration the pendency of the matter for more than 2 years it could not ,have dismissed it as not maintainable or premature or immediately after the presentation, the court ought to have returned the papers for presentation after completion of the period of one year. But the same could not have been done as the new Act had not come into force. Therefore, in my opinion, the dismissal of the eviction petition on the ground that it is not maintainable is not sustainable. ( 10 ) ACCORDINGLY, the revision is allowed by setting aside the order of dismissal of the eviction petition. The Trial Court is directed to consider the matter on merits expeditiously after issue of notice to the parties and dispose of the same in accordance with law. --- *** --- .