Judgment 1. In this writ petition, petitioner is aggrieved by denial of first time bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1931 and second time bound promotion with effect from 22.12.1985 and also for consequential benefits of such promotion. 2. Mr. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the High Court has raised preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition. He stated that petitioner had earlier filed writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 763 of 1991 for the same relief, which was withdrawn by him vide order dated 3.5.1993. Thus, he contended that on view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service V/s. S.T.A.Tribunal, Gwalior, reported in AIR. 1987 Supreme Court 88, after withdrawal of the writ petition without liberty to re-agitate his claim the second writ with similar grievance is not maintainable. 3. I am unable to accept the said submission of the learned counsel. In the case of Sarguja Transport Service V/s. S.T.A. Tribunal withdrawal was simple, whereas in the present case the order contained in Annexure-6 shows that the writ petition was withdrawn by filing petitioner seeking withdrawal of the writ petition for the reasons stated in paragraph 4 of the said, petition. In paragraph 4 of the said petition, it was stated that ".....case of the petitioner has been recently considered for promotion to the higher post of Section Officer. After such consideration of the case of the petitioner, specific order of promotion in favour of the petitioner has not yet been issued because of pendency of the writ petition." Thus, when the grievance of the petitioner was not redressed, he filed the present writ application, which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be dismissed on the ground of nonmaintainability. 4. Petitioner was initially appointed as Lower Division Assistant. Later, both the post of Lower Division and Upper Division Assistant were merged into one cadre known as Assistant. Subsequently, the State Government while implementing the revised pay scales with effect from 1.4.1981 by their resolution dated 30.12.1981 provided Junior Section Grade and Senior Selection Grade in all cadres. It also provided two time bound promotions, first by the end of 10 years of service and the second by the end of 25 years of service. Subsequently, the State Government while implementing the revised pay scales with effect from 1.4.1981 by their resolution dated 30.12.1981 provided Junior Section Grade and Senior Selection Grade in all cadres. It also provided two time bound promotions, first by the end of 10 years of service and the second by the end of 25 years of service. This benefit was, however, not made applicable to such employees who, after joining Government service have, for any reasons, been elevated to a higher pay scale, by promotion, merger or even upgradation. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondent nos. 1 to 3, in which it has been stated that as there was merger of Lower Division and Upper Division posts with effect from 1.3.1977, the benefit of time bound promotion from 1.4.1981 was then not made applicable to the Assistant of the High Court. It is further stated that in the year 1982 a departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and ultimately vide order dated 26.8.1983, punishment was awarded to the petitioner to the effect that he will not get any promotion for a period of three years. It is contended that by resolution dated 16.7.1985, the State Government extended the provision of aforesaid two time bound promotions to such employees also who were eievated to higher pay scale by promotion, merger or even upgradation. Thus, according to them, the cases of eligible Assistants in the High Court for the first time bound promotion (Junior Selection Grade) from 1.4.1981 was considered in the year 1985 and as the petitioner was then serving penalties of three years bar in his promotion, he was not given first time bound promotion from the due date i.e. 1.4.1981. It is further stated that after completion of the period of penalty petitioner was given first time bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1987, which was confirmed by the Finance Department, but the Finance Department did not agree to confirm his second time bound promotion with effect from 21.8.1987 as proposed by the High Court due to the reason that there should be a gap of three years between both the promotions of Selection Grade. 6. Mr. 6. Mr. Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner is entitled to get his first time bound promotion with effect from 1.4.1981 as accepted and recommended by the Government after approval of the Finance Department and second time bound promotion with effect from 22.12.1985 as there was nothing adverse against the petitioner and he was otherwise found fit for promotion and the period of disability for promotion, as per order dated 11.9.1983, expired on 11.9.1985 and the petitioner completed his 25 years of service on 22.12.1985. He further contended that computation of the period of disability for promotion should be done from the date of allegation and not from the date of order. In support of this, learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Anugrah Singh V/s. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in 1992(1) PLJR 502. I am unable to appreciate the said submission of Mr. Prasad. In the said case, learned single Judge of this Court was considering the scope of Rule 726 III of the Statutory Rules which does not clearly provide as to when three years period of disability or disqualification for admission to a promotion list or retention thereon will start and held that the period of three years should be calculated from the date of occurrence and not from the date on which the concerned Police Officer was awarded major punishment. 7. Mr. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the High Court contended that it is not disputed that the benefit of two time bound promotions were not made applicable to such employee, who, after joining Government service have, for any reasons, been elevated to a higher pay scale, by promotion, merger or even upgradation. It is also not disputed that there was merger of lower division and upper division posts with effect from 1.3.1977, so, the benefit for time bound promotion from 1,4.1981 was not made applicable at that time to the Assistant of the High Court, which was later made applicable by the State Government vide resolution no. 4245/(F) dated 16.7.1985 to such employees also. This, the cases of eligible Assistants in the High Court for the first time bound promotion from 1.4.1981 was considered in the year 1985. 4245/(F) dated 16.7.1985 to such employees also. This, the cases of eligible Assistants in the High Court for the first time bound promotion from 1.4.1981 was considered in the year 1985. As the petitioner was then serving penalties of three years bar in his promotion, so he was not given the first time bound promotion from the due date i.e. 1.4.1981, and after expiry of the period of punishment the petitioner was given the said promotion with effect from 1.4.1987. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India V/s. K.V. Jankiraman, reported in (1991)4 S.C.C. 109 . 8. In the said case before the Apex Court, the D.P.C. met for considering the promotion to Selection Grade on June 3, 1988. Pursuant to this meeting by an order of July 28, 1988 some juniors were given the Selection Grade with retrospective effect from July 30, 1986 and the name of the Respondent was kept in a sealed cover as departmental proceeding was pending against him by serving charge sheet on February 22, 1988. The charge sheet was for misconduct for the period between 1982 and 1985. The employee was punished by an order dated August 19,1988 and his one increment was withheld. The Supreme Court held that although the promotions to his juniors were given with retrospective effect from July 30, 1986, the denial of promotion to the Respondent-employee was not unjustified on the ground that D.P.C. had for the first time met on June 3, 1988 and that it was in this meeting that his juniors were given selection grade with retrospective effect from July 30,1986 and the sealed cover procedure was adopted in his case. The Apex Court held that if no disciplinary proceedings were pending against him and if he was otherwise selected by the D.P.C. he would have got the selection grade with effect from July 30, 1986, but, in that case the disciplinary proceeding against him for his misconduct from earlier period i.e. between 1982 and 1985 would have been meaningless. The Apex Court held that if no disciplinary proceedings were pending against him and if he was otherwise selected by the D.P.C. he would have got the selection grade with effect from July 30, 1986, but, in that case the disciplinary proceeding against him for his misconduct from earlier period i.e. between 1982 and 1985 would have been meaningless. It was held that if the Tribunals finding is accepted, it would mean that by giving him selection grade from July 30, 1986 he would stand rewarded notwithstanding his misconduct for the earlier period for which disciplinary proceedings were pending at the time of the meeting of the D.P.C. and for which again he was visited with penalty. In the present case, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner vide minutes dated 16.9.1982 on the charge that Misc. Appeal No. 244 of 1976, which stood dismissed in default on 16.2.1977 was again made ready by him for hearing by removing the order sheet containing the formal order of dismissal apparently in connivance with the affected party and also without obtaining the order of the Bench recalling formal order of dismissal. It is alleged that he also issued notice in a manner as if to show that the case had not been disposed of in usual course earlier. Consequently, the case was allowed by judgment dated 11.8.1981. Thus, it is alleged that it showed that the act on the part of the petitioner were highly irregular and cast a shadow of doubt touching upon his character and integrity in performance of his duty as Government servant for which he was awarded punishment vide order dated 26.8.1983. Undisputedly, the case of eligible employees of the High Court was considered in the year 1985 as I have already noticed above when the petitioner was serving penalty of three years bar in his promotion. Thus, even though his juniors were given promotion with retrospective effect from 1.4.1981, denial of promotion to the petitioner was not unjustified in view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India V/s. K.V. Jankiraman, (supra). 9. Thus, even though his juniors were given promotion with retrospective effect from 1.4.1981, denial of promotion to the petitioner was not unjustified in view of the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India V/s. K.V. Jankiraman, (supra). 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has ventured to submit that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India V/s. K.V. Jankiraman (supra) was later on explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Bank of India V/s. Degala Suryanarayana (supra) and was further explained in the case of Delhi Jai Board V/s. Mahinder Singh (supra) and contended that the case of the petitioner is squarely covered by the said decisions. 10. I am unable to appreciate the said submission of Mr. Prasad. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no help to him and have been passed in completely different context. In the case of Bank of India V/s. Degala Suryanarayana (supra) when the Promotion Committee held its meeting there were no departmental inquiry proceedings pending against the respondent, and, thus, the Apex Court held that sealed cover procedure could not have resorted to nor could the promotion in the year 1986-87 be withheld for the D.E. proceedings initiated at the fag end of the year 1991. In the case of Delhi Jal Board V/s. Mahinder Singh (supra) the Apex Court while holding that sealed cover procedure permits the question of promotion to be kept in abeyance till the result of any pending disciplinary inquiry held that the findings of the disciplinary inquiry exonerating the Officer would have to be given effect to as they obviously relate back to the date on which the charges are framed. It was held that if the Respondent has been found fit for promotion and if he was later exonerated in the disciplinary inquiry which was pending at the time when D.P.C. met, the mere fact that by the time the disciplinary proceedings in the first inquiry ended in his favour and by the time the sealed cover was opened to give effect to it, another departmental inquiry was started by the Department, would not, come in the way of giving him the benefit of the assessment by the first D.P.C. in his favour in the anterior selection. In the present case, there was no such finding either by the D.P.C. nor the petitioner was later exonerated in the disciplinary inquiry which was pending at the time when D.P.C. met. Thus, the decision of Delhi Jal Board V/s. Mahinder Singh (supra) has got no application to the facts of the present case. 11. Accordingly, I find no merit in the writ application and the same is dismissed.