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2005 DIGILAW 480 (UTT)

Yesh Pal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal

2005-11-21

CYRIAC JOSEPH, PRAFULLA C.PANT

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JUDGEMENT Prafulla C. Pant, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties .. 2. This Special Appeal has been preferred under Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the Rules of the Court, 1952 (applicable to the High Court of Uttaranchal). It is directed against the order dated 05-09-2005, passed in Writ Petition No. 191 (M/S) of 2005, by the learned single Judge of this Court. The Writ Petition No. 191 (M/S) of 2005 was filed by the petitioner (appellant) seeking writ of the certiorari, quashing order dated 11-02-2005, passed by respondent No. 3- Additional Labour Commissioner, Hardwar, and order dated 17-01-2002 passed by respondent No. 2- Deputy Labour Commissioner, Hardwar. According to the petitioner (appellant), as stated in the writ' petition, he was appointed as Fitter with respondent No. 4- Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Hardwar, vide its order dated 24-05-1977. Admittedly, he did riot work after 2206-1977. It appears that after long 18 years, he moved an application, raising the industrial dispute under U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which was rejected by Conciliation Officer in the year 1996. Again he moved fresh application and got it sent to State Government but this time the State Government also refused to refer the dispute to Labour Court in the matter. On further application, respondent No. 2- Deputy Labour Commissioner, Dehradun, vide his order dated 17-01-2002, dropped the attempted reference also on the ground that petitioner has not worked for 240 days in a calendar year and that now there exists no dispute which is required to be referred to the Labour Court. Again the petitioner (appellant) slept for more than three years and filed the Writ Petition No. 191 (MIS) of 2005. Learned Single Judge after hearing the parties, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that there was un-explained delay on the part of the petitioner for more than 18 years in getting referred the dispute to the Labour Court. Aggrieved by said order, .this appeal has been preferred. . 3. Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to Section 4-K of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, arid argued that no limitation is provided to get referred an industrial dispute to the Labour Court. It Is further contended on behalf of the appellant that the respondents No. 2 and 3 have erred in law by refusing to refer the dispute raised by him. It Is further contended on behalf of the appellant that the respondents No. 2 and 3 have erred in law by refusing to refer the dispute raised by him. Sri Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel for the appellant challenged the impugned order of the learned Single Judge on the ground that the writ petition should not have been dismissed merely on account of unexplained delay of 18 years in raising the dispute. 4. Section 4-K of the Industrial Disputes Act, reads as under :- "4-K. Reference of disputes to Labour Court or Tribunal- Where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute to a Labour Court if the matter of industrial dispute is one of those contained in the First Schedule, or to a Tribunal if the matter of dispute is one contained in the First Schedule or the Second Schedule for adjudication : Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the State Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court." 5. On behalf of the appellant, emphasis was given to the expression "at any time" mentioned in the aforesaid Section and it is argued that the reference can be got made at any time. However, In our opinion, expression "at any time" is required to be read with reference to the context of the words "where the government Is of the opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". In Sapan Kumar Pandit Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board AIR 2001 S.C. 2562, the apex court has also expressed the same view. It is only when an industrial dispute exists or apprehended, the reference is required to be made. There are cases when long lapse of time causes fading of the dispute. If the party to dispute has failed to keep the dispute alive for unreasonable long period without reasonable explanation, it cannot be said that the dispute remained existed. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to Ajaib Singh Vs. There are cases when long lapse of time causes fading of the dispute. If the party to dispute has failed to keep the dispute alive for unreasonable long period without reasonable explanation, it cannot be said that the dispute remained existed. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to Ajaib Singh Vs. Sir hind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. AIR 1999 S.C. 1351 and argued that the relief to the workman cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. We have gone through the said judgment and found that in said case though there was delay of some seven years in raising the dispute to the Labour court but no objection was raised as to the delay up to the stage of fabour Court. Apart from this the view expressed in Sapan Kumar Pandit's case AIR 2001 S.C. 2562, the apex court has expressed the view that the expression "at any time" does not stretch time to endless period to get the reference made. The view in Sapan Kumar Pandit's case is a later one, and being latest is more binding on this Court. Not only this, in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. Vs. K.P. Madhavankutty 2000 S.C.C. (L&S) 283, the apex court has held that the dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under the Industrial Disputes Act. This view expressed by the apex court in the year 2000 also later to the view expressed in Ajaib Singh's case, which was of the year 1999. Also, in Cooperative Stores Ltd. Vs. K.S. Khurana 1996 S.C.C. (L&S) 606, the Apex Court, earlier also had held that if the claim is entertained after gross delay, it might cause considerable hardship to the employer, as the employer would have destroyed the records because It cannot be expected to preserve the record for all time to come. 7. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition was dismissed. Accordingly this appeal is dismissed in limine.