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2005 DIGILAW 49 (GAU)

Roitong Singpho v. Amit Goel

2005-01-20

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA

body2005
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. The issue involved in both the criminal revisions is the same and thus as agreed to by the learned Counsel for the parties, were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. While in the first case, the proceeding is concerned with complaint Case No. 173(C) of 2003 pending in the Court of learned SDJM (S) Tinsukia, in the second proceeding it is concerned with the complaint Case No. 174 (C) of 2003 pending in the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tinsukia. Both the proceedings are in respect of the same very Petitioner. However, the complainants in both the proceedings are different. But the nature of the complaint in both the proceedings is the same and the issue involved is also same. Hence the facts as involved in the first case is taken up for consideration. Suffice is to say that while in the first case the, cheque in question stated to have been bounced/returned is for an amount of Rs. 18,00,000/- in the second case, the cheque amount is Rs. 20,00,000/- 2. By the application being criminal revision No. 427 of 2003 filed Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, the Petitioner seeks quashing of the criminal proceeding in case No. 173 (C) of 2003 pending in the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Tinsukia. The Petitioner is a Public Distribution System whole sale nominee of Changlang District in the State of Arunachal Pradesh. A license for collection of distribution of PDS materials was issued to her on 03.09.98 by the Deputy Commissioner, Changlang. The Petitioner floated a firm under the name and style of M/s R.S. Trading Company having its head office at Mudai Diyun Circle, District Changlang, A.P. The firm is proprietorial one and the Petitioner is the sole proprietor of the firm. All dealings with the firm are in the name of the firm 3. The Petitioner being unable to look after and manage the affairs of the proprietorial firm, she nominated/constituted and appointed one Shri Pisi Jawali Singpho Miao and one Shri Nanda Krishore Goel of Bordumsa Bazar, District Changlang, A.P. as her attorneys to look after and manage the affairs of the firm relating to the works in respect of the PDS nomineeship. The Petitioner being unable to look after and manage the affairs of the proprietorial firm, she nominated/constituted and appointed one Shri Pisi Jawali Singpho Miao and one Shri Nanda Krishore Goel of Bordumsa Bazar, District Changlang, A.P. as her attorneys to look after and manage the affairs of the firm relating to the works in respect of the PDS nomineeship. Such authorization was also in respect of opening and operation of the Bank accounts in any bank at Tinsukia in Assam, Miao, Bordumsa, Changlang etc. in the name of the firm, M/s. R.S. Trading Company. 4. At a later point of time, Shri N.K. Goel stopped to act as the constituted attorney of the Petitioner which is stated to be from April, 1999. Thereafter, Shri Singpho remained as the sole constituted attorney of the Petitioner to act on behalf of the firm. 5. The legal notice dated 14.05.03 was served by the opposite party Shri Amit Goel on the Petitioner and her constituted attorney Shri Singpho alleging inter alia that the cheque amount Rs. 18,00,000/- issued by Shri Singpho to the opposite party towards repayment of transportation job done particular loan was bounced on presentation to the bank. On receipt of the notice, Shri Singpho, constituted attorney of the Petitioner replied through his Advocate on 28.05.03. As per the averments made in the petition, the Petitioner could come to know from Shri Singhpho that summons has been issued to her to appear in person in the Court of the learned SDJM, Tinsukia on 30.09.03 in connection with the complaint case being No. 173(C) of 2003. The complaint was lodged by the opposite party in respect of the demand made by the aforesaid legal notice Under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. 6. Thereafter the Petitioner collected the copy of the complaint and on perusal of the same found that Shri Singpho during the course of business of the firm got the transportation job executed through the complainant and in lieu of that a cheque of Rs. 18,00,000/- was given to the opposite party towards payment of Bills. Upon presentation of the cheque in the bank, same was dishonoured and bounced. On demand, Shri Singpho refused to make good the demand and consequently, the opposite party was forced to file a complaint praying to take cognizance of the matter Under Section142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. 18,00,000/- was given to the opposite party towards payment of Bills. Upon presentation of the cheque in the bank, same was dishonoured and bounced. On demand, Shri Singpho refused to make good the demand and consequently, the opposite party was forced to file a complaint praying to take cognizance of the matter Under Section142 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. According to the Petitioner the contents of the complaint petition having not at all implicated the Petitioner and no liability having been attributed to her in respect of the transaction leading to bouncing of the cheque, she is not liable to be prosecuted in the criminal proceeding. Annexing a copy of the initial deposition made by the complaint/opposite party, the Petitioner further asserts that in the initial deposition also the Petitioner has not been implicated. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint lodged by the opposite party, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the case and recording prima facie satisfaction to proceed against the accused persons which include apart from the Petitioner, said Shri Singpho and the proprietorial firm in the name and style of M/s. R.S. Trading Company. In the complaint the Petitioner is accused No. 3 while the firm, and the attorney are accused No. 1 and 2 respectively. 8. It is in the aforesaid backdrop, the Petitioner has invoked the inherent power of this Court towards quashing the proceeding launched against the Petitioner. According to the Petitioner, she having not been implicated either in the complaint or in the initial deposition made by the opposite party, there is no reason to take cognizance of the matter against her and to proceed against her. It is the case of the Petitioner that she being nowhere connected with the dealings allegedly made by Shri Jaiswal Singpho in his individual capacity and she having not issued the cheque in her personal capacity to the opposite party, there is no question of proceeding against her. The Petitioner asserts that the action on the part of the learned Magistrate to take cognizance of the case in so far as the Petitioner is concerned, is an abuse of the process of the Court and therefore, the proceeding against her is liable to be interfered with. 9. It appears that while entertaining the revision petition by order dated 29.07.03 further proceeding in the aforesaid complaint case No. 173(C) of 2003 was stayed Mr. 9. It appears that while entertaining the revision petition by order dated 29.07.03 further proceeding in the aforesaid complaint case No. 173(C) of 2003 was stayed Mr. J.M. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. B. Buragohain, learned Advocate submitted that on the face of the complaint their being no materials implicating the Petitioner, the learned Magistrate ought not have taken cognizance of the case against her. In this connection, he extensively referred to the averments made in the complaint petition, more particularly the averments in paragraphs 2 and 3. For a ready reference paragraphs No. 2 and 3 are quoted below: 2. That accused No. 1 is Proprietorship Firm and Mrs. Roitong Singpho is the sole proprietor of the said firm and Mrs. Roitong Singpho has appointed Shri Pisi Jawlai Singphoo as her Attorney who used to look after day to day affairs of the business etc. and the said firm M/s. R.S. Trading Co., being represented by its Attorney accused No. 3 having its office amongst other at Gandhi Park Road, Tinsukia (Assam). 3. That the complaint was engaged by the aforesaid firm M/s. R.S. Trading Co., Tinsukia for transporting jobs and on advices/instructions/supervisions of the Attorney accused No. 2 for the firm, your humble complainant excepted the transporting jobs and submitted his bills for the works done in the office of the said firm situated at Tinsukia. And the accused No. 2 had issued a cheque on behalf of accused No. 1 being cheque No. B/49/50-326604 dated 23.04.03 for Rs. 18,00,000/- (Rupees eighteen lakhs) only of the State Bank of India, Tinsukia Branch, Tinsuka in favour of your complainant as full and final payment for the transportation work done. The complainant begs to submit that in four times the accused No. 2 paid a total sum of Rs. 1,48,174.10 out of total Bills amount of Rs. 19,48,174.10 (Rupees nineteen lakhs fort eight thousand one hundred seventy four and paise ten) only. That the complainant was engaged at Tinsukia for Transportation work by the accused No. 2 and the part payment wag also made to complainant at Tinsukia and cheque in question was also hand over for discharge of liability at Tinsukia. 10. Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. 19,48,174.10 (Rupees nineteen lakhs fort eight thousand one hundred seventy four and paise ten) only. That the complainant was engaged at Tinsukia for Transportation work by the accused No. 2 and the part payment wag also made to complainant at Tinsukia and cheque in question was also hand over for discharge of liability at Tinsukia. 10. Mr. Choudhury, learned Sr. Counsel referring to the provisions of Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, submitted that the ingredients so as to constitute an offence against the Petitioner under the said Sections are missing in the instant case. He placed reliance on the decisions as reported in (2001) 10 SCC 218 (K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd.) and (2004) 7 SCC 15 (Monaben Kentanbhai Shah and another v. State of Gujarat and other). 11. As against the aforesaid submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the opposite party argued that the firm in question being a proprietorial one, the Petitioner cannot absolve herself from the liability in respect of the transaction in question conducted by her appointed Attorney, more particularly when she is the sole proprietor. He submitted that a person may conduct his business either in his own name or in the name of the business concern, but any act done by his constitute Attorney would make him liable. Referring to the reply to the legal notice served on the Petitioner and others, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-C to the Misc. Case being No. 2021/03, Mr. Sahewalla submitted that the reply would clearly indicate the liability of the Petitioner. He also submitted in reference to the provision of Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act that the liability of the Petitioner is well established and concurrently there was nothing wrong in taking cognizance of the case against the Petitioner by the learned Magistrate. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court as reported in (2005) 2 GLR 600 (Nilam Devi Bagoria v. Vimal Kr. Tody). 12. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and the materials on record. The relevant paragraphs of the complaint petition have been quoted above. He placed reliance on the decision of this Court as reported in (2005) 2 GLR 600 (Nilam Devi Bagoria v. Vimal Kr. Tody). 12. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and the materials on record. The relevant paragraphs of the complaint petition have been quoted above. In paragraph-2 of the complaint petition, the complainant/opposite party has stated that it is Shri Pisi Singpho who used to look after the day to day affairs of the business and the firm is represented by him. In paragraph-3 of the complaint referring to the alleged incident, the complainant has stated that it was as per the advice/instruction/supervision of the Attorney Shri Pisi Singpho, he accepted the transporting jobs and submitted bills for the works and it was said Shri Singpho who had issued the cheque on behalf of the company for the amount of Rs. 18,00,000/-. The cheque was drawn in favour of the complainant in the SBI, Tinsukia Branch. It has also been stated in the paragraph-3 of the complaint that the complainant was engaged by said Shri Pisi Singpho, the constituted and appointed attorney of the Petitioner, who is the sole proprietor of the firm. 13. It is on the above allegations made in the complaint, it is to be seen as to whether the present Petitioner who has been arrayed as accused No. 3 in the criminal proceeding could be said to be liable Under Section 138/141 of the N.I. Act. Section 141 (relevant provisions) reads as follows: 141. Offences by companies (1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. (Emphasis added). 14. Section 138 of the Act reads as follow: 138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in the account: Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. Provided that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless: (a) The cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the ban regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 15. (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 15. The liability Under Section 138 in respect of dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of the funds in the account is in respect of the person who has drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him. It is only that person who shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall without prejudice to any other provisions of the Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years or fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque or with both. Proviso-C to Section 138 speaks the liability of the drawer of the cheque upon his failure to make the payment of the amount to the payee within 15 days of receipt of the notice. Proviso (b) speaks of notice to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of receipt of information from the Bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid. Thus, the whole basis of emphasis is on the person concerned who issues the cheque so as to attract the liability of Section 138 of the Act. 16. Section 141 of the N.I. Act casts the liability on the person who at the time of the offence was in charge and was responsible to the company in the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company itself. It is the said person who shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The proviso of Section 141 makes the position clear. A person shall not be liable to punishment, if he proves that the offence is committed without his knowledge. It is the said person who shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The proviso of Section 141 makes the position clear. A person shall not be liable to punishment, if he proves that the offence is committed without his knowledge. Sub-section 2 of Section 141 further makes the position clear by providing that in the event of commission of any offence under the Act by a company, if its proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. The explanation of Section 141 explains that "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals. In the instant case, the business concern is a firm, represented by its sole proprietor, i.e. the Petitioner, who is the accused No. 3 in the complaint proceeding. 17. In the case of Monaben Ketanbhai (supra), the Apex Court noticing that in the complaint there was no averments against the Appellants except stating in the title that they were partners of the firm, held that Appellants in that case were not liable Under Section 141 of the N.I. Act. Although it was contended that the Appellants were active in the business, but no such documents were filed with the complaint or made part thereof. It was held that filing of such documents at a later point of time is of no consequence for determining the point in issue. The following observations of the Apex Court are significant to be noted. 6. ...Section 141 does not make all partners liable for the offence. The criminal liability has been fastened on those who, at the time of commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm. These may be sleeping partners who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm: they may be ladies and others who may not know anything about the business of the firm. These may be sleeping partners who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm: they may be ladies and others who may not know anything about the business of the firm. The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every partner knows about the transaction. The obligation of the Appellants to prove that at the time the offence was committed they were not in charge of and were not responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The present case is of total absence of requisite averments in the complaint. 7. In K.P.G. v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. this Court held that the substance of allegations read as a whole should answer and fulfill the requirements of the ingredients of Section 141. The criminal complaint quashed in Katta Sujatha v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. since in the complaint it was not stated that the accused was in charge of the business and was responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm nor was there any other allegation that she had connived with any other partner in the matter of issue of cheque. 18. In the case of K.P.G. Nair (supra), the cheque issued by the company was dishonoured. The Appellant who did not sign the cheque himself was sought to be prosecuted Under Section 141 of the N.I. Act as he happened to be the Director of the Company at one point of time. Allegations in the complaint having not made out any case either in express words or in reference to the allegations contained therein, to the effect that at the time of commission of the offence, the Appellant was In-charge of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of business, it was held by the Apex Court that the requirements of Section 141 were not fulfilled. Accordingly, the proceeding against the Appellant in that case for the alleged offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was quashed. The observation of the Apex in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment are quoted below: 8. Accordingly, the proceeding against the Appellant in that case for the alleged offence Under Section 138 of the N.I. Act was quashed. The observation of the Apex in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment are quoted below: 8. From a perusal of Section 141, it is evident that in a case where a company committed offence under Section 138 then not only the company but also every person who at the time when the offence was committed, was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It follows that a person other than the company can be proceeded against under those provisions only if that person was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. 9. It is true, as submitted by Mr. Arora, that the words of Section 141(1) need not be incorporated in a complaint as magic words but it cannot be also be disputed that substance of the allegations read as a whole should answer and fulfill the requirements of the ingredients of the said provision (for being proceeded against for an offence which he is alleged to have committed), on the above premise, it is clear that the allegations made in the complaint do not either in express words or with reference to the allegations contained therein make out a case that at the time of commission of the offence the Appellant was in charge of and was responsible to the Company for the conduct of it business. 19. In the instant case, the firm in question is a proprietorial firm of which the Petitioner is the sole proprietor. The firm has no existence without the Petitioner. It is the Petitioner, who represents the firm. Merely because, she has constituted and appointed the accused No. 2 as her attorney to look after and manage the affairs of the firm including the task of opening and operating Bank Account, she cannot escape the liability of the act done by the said attorney on the strength of such power of attorney executed in his favour by the Petitioner to manage the affairs of the proprietorial firm. 20. 20. Unlike the present case, in the case of Monaben Ketanbhai (supra) the Appellants were partners of the firm. Noticing that they may be sleeping partners who are not required to take any part in the business of the firm and there being no averments in the complaint that the Appellants were in charge of and responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm so as to make the Appellants vicariously liable for fastening the criminal liability the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the High Court and restoring the order of the Magistrate discharging the Appellants holding that there were no allegations in the complaint making out a offence against them under Section 138 of the NI Act. Same is the position in KPG Nair (supra) case. The Appellant in that case was one of the Directors of the company at one point of time. He had not signed the cheques himself. Allegations in the complaint having not made out a case of commission of the offence by the Appellant when in charge of and responsible to the company, it was held that the requirements of Section 141 of the NI Act were not satisfied. Accordingly the proceeding against the Appellant under Section 138 of the Act was quashed. Sections 138 and 141 of the Act have been quoted above. To escape the liability of the offence under Section 138 by a company under Section 141, the person concerned shall have to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Sub-section 2 of Section 141provides that when it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, each of such persons shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. 21. In the instant case, it is not the case of the Petitioner that the offence was committed without her knowledge or that she had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. 21. In the instant case, it is not the case of the Petitioner that the offence was committed without her knowledge or that she had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Conversely, the stage has also not come to prove that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of the Petitioner. In fact, the stage of proving that the offence was committed without the knowledge of the Petitioner or that she had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence has also not come. The Petitioner having nominated and constituted the accused No. 2 to look after and manage the affairs of the proprietorial firm, which necessarily implies ratification of all acts and deeds done by him, unless the Petitioner proves the contra, in the normal circumstances, she being the sole proprietor of the firm, cannot escape the liability for the transaction carried out by her attorney. 22. The Petitioner being the sole proprietor of the firm is responsible for the business of the firm. The identity of the firm lies with the identity of the Petitioner. In the expanded ambit of the word "company, even firms or any other associations of persons are included and as a necessary adjunct thereof a partner of the firm is treated as director of that company". The effect of reading Section141 is that when the company is the drawer of the cheque, such company is the principal offender by virtue of the legal feature created by the legislature as per the Section. Hence, the company should have committed the actual offence. The Petitioner alone represents the firms, she being the sole proprietor of it. It is another thing that the business and affairs of the firm, are being managed by the accused No. 2, her constituted and nominated attorney. 23. If the Petitioner cannot be prosecuted, there is no question of prosecuting the firm, there being none to represent it. The accused No. 2 is only entrusted with the task of looking after and managing the affairs of the firm. Such entrustment does not make him the sole authority of the firm, who undoubtedly is the Petitioner herself. 23. If the Petitioner cannot be prosecuted, there is no question of prosecuting the firm, there being none to represent it. The accused No. 2 is only entrusted with the task of looking after and managing the affairs of the firm. Such entrustment does not make him the sole authority of the firm, who undoubtedly is the Petitioner herself. As observed by the Apex Court in Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd. reported in (2000) 1 SCC 01, if the offence is committed by a company it can be punished only if the company is prosecuted. However, it was observed that as per the provisions of Section 141, prosecution of the company is not a sine qua non for prosecution of the persons connected with the company, although a finding that the company committed the offence is sine qua non, for convicting the persons. Thus, in any case the offence will have to be committed by the company and such company cannot have any identity in air, but it will have to have its identity through someone, which in the instant case is the Petitioner, she being the sole proprietor of the firm. 24. The above conclusions arrived at is not to say that the Petitioner cannot have the defense as inbuilt in the provisions of Section 141 of the Act. In the case of P. Rajarathinam v. State of Maharastra reported in (2000) 10 SCC 529 , the Apex Court upon a reference to the provisions of Section 141 held the proper stage for such a defence would be at the stage of framing of charge. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, the Apex Court stated thus: A bare reading of the provision mandates that some facts must come on the record in order to figure as to who should answer the charge ultimately. Necessarily, pre-charge evidence assumes importance. The complainant will have to put his site of the case as given out in the complaint and the persons summoned would have to put on the record all what is material to extricate themselves out. In any case, the crucial time would be when framing charge whereat a decision in that respect would be required to be made by the court. 25. In any case, the crucial time would be when framing charge whereat a decision in that respect would be required to be made by the court. 25. In the case of Bharat K. Gupta v. Arun Kumar and other reported in (2000) 10 SCC 658 , the Apex Court interfered with the order of the High Court quashing the proceeding against the Respondent No. 1, inter alia on the ground that in the complaint there was a specific averment that the Respondent No. 1 used to run the business of the firm. In the instant case also, there is averment in the complaint as noted above that the Petitioner is the sole proprietor and she has appointed the accused No. 2 as her attorney to look after the day to day affairs of the business of the firm. It is immaterial as to whether the Petitioner looks after the business of the firm all by herself or through her appointed attorney. 26. In the case reported (2005) 4 SCC 173 (S.V. Muzumdar v. Gujarat State Fertilizer Co. Ltd. and another), dealing with the elements ingrained about which mention has been made in paragraph-20 above, held that the questions have to be adjudicated at the trial. The observations of the Apex Court in this regard are quoted below: 8. We find that the prayers before the courts below essentially were to drop the proceedings on the ground that the allegations would not constituted a foundation for action in terms of Section 141 of the Act. These questions have to be adjudicated at the trial. Whether a person is in charge of or is responsible to the company for conduct of business is to be adjudicated on the basis of materials to be placed by the parties. Sub-section (2) of Section141 is a deeming provision which as noted supra operators in certain specified circumstances. Whether the requirements for the application of the deeming provision exist or not is again a matter for adjudication during trial. Similarly, whether the allegations contained are sufficient to attract culpability is a matter for adjudication at the trial. 9. Sub-section (2) of Section141 is a deeming provision which as noted supra operators in certain specified circumstances. Whether the requirements for the application of the deeming provision exist or not is again a matter for adjudication during trial. Similarly, whether the allegations contained are sufficient to attract culpability is a matter for adjudication at the trial. 9. Under the scheme of the Act, if the person committing an offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company; by application of Section 141 it is deemed that every person who is in charge of and responsible to the company for conduct of the business of the company as well as the company are guilty of the offence. A person who proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence is exempted from becoming liable by operation of the proviso to Sub-section (1). The burden in this regard has to be discharged by the accused. 10. The three categories of person covered by Section 141 are as follows: (1) The company who committed the offence. (2) Everyone who was in charge of and was responsible for the business of the company. (3) Any other person who is a Director or a manager or a secretary or officer of the company with whose connivance or due to whose neglect the company has committed the offence. 11. Whether or not the evidence to be led would establish the accusations is a matter for trial. It needs no reiteration that proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 141 enables the accused to prove his innocence by discharging the burden which lies on him. 27. The decision of this Court in Nilam Devi Bagaria (supra), on which the learned Counsel for the Respondent placed reliance also supports the case of the complaint/Respondent. In paragraph 19 of the judgment, it has been observed thus: The explanation to Section 138 of the NI Act clearly explains that the expression "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. When the proprietary concern is under a debt or other liability, which is enforceable under the law and despite receiving notice under Section 138 of the NI Act, if the proprietor or proprietress does not make good his/her liability or clear his/her debt, he/she cannot escape the criminal liability imposed by Section 138 of the NI Act. 28. When the proprietary concern is under a debt or other liability, which is enforceable under the law and despite receiving notice under Section 138 of the NI Act, if the proprietor or proprietress does not make good his/her liability or clear his/her debt, he/she cannot escape the criminal liability imposed by Section 138 of the NI Act. 28. For all the foregoing reasons, discussions and findings, I am of the considered opinion that no case has been made out warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure so as to quash the proceedings against the Petitioner in Complaint Case Nos. 173 (C) of 2003 and 174(C) of 2003 pending in the Court of learned SDJM(S) Tinsukia and the learned CJM, Tinsukia, respectively. There is no any abuse of the process of the Court. 29. Both the criminal revision petitions stand dismissed. No costs. 30. Registry shall transmit the case records to the respective courts below immediately. Petition dismissed.