( 1 ) PUBLIC Prosecutor, on behalf of Respondent No. 2. The petitioners are accused Nos. 1 and 6 in C. C. No. 685 of 2001. They are the Directors of M/s. Visakha Aqua Farms Limited, which is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. They filed the present petition under Section 482 of code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P. C. ). They pray this Court to quash the criminal case in C. C. No. 685 of 2001 on the file of the court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate of first Class, Yelamanchili, Visakhapatnam district. ( 2 ) THE first respondent herein filed a private complaint before the Court of Additional judicial Magistrate of First Class, Yelamachili alleging as follows. The wife of first respondent purchased land admeasuring Acs. 3. 41, which is a middle part of the total extent of Acs. 10. 22 in Survey No. 364/a of Gudivada village, S. Rayavaram Mandal under registered sale deed. After the said purchase, the first respondent is cultivating salt by raising bunds on all over the land by reason of the General power of Attorney executed in his favour by l. W. 1. The accused No. 1 to 10 are the directors of M/s. Visakha Aqua Farms limited. They threatened the complainant to interfere with the possession and enjoyment and therefore he filed the suit being o. S. No. 286 of 1994 on the file of the Court of the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Yelamanchili. In I. A. No. 1543 of 1994, the complainant sought temporary injunction. Though the accused received notices in the said interlocutory Application, they are not making attempts for disposal of the same. The complainant also filed application being i. A. No. 25 of 1995 for appointment of commissioner to note the physical features of the locality. The accused trespassed into the land of L. W. 1 and started making illegal constructions and that the accused cut away the bund belonging to L. W. 1 spoiling large area of the land. Therefore, the complainant filed I. A. No. 156 of 1995 and the Civil Court ordered status quo on 2-3-1995. The same was not obeyed. The accused filed I. A. No. 202 of 1995 for appointment of Commissioner. A commissioner was appointed and after inspecting the area, the Commissioner filed a report showing acts of trespass and mischief. Therefore, the complainant filed I. A. No. 156 of 1995 and the Civil Court ordered status quo on 2-3-1995. The same was not obeyed. The accused filed I. A. No. 202 of 1995 for appointment of Commissioner. A commissioner was appointed and after inspecting the area, the Commissioner filed a report showing acts of trespass and mischief. The accused are continuing such activities till the date of filing of the complaint and made large part of the land useless for cultivation. The accused also threatened to beat the complainant and kill him when the complainant obstructed on 8-10-1995. In spite of the report, no action was taken by the police and therefore complaint was filed. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the case on 20-11-2001 under Sections 447, 427, 323 and 506 (2) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) against the accused Nos. 1 to 8 and ordered issued of summons. The petition was filed immediately there after for quashing the proceedings in C. C. No. 685 of 2001. ( 3 ) THE learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, Sri C. Padmanabha Reddy, made three submissions. First, the alleged acts of trespass were committed in 1994 and therefore the complaint filed on 15-2-2001 by the first respondent is barred by limitation. Secondly, the allegation made by the first respondent are vague and based on such vague allegations, the petitioners herein cannot be tried. Thirdly, the first petitioner resigned as Director of the Company on 9-12-1998 and the second petitioner resigned as Director on 28-8-1998 the therefore if the criminal prosecution is allowed against them, the same would amount to abuse of process of law. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the first respondent, Sri D. V. Sitaram Murthy, submits that at the relevant time the petitioners and other Directors were in the Management of the Company and being wealthy and influential persons they commenced construction illegally by trespassing into the land belonging to first respondent. Even though the Civil Court granted injunction, they disobeyed the injunction order and threatened the petitioner. As the accused threatened the first respondent with death, the punishment that may be imposed is seven years imprisonment and therefore section 468 of Cr. P. C. , has no application. Even though the Civil Court granted injunction, they disobeyed the injunction order and threatened the petitioner. As the accused threatened the first respondent with death, the punishment that may be imposed is seven years imprisonment and therefore section 468 of Cr. P. C. , has no application. Taking this Court through the complaint, the learned counsel would urge that the allegations are clear and categorical about the involvement of the petitioners and therefore it is not a fit case to quash the crime. ( 5 ) THE submission of the learned Senior counsel for the petitioners that the offence of trespass under Section 447 of IPC attracts the punishment of imprisonment of a period of three months and therefore the case is barred by limitation cannot be accepted. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the first respondent, for the offence under section 506 (part II) of IPC, the punishment is imprisonment, which may extend to seven years. The allegations made in the complaint given by the first respondent that the petitioners and other accused threatened him to beat and kill the complainant cannot be ignored. Further, on a ground of limitation itself, the criminal case cannot be quashed. A reference may be made to Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan and Ramesh v. State of tamil Nadu. ( 6 ) IN Jagdish Ram v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court laid down as under:. . . In considering the question whether criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed on the ground of delay, the first question to be looked into is the reason for delay as also the seriousness of the offence. Regarding the reasons for delay, the appellant has to tank himself. He is responsible for delay. Regarding the seriousness of the offence, we may notice that the ill of untouchability was abolished under the constitution and the Act under which the complaint in question has been filed was enacted nearly half a century ago. The plea that the complaint was filed as a result of vindictiveness of the complainant is not relevant at this stage. The appellant would have adequate opportunity to raise all pleas available to him in law before the Trial Court at an appropriate stage. ( 7 ) IN Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), it is a case arising out of offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. The appellant would have adequate opportunity to raise all pleas available to him in law before the Trial Court at an appropriate stage. ( 7 ) IN Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra), it is a case arising out of offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. Three grounds were urged before the Supreme court, inter alia, that taking cognizance of the alleged offence is barred under Section 468 (1) of Cr. P. C. , as it was beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468 (2) of the Cr. P. C. The said contention was rejected by the Supreme Court observing thus: on the point of limitation, we are of the view that the prosecution cannot be nullified at the very threshold on the ground that the prescribed period of limitation had expired. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the alleged acts of cruelty giving rise to the offence under Section 498-A ceased on the exist of the informant from the matrimonial home on 2-10-1997 and no further acts of cruelty continued thereafter. The outer limit of time for taking cognizance would therefore be 3-10-2000, it is contended. However, at this juncture, we may clarify that there is an allegation in the FIR that on 13-10-1998/14-10-1998, when the informant s close relations met her in- laws at a hotel in Chennai, they made it clear that she will not be allowed to live with her husband in Mumbai unless she brought the demanded money and jewellery. Even going by this statement, the taking of cognizance on 13-2-2002 pursuant to the charge-sheet filed on 28-12-2001 would be beyond the period of limitation. The commencement of limitation could be taken as 2-10-1997 or at the most 14-10-1998. As pointed out by this Court in Arun Vyas v. Anita vyas (3) the last act of cruelty would be the starting point of limitation. The three-year period as per Section 468 (2) (c) would expire by 14-10-2001 even if the latter date is taken into account. But that is not the end of the matter. We have to still consider whether the benefit of extended period of limitation could be given to the informant. . . The three-year period as per Section 468 (2) (c) would expire by 14-10-2001 even if the latter date is taken into account. But that is not the end of the matter. We have to still consider whether the benefit of extended period of limitation could be given to the informant. . . (emphasis supplied) ( 8 ) ON a reading of the above paragraph as a whole, this Court is not able to countenance the submission of the learned senior Counsel for the petitioners that as a general rule, the criminal prosecution cannot be allowed if the F. I. R. , is lodged belatedly beyond the period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (2) of Section 468 of cr. P. C. Such a question is to be gone into by the lower Court while conducting criminal trial. In a petition for quashing under section 482 of Cr. P. C. , the prosecution cannot be nullified at the threshold on the ground of limitation as held by the Supreme court. ( 9 ) THIS Court has given anxious consideration for the other two submissions. After perusing the complaint filed by the first respondent, this Court is convinced that there are clear and categorical allegations made against the petitioners attracting the offences punishable under Section 447 and 506 (part II) of IPC and similarly the offence was committed continuously since 1994-1995 at relevant time both the petitioners were directors of the Company. Therefore, the above submissions cannot be countenanced. ( 10 ) IN the result, for above reasons, the criminal Petition is dismissed as devoid of merit.