JUDGMENT Perused the averments made in the petition and heard Shri Anoop Nair, learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4. By this petition, the petitioners challenging the order dated 26.2.1999 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Member Judge, Industrial Court, Jabalpur Bench reversing the order passed by the Labour Court. Unfolded facts are that petitioner was an employee under the establishment of respondent No.2. He met with an accident, as a result of which he became partially disabled upto the extent of 20%. On account of electro-shock, left hand, head and neck of the petitioner were seriously injured and he became totally unable to discharge the work. As the accident occurred during the course of employment, the compensation was paid to him in accordance with law. Shri Nair, learned counsel appearing for the employer has invited my attention to para 5 of the return and has contended that compensation under the provisions of Workmen Compensation Act has been paid to the petitioner. Apart from this, petitioner is also getting annual pension, gratuity, provident fund and other monetary benefits treating him to have retired from service. All these aspects of the matter have been taken note by the Industrial Court in its order. Thus, the order of retirement of petitioner cannot be said to be 'retrenchment' in terms of section 2(oo) (c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short' 'the Act' '). In the case of Anand Bihari v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, [ (1991) 1 SCC 731 ] the Apex Court while considering the scope of sections 2(oo) (c) and 25-F of the Act explained the meaning of words "continued ill-health" and has held that "continued ill-health" covers defective or subnormal eyesight developed during the course of employment which would effect the normal functioning or discharge of duties. Another decision of the Supreme Court on the point is Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Labour Court, Varanasi and another [ (2001) 9 SCC 178 ]. In the present case also on account of electro-shock injuries sustained to the petitioner which had resulted into non-discharge of normal functions and duties. Therefore, according to me the action of respondents retiring the petitioner would not amount to 'retrenchment' as envisaged under section 2(oo) of the Act and the case would come under Clause (c) of section 2(oo) of the Act. I have gone through Annexure P-8 which is order of retirement dated 18.2.1998. Therefore, according to me the action of respondents retiring the petitioner would not amount to 'retrenchment' as envisaged under section 2(oo) of the Act and the case would come under Clause (c) of section 2(oo) of the Act. I have gone through Annexure P-8 which is order of retirement dated 18.2.1998. If this order is kept in juxtaposition to section 2(oo) (c) of the Act, it can safely be said that the order Annexure P-8 is not faulty and the action of respondent No.2 retiring the petitioner from service cannot be said to be arbitrary or in violation of any statutory provision. Indeed the employer has taken care of the employee (petitioner) and is regularly paying pension and other· monetary benefits applicable to him in accordance with law. I have given my anxious arid bestowed consideration to the reasoning assigned by the Industrial Court and I do not find anything in order to interfere with the well reasoned order either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. Eventually this petition is found to be devoid of any substance and the same is hereby dismissed. No costs.