JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, C.J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 13th May, 2005 passed by a learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition, being WP (C) No. 1785 of 2005, filed by the appellant herein. 2. The grievance of the writ petitioner-appellant was in respect of a tender notice dated 18th February, 2005 and in the writ petition a direction was sought upon the respondents not to allot the work in terms of the said tender notice to M/s. Santosh Kumar Singh, respondent No. 5 in the instant appeal. 3. As will appear from the materials on record, the respondents issued the aforesaid tender notice for road construction between Km. No. 21 to Km No. 41 of the National Highway No. 75. Pursuant to the said notice, both the writ petitioner-appellant as also the respondent No. 5 submitted their respective tenders. On behalf of the writ petitioner-appellant, it was contended in the writ petition that in spite of non-fulfillment of all the conditions contained in the tender notice, the Chief Engineer had decided to allot the work in favour of the respondent No. 5. 4. The main objection taken on behalf of the writ petitioner in the writ petition was that while the tender notice specifically put a condition that the tenderer would have to give information regarding the allocation of his Hot-Mix Plant and its capacity and also to indicate whether the same was situated within 40 kms. from the initial end-point of the work site, the respondent No. 5 did not provide such information and the decision taken by the Chief Engineer to allot the work to the said respondent was, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the tender notice and could not be sustained. Before the learned Single Judge, it was submitted by the learned Advocate General that the Board of Directors of the petitioner company was the same as the Directors of M/s. Sharda Construction (India) Private Limited, and that the work performed by them was of a very poor quality as a result of which recommendation had been made by the Ministry of Road Transport of Highways, Government of India for blacklisting Sharda Construction (India) Private Limited. It was also submitted that the writ petitioner-company had also been granted work on the National Highway No. 78 which was scheduled to be completed by the 29th August, 2003, but had not been completed till the date of hearing of the said writ petition. On consideration of the aforesaid facts, the learned Single Judge declined to interfere and dismissed the writ application as being without any merit. 5. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Senior Advocate, urged that since the respondent No. 5 had not provided the information with regard to the location of his Hot-Mix Plant, which was found to be more than 40 kms. away from the end point of the work site, the Chief Engineer had deviated from the terms of the tender notice in awarding the contract to the respondent No. 5. Apart from the above, it was pointed out from Annexure-6 to the memorandum of appeal that in respect of the tenders which were for more than rupees 2-1/2 crores, the work was to be awarded by a Tender Committee consisting of the Engineer-in-Chief who would be the Chairman of the Committee, the Chief Engineer and the Financial Adviser of the Department. Mr. Giri submitted that in the instant case, the decision to allot the work was taken by the Chief Engineer alone in contravention of the said rules issued by the Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand on 2nd June, 2004. Relying on the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in the celebrated decision of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 , Mr. Giri submitted that it is a well-settled rule of administrative law that the conditions of the Tender Notice were required to be satisfied by every person submitting a tender. Mr. Giri submitted that the learned Single Judge appears to have been prejudiced by the submissions made on behalf of the respondents regarding the workmanship of M/s. Sharda Construction (India) Private Limited, which was a completely different company from that of the writ petitioner-appellant, though the Board of Directors of the two companies might be common. Mr. Mr. Giri submitted that the learned Single Judge appears to have been prejudiced by the submissions made on behalf of the respondents regarding the workmanship of M/s. Sharda Construction (India) Private Limited, which was a completely different company from that of the writ petitioner-appellant, though the Board of Directors of the two companies might be common. Mr. Giri submitted that the learned Single Judge ought to have considered the manner in which the contract had been awarded to the respondent No. 5 by the Chief Engineer in violation of the Notice Inviting Tender itself as also the instructions contained in the Circular dated 2nd June, 2004 of the Road Construction Department. Mr. Giri submitted that the order of the learned Single Judge was liable to be set-aside and a direction should be given to the respondents to re-tender the work in question. 6. Appearing for the State of Jharkhand, the learned Advocate General reiterated the submission made by him before the learned Single Judge and added that the contract had been awarded to the respondent No. 5 on account of the fact that although neither the said respondent, nor the writ petitioner- appellant had submitted the information with regard to their respective Hot-Mix Plants, upon enquiry it was found that the respondent No. 5 was in a position to establish another Hot-Mix Plant, within the prescribed limit. The learned Advocate General submitted that having regard to certain directions issued by this Court in the public interest, a short tender notice had been issued and the respondent No. 5 having been found suitable, the contract was allotted to him. 7. The learned Advocate General submitted that every public authority possessed a certain amount of discretion in relaxing the conditions of the tender, but in a manner so as not to cause injustice to any of the parties involved or to the public interest in general. In support of his said submission, the learned Advocate General firstly referred to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of G.J. Fernandez v. The State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 1990 SC 958 , where a similar question arose for consideration and it was observed that the authority inviting tenders cannot deviate or relax the prescribed standard in any situation, but any deviation, if made, should not result in arbitrariness or discrimination. The learned Advocate General also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Limited, reported in AIR 1999 SC 393 , wherein it was observed that normally challenge to the grant of contract by an unsuccessful tenderer should not be entertained by the Court unless substantial public interest is involved or the grant is mala fide. It was also observed that interference at the instance of tenderers, who do not fulfil the requisite qualifications fixed by the tender, was not proper. 8. The learned Advocate General contended that it was also the established law that the Courts do not interfere with the decisions of the authorities, but it can interfere with the decision making process on the ground of mala fide, unreasonableness or arbitrariness and even then the Court should exercise discretionary power with great caution and only in furtherance of overwhelming public interest. In this regard, the learned Advocate General referred to the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Air India Limited v. Cochin International Airport Limited and Ors., 2000 (2) SCC 617 . The learned Advocate General submitted that the decision to award the contract to the respondent No. 5 had been taken after considering various aspects of the matter and does not warrant interference by the Court. 9. On the question of authority of the Chief Engineer to award the contract, the learned Advocate General pointed out that the work involving the construction of the road was under the purview of the National Highway Division and under the rules pertaining to the construction work to be undertaken, the Chief Engineer was fully competent to award the contract in favour of the respondent No. 5. 10. It was lastly contended by the learned Advocate General that pursuant to the contract awarded to the respondent No. 5, the work had already been commenced by the said respondent and since the work was in progress, rib interference in the public interest was called for at this stage. 11. Appearing for the respondent No. 5, Mr. 10. It was lastly contended by the learned Advocate General that pursuant to the contract awarded to the respondent No. 5, the work had already been commenced by the said respondent and since the work was in progress, rib interference in the public interest was called for at this stage. 11. Appearing for the respondent No. 5, Mr. Krishna while adopting the submissions of the learned Advocate General urged that the Hot-Mix Plant of the respondent No. 5 was, in fact, within the prescribed area, but that during the enquiry, a longer route was suggested as far as the respondent No. 5 was concerned, whereas a shorter route was indicated for the writ petitioner -appellant. Mr. Krishna urged that originally the Hot-Mix Plant of the respondent was within 35 kms. of the end-point of the work site and not beyond 40 kms. as had been suggested in the enquiry. 12. On consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. From the materials on the record, it is evident that neither the writ petitioner-appellant, nor the respondent No. 5 had, at the initial stage, provided the information required with regard to their respective Hot-Mix Plants and only upon enquiry it was indicated where the Hot-Mix Plants of the two parties were located. It is, therefore, obvious that at the very initial stage, a certain amount of relaxation had been permitted by the respondents and subsequently upon exercising their discretion in the public interest, the respondents chose to award the contract to the respondent No. 5. In doing so, the respondents also took note of the performance of the writ petitioner- appellant which had been awarded other contracts. Taking an overall view of the matter and the capability of the two parties and also having regard to the fact that other work orders of similar nature had been awarded in favour of the writ petitioner-appellant, the respondents, in our view, took the decision, which they considered to be in the public interest. 13. Law is well-settled that the authorities are bound by the terms indicated in the Notice Inviting Tender. But it is also well-settled that a certain amount of discretion has to be left with the authorities to relax any of the less stringent conditions in the public interest. 13. Law is well-settled that the authorities are bound by the terms indicated in the Notice Inviting Tender. But it is also well-settled that a certain amount of discretion has to be left with the authorities to relax any of the less stringent conditions in the public interest. We are of the view that in the instant case, the respondents did not have any unreasonableness or mala fide intention in relaxing the conditions regarding the location of the Hot-Mix Plant of the respondent No. 5. The Honble Supreme Court has, in the case of G.J. Gernandez (supra) referred to by the learned Advocate General, made it clear that while the rule in Ramanas case (supra) is to be readily applied by the Courts to a case where a person complains that a departure from the qualification has kept him out of race, injustice is less apparent where the attempt of the applicant before Court is only to gain immunity from competition. In other words, any deviation, if made, should not be made arbitrarily or to discriminate between the different tenderers. In the instant case, the same yardstick was applied to both the tenderers and the decision to award the contract to the respondent No. 5 was taken in the public interest. In the circumstances aforesaid, the appeal must fail and is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.