Suneel Kumar Gupta And Ors. v. Punjab And Sindh Bank
2005-11-25
P.C.VERMA, PRAFULLA C.PANT
body2005
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Prafulla C. Pant, J. 1. These two appeals are directed against the same judgment and decree dated 17-9-1998, passed in Civil Suit No. 260 of 1987 by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Hardwar. As such, both the appeals are being taken up together for its disposal. 2. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff/bank allowed a cash credit facility to defendant No. 1 who is proprietor of M/s. Madhu Shree Industries (defendant No. 2) on 1-4-1980 for a sum of Rs. 65.000/- in respect of which a promissory note was executed by defendants. Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 are the guarantors of said loan. Defendant No. 2, hypothecated its goods to the bank, apart from executing equitable mortgage of his property. On 24-12-1980, cash credit limit was extended to Rs. 1,25,000/-on interest at the rate of 19.40% with quarterly interest thereon. After few years, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 stopped to submit the hypothecation statement to the bank. On 28-9-1986, plaintiff/bank served a notice on the defendant No. 1 for repayment of loan on which he promised to pay the sum of installment of Rs. 10.000/- per month. However, he deposited only Rs. 4.000/- on 8-12-1986 and failed to pay anything thereafter. Meanwhile on 27-11-1986 and 31-11-1986, a hypothecation agreement and a pro-note was executed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for Rs. 4,78,505.61 and Rs. 4,80,521.01 respectively. Defendant Nos. 3 to 5 undertook to pay the debt jointly and severally. When the defendants failed to pay the debt, suit No. 260 of 1987 was instituted by the plaintiff/bank for a total sum of Rs. 5,64,158.56 with interest, before the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Hardwar. 3. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 contested the suit and filed the written statement before the trial Court in which they admitted having been cash credit facility to the tune of Rs. 65.000/-. It was also admitted by the defendants that raw material was hypothecated in favour of the bank by them. However, they denied other terms and conditions. Defendants did not deny the plea in the plaint that cash credit facility was not extended to Rs, 1,25,000/-. In the written statement, the contesting defendants pleaded that in December, 1983, a fire took place in the factory of the defendants and the entire stock got destroyed. According to the defendants, due notice of the aforesaid incident was given to the plaintiff/bank.
In the written statement, the contesting defendants pleaded that in December, 1983, a fire took place in the factory of the defendants and the entire stock got destroyed. According to the defendants, due notice of the aforesaid incident was given to the plaintiff/bank. Challenging the amount of interest claimed by the plaintiff, it was pleaded in the written statement that the account maintained by the plaintiff/bank was not proper and the defendants have not shown the proper account of the loan. It is also pleaded by the defendants that the suit is not maintainable for recovery of the loan against the defendants unless the amount due remains unsatisfied after the sale of mortgaged goods. Lastly, it is pleaded that the defendants should be discharged against Sections 139 and 141 of Indian Contract Act, 1872. 4. After perusing the pleading, the learned trial Court framed following issues : 1. Whether the plaintiff/bank is entitled to recover Rs. 5,64,258.56 from the defendants? 2. Whether the plaintiff/bank is entitled to the rate of interest of 16.5% on the amount due for the period of pendency of suit and for future? 3. Whether plaintiff is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for want of not being instituted by the competent persons? 4. Whether the officers of the plaintiff/ bank got signed blank forms in respect of the loan transactions, if so its effect? 5. Whether defendants have mortgaged any property in respect of the disputed loan, if so, its effect? 6. Whether the suit is barred by time? 7. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of Shri B. D. Nagpal? 8. Whether defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5, stood guarantors in respect of the disputed loan taken by defendant Nos. 1 and 2? 9. Whether defendants are entitled to recover any amount from the plaintiff/bank, if so, are they entitled to any counter-claim? 10. Whether plain tiff/bank is entitled to recover sum of the loan from the Insurance Company, if so, its effect? 11. To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled? 5. Learned trial Court after hearing the parties and perusing the evidence on record found that on the date of institution of the suit, the plaintiff was entitled to recover only Rs. 2,52,945.10 from the defendants including 16.5% annual interest with quarterly interest thereon till the date of institution of suit.
To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled? 5. Learned trial Court after hearing the parties and perusing the evidence on record found that on the date of institution of the suit, the plaintiff was entitled to recover only Rs. 2,52,945.10 from the defendants including 16.5% annual interest with quarterly interest thereon till the date of institution of suit. The learned trial Court directed to pay 6% interest after the period of pendency of suit till the recovery is made. The trial Court did not find any reason to reject the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further it did not find anything to show if the officers of the plaintiff/bank got signed blank forms in respect of the loan transactions. It also found that recovery of the decreed sum may also be made by auction of the mortgage property. Learned trial Court observed that the suit was not barred by time, as alleged by the defendants nor the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It also held that defendant Nos. 3, 4 and 5, stood guarantors for the loan in question. It also rejected the counter-claim of the defendants. As to the plea that the recovery can be made by the plaintiff/bank from the Insurance Company, learned trial Court held that the defendants are at liberty to recover their claim from the Insurance Company and the plaintiffs right remain unaffected. With these findings, the suit was partly decreed only for Rs. 2,52,945.10 and 6% interest thereon with the observation that any amount paid by the defendants after 1-12-1983 shall be adjusted towards the decretal amount. Aggrieved by said judgment and decree, plaintiff as well as defendants preferred aforementioned separate appeals. 6. We heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Learned Counsel for the defendants argued before us that since the goods of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3 were hypothecated to the plaintiff/bank and the goods were destroyed due to fire, as such, the plaintiff/ bank is not entitled to recover any sum from the defendants. In this connection on behalf of the defendants, our attention was drawn to the principle of law laid down in Lallan Prasad v. Rahmat Ali , Central Bank of India v. Grains and Gunny Agencies and Gopal Singh Hira Singh v. Punjab National Bank .
In this connection on behalf of the defendants, our attention was drawn to the principle of law laid down in Lallan Prasad v. Rahmat Ali , Central Bank of India v. Grains and Gunny Agencies and Gopal Singh Hira Singh v. Punjab National Bank . We have carefully gone through aforementioned case laws. What has been held in aforesaid cases is that in the case of the goods pledged after the goods are lost, the creditor is not entitled to recover the loan from the debtor. In the present case, there is no iota of evidence that the goods were pledged to the bank rather admittedly the goods of the defendants' shop were hypothecated to the bank and the goods remained in the physical possession of the debtor. As such, loss caused to such goods due to fire in our opinion, does not affect right of the plaintiff/bank for recovering the loan from the defendants. It is pertinent to mention here that delivery of physical or constructive possession to the creditor is necessary for the purposes of pledge of the goods. 8. Shri Alok Singh, learned senior Advocate for the defendants argued that though physically goods were in the shop of the plaintiff but the bank had constructive possession as it was deducting the premium to be paid to the Insurance Company for the goods hypothecated in favour of the bank. In our considered view, mere deduction of the premium from the accounts of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by the plaintiff/bank to the Insurance Company regarding the hypothecated goods, does not make out the case of constructive possession of the plaintiff/bank and merely for that reason the plaintiff/bank does not lose its right to recover the loan from the defendants, particularly when the goods lost were in the physical custody of the debtor. 9. It is also argued before us that since the policy of the goods insured was deposited with the plaintiff/bank, as such, the defendants cannot be made liable to pay the debt. In this connection, it is also contended that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have not made any claim in respect of the goods insured, as such, they cannot be held liable to make payment of the debt. We are unable to accept this contention. The defendant Nos.
In this connection, it is also contended that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have not made any claim in respect of the goods insured, as such, they cannot be held liable to make payment of the debt. We are unable to accept this contention. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have failed to show the steps they have taken for making claim in respect of the goods lost. Paper No. 158-B in the record of the trial Court shows that only in August 1985, the defendant informed plaintiff/bank that the goods have been destroyed in fire in December, 1983. 10. No other point is pressed in the appeal on behalf of the defendants. 11. On behalf of the plaintiff/bank, it is argued that the learned trial Court has erred in law in not decreeing the interest pendente lite at the rate of 16.5% per annum, which was an agreed rate of rent between the parties. It is pertinent to mention here that learned trial Court did decree the suit for an amount of Rs. 2,52,945.10, which included 16.5% interest per annum on the loan advanced till the date of institution of the suit. However, trial Court has decreed only 6% interest per annum on aforesaid amount after the date of the institution. Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, empowers the Court to order interest in a suit for decree for payment of money at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged from the date of the suit to the date of the decree in addition to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit with further interest at such rate, not exceeding 6% per annum. It further empowers the Court to award at the same rate of interest for the period from the date of decree till the date of payment. However, there is proviso to Section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged has arisen out of the commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed 6% per annum but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest. In Section 34, the word used is "may" and not shall.
In Section 34, the word used is "may" and not shall. Therefore, the discretion has been left to the court to award interest exceeding 6% but not exceeding contractual rate. Therefore, the trial Court had the discretion to decree the suit for pendente lite interest not exceeding the contractual rate. As such, the trial Court, in our opinion, has not committed any error of law by decreeing the suit for Rs. 2,52,945.10, which was the amount due with interest at the contractual rate of 16.5% per annum and also for 6% interest on said sum for the period of pendency of such suit till the recovery is made. 12. In view of the above discussion, we do not find force in either of the appeals and both the appeals are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. Costs easy.