JUDGMENT Abhilasha Kumari, J. 1. The State of Himachal Pradesh (hereafter referred to as 'the appellant') has filed the present appeal, being aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Nurpur, District Kangra, dated 8.1.1998, whereby accused Kamal Kishore @ Billa (hereinafter referred to as 'the respondent') has been acquitted of an offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that on 30.4.1994, complainant Veena Kumari lodged a report in Police Station, Nurpur, alleging that on 23.4.1994 in the evening at 6 p.m. she was allegedly sitting in the shop of her husband at Raja Ka Talab. At the relevant point of time her husband, who was RMP doctor, was away from the shop in order to see a patient. In the meantime, the respondent, who was a resident of Raja Ka Talab, passed-by and started making gestures to the complainant from outside the shop in order to call her. However, the complainant did not respond. It is further alleged that after some time the respondent allegedly entered the shop and caught hold of her with an intention of taking her inside. The complainant has further alleged that the respondent had also pressed her breasts and when she raised hue and cry, Piare Lal and Narinder Kumar came on the spot. On seeing these two persons, the respondent ran away from the spot. It is a case of the complainant that had Piare Lal and Narinder Kumar not come there, the respondent would have definitely outraged her modesty. On the basis of a complainant, FIR No. 88 of 1994 was registered at Police Station, Nurpur and the police commenced the investigation in the matter. After the completion of necessary formalities, the challan was presented in the Court on 5.7.1994. Charge was framed under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code against the respondent, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3. In support of its case, the prosecution examined four witnesses. However, PW Narinder Kumar, who is stated to be an eye-witness, was given up by the prosecution. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent denied the story of the prosecution and claimed to be innocent. No defence evidence was adduced by the defence. 4. I have heard Mr. However, PW Narinder Kumar, who is stated to be an eye-witness, was given up by the prosecution. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent denied the story of the prosecution and claimed to be innocent. No defence evidence was adduced by the defence. 4. I have heard Mr. Som Dutt Vasudeva, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant-State and Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent and have also minutely scrutinized the material on record. 5. Assailing the judgment of the trial Court, the learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the respondent has committed a serious offence inasmuch as he outraged the modesty of a woman and in such a case, the trial Court ought not to have returned a finding of acquittal. The impugned judgment is not based on proper appreciation of evidence and sound reasoning and deserves to be set aside. Regarding the evidence of enmity of the complainant towards the respondent due to the pending litigation, he has stated that the same is not a reasonable ground. In support of his contentions, the learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on titled Rupan Deol Bajaj and Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and Anr., 1967CriLJ1 titled State of Punjab v. Major Singh and 1962 (2) Cri. L.J. 715 (Punjab High Court), titled Hukam Chand Inder Singh v. State. 6. On the other hand, Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent has argued that the case of the prosecution against the respondent has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt as is evident from the evidence on record. The complainant has introduced various improvements in her statement before the trial Court which are not present in the FIR Ex. PW 3/A. 7. From the scrutiny of the evidence on record, I find that there are numerous contradictions and discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. 8. In her statement, the complainant (PW-1) has stated that when the respondent entered the shop of her husband, where she was sitting alone, he threw her under the chair and started pressing her breasts. Whereas, in the version narrated in the FIR, she has only stated that the respondent caught her arm and told her to go inside and thereafter pressed her breasts. Whereas, in the version narrated in the FIR, she has only stated that the respondent caught her arm and told her to go inside and thereafter pressed her breasts. The version of being thrown under the chair is an improvement over and above the version stated in the FIR. Moreover, in her statement before the trial Court, the complainant has stated that the respondent grappled with her whereas it is not so recorded in the FIR. Further, the complainant states that Narinder Kumar and Piare Lal came when she started shouting and thereafter her husband also came there. If the statement of PW-2 Piare Lal is seen, he has clearly stated that when he and Narinder Kumar entered the shop, the respondent went out from the back door but he has not stated anything about the husband of the complainant coming there. 9. PW-2 Piare Lal does not state anywhere that he saw the respondent pressing the breasts of the complainant. Rather, he only says that he saw him grappling with the complainant and he was outraging her modesty. In what manner he was doing so is not stated. 10. The other person, who is stated to have been present at the spot is Narinder Kumar who, for the reasons best known to the prosecution, has not been examined. In fact, he is stated to have been the. tenant of the complainant and being an eye-witness should have been examined by the prosecution. It has come in evidence of the complainant that the shop was in the bazaar. The incident took place between 5-6 p.m. in the evening. In her cross-examination, the complainant herself states that the patients come during the evening time and sometimes in the morning. It is surprising that no independent person has been associated to be a witness since at that point of time there must have been several persons in the market. PW-2 is stated to have been purchasing some articles at a nearby shop when he heard the cries of the complainant. He states that there were 2 or 3 persons who were also making purchases. He has categorically denied the suggestion that at that time in the evening there was no other person present. A suggestion has been put to this witness that he is a witness in a case filed by the husband of the complainant against the relatives of the respondent. He has categorically denied the suggestion that at that time in the evening there was no other person present. A suggestion has been put to this witness that he is a witness in a case filed by the husband of the complainant against the relatives of the respondent. 11. The fact that there is some enmity between the complainant, her husband and the respondent, and his relatives is evident from the statement of the complainant herself, who states that she has filed different cases in different Courts against the respondent, his father and his brothers. 12. PW-4 has stated, in his cross-examination, that it is possible that Shiv Raj, husband of the complainant, has filed a false case against the respondent. 13. This, in totality, is the evidence available on record which has, in my considered view, been correctly appreciated by the trial Court. 14. Now I come to the judgments cited by the learned Additional Advocate General. The first judgment cited by him is Rupan Deol's case (supra). In this case, the appellant had approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by challenging the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, by which the FIR and complaint of the appellant had been quashed. It is no doubt true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the offence under Sections 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code had been made out, but this judgment may not be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the present case because it deals with the question whether the High Court could have quashed the complaint and FIR in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The present case is an appeal against acquittal and the parametres to adjudge the correctness or otherwise of quashing the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be applicable in this case. 15. The next case relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General is State of Punjab v. Major Singh's case (supra). In this judgment, the Supreme Court has explained what is meant by 'outraging the modesty of a woman'. The relevant portion is reproduced herein below: Intention and knowledge are of course states of mind. They are nonetheless facts which can be proved. They cannot be proved by direct evidence. They have to be inferred from the circumstances of each case. In this judgment, the Supreme Court has explained what is meant by 'outraging the modesty of a woman'. The relevant portion is reproduced herein below: Intention and knowledge are of course states of mind. They are nonetheless facts which can be proved. They cannot be proved by direct evidence. They have to be inferred from the circumstances of each case. Such an inference, one way or the other, can only be made if a reasonable man would, on the facts of the case, make it. The test of outrage of modesty must be whether a reasonable man will think that the act of the offender was intended to or was known to be likely to outrage the modesty of the woman. The view that 'modesty' in Section 354 has to be understood as and attribute of a human female irrespective of the fact whether she has developed a sense of modesty or not is erroneous. In order that a reasonable man may think that an act was intended or must be taken to have been known likely to outrage modesty, he has to consider whether the woman concerned had developed a sense of modesty and also the standard of that modesty. To say that every female of whatever age is possessed of modesty capable of being outraged seems to be laying down too rigid a rule which may be divorced from reality. There obviously is no universal standard of modesty. A reasonable man would not say that a female child of seven and a half months is possessed of womanly modesty. If she had not, there could be no question of the accused having intended to outrage her modesty or having known that his act was likely to have that result. In this case, the accused person had caused injury to the private part of a female child of 7-1/2 months and the Supreme Court held him to be guilty under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. 16. As has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, in such cases intention and knowledge cannot be proved by direct evidence but has to be inferred from the circumstances of each case and such an inference can only be made on the basis of the assessment of a reasonable man. The facts of the present case are totally on a different footing. The facts of the present case are totally on a different footing. The complainant has given different versions of the incident in her statement before the trial Court and as stated in the FIR. Besides this, even the so-called eye-witness, who has been examined, as PW-2, Piare Lal, has not stated that he saw the respondent pressing the breasts of the complainant. Neither has he said that the complainant had been thrown under a chair as has been stated by her. He has only stated that he saw the respondent grappling with the complainant. Whether the intention to outrage the modesty of the complainant can be inferred from such grappling, is the moot question. The complainant herself states that had Piare Lal and Narinder not come, the respondent would have definitely outraged her modesty. This gives the impression that no act of outraging her modesty had been done by the respondent till the coming in of Piare Lal and Narinder. In my opinion, it is not possible to infer from the evidence on record that the respondent had the specific intention of outraging the modesty of the complainant and he was grappling with her with this intention. Nor has it been conclusively proved from the evidence on record that he committed a particular act which amounted to outraging the modesty of the complainant. 17. What is most relevant is the fact stated by the complainant herself in her cross-examination that when she was sitting inside the shop and the respondent was passing by he gestured to her to go inside, and at that point of time she did not think it proper to raise a hue and cry. Had the complainant herself read into the gestures of the respondent any bad intention, she would definitely not have wasted time and would have raised a hue and cry there and then. She would not have waited for the respondent to enter the shop after some time. In any case, she would have done so the moment the respondent entered the shop and would not have waited until he, as per her version, threw her under the chair and started pressing her breasts. The complainant has further stated in her cross-examination that it is correct that she has levelled the same allegations upon one Dr. Jeevan and Bali. The complainant has further stated in her cross-examination that it is correct that she has levelled the same allegations upon one Dr. Jeevan and Bali. From this it can be inferred that she was in the habit of levelling such allegations in a very casual and careless manner. 18. Mr. K.D. Sood, learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon 2001CriLJ4677 , titled Kalyan and Ors. v. State of U.P., relevant portion of which is reproduced hereunder: The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, the principle of presumption of innocence of the accused persons is also equally well settled. Normally the views of the trial Court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial Court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witnesses and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Court. 19. There is no doubt in my mind regarding this settled position of law and its applicability to the facts and circumstances of the present case. As is clear from the discussion of the evidence, there is no clear evidence of the guilt of the respondent. The prevalence of major contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses cast a grave doubt upon the version of the complainant and the prosecution. The offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be said to have been made out since there is no conclusive evidence that the respondent has either committed such an offence, or that some person has seen him committing this offence. Further, it has not been proved that the respondent has entered the shop of the complainant with an intention to outrage her modesty. 20. In my considered opinion, the trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondent. There is no reason whatsoever to interfere with the impugned judgment of the trial Court. 21. There is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.