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2005 DIGILAW 505 (JHR)

State Of Jharkhand v. Sadanand Thakur

2005-07-14

ALTAMAS KABIR, R.K.MERATHIA

body2005
ORDER 1. This appeal, at the instance of the State of Jharkhand, is directed against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge on 10th March, 2003, allowing the writ application filed by the respondent No. 1 herein and quashing the order dated 27th May, 2000, whereby the services of the writ petitioner had been terminated. While allowing the writ application, the learned single Judge also gave certain directions to the respondents therein, directing them to go to the house of the petitioner personally and to hand over a formal letter of reinstatement, together with all benefits. 2. Appearing in support of the appeal, Mrs. Sheela Prasad, learned Advocate, urged that the learned single Judge had erred in allowing the writ application, having regard to the fact that the initial appointment of the writ petitioner- respondent No. 1 was not in keeping with the Rules and had been made by a person, who was not competent to make such appointment, namely, the District Education Officer. According to Mrs. Prasad, such appointment could have only been made by the Divisional Establishment Committee headed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education. 3. While appreciating the submissions made by Mrs. Prasad, we cannot held but take note of the fact that the writ petitioner was appointed as far back as on 20th January, 1989, on the basis of an office order issued by the District Education Officer, Sahebganj. Thereafter, in 1996, on the basis of a writ application filed by one Om Prakash Mandal and two others, who had also been appointed along with the writ petitioner-respondent No. 1 and whose services had been terminated, the services of the writ petitioner was also terminated on 15th April, 1997. The said order, by which the services were terminated, was challenged by the writ petition in CWJC No. 4918/1997, which was allowed by the Patna High Court on 13th August, 1997 and the order of termination of services was quashed by the Court without going into the merits of the matter. Subsequently, on being asked by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, the writ petitioner produced all the necessary papers relating to his appointment and thereafter, the said Regional Deputy Director of Education directed that the writ petitioner be reinstated by an order dated 29th December, 1997. Subsequently, on being asked by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, the writ petitioner produced all the necessary papers relating to his appointment and thereafter, the said Regional Deputy Director of Education directed that the writ petitioner be reinstated by an order dated 29th December, 1997. Thereafter again by another memo dated 24th December, 1999, the services of the writ petitioner was terminated allegedly on account of the violation of Rule 74 of the Cadre Rules and Conditions of Service of the Ministerial Staff of the Department of Education, whereunder only the Regional Deputy Director of Education was competent to make appointment to the post of Clerk/Peon falling within the divisional cadre. 4. It is the said order which is the subject-matter of the writ application before the learned single Judge, who, upon consideration of all materials and having particular regard to the said Rule 74, quashed the impugned order and directed that the order of reinstatement should be issued to the petitioner. 5. About 16 years have elapsed since the writ petitioner was initially appointed and thereafter his services were terminated and he was also reinstated in service and after almost 10 years of his appointment, his services were once again sought to be terminated. In our view, having regard to the fact that on 29th December, 1997, the Regional Deputy Director of Education directed that the writ petitioner be reinstated in service, without going into the question of initial appointment, we direct, in keeping with the order passed by the learned single Judge, that the writ petitioner be allowed to resume his duties, in case he has not yet reached the age of superannuation. We, however, make it clear that for the period from 27th May, 2000, when the order of termination of the services of the writ petitioner was passed till the date of his rejoining duties, the writ petitioner will not be entitled to salary, since he has to worked for that period. Further, that period will not be treated as break in service but should be taken into consideration for calculation of other benefits to which the writ petitioner may be entitled. It is expected that the order of reinstatement will be passed within two weeks from date. Further, that period will not be treated as break in service but should be taken into consideration for calculation of other benefits to which the writ petitioner may be entitled. It is expected that the order of reinstatement will be passed within two weeks from date. We make it clear that this order is being passed having regard to the particular features of this case and is not to be treated as a precedent for other cases. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this appeal is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.