JUDGMENT : Deepak Gupta, J. 1. This judgment shall dispose of 15 appeals being F.A.O. Nos. 202 to 213 and 233 to 235 of 2003 as they arise out of the same accident and similar awards. 2. The brief facts of the case are that an accident of truck No. HP-14 5116 took place on 30.12.1999 near Devimore, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P. In this accident 18 labourers died, some were injured and the driver and cleaner of the truck also died. Claim petitions were filed by the claimants who are the heirs of the labourers travelling in the truck in question. The averments made in the claim petitions are virtually identical and it is stated that deceased were employees of Jyoti Structures and were skilled labourers. It is also stated that they were travelling in the truck and not a word is stated as to in what capacity they were travelling in the said truck. The owner filed reply stating that the truck was hired by Jyoti Structures and the truck was loaded with materials and thereafter the labourers also boarded the truck on the pretext that they would take care of the goods. Rest of the labourers were to go the construction site by bus. 3. The insurance company took the plea that the deceased were gratuitous passengers in a goods carriage vehicle and hence the insurance company was not liable. 4. Evidence was led by both the parties. However, virtually no evidence has been led to show as to in which capacity the deceased were travelling in the truck. In cross-examination, Parvaz Ahmad, PW 2, states that Jaffar Singh Kotwal, contractor had employed the deceased persons as labourers. These labourers were previously working under the same contractor at village Mangarh. He further states that this contractor was doing the work of NJPC and Jyoti Construction Company. He further states that negotiations for hiring the truck was done by the contractor but not in his presence. He has denied the suggestion that the tools, etc. and rations belonged to the contractor. However, according to him the contractor had purchased the tools and rations but deductions for the cost were made from the wages of the workers. Probably what this witness wants to say is that they were travelling as owner of goods. However, this is not a case set-up either in the claim petition or any other pleadings. However, according to him the contractor had purchased the tools and rations but deductions for the cost were made from the wages of the workers. Probably what this witness wants to say is that they were travelling as owner of goods. However, this is not a case set-up either in the claim petition or any other pleadings. 5. Section 2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act defines 'goods carriage' as follows: 2(14) 'goods carriage' means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use solely for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of goods. 6. A goods carriage is not meant to carry passengers and under the garb of carrying owners of goods, passengers cannot be carried. In the F.I.R., Exh. P4, it is mentioned that there were 50 to 52 passengers in the truck. There cannot be 50 to 52 owners of goods in a goods carriage. This would defeat the purpose and intention of the legislature. A goods carriage is hired mainly for carriage of goods and not vice versa. When there are 52 passengers in a truck it is apparent that primary purpose was carriage of passengers and incidentally some goods may be carried. For instance in case a goods carriage is used for carrying a barat or a large number of persons to a religious place then merely because each of such person is carrying his belongings would not lead to the conclusion that such persons were travelling as owner of goods. This would amount to grossly violating the bare provisions of the Act. 7. The learned Tribunal after recording evidence and hearing arguments has come to the clear conclusion that the deceased were travelling as gratuitous passengers in the vehicle in question. 8. From the aforesaid mentioned facts and especially the fact that about 50 persons were being carried in the truck it is apparent that the main purpose for which the truck was hired was to carry the passengers and not the goods. 9. The law with regard to the liability of the insurance company in respect of passengers being carried in a goods vehicle is now settled. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. 9. The law with regard to the liability of the insurance company in respect of passengers being carried in a goods vehicle is now settled. A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Asha Rani and Others, considered the question whether it is compulsory for the insurance company to cover the liability in respect of passengers travelling in a goods vehicle. This decision was in context of the un-amended Act. The Apex Court overruled its earlier judgment in New India Assurance Company Vs. Shri Satpal Singh and Others, It held as follows: ...It is held that the insurer will not be liable for paying compensation to the owner of goods or his authorised representative on being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle meets with an accident and the owner of goods or his representative dies or suffers any bodily injury. Justice S.B. Sinha, in his concurring judgment, held as follows: (25) Section 147 of 1988 Act, inter alia, prescribes compulsory coverage against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of 'public service vehicle'. Proviso appended thereto categorically states that compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in a goods vehicle would be limited to the liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It does not speak of any passenger in a 'goods carriage'. (26) In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in 1988 Act vis-a-vis, 1939 Act, we are of the opinion that the meaning of the words 'any person' must also be attributed having regard to the context in which they have been used, i.e., 'a third party'. Keeping in view the provisions of 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passengers travelling in a goods vehicle, the insurers would not be liable therefor. 10. This matter again came up for consideration in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Devireddy Konda Reddy and Others etc. etc. and Jogi Subbamma and Others etc. etc., The Apex Court considered the difference between the definition of 'goods vehicle' appearing in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and 'goods carriage' appearing in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 10. This matter again came up for consideration in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Devireddy Konda Reddy and Others etc. etc. and Jogi Subbamma and Others etc. etc., The Apex Court considered the difference between the definition of 'goods vehicle' appearing in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and 'goods carriage' appearing in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It held as follows: The difference in the language of 'goods vehicle' as appearing in the old Act and 'goods carriage' in the Act is of significance. A bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that the legislative intent was to prohibit goods vehicle from carrying any passenger. This is clear from the expression 'in addition to passengers' as contained in definition of 'goods vehicle' in the old Act. The position becomes further clear because the expression used is 'goods carriage' is solely for carriage of goods. Carrying of passengers in a goods carriage is not contemplated in the Act. Thus the Apex Court held that passengers cannot be carried in a goods vehicle. 11. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Baljit Kaur and Others, , the Apex Court considered the impact of the amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act made in 1994. The Supreme Court held that after the amendment of 1994, the insurance company was bound to cover liability with respect to owner of the goods or his authorised representatives. However, it further held that no passenger can be carried in a goods vehicle and the insurance company was not liable to pay compensation with respect to passengers especially gratuitous passengers. The Apex Court held thus: (20) It is, therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorised representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorised representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor was any premium paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people. 12. The Apex Court again considered this point in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. 12. The Apex Court again considered this point in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ajit Kumar and Others, . After considering the definitions and various provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act both amended and unamended, the Apex Court held as follows: The difference in the language of the 'goods vehicle' as appearing in the old Act and 'goods carriage' in the Act is of significance. A bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that the legislative intent was to prohibit goods vehicle from carrying any passenger. This is clear from the expression 'in addition to passengers' as contained in definition of 'goods vehicle' in the old Act. The position becomes further clear because the expression used is 'goods carriage' is solely for the carriage of goods. Carrying of passengers in a goods carriage is not contemplated in the Act. There is no provision similar to Clause (ii) of the proviso appended to Section 95 of the old Act prescribing requirement of insurance policy. Even Section 147 of the Act mandates compulsory coverage against death of or bodily injury to any passenger of 'public service vehicle'. The proviso makes it further clear that compulsory coverage in respect of the drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in goods vehicle would be limited to the liability under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (in short 'the WC Act'). There is no reference to any passenger in 'goods carriage'. 13. Following the aforesaid judgments, a similar view was taken by the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. V. Chinnamma and Others, 14. In view of the aforesaid clear enunciation of law laid down by Apex Court, the position of law may be summarized as follows: Under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, prior to its amendment in 1994, which came into effect from 14.11.1994, the insurance company was not liable in case of any passenger being carried in a goods vehicle. The only liability of the insurance company was to indemnify the insured with regard to the amount payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of death or bodily injury to any employee engaged in driving the truck or being carried in the vehicle. The only liability of the insurance company was to indemnify the insured with regard to the amount payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of death or bodily injury to any employee engaged in driving the truck or being carried in the vehicle. The only difference made by the amendment of 1994 is that now the insurance company is also liable to indemnify the insured for compensation payable in respect of the owner of goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. However, the Act does not contemplate the carriage of any other person in a goods vehicle. 15. Following the aforesaid principles it can be stated that the insurance company was not liable to pay the amount. 16. Mr. G.D. Sharma, learned Counsel for the insurance company, relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Bommithi Subbhayamma and Others, wherein the Apex Court has held that the claimant will be entitled to recover the amount of compensation from the owner of the vehicle and urges that in this case too the insurance company should not be ordered to deposit the amount. 17. It is apparent from a perusal of the aforesaid judgment that in this case the Apex Court did not consider the question as to whether insurance company should be directed to deposit the amount or not. The vehicle in question was admittedly insured with the insurance company. Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Baljit Kaur and Others, , has held as follows: (21) The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in New India Assurance Company Vs. Shri Satpal Singh and Others, . The said decision has been overruled only in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Asha Rani and Others, . We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in New India Assurance Company Vs. Shri Satpal Singh and Others, . The said decision has been overruled only in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Asha Rani and Others, . We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be subserved if the appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant, if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. For the purpose of such recovery, it would not be necessary for the insurer to file a separate suit but it may initiate a proceeding before the executing court as if the dispute between the insurer and owner was the subject-matter of determination before Tribunal and the issue is decided against the owner and in favour of the insurer. We have issued the aforementioned directions having regard to the scope and purport of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in terms whereof, it is not only entitled to determine the amount of claim as put forth by the claimant for recovery thereof from the insurer, owner or driver of the vehicle jointly or severally but also the dispute between the insurer on the one hand and the owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident inasmuch as can be resolved by the Tribunal in such a proceeding. 18. Similarly in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Swaran Singh and Others, , Apex Court in para 102 (x) held as follows: (x) Where an adjudication of the claim under the Act the Tribunal arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its defence in accordance with the provisions of Section 149 (2) read with Sub-section (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to pay to the third party under the award of the Tribunal. Such determination of the claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable on a certificate issued by the Tribunal to the Collector in the same manner u/s 174 of the Act as arrears of land revenue. The certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue only if, as required by Sub-section (3) of Section 168 of the Act the insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by the Tribunal. 19. In view of these two three-Judge Bench judgments of the Apex Court I hold that the insurance company is liable to satisfy the award. However, the insurance company shall be entitled to recover the amount deposited by it along with interest from the insured-owner by taking out the execution proceedings and shall not have to take recourse to any other proceedings. 20. All the appeals are partly allowed in the aforesaid terms. No orders as to costs.