JUDGMENT P.K. Jaiswal, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the defendant/appellant against the judgment and decree dated 1-1-2002 passed by First Additional District Judge, Shivpuri in Civil Appeal No. 3-A/2001, whereby learned Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal of defendant and affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 11-12-2000 passed by First Civil Judge, Class II, Shivpuri in Civil Suit No. 47-A/98. 2. The facts of the case are that respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for eviction under Clause (c) (0 (h) and (k) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of M.P.. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called as "the Act") on the ground that plaintiff was owner of the suit shop and defendant was tenant at the rate of Rs. 85/- per month. The plaintiff issued notice dated 10-1-1987 and terminated the tenancy with effect from 31-1-1987. In reply to legal notice defendant denied the title of the plaintiff and as such plaintiff claimed decree for ejectment under section 12(1)(c) of the Act. 3. The defendant in his written statement denied the averments made in the plaint. In para 1 of the written statement defendant stated that he was not the tenant of plaintiff and there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them. In paras 2 and 4 of the written statement he denied the title of the plaintiff and stated that plaintiff cannot claim decree on the ground of disclaimer of title. In para 10 he further denied the title and stated that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between them. Plaintiff Madan Mohan Agarwal (P.W. I) in his deposition stated that suit premises owned by him. He filed Ex. P. 10 Municipal Assessment Register in which his name was recorded as owner of the suit shop. Ex. P.11, P. 12, P. 13 and P. 14 are receipt and challan by which property tax was deposited by him time to time in the Municipal Council. He further stated that Ex. P.15, P.16, P.17, P.18 and P.19 were the rent receipts issued by the plaintiff in his name to the defendant which were duly signed by him. The defendant earlier never raised any objection regarding ownership of the plaintiff. Plaintiff witness Ram Kishan (P.W. 2) in his cross-examination stated that in the year 1965 suit shop was given on rent to the defendant Meenamal Jain. The defendant earlier never raised any objection regarding ownership of the plaintiff. Plaintiff witness Ram Kishan (P.W. 2) in his cross-examination stated that in the year 1965 suit shop was given on rent to the defendant Meenamal Jain. He further stated that in family partition deed in the year 1969 the suit shop was given to the plaintiff. The said partition deed was registered in the year 1972 and thus plaintiff became the owner of the suit shop and from 1980 plaintiff is taking rent from the defendant. Defendant Meenamal (D.W.I) in his deposition stated that he is tenant of the suit premises from last 34 years and suit shop was given to him on rent at the rate of Rs. 45/- by the father of plaintiff Ramkishan. In 1980 the rent was enhanced from Rs. 45/- to Rs. 60/- and from 1984-85 he is paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 85 per month. He further admitted that P. 15, P.16, P.17 and P.18 are the rent receipt issued in the name of plaintiff Madan Mohan and Ex. P. 19 is the rent receipt given by the plaintiff Madan Mohan. Ex. P.20 and P.21 are the rent receipt signed by the plaintiff and plaintiff name was also shown as owner of the premises. From the above facts the trial Court came to the conclusion that plaintiff is owner and landlord of the suit premises and defendant is tenant at the rate of Rs. 85/- per month. The plaintiff vide Ex. P.5 issued notice dated 10-1-1987 by which he terminated the tenancy from 31-1-1987. Ex. P.6 is the postal receipt. Ex. P.7 is acknowledgment by which defendants received the notice. Ex. P.8 is reply to the notice, by which defendants denied the title and stated that no relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant as a landlord and tenant. The defendant in his written statement further stated that there does not exists any relationship of landlord and tenant between him and plaintiff. During pendency of the suit, defendant by way of amendment withdrew the averment regarding denial of title of the plaintiff and urged that if Court came to the conclusion that after partition plaintiff had become owner of the suit premises then he had no objection in acceptance of landlordship, the said amendment was allowed by the trial Court. During pendency of the suit, defendant by way of amendment withdrew the averment regarding denial of title of the plaintiff and urged that if Court came to the conclusion that after partition plaintiff had become owner of the suit premises then he had no objection in acceptance of landlordship, the said amendment was allowed by the trial Court. The defendant Meenamal Jain (D.W. 1) in para 3 of his statement very specifically stated that plaintiff was not the owner of the suit house and in para 27 and 28 he stated that written statement was drafted under his instructions and before signing the written statement he understood and read the contents stated therein. He further stated that the contents of Ex. P.8 reply to the notice was correct. The trial Court while granting the decree held that withdrawal of earlier statement will not in any way affect the case of the plaintiff. The trial Court further held that plaintiff failed to prove his case under clause (h) (f) and (k) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff and granted decree only under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. 4. The appellant challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court by filing an appeal before the Lower Appellate Court. The lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the defendant and affirmed the finding of the trial Court. 5. The appellant filed second appeal against the judgment and decree of lower appellate Court which was admitted on 16-7-2002 on the following substantial question of law: Whether the Court below has erred in passing a decree under section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act when the tenant has not claimed title in himself and there is no material on record to show that whether this denial has adversely and substantially effected the interest of plaintiff landlord? 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant has urged that the appellant has not claimed title in himself nor there is any material to show that the averments made by the defendant amounts to disclaimer and will substantially affect the interest of landlord. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant has urged that the appellant has not claimed title in himself nor there is any material to show that the averments made by the defendant amounts to disclaimer and will substantially affect the interest of landlord. Learned Counsel for the appellant further stated that no sooner he came to know that by the partition plaintiff had become owner of the suit premises he filed an application for amendment for withdrawal of the averments by which he denied the title of the plaintiff. The trial Court allowed the said amendment and now he has acknowledged the plaintiff as his landlord and denial made by him earlier was bona fide and that does not amount to disclaimer of title. 7. On the other hand Learned Counsel for the respondents supported the judgment and decree of the Courts below and stated that defendant in reply to the notice as well as in his written statement denied the title of the plaintiff landlord in unequivocal terms and withdrawal of denial by way of amendment was of no consequence and finding given by the Courts below were finding of fact based on the clear admission made by the defendants in his pleading as well as in oral evidence and no question of law muchless as substantial question of law involved in this appeal and appeal has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. 8. Heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record of case. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the various paragraphs of the written statement and deposition of Meenamal Jain defendant (D.W.I). He placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kundan Mal vs. Gurudutta, reported in (1989) 1 SCC 552 , C. Chandramohan vs. Sengottayan (dead) by LRS. and others, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 451 and Sheela and others vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 375 . 10. In a case of Kundan Mal (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the denial of landlord's title by tenant has to be clear and inequivocable terms. 11. In the case of C. Chandramohan (supra) the appellant/landlord derived his title to the premises under the release deed executed by his father. 10. In a case of Kundan Mal (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the denial of landlord's title by tenant has to be clear and inequivocable terms. 11. In the case of C. Chandramohan (supra) the appellant/landlord derived his title to the premises under the release deed executed by his father. The respondent became tenant of the appellant's father long prior to execution of release deed in favour of appellant by his father. The respondent-tenant in reply to notice for eviction stated that appellant was only a co-owner of the property as the original owner (father of appellant) died leaving behind three daughters and a widow. They also stated that they did not know about execution of the release deed in favour of the appellant by his father and that the denial of absolute title of the property was not wilful and mala fide. The Hon'ble Supreme Court on that background held that there was no wilful or mala fide denial of title and such denial did not amount to denial of title and it cannot be said that the tenants denied the title of the landlord, muchless can it be said that such denial was not bona fide. In the case of Sheela and others (supra), in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an effect which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. Para 14 and 17 are relevant which reads as under: 14. Denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy, is it an act injurious to interest of landlord? How does this rule operate and what makes it offensive? Evans and Smith state in the Law of Landlord and Tenant (4th Edn., 1993, at p.89) that it is an implied condition of every lease, fixed-term or periodic and formal or informal, that the tenant is not expressly or impliedly to deny the landlord's title or prejudice it by any acts which are inconsistent with the existence of a tenancy. Disclaimer of the landlord's title is analogous to repudiation of a contract. Disclaimer of the landlord's title is analogous to repudiation of a contract. The rule is of feudal origin; the Courts are not anxious to extend it and so any breach of this condition must be clear and unambiguous. Hill and Redman in Law of Landlord and Tenant. (17th Edn,, para 382, at pp. 445-46) dealing with "acts which prejudice lessor's title" state that there is implied in every lease a condition that the lessee shall not do anything that, may prejudice the title of the lessor; and that if this is done the lessor may re-enter for breach of this implied condition. Thus, it is a cause of forfeiture if the lessee denies the title of the lessor by alleging that the title of the landlord is in himself or another; or if he assists a stranger to set up an adverse title or delivers the premises to him in order to enable him to set up a title. It is a question of fact, however, what intention underlies the words or the actions of a tenant, whether in fact he is definitely asserting a title adverse to the landlord or, as the case may be, intending to enable someone else to set up such a title. Thus, it is not sufficient that the lessee does not at once acknowledge the title of the landlord and a general traverse in the defence to an action for possession does no more than put the landlord to proof and does not assert that the title is in another. The essential characteristic of disclaimer by tenant as stated in Foa's General Law of Landlord and Tenant (8th Edn., para 934 at p. 589) is that it must amount to a renunciation by the tenant of his character of tenant, either by setting up a title in another, or by claiming title in himself. A mere renunciation of tenancy without more, though it may operate as a surrender, cannot amount to a disclaimer. The denial, though it need not be express and can be implied, must nevertheless be a clear denial and it must be clearly proved. 17. A mere renunciation of tenancy without more, though it may operate as a surrender, cannot amount to a disclaimer. The denial, though it need not be express and can be implied, must nevertheless be a clear denial and it must be clearly proved. 17. In our opinion, denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord and hence is a ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial or disclaimer, as would entail forfeiture of tenancy rights and incur the liability to be evicted, the tenant should have renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. A tenant bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available to him by the rent control law but without disowning his character of possession over the tenancy premises as tenant cannot be said to have denied the title of landlord or disclaimed the tenancy. Such an act of the tenant does not attract applicability of section 12(1)(c) abovesaid. It is the intention of the tenant, as culled out from the nature of the plea raised by him, which is determinative of its vulnerability. 12. In the present case the defendant denied the title of the landlord in his reply to notice issued by the landlord (Ex. P.8). In paras 1, 2, 4 and 10 of the written statement also he denied the title of the landlord. The tenant Meenamal Jain (D.W.I) in para 3 of his deposition denied the title of the landlord. Thus, both the Courts below have not committed any error in granting the decree under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Sheela and others (supra) will not in any way help the appellant. 13. Thus, both the Courts below have not committed any error in granting the decree under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Sheela and others (supra) will not in any way help the appellant. 13. Learned Counsel for the appellant lastly stated that defendant has successfully withdrawn the earlier statement made in the written statement and the Courts below have committed error in granting the decree against the appellant. 14. On the other hand Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that withdrawal of landlord's title by way of amendment of written statement will not help in any way to the defendant. In support of the said contention he placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Bhagwati Prasad vs. Rameshchand and others, reported in 1994 MPLJ 619 , in which this Court has held that once the tenant has incurred the liability for ejectment under clause (c) of section 12(1) of the Act merely because he chooses to withdraw the denial belatedly, the cause of action accrued to the landlord/plaintiffs would not be wiped out in the absence of there being a specific provision to that effect in the Act. Para 10 is relevant which reads as under : Moreover, the sin which the tenant/appellant has committed, would not be wiped out in spite of the proposed amendment. Once the tenant has incurred the liability for ejectment under clause (c) of section 12(1) of the Act merely because he chooses to withdraw the denial belatedly, the cause of action accrued to the landlord/plaintiffs would not be wiped out in the absence of there being a specific provision to that effect in the Act. Once the tenant has incurred the liability for ejectment under clause (c) of section 12(1) of the Act merely because he chooses to withdraw the denial belatedly, the cause of action accrued to the landlord/plaintiffs would not be wiped out in the absence of there being a specific provision to that effect in the Act. Reference may be had to a recent pronouncement of this Court in Navalmal vs. Laxmansingh, 1991 MPLJ 812 : 1991 1 MPJR, 256, wherein on a review of the available law on the point, taking light from the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the underlying scheme of the provisions of the Act, this Court has held that the tenant once having incurred liability for ejectment on account of bar against suit for ejectment provided by opening clause of section 12(1) of the Act having been lifted on account of a wrong on the part of the tenant, a subsequent resiling by the tenant would not protect him from ejectment unless and until there be a provision in the Act itself to that effect. this Court has said in so many words, placing reliance on the law laid down in Prabhakaran Nayar's case, AIR 1987 SC 2117 , that the Court cannot devise relaxations and protections if they were not provided by the Legislature. 15. The findings recorded by the Courts below does not suffer from any illegality manifest error of perversity. I am of the opinion that no case for interference with the finding recorded by the Courts below is made out. I do not find any substance in any of the contentions raised by the Learned Counsel for appellant. The Courts below has not committed any error in passing the decree under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. The question of law is answered accordingly. The appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs.