RAJESH TANDON, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Sri R. C. Arya, learned Counsel for the petitioner and sri J. C. Pandey, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1. ( 2 ) BY the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 6th July, 2002 passed by the respondent No. 3 and allow the application of the petitioner under section 5 of thelimitation Act. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY stated, a lease in favour of the respondent No. 1 sanctioned on 3rd January, 1997 pursuant to the said sanction, the respondent No. 1 deposited the requisite amount as directed by the District Magistrate, Nainital. ( 4 ) THE land, which was proposed to lease out to respondent No. 1 by Tehsil Kichha, is situated at Kichha adjoining to the main highway passing through the Kichha main market within Nagar Palika Parishad, Kichha. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, the suit was filed by the respondent No. 1 (being Suit No. 151 of 1997 vinod Kumar v. State of U. P. , Suit No. 197 of 1997; Shahubuddin and others v. State of U. P. , Suit No. 149 of 1997; Abdul Hamid v. U. P. State, Suit No. 152 of 1997; Roop singh v. U. P. State) for prohibitory as well as mandatory injunction on 20-8-1997 claiming therein that defendant/petitioner be directed to execute the lease deed in his favour. The petitioner has contested the suit by filing his written statement on the ground that the land to which the petitioner wants to lease out in his favour is a public place and situated in the side of main highway and is within the main market and therefore, the same cannot be executed. ( 6 ) THE learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)Rudrapur vide his order dated 25-5-1999 decreed the suit for both the reliefs claimed in it and decided the matter in favour of respondent no. 1. The said order is quoted below : ( 7 ) THE petitioner filed the appeal against the aforesaid judgment and decree of learned respondent No. 3 before District Judge, Udham singh Nagar. It was submitted that it was mandatory for the petitioner to sought permission from the Government, however, permission was accorded to the petitioner by the Government on 12/10/1999 and thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal on 15/5/2000 against the order dated 25/5/1999. It was submitted that it was mandatory for the petitioner to sought permission from the Government, however, permission was accorded to the petitioner by the Government on 12/10/1999 and thereafter, the petitioner filed an appeal on 15/5/2000 against the order dated 25/5/1999. A delay application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed. ( 8 ) THE Appellate Court vide its order dated 6/7/2002 rejected the delay condonation application of the petitioner filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Hence, the present writ petition has been filed. ( 9 ) A perusal of the plaint filed by the respondent No. 1 shows that on an application made by the respondent No. 1 on 3rd January, 1997, the lease was granted for a period of 90 years for commercial purposes and the respondent No. 1 has deposited a sum of rs. 11,736. 00 in the treasury and further 25 paisa per square metre was fixed towards lease rent and as such he has deposited a sum of rs. 162. 50 paise in the treasury. The necessary stamp duty was also submitted and on the stamp duty received, the State has sanctioned the lease deed which was executed for registration to the office of Sub Registrar Kichha district Udham Singh Nagar and this information was forwarded to the respondent No. 1. ( 10 ) AFTER a long time, when the lease deed was not registered, the respondent No. 1 enquired from the office of Sub Registrar, Kichha and then it came to notice of the respondent no. 1 that the aforesaid lease deed has been taken back and instructions have been given not to register the lease deed and the respondent no. 1 has represented on 9/7/1997, 16/7/1997, 21/7/1997, 26/7/1997, 4/8/1997 and 11/8/1997 and as such the respondent no. 1 has filed the suit for permanent injunction and also sought the direction that the lease deed can be registered in his favour. ( 11 ) THE Trial Court has framed as many as three issues. The issue No. 1 was to the effect as to whether the defendant has executed the lease deed in favour of the respondent No. 1. ( 12 ) ISSUE No. 2 was to the effect as to whether the defendant has intended to execute a lease deed. ( 11 ) THE Trial Court has framed as many as three issues. The issue No. 1 was to the effect as to whether the defendant has executed the lease deed in favour of the respondent No. 1. ( 12 ) ISSUE No. 2 was to the effect as to whether the defendant has intended to execute a lease deed. ( 13 ) THE learned Judge has observed that d. W. 1 has admitted that in order to get the lease deed registered, it was written before the registrar and as such issue No. 2 decided. It has been also given in the evidence that the lease deed has also been sanctioned for commercial purposes in favour of the respondent no. 1 and for that purpose, the papers have been sent to the Sub Registrar Kichha. ( 14 ) IT has been submitted that the judgment of the Civil Judge was passed on 26th may, 1999 and an appeal was preferred on 10-8-2000 along with the section 5 of application, which has been rejected by the Additional District Judge on 6-7-2002. ( 15 ) THE Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that even after the permission was granted on 12/10/1999, the filing of the appeal was delayed. From 12/10/1999 to 10/8/2000, there was no rhyme or reason not to file the appeal and even on 12th October, 1999, when the permission was granted then the appeal was preferred on 10/8/2000 i. e. much expiry of the period of sanction. The learned Judge has observed as under:- ( 16 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents has referred the judgment of State of U. P. and others v. Hari Shanker Dubey, where the division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad has observed that the right of the respondents cannot be ignored, where a right has been accrued on account of the delay of other side. The relevant observations are quoted below: -"it is well-settled that when a proceeding is barred by limitation valuable rights accrue in favour of the other party. Under such circumstances, without having any material before us on the basis of which we can grant any relief to the applicant, we cannot ignore the right of the respondent-writ petitioner. In that view of the matter, there is no other alternative for us but to dismiss the application of the applicant-State Government. Under such circumstances, without having any material before us on the basis of which we can grant any relief to the applicant, we cannot ignore the right of the respondent-writ petitioner. In that view of the matter, there is no other alternative for us but to dismiss the application of the applicant-State Government. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, we feel that because of the said state of affairs of the State Government, the valuable rights of the public at large should not be suffered. In that view of the matter we most reluctantly direct that the order passed in this matter may be brought to the notice of the Chief Minister of the state, who may pass appropriate direction so that litigations may be conducted in proper manner. As learned Standing counsel submits, the Additional L. R. who is posted at Allahabad High Court is directed to communicate this order to the chief Minister of the State forthwith. 3. It is true that the application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be liberally construed but such interpretation on liberally has to be made on the basis of the materials disclosed. If no material is disclosed, it is not possible to construe the petition liberally because very valuable rights of the other party are involved and the same cannot be ignored. " ( 17 ) IN Chandrakant Shukla v. Maharaja martand Singh, their Lordships have defined the word "sufficient cause". Relevant paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted below: -"5. Now coming to the question whether there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay the High Court held that no such sufficient cause was shown. This is essentially a finding of fact and this court ordinarily does not interfere with the decision of the High Court on questions of fact. Further, the relief asked for is essentially a discretionary relief and when a Trial court is reluctant to interfere with the discretion unless there are very good grounds for doing so. " ( 18 ) IN Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. R. N. Datta, the Single Judge of Calcutta High court has observed as under: -"the petitioner has taken out an application under section 5, Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in making this application. " ( 18 ) IN Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. R. N. Datta, the Single Judge of Calcutta High court has observed as under: -"the petitioner has taken out an application under section 5, Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in making this application. It is admitted on the face of this petition that the petitioner had knowledge of the filing of the award since 15-5-1981 from the respondent's letter dated 6-5-1981. Section 14 (2) notice was served on the petitioner on 26-6-1981 and the present application was taken out on 4-8-1981. The reason for delay shown in the petition is the alleged wrong advice by the Lawyers that time will not run unless notice under section 14 (2) is served or any informal notice of filing of the award innovates from Court. In Mondal and Co. v. State of West Bengal, I have already held that even ail informal notice from whatever source it may be, intimating the petitioner that the award been filed, will start the time running from the date of such informal knowledge. Hence, in this case limitation will start from 15-5-1981," ( 19 ) THE respondent No. 1 has informed that the lease deed has already been executed but the same has not yet been registered. Taking into consideration the aforesaid fact that on 13-1-1997 the lease was sanctioned for a period of 90 years and the necessary time has already been passed that is not a fit case where the delay of 440 days should be condoned. It has also come in evidence that the sanction was granted on 12-10-1999. However, the appeal has been filed after such delay and as such the cause for condonation of delay becomes relevant as in spite of knowledge of the sanction, no appeal was preferred within time and therefore, I find no illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Court while rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation act and thereby dismissed the appeal as time barred. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, liberty is given to the petitioner to initiate proceedings in accordance with law, if there is any violation of terms and conditions of the lease deed. ( 21 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the writ petitions are dismissed. No order as to costs. Petitions dismissed. --- *** --- .