N. K. SODHI, C. J. ( 1 ) WITH a view to promote and develop small scale industries in the state of Karnataka, the Karnataka State Small Industries Development corporation Limited (for short, 'the Corporation') allots plots/industrial sheds to entrepreneurs under its different schemes on such terms and conditions as agreed to between the parties. Industrial shed No. 303 (a) under the Hire Purchase Scheme in the Industrial Estate, Peenya II stage, Bangalore was allotted by the Corporation to M/s. Priyanka products a sole proprietorship concern of Y. M. Shetty, resident of No. 40, hill Queen, Dr. Ambedkar Road, Khar, Mumbai (hereinafter referred to as 'the petitioner) for establishing an industry for the manufacture of electroplating and Heat Treatment Salt. This allotment was made on the terms and conditions contained in the letter of intent dated 19-4-1983 and the lease-cum-sale agreement executed between the corporation and the petitioner on 8-10-1983. Clauses 8 and 13 of the letter of intent provide as under:"8. Default in payment of installments or any other dues like water charges, penalty levied/demanded even for one month, within the due date will entail cancellation of allotment of shed allotted under 'here PURCHASE SCHEME' and forfeiture of earnest Money Deposit and installments paid. 13. You should start the industry within 3 months from the date of taking possession or within such time as may be allowed by the undersigned, failing which, the allotment made to you will be cancelled, without further notice and the Earnest Money Deposit forfeited". It appears that the petitioner did not show any interest in starting with the industry nor did he care to take possession of the shed even though it was allotted in April 1983. A notice had to be issued to him on 1-10-1983 calling upon him to show cause why the allotment should not be cancelled because he had failed to take possession of the shed. It was thereafter that the petitioner executed lease-cum-sale agreement on 8-10-1983 and took possession of the shed on 29-10-1983. The cost of the land and building with appurtenances was tentatively estimated at Rs. 3,74,336/- which the petitioner was required to pay in installments and it is the case of the Corporation that the petitioner always delayed the payment of installments and paid compound interest in terms of the agreement. The cost of the land and building with appurtenances was tentatively estimated at Rs. 3,74,336/- which the petitioner was required to pay in installments and it is the case of the Corporation that the petitioner always delayed the payment of installments and paid compound interest in terms of the agreement. He is said to have failed to pay the hire purchase installments and on receipt of notices from the Corporation the petitioner deposited the consolidated arrears. In terms of the agreement executed between the parties the petitioner had to directly approach the karnataka Electricity Board for sanction of his power requirements. He approached the Electricity Board for power sanction in 1987 though the shed had been allotted in the year 1983. On the asking of the petitioner the Corporation had also requested the Executive Engineer of the Board to sanction power supply. Since the petitioner had failed to start the industry within the time stipulated in Clause 13 of the letter of intent, the allotment had been cancelled on several occasions and seizure orders issued which were revoked on the petitioner's assurances that the industry would be started soon. A final notice had been issued to the petitioner on 12-2-1985 calling upon him to clear the dues installment arrears and start the industry. On his failure to send any reply the allotment was cancelled on 17-4-1985. On his oral representation and grievance of non-sanction of power supply, further time was granted to him to start the industry. Despite the assurances, the industry did not start and therefore a notice dated 11-9-1986 was issued calling upon the petitioner to start the industry again. No reply was sent to this notice and the Corporation revived the order of 17-4-1985 cancelling the allotment and issued a seizure order on 23-10-1986. The petitioner then by his letter dated 4-8-1987 sought for revocation of the seizure order undertaking to start the industry by 15-10-1987. The seizure order was revoked and the petitioner was directed to take possession of the shed and start the industry. Repeated reminders were issued to the petitioner thereafter to start the industry but to no effect. Further, two final notices were issued on 26-5-1988 and 27-12-1989 giving the petitioner 15 days time to start the industry. The seizure order was revoked and the petitioner was directed to take possession of the shed and start the industry. Repeated reminders were issued to the petitioner thereafter to start the industry but to no effect. Further, two final notices were issued on 26-5-1988 and 27-12-1989 giving the petitioner 15 days time to start the industry. During the year 1990 the representatives of the Corporation visited the premises and found that the industry had not been set up and that some packing material unconnected with the petitioner's industry was found at the site. As no explanation could be furnished by the petitioner for contravening Clause 13 of the lease-cum-sale agreement which provided that the shed shall not be used for any purpose other than the one for which the allotment had been made, the Corporation again cancelled the allotment by order dated 5-9-1990 and the shed was seized on 14-9-1990. Immediately thereafter the petitioner filed an affidavit stating that the packing material belonged to M/s. Agro Chemical Industry which was occupying the neighbouring shed and that the same had been stored in the petitioner's shed without his knowledge. The petitioner was given yet another opportunity to start production and a letter in this regard was issued on 25-5-1991 laying down certain conditions on the compliance of which the seizure order dated 14-9-1990 was to be revoked. One of the conditions was that the petitioner would start the industry within two months of taking over possession. The petitioner by his letter dated 26-6-1991 agreed to comply with the conditions. What to talk of two months, the petitioner was given more than three years thereafter to start the industry but he failed to do so and finally by order dated 24-1-1995 the allotment was cancelled and the shed seized on 27-1-1995 on which date the following communication was sent to the petitioner: "with reference to the above, it is to inform you that even after completion of 10 years lease period you have not taken any steps to start the industry in spite of our repeated notices issued in your favour. This clearly shows that you are not interested in starting set up the industry. In view of this today i. e. , on 24-1-1995 we have taken possession of the shed to the Departmental custody after given so many opportunities for the above reason. This clearly shows that you are not interested in starting set up the industry. In view of this today i. e. , on 24-1-1995 we have taken possession of the shed to the Departmental custody after given so many opportunities for the above reason. Hence, you are hereby prohibited from entry into the shed. Any attempt to tamper the seal of any unauthorised entry into the shed premises bearing No B-303 (a) by any force which will be viewed very seriously and action will be taken as per rules". ( 2 ) AFTER cancelling the allotment in favour of the petitioner shed No. 303 (a) was allotted to M/s. TEX CEM, Bangalore the 2nd respondent herein. This allotment was made on 6-6-1995 and a lease-cum-sale agreement executed between the Corporation and the 2nd respondent on 9-6-1995. Power supply was sanctioned to the 2nd respondent on 12-9-1995 and since then it is carrying on its industry. ( 3 ) FEELING aggrieved by the order of cancellation dated 24/27-1-1995 the petitioner filed W. P. No. 12799 of 1998 in this Court in April 1998 making a grievance that the Corporation could not have taken possession of the industrial shed without resort to the provisions of the karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner that it was for the corporation to provide infrastructure to the petitioner to start his industry in terms of the letter of intent and that no electricity was provided to the shed and therefore the industry could not be started. The petitioner contended that it became necessary for him to approach the karnataka Electricity Board for supply of electricity and it is in these circumstances that the industry could not be set up. The writ petition was contested by the Corporation and a detailed counter-affidavit had been filed on its behalf. The cancellation of the allotment was sought to be justified on the ground that the petitioner failed to set up the industry and therefore the Corporation had no option but to cancel the allotment. It was pleaded on behalf of the Corporation that on several occasions the petitioner had been told to start his industry and that the orders of cancellation passed earlier had been revoked on assurances given by the petitioner that he would start the industry. It was pleaded on behalf of the Corporation that on several occasions the petitioner had been told to start his industry and that the orders of cancellation passed earlier had been revoked on assurances given by the petitioner that he would start the industry. The matter was considered by the learned Single Judge who came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not diligent in complying with the terms and conditions contained in the letter of intent and the sale agreement and despite the orders cancelling the allotment on three earlier occasions he did not start the industry and therefore he could not be heard to say that the Corporation had failed to comply with the provisions of the public Premises Act. The learned Single Judge also found that after cancelling the order of allotment the shed had been allotted to the 2nd respondent who was running the industry there. As regards the action of the Corporation in forfeiting the sale consideration amount paid by the petitioner, the learned Single Judge held that Clause 8 of the sale agreement which enables the Corporation to forfeit the amount was opposed to public policy and being unconscionable could not be given effect to. He placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v Brojo Nath ganguly and Delhi Transport Corporation v Delhi Transport corporation Mazdoor Congress, in this regard and directed the corporation to refund the forfeited amount. Since the petitioner had remained in possession of the shed, the Corporation was allowed to deduct the rent for the period the petitioner remained in its occupation. The writ petition was dismissed with a direction to the Corporation to refund the amount after deducting the rent for use and occupation of the shed. It is against this order of the learned Single Judge that the corporation has filed the present writ appeal. ( 4 ) WE have heard the learned Counsels for the parties and it is their common case that the allotment of the shed in favour of the petitioner had been cancelled by the Corporation on 24-1-1995 and its possession was taken by it on 27-1-1995. Thereafter the shed in question was allotted to the 2nd respondent in June 1995 where it is carrying on its industry. Thereafter the shed in question was allotted to the 2nd respondent in June 1995 where it is carrying on its industry. The writ petition came to be filed in April 1998, that is, after more than 3 years from the date of cancellation. We are clearly of the view that the petitioner should have been non-suited on the ground of delay alone. If the order of cancellation were to be challenged in a Civil court, the suit would have been barred by time in April 1998 when the writ petition was filed. The learned Single Judge should not have entertained the same. Not only this, third party rights had intervened in the meanwhile. As already observed, the Corporation after cancelling the allotment in favour of the petitioner had allotted the shed to the 2nd respondent which is now running the industry there. It was therefore most inequitable to entertain a belated writ petition. ( 5 ) THE learned Single Judge, no doubt, has upheld the order of cancellation and while dismissing the writ petition has directed the corporation to refund the consideration amount paid by the petitioner towards the shed in question after deducting the amount, if any, towards the rent for the period he remained in its possession. The learned Single Judge has held that Clause 8 of the sale agreement was unconscionable. Clause 8 of the lease-cum-sale agreement does not deal with forfeiture of the amount paid by the petitioner on his committing any default. It is Clause 8 of the letter of intent which deals with this matter and probably the learned Single Judge meant to refer to that clause. Clause 8 of the letter of intent has been reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment and we do not think that this clause is in any way, unconscionable. Ali that is provided therein is that default in making payment of installments or any other dues shall entail cancellation of the allotment of the shed and that the earnest money deposited and the installments paid shall be forfeited. This clause is usually found in all such allotments and the Corporation is entitled to reserve a right to itself to forfeit the amount paid if the allottee contravenes any of the terms of the allotment. This clause is usually found in all such allotments and the Corporation is entitled to reserve a right to itself to forfeit the amount paid if the allottee contravenes any of the terms of the allotment. Industrial sheds constitute a valuable and scarce resource which is to be utilised for promoting industrial activity by allotting the same to genuine entrepreneurs capable of setting up their units within the prescribed time frame. Similarly, allottees who are unable to pay the installments or other dues in terms of the agreement should not be allowed to continue and it is imperative that the corporation should exercise its power of resumption/cancellation diligently to ensure that sheds could be utilised by making allotment to others who may be wanting to set up their industries. The judgments relied upon by the learned Single Judge do not, in our opinion, have any relevance to the facts of the present case. In those cases the Apex Court was dealing with service contracts and service rules which empowered the Government Corporation to terminate the services of its permanent employees by giving notice or pay in lieu of notice period which was held to be opposed to public policy and violative of Article 14 and Directive principles contained in Articles 39 (a) and 41 of the Constitution. Such is not the case here. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner fairly conceded that the judgments of the Supreme Court in Central inland Water Transport Corporation's case and Delhi Transport corporation's case, were not attracted to the case in hand. The corporation was therefore justified in forfeiting the amount because the petitioner had failed to set up his industry even after more than 10 years from the date of allotment. From the facts stated in the earlier part of the judgment, it is clear that right from the beginning the petitioner was never serious in setting up the industry and it is possible that being a resident of Mumbai, had taken the shed only for speculative purposes. Fortunately, the Corporation had not executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner as he had violated some clauses of the letter of intent and also of the lease-cum-sale agreement. Fortunately, the Corporation had not executed the sale deed in favour of the petitioner as he had violated some clauses of the letter of intent and also of the lease-cum-sale agreement. Moreover, the action of the Corporation in forfeiting the consideration amount paid by the petitioner towards the shed gave rise to contractual disputes and the learned Single Judge should have left the parties to settle such disputes in a Civil Court. We, therefore, set aside the direction issued by the learned Single Judge directing the Corporation to refund the consideration amount paid by the petitioner towards the shed. ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner then urged that in terms of the letter of intent it was the Corporation which was required to supply the infrastructure to enable the petitioner to start his industry and since no electricity was provided to the shed the petitioner was justified in not starting the industry and the Corporation could not cancel the allotment on that ground. This contention is being noticed only to be rejected. A reading of Clause 12 of the letter of intent leaves no room for doubt that it was the petitioner who was required to approach the Electricity Board directly for the sanction of his power requirements and that he was required to get the power connection sanctioned within one month from the date of allotment and the responsibility in this regard was entirely his. As already observed he did not even bother to take possession within three months of the allotment within which period he was required to start the industry. He applied for the electricity connection only in the year 1987. It is, thus, clear that the petitioner was not serious in starting with the industry and the Corporation cannot be blamed at all in this regard. ( 7 ) NO other point was raised. In the result, the writ appeal is allowed and the writ petition filed by the petitioner dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .