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2005 DIGILAW 511 (ORI)

Tapan Kumar Prusty v. State of Orissa

2005-09-01

I.M.QUDDUSI, PRADIP MOHANTY

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JUDGMENT I. M. QUDDUSI, J. — This writ petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated 2. 11. 1998 passed by the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cut¬tack in O.A. No. 2844 (C) of 1998 filed by the petitioners dis¬missing the same as barred by limitation. The impugned order has also been passed ex parte in absence of the petitioners and their counsel. 2. The petitioners had filed the O.A. on 19.9.1997 claim¬ing salary in the untrained scale instead of stipend which they were paid during the period of C.T. training. The training was completed on 31.3. 1996. The O.A. was dismissed on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.K. Ramachan¬dran v. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 in which the Apex Court has held that the law of limitation has to be applied with allits rigor prescribed by Statutes and Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. As the case of the petitioners was squarely covered by the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the Tribunal dismissed the O.A. holding the same as barred by limitation. 3. We have perused the case of P.K. Ramachandran (Supra). The respondent-State of Kerala and another filed Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 316 of 1996 against the judgment and decree of the learned Sub-Court at Kollam in Arbitration Application No. 108 of 1992. The appeal was barred by 565 days. The respondents had filed an application seeking condonation of delay and by the order impugned before the Hon’ble apex Court passed by the High Court of Kerala, the delay was condoned. 4. In the above regard, we may notice that in filing the appeals which are barred by time, the law of limitation applies and an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be filed. But, when we see the provision of Clause (3) of Section 21 of the Admin¬istrative Tribunals Act, we find that the Tribunal has been con¬ferred with the powers to entertain the application even after expiry of the period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal showing sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. But, when we see the provision of Clause (3) of Section 21 of the Admin¬istrative Tribunals Act, we find that the Tribunal has been con¬ferred with the powers to entertain the application even after expiry of the period of limitation if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal showing sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. As such, according to this clause, there is no necessity for filing a petition for condonation of delay in filing an O.A. Only the cause is to be explained for not making the application within the period specified under Section 21 (a) and (b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act. I Therefore, if the petitioner explains the cause for not making application within the period prescribed under Clauses (1) and (2) of Section 21 in the memo of O.A. itself, the Tribunal is bound to see whether the cause is explained sufficiently and the Tribunal is satisfied with this or not. However, it does not preclude the applicant from filing a separate petition explaining the cause for not making the application within the prescribed period. 5. The Government itself used to make payment of arrear dues of its employees even beyond one year period. The Government passes orders providing benefits to its servants with retrospec¬tive effect and at times even ten years before or so. Therefore, it is always presumed that when a person is in service and he demands arrears of salary or differential salary during the period of service, it cannot be said that his claim is time barred. It is a recurring cause of action accruing day to day and at any point of time the payment of arrears of salary or the differen¬tial of the same can be paid to the Government servant without considering the period for which the payment is sanctioned. 6. In the instant matter, the cause of action was a recur¬ring one as the petitioners had got the stipend for the period of training and they were claiming the untrained pay scale instead of stipend during that period, inter alia, on the ground that prior to going on training they were getting untrained scale. When they completed the training on 31.3.1996 they claimed the arrear of differential amount on the basis of untrained scale. When they completed the training on 31.3.1996 they claimed the arrear of differential amount on the basis of untrained scale. They filed the O.A. on 19.9.1997, i.e., after one year five months nineteen days during which they had submitted representa¬tion claiming the relief sought in the O.A. Therefore, Clauses l (a) and (b) of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act would be applicable in their case. The said clauses read as under : “21. (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application, (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.” 7. In view of the above mentioned facts and circumstances, when the petitioners had filed the O.A.. within a period of one year and six months from the date of completion of their training, it cannot be said that the claim of the petitioners was time barred. Therefore, the impugned judgment/order passed by the Tribunal is not sustainable in the eye of law and is liable to be quashed. 8. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The judg¬ment and order dated 2.11.1998 passed by the Orissa Administra¬tive Tribunal in O.A. No. 2844 (C) of 1998 is quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal on merits in accordance with law. The Tribunal will decide the O.A. as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of three months on priority basis from the date of communication or re¬ceipt of certified copy of this order. PRADIP MOHANTY,J. I agree. Petition allowed.