( 1 ) THE judgment-debtors in E. P. No. 164 of 2000 in O. S. No. 815 of 1996 on the file of the Court of i Additional Junior Civil Judge, Nellore, are the petitioners. They challenge the docket order dated 27-8-2004, through which, the executing Court confirmed the sale. ( 2 ) THE respondent filed the suit for recovery of certain amount from the petitioners. He obtained attachment, under order 38 Rule 5 C. P. C. , in relation to an item of immovable property belonging to the petitioners, before judgment. The suit was decreed on 22-3-1999, and the decree became final. ( 3 ) THE respondent filed E. P. No. 164 of 2000 for execution of the decree. Since the property was already under attachment, sale notification was published and auction was held on 26-7-2004. The respondent participated in the auction with the permission of the Court and emerged as the highest bidder for a sum of Rs. 1,15,000/ -. The Executing Court confirmed the sale through the order under revision. ( 4 ) SRI M Venkata Narayana, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the limitation Act (for short the Act ) prescribes 60 days time for filing an application to set aside the sale in execution, and without waiting for the expiry of 60 days from the date of auction, the Executing court confirmed the sale, almost within one month, he submits that confirmation of sale is a step to be taken under Rule 92 of order 21 C. P. C. , only when no application under Rules 89, 90 or 91 was filed, or, the applications so filed was disallowed. He contends that, by confirming the sale before expiry of the period of limitation, the Executing Court had rendered the right of the petitioner under Rules 89, 90 and 91, nugatory. ( 5 ) SRI P. Ganga Kami Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the C. R. P. , is not maintainable, inasmuch as the petitioners did not move the Executing Court for necessary relief. He contends that the petitioners could have moved the application before the Executing Court in accordance with the relevant provisions, and that there is nothing in Order 21 C. P. C. , which precludes an Executing Court from confirming the sale before the expiry of 60 days from the date of auction. He contends that the petitioners could have moved the application before the Executing Court in accordance with the relevant provisions, and that there is nothing in Order 21 C. P. C. , which precludes an Executing Court from confirming the sale before the expiry of 60 days from the date of auction. ( 6 ) THIS revision presents an important situation and question. The decree against the petitioners became final, and an item of immovable property stood attached during the pendency of the suit. The petitioners permitted the decree to become final. To the extent the property was notified for sale, there did not exist much of a controversy. The auction was held on 26-7-2004. The respondent obtained permission of the Court under Rule 72 of order 21 C. P. C. , and participated in the sale. He emerged as the highest bidder for a sum of Rs. 1,15,000/ -. The Executing Court confirmed the sale in favour of the respondent through its docket order dated 27-8-2004. This order is passed under Rule 92 of order 21 C. P. C. It is beneficial to extract rule 92 of Order 21. "sale when to become absolute or be set aside. (1) Where no application is made under rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute: provided that, where any property is sold in execution of a decree pending the final disposal of any claim to, or any objection. to the attachment of, such property, the Court shall not confirm such sale until the final disposal of such claim or objection. (2) Where such application is made and allowed, and where, in the case of an application under Rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within thirty days from the date of sale, [or in cases where the amount deposited under Rule 89 is found to be deficient owing to any clerical or arithmetical mistake on the part of the depositor and such deficiency has been made good within such time as may be fixed by the Court, the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale: provided that no order shall be made unless notice of the application has been given to all persons affected thereby. (3) No suit to set aside an order made under this rule shall be brought by any person against whom such order is made. (4) Where a third party challenges the judgment-debtor s tide by filing a suit against the auction-purchaser, the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor shall be necessary parties to the suit. (5) If the suit referred to in sub-rule (4) is decreed, die Court shall direct the decree- holder to refund the money to the auction- purchaser, and where such an order is passed the execution proceeding in which the sale had been held shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be revived at the stage at which the sale was ordered;" ( 7 ) SUB-RULE (1) discloses that the sale become absolute and can be confirmed subject to two conditions, viz. , (a) no application is filed under Rules 89, 90 or 91, or, (b) the applications filed under the said provisions have been disallowed. Rule 89 enables a judgment-debtor to have the sale set aside by complying with two conditions, namely, payment of a sum, representing 5% of the purchase money to the auction- purchaser, and (c) payment to the decree- holder of the E. P. schedule amount. The purport of this rule appears is mainly, to enable the judgment-debtor to comply with the decree, even at a belated stage, duly compensating the auction-purchaser. ( 8 ) THE purport of application under rule 90 is different. If the decree-holder alleges irregularities or fraud in the sale, he is not under obligation to make any deposits, as in the case of application under rule 89. The auction-purchaser is also conferred with a right to file an application to set aside the sale under Rule 99, if he detects that the judgment-debtor does not have any salable interest in the property. ( 9 ) FOR making an application to set aside the sale, contemplated under the three provisions referred to above, the limitation prescribed is, 60 days, under Article 127, in the Schedule to the Act. The starting point is the date of sale. Ordinarily, the period of limitation is treated as the outer limit, for taking a particular step, referred to under the relevant provision. The starting point is the date of sale. Ordinarily, the period of limitation is treated as the outer limit, for taking a particular step, referred to under the relevant provision. Though the relevant provision confers a right upon the concerned person, to take any step, at any point of time, till the last day of limitation, such provisions do not debar the other party, or for that matter, the Court, to proceed with the matter. For example, the period of limitation for preferring an appeal from a decree, to a High Court, is 90 days. Though the appellant can prefer an appeal within 90 days, there is no corresponding obligation on the Court or the decree-holder, to wait till the expiry of that period, in the matter of initiation of execution proceedings, unless the Appellate court had granted stay. ( 10 ) AT the first blush, Article 127 of the Act, appears to be similar to any other analogous provision, in its character. However, if one reads the same in conjunction with Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. , it would be evident that, apart from prescribing the limitation for filing of application, it disables the Executing Court from taking the next step of confirmation of the sale. The reason is that the occasion to take further steps under Rule 92 would arise, only if an application to set aside the sale is not filed, or such an application, if filed, was disallowed. The opening phrase of Rule 92 (1) "where no application is made under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91", indirectly requires the Executing Court to wait till the last date of limitation, which invariably means 60 days from the date of sale. It is not permissible to give any other meaning or interpretation. The court cannot choose to proceed under the rule, before expiry of 60 days from the date of sale, even if it finds that no application under Rules 89, 90 or 91 were filed, because such an application can be filed at any time before the period of limitation elapses. ( 11 ) A perusal of clause (2) of Rule 92 adds strength to this viewpoint. One of the circumstances under this provision is, where an application under Rule 89 is made, together with necessary deposit, stipulated thereunder. Once such a situation exists, the Executing Court is precluded from proceeding further. ( 11 ) A perusal of clause (2) of Rule 92 adds strength to this viewpoint. One of the circumstances under this provision is, where an application under Rule 89 is made, together with necessary deposit, stipulated thereunder. Once such a situation exists, the Executing Court is precluded from proceeding further. The provision takes in its fold, certain other analogous situations also. The net result is that the Court is required to wait, either till the last date for filing of applications to set aside the sale, or if the applications are filed till their disposal. ( 12 ) REVERTING to the facts of the case, it is a matter of record that the sale took place on 26-7-2004, and it was confirmed under Rule 92 on 27-8-2004, i. e. , almost one month before the last date of limitation for filing such applications. Therefore, it emerges that the Executing court committed an error in taking a step under Rule 92 of Order 21 C. P. C. , before the expiry of period of limitation, prescribed under Article 127 of the Act, and without ensuring whether the disabling factors under sub-rules (1) and (2) do not exist at all. Hence, the order under revision is liable to be set aside. ( 13 ) NOW, it has to be examined as to what course of action is available to the petitioners. In the natural course of things, they have to file an application under Rule 89 or 90 to set aside the sale, which took place on 26-7-2004. Such application ought to have been filed within 60 days. However, in view of the developments, referred to above, they were prevented from filing it. They felt, and in a way, rightly, that the confirmation of the sale by the Executing court had disabled them from filing application to set aside the sale. Now that the disabling factor had been wiped away by this Court; the petitioners can avail their remedy under Rule 89 or 90. So far as the limitation is concerned, they do not have to face any problem as to limitation. The reason is that once the order dated 27-8-2004 is set aside, the situation has to be relegated to the one, obtaining as on that day, by legal fiction. The limitation for the leftover time of roughly 29 days would naturally be available to the petitioners. The reason is that once the order dated 27-8-2004 is set aside, the situation has to be relegated to the one, obtaining as on that day, by legal fiction. The limitation for the leftover time of roughly 29 days would naturally be available to the petitioners. As a condition precedent, for granting interim orders, this Court directed the petitioners to pay the amounts, that are required to be deposited under Rule 89 of order 21 C. P. C. The condition is said to have been complied with. ( 14 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the c. R. P. is allowed and the order under revision is set aside. The petitioners shall be entitled to present an application under rule 89 or 90, of Order 21 C. P. C. , as the case may be, within four weeks from today. If such an application is presented before the Executing Court, within that time, the executing Court shall treat the same as having been filed within limitation and proceed to decide the matter in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.