B. PRAKASH RAO, J. ( 1 ) THESE two revision have come up before us on a reference made by the learned Single Judge of this Court for consideration on the issue as to : "whether a trial Court awards compensation, while imposing a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, in purported exercise of powers under Section 357 (3) Cr. P. C. , is such compensation amount not liable to be paid either before the period allowed for presenting an appeal has elapsed or when an appeal is presented, before the decision in the appeal; and whether the appellate court before whom an appeal is presented by the accused has discretion in the matter of modulating the grant of an interlocutory order (of suspension and grant of bail) by imposing conditions as to how payment of compensation shall be made pending decision in the appeal". ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stating the facts on the backdrop are that the revision petitioner is the accused who has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short the Act ) by the learned XV- metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad and sentenced to a term of imprisonment and further, awarded compensation of rs. 2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only) in each of these cases in favour of the de facto-complainant. It is to be noticed that no fine was however imposed. Aggrieved thereby, the accused preferred regular appeals against the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court wherein the appellate Court pending disposal thereof, granted stay in regard to the compensation subject to condition that the petitioner/accused deposits a sum of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees twenty Five thousand only) as awarded by the Court below in each case. Challenging the same, the petitioner/accused filed these two revisions, inter alia, placing reliance on the decision of this Court in V. Prasada rao v. State of A. P. , 2001 (2) ALD (Crl.) 566 (AP) = 2001 (2) ALT (Crl.) 348 (AP), contending that having regard to the provision under sub-section (2) of Section 357 of the code of Criminal Procedure (for short the cr. P. C. ), there is no need for payment of any amount and therefore imposition of such condition is wholly beyond the powers conferred thereunder. P. C. ), there is no need for payment of any amount and therefore imposition of such condition is wholly beyond the powers conferred thereunder. The learned single Judge by taking into consideration the submissions made on either side and especially having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Stannp Felix Pinto v. Jangid Builders Private Limited and another, 2001 (2) ALD 96 (SC), observed that there is a distinction in regard to the amounts to be awarded both either of the provisions in sub-section (2) or subsection (3) of Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. and therefore, it is perhaps possible to take a different view other than the one expressed by the Single Judge of this Court. Hence, referred these revisions to this Court on the aforesaid aspect. ( 3 ) HEARD Sri C. Praveen Kumar, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent. ( 4 ) HAVING regard to the question referred and the submissions made across the Bar on both the sides, the question referred takes in its ambit, the scope and the principles governing under both the subsections (1) and (2) of Section 357 of the cr. P. C. visa-a-visa that of sub-section (3) of the said provision and applicability of the immunity as provided for under sub-section (2) thereof in respect of the amount as contemplated. ( 5 ) BEFORE going into details, it is relevant to extract Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. in its entirety which reads as follows : (1) When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied: (a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution; (b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the court, recoverable by such person in a civil Court; (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) If the fine is imposed in a case which is a subject to appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be presented before the decision of the appeal. (3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentenced. ( 6 ) ON a bare reading of the aforesaid provision it amply indicates that while imposing sentence, the Court has power to levy fine as provided for specifically under sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof which can include any compensation towards any loss or injury etc. , as enunciated under sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. whereas sub-section (3) on the face of it stands on its own and confers powers to impose compensation and it also further specifically states to the effect that the same is not conforming part of any fine. Therefore, the expression compensation has been used in two different places namely sub-clause (b) of sub-section (1) and subsection (3) of the aforesaid provision. Both such expressions are totally in a different context and the assessment thereof also necessarily has to be on varied conditions. Therefore, it necessarily follows that expression compensation used in two different places does not run on similar lines but almost parallel namely to say that the fine as contemplated under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. may include compensation in a different context but the compensation as provided for under sub-section (3) would not take or form part of the fine as the Legislature has clearly and expressly denoted. Therefore, prima facie, the compensation as awarded towards sentence under sub-section (3) would not squarely take for the purpose of any benefit as sought to be conferred under subsection (2) thereof. Therefore, prima facie, the compensation as awarded towards sentence under sub-section (3) would not squarely take for the purpose of any benefit as sought to be conferred under subsection (2) thereof. It is only the fine amount, which may also include compensation as a part thereof whenever it is awarded which automatically gets stayed or for any such immunity in making payment thereof during pendency of the appeal. However, that itself would not include the compensation, which has been awarded totally under different contexts as provided under sub-section (3) thereof. In Hari Kishan and State of haryana v. Sukhbir Singh and others, air 1988 SC 2127 , while considering subsection (3) of the aforesaid Provision, the supreme Court held at Paras 10 and 11 as follows : "10. Sub-section (1) of Section 357 provides power to award compensation to victims of the offence out of the sentence of fine imposed on accused. In this case, we are not concerned with sub-section (1 ). We are concerned only with sub-section (3 ). It is an important provision but Courts have seldom invoked it. Perhaps due to ignorance of the object of it it empowers the Court to award compensation to victims while passing judgment of conviction. In addition to conviction, the Court may order the accused to pay some amount by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of accused. It may be noted that this power of Courts to award compensation is not ancillary to other sentences but it is in addition thereto. This power was intended to do something to reassure the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal justice system It is a measure of responding appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the offender. It is, to some extent a constructive approach to crimes. It is indeed a step forward in our criminal justice system. We, therefore, recommend to all Courts to exercise this power liberally so as to meet the ends of justice in a better way. 11. The payment by way of compensation must however be reasonable. What is reasonable, may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of crime, the justness of claim by the victim and the ability of accused to pay. 11. The payment by way of compensation must however be reasonable. What is reasonable, may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The quantum of compensation may be determined by taking into account the nature of crime, the justness of claim by the victim and the ability of accused to pay. If there are more than one accused they may be asked to pay in equal terms unless their capacity to pay varies considerably. The payment may also vary depending upon the acts of each accused. Reasonable period for payment of compensation if necessary by instalments, may also be given. The Court may enforce the order by imposing sentence in default. " having regard to the aforesaid object as enunciated by the Apex Court necessarily it connotes that there is a sea-difference between the different natures of compensation as contemplated under both sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of the aforesaid provision. In the aforesaid cases referred to above, the learned Single Judge of this Court while interpreting both the subsections namely sub-section (2) and subsection (3) of the aforesaid provision, held that sub-section (2) also comes into operation automatically even in regard to the compensation as awarded under subsection (3) of the said provision. In support, the learned Single Judge sought to place reliance on Section 431 of the Cr. P. C. which contemplates for recovery of any amounts other than the fine which also includes the compensation. Hence, sub-section (2) can safely be applied to the compensation awarded under sub-section (3) of the said provision. Further, the learned Judge sought to rest the ultimate finding holding that there is no reason as to why stay shall not operate in respect of the said compensation granted under sub-section (3) of the aforesaid provision apart from the fact merely because sub-section (2) is coming under sub-section (1) and speaks of fine imposed by the Court in an appelable case the benefit of the stay engrafted under section cannot be restricted to sub-section (1) alone nor its application be excluded to the provisions of sub-section (3) thereof, since it is manifest now even the compensation granted under sub-section (3) of Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. shall have to be recovered only as if it were a fine. P. C. shall have to be recovered only as if it were a fine. ( 7 ) ON the entire reading of the aforesaid decision, it follows that the learned single Judge sought to usher in the presumption aspect has made part of Section 431 of the Cr. P. C. for the purpose of recovery of compensation awarded under sub-section (3 ). It is now well settled that a dealing provision cannot be imparted unless and until the Statute specifically contemplates otherwise the very purpose and object of the specific legislations made by the inclusion or exclusion would become arduous. Further, when the Legislature has expressly used the words in its own differential contexts under exclusive varying conditions and the incidents, the same cannot be made together or the Legislature parallel lines cannot be brought in one line nor can be interpreted to make a superimposing one line over the other. Therefore, there cannot be presumption enlarging the expressions used. ( 8 ) IN the context, it is apt to note the decision of the Supreme Court in the Stanny felix Pinto v. Jangid Builders Private limited and another (supra), wherein the apex Court on considering the provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments act held that in a case where the sentence included imprisonment and fine, it was held that while suspending the sentence for the said offence, it is advisable that the Court imposes a condition that the fine part is remitted within a certain period. If the fine amount is heavy, the Court can direct at least a portion thereof to be remitted as the convicted person wants the sentence to be suspended during the pendency of the appeal. Ultimately by taking into consideration the total amount of fine in that case, the trial court imposed Rs. 20,00,000/ -. The condition imposed by the High Court was upheld. Therefore, even the case squarely falling under sub-section (2) of the aforesaid provision in a given case and if the circumstances warrant, there is ample power left with the appellate Court to impose such condition. ( 9 ) ANOTHER interesting feature of the aspect is to take note of sub-section (1) of section 389 of the Cr. Therefore, even the case squarely falling under sub-section (2) of the aforesaid provision in a given case and if the circumstances warrant, there is ample power left with the appellate Court to impose such condition. ( 9 ) ANOTHER interesting feature of the aspect is to take note of sub-section (1) of section 389 of the Cr. P. C. , which reads a follows : " (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person the appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond. " from the above, it is quite evident that the appellate Court has all powers to suspend not only the sentence but also all such orders having regard to the specific expression used therein. Necessarily it follows that any provision of sentence for compensation as provided under subsection (3) of Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. would come well within the meaning of not only the expression sentence but also orders since such compensation forms part of a sentence in wider terms though not as a fine in its stricter terms. In the circumstances, it has to be held that it cannot be said that there is no power conferred on the appellate Court to suspend any such sentence or order other than for the fine as contemplated under sub-section (2) of Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. alone. Having regard to such clear provision of law available, it is to be held that in exercise of powers conferred under subsection (1) of Section 389 of the Cr. P. C. the appellate Court can pass appropriate interim orders of suspension with any conditions or terms as may warrant in the circumstances in respect of compensation awarded under sub-section (3) of Section 357 of the Cr. P. C. This provision has not been brought to the notice of the learned single Judge in V. Prasada Rao s case. Having regard to the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the decision in V. Prasada Rao s case does not reflect the correct position of law. ( 10 ) IN the result, the references are answered accordingly.