Judgment :- The petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 3.9.1996 in Proc No.9789/EB4.96 and for a consequential direction that she should be reinstated with backwages and attendant benefits. 2. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition are as follows: - The petitioner was appointed as (personal clerk) Steno typist Grade-III in the office of the Chairman & Managing Director of the Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd., with effect from 22.7.1994 in the scale of pay of Rs.1200-30-1560-40-2040 along with special pay and other allowances as applicable under the Rules and Regulations of the Tamil Nadu Small Industries Development Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation", by order dated 17.8.1994. By Proceedings No.12680/EA1/95 dated 29.6.1995, it was declared that the petitioner had completed the period of probation on 29.6.1995 and was declared as the approved probationer. Thereafter, by Proceedings dated 22.7.1995, she was sanctioned first increment with effect from 1.7.1995. While she was working, by order dated 3.9.1996, she was ousted from service for want of vacancy. Even though the petitioner made several representations, no further orders were passed and she was not permitted to join duty. 3. The main ground of attack in the writ petition is that since she has completed the period of probation and had been appointed in the existing vacancy, she should not have been ousted from service on the false guize "for want of vacancy". It is further contended that the impugned order is illegal as one month notice or payment of one month salary in lieu thereof had not been issued in accordance with Clause 5 of the appointment order dated 17.8.1994. It is further indicated that there were several vacancies available and terminating her service on the ground that there was no vacancy was not permissible. It is contended that the impugned order of ouster from service was politically motivated and after resignation of the Chairperson, action was taken against her. 4. A counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent Corporation. Such counter affidavit has been sworn to by the General Manager. In the counter affidavit, factual dispute has been raised relating to the actual date of appointment and date of joining of the petitioner. It has been indicated that the order of appointment was issued on 17.8.1994 with retrospective date, i.e., 22.7.1994. Such counter affidavit has been sworn to by the General Manager. In the counter affidavit, factual dispute has been raised relating to the actual date of appointment and date of joining of the petitioner. It has been indicated that the order of appointment was issued on 17.8.1994 with retrospective date, i.e., 22.7.1994. However, the petitioner actually gave the joining report on 7.9.1994, even though she has been signing the Attendance Register from 22.7.1994 on the oral instructions given by the then Chairperson. It is further indicated that even assuming that she had joined duty on 22.7.1994, she would have completed her probation only on 21.7.1995, but an order had been written by the then Chairperson as if the petitioner had completed probation on 29.6.1995. It is further indicated that the appointment to the post of Stenographer in the Corporation is either made by deputation from Government departments on foreign service or through Employment Exchange. In the present case, the appointee was neither sponsored by the Employment Exchange nor her appointment was on deputation. The appointment was made purely by exercising the discretionary powers by the non-official Chairperson in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.447 dated 10.7.1992. In such G.O., it has been indicated that in respect of certain Public Sector undertakings, at times, the Government used to appoint non-official Chairman / Chairperson instead of official Chairman/Chairperson. It was further indicated that in case of appointment of non-official Chairman/Chairperson in any Public Sector undertaking, one Personal Clerk (Stenographer) could be appointed and in accordance with such G.O., only on the basis of the direction issued by the then non-official Chairman/Chairperson, the petitioner has been appointed without undergoing any selection process. Since the existing non-official Chairperson relinquished the post, thereafter, there was no need for the post of Personal Clerk (Stenographer), and therefore, the order of ouster had been issued. 5. In course of hearing of the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to paragraph 8 of the counter, wherein the General Manager in the affidavit has indicated as if he had taken the decision to abolish the post. It is therefore contended that since the post could be abolished only by the decision of the Board, the General Manager had no authority to abolish the post. It is therefore contended that since the post could be abolished only by the decision of the Board, the General Manager had no authority to abolish the post. A further contention has been raised that the appointment order has been issued by the Chairman, and therefore, the order of termination issued by the Managing Director is improper. 6. In order to clarify the position, the file has been produced by the counsel for the respondent. The file indicates that a note was prepared by the General Manager indicating that the petitioner had been appointed pursuant to G.O.Ms.No.447 dated 10.7.1992 and since the non-official Chairperson has relinquished the post, the attendant post of stenographer attached to such non-official Chairman cease to exist simultaneously with the cessation of the non-official Chairperson. Therefore, it was necessary to oust the junior most person in the category of steno-typist and since the present petitioner is the junior most, her services was terminated. The file indicates that such note put up by the General Manager has been approved by the Managing Director. In such view of the matter, the contention that the General Manager had taken the decision to abolish the post is not correct and the expression to that effect in the counter affidavit appears to be inartistic representation of the factual scenario. 7. From the materials on record, including the file, it is apparent that the order of ouster was passed on the basis that there was no necessity to the post after the non-official Chairperson has ceased to exist. In other words, the post itself ceased to exist, and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had any right to continue. The factual assertion of the Corporation that the petitioner was the junior most in the category of steno-typist appears to be correct. It is also apparent that her selection had been made only on the basis of the recommendation made by the non-official Chairperson without undergoing any process of selection. Since the appointment was not based on any regular process of selection and purely on the discretionary power of the then Chairperson, the petitioner cannot raise any grievance on account of the subsequent ouster. After the non-official Chairperson ceased to hold the office, the post of Personal Clerk (Steno-typist) also ceased to exist. Since the appointment was not based on any regular process of selection and purely on the discretionary power of the then Chairperson, the petitioner cannot raise any grievance on account of the subsequent ouster. After the non-official Chairperson ceased to hold the office, the post of Personal Clerk (Steno-typist) also ceased to exist. In these facts and circumstances, no illegality can be found in the order of ouster passed by the respondent. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the petitioner was under legitimate expectation that she would be continued in service, and since she had crossed the upper age limit, there is no possibility of getting any employment in any official organisation in future. 9. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is observed that in case the petitioner files an application for any appointment in such Corporation in future, her application may be considered on merits in accordance with law, however, without insisting upon the question of upper age limit. 10. Subject to the aforesaid observation, the writ petition is dismissed without any order as to costs.