Judgment :- (1.) THIS appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 6th july, 1998 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 46 (W) of 1995 allowing the writ petition and setting aside the order dated 12th april, 1994. (2.) THE relevant facts, in short, are that a complaint pointing out financial and other irregularities was lodged against the authorities of the school. Thereafter, an enquiry was held. It was alleged that as the writ petitioner who is the respondent in this appeal was not inclined to place the documents including the books of accounts. The District Inspector of schools was directed by the Director of School Education either to visit the school with adequate police force or direct the Headmaster and secretary of the school to attend the office with all records. Thereafter, pursuant to requisitions some documents were produced. One Gaur chandra Baidya was appointed as the Administrator of the School. It was alleged that at the time of taking over charge though requested neither the Headmaster nor the Secretary was present. A special audit was conducted. Allegations were made that there were mis-appropriation or defalcation of money. Thereafter, the Director of School Education requested the District Inspector of Schools (Secondary Education) to direct the Administrator of the school to lodge F. I. R. with the Police Station against the President, the Secretary and the Headmaster of the school. The administrator was also directed to take administrative step against the person involved in the irregularities. On 13th November, 1992 the F. I. R. was lodged by the Administrator. On 14th November, 1992 the respondent was suspended by the Administrator. A writ petition challenging the said order of suspension was filed. The said writ petition was disposed of on 22nd December, 1992 in which the following order was passed: -"i extend the time for a further period of fort night from this date of order to enable the Board either to grant approval to the order of suspension or disapprove the same. " (Page 486 of the Paper book) (3.) ON 23rd February, 1993 the Administrator of the school issued the charge-sheet. It was served on the wife of the respondent who by letter dated 19th February, 1993 sought extension of time to file reply on the ground that her husband was ailing. The same was allowed. " (Page 486 of the Paper book) (3.) ON 23rd February, 1993 the Administrator of the school issued the charge-sheet. It was served on the wife of the respondent who by letter dated 19th February, 1993 sought extension of time to file reply on the ground that her husband was ailing. The same was allowed. Later the wife of the respondent repeatedly requested the Administrator to furnish documents to give a reply to the charges. The Administrator insisted on inspection of the documents and allowed preparation of notes on the basis of inspection for the purpose of reply. By letter dated 30th July, 1993 the administrator fixed the dates for inspection. It was also intimated that the respondents would be required to submit the reply to the charge-sheet within a period of seven days from the date of inspection failing which he shall have no other alternative but to proceed. Since the petitioner did not appear the Administrator fixed a fresh date and it was intimated that if the respondent failed to turn up the matter would be decided ex parte. The respondent did not turn up. The respondent preferred an appeal before the Board praying to supply documents upon which the charge-sheet was drawn. The Administrator was intimated and a prayer was made for Stay of the proceedings till the matter was decided by the Appeal Committee of the Board of Secondary Education. In the meantime on 27th August, 1993 during the pendency of the appeal, the Administrator passed an order holding that the respondent committed irregularities and sought approval of the Board on the first stage of the proceedings. By memo dated 16th september, 1993 the Administrator forwarded all documents to the secretary of the Board. However, the Secretary by a Memo dated 14th october, 1993 intimated the Secretary of the Institution the decision of the appeal Committee that the authorities should supply copies of all relevant documents to the respondent at a very early date. Later, however upon a perusal of the letter dated 17th November, 1993 the Board reversed its decision and only inspection of the documents was allowed. The committee constituted under Section 24 of the West Bengal Board of Secondary education Act, 1963 in its meeting held on 7th April, 1994 accorded approval 442 Special Officer (D. I. S. (SE), Cal. Later, however upon a perusal of the letter dated 17th November, 1993 the Board reversed its decision and only inspection of the documents was allowed. The committee constituted under Section 24 of the West Bengal Board of Secondary education Act, 1963 in its meeting held on 7th April, 1994 accorded approval 442 Special Officer (D. I. S. (SE), Cal. v. Durgadas Mukhopadhyay [2007 (2)CLJ (Cal)of the first stage of the disciplinary proceedings and by letter dated 12th april, 1994 the same was intimated. The school authority was also directed to issue show-cause notice why the punishment proposed shall not be initiated. (4.) THEREAFTER, the second stage under the Rule began. On 7th June, 1994 a show-cause notice was issued. The petitioner was called upon as to why the punishment as proposed should not be imposed. The respondent, on 15th July, 1994 filed his ad hoc reply. A writ petition was filed by the respondent challenging the notice dated 7th June, 1994. On 2nd September, 1994 it was dismissed. On 27th September, 1994 an order was passed by the Administrator recommending the removal Of the respondent and, thereafter, by a letter dated 7th October, 1994 sought approval of the Board for removal. It appears from the records that the petitioner had preferred an appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge but on 6th December, 1994 the application was rejected with observations. The appeal was also disposed of. On 23rd March, 1995 the Board communicated the decision of the Committee approving the proposal for punishment of the respondent. Thereafter, the petitioner was dismissed from service. The same was challenged by filing a writ petition. The question raised before the learned Single Judge was whether the provisions contained in Rule 28 of the Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided), rules, 1969 (the Rules for short) were followed while passing the order under challenge. It is to be noted that the learned Single Judge in his judgment had noted certain infirmities in the disciplinary proceedings. (5.) MR. Samaraditya Pal, learned Senior Advocate, ably assisted by mr. Alok Kumar Ghosh appearing for the appellant submitted that the respondent was given ample opportunity to defend. The respondent was requested to come to the school for inspection of the documents but he insisted for the copies of the documents. (5.) MR. Samaraditya Pal, learned Senior Advocate, ably assisted by mr. Alok Kumar Ghosh appearing for the appellant submitted that the respondent was given ample opportunity to defend. The respondent was requested to come to the school for inspection of the documents but he insisted for the copies of the documents. He neither availed himself of the opportunity nor wrote any letter expressing his difficulties to attend the school for the purpose of inspection of the documents and taking notes therefrom. The conduct of the appellant reveals the respondent was given access to the documents. There was no explanation why he failed to turn up during personal hearing. The respondent had preferred an appeal before the appeal Committee for alleged non-supply of the documents, which was dismissed. Liberty was granted to the petitioner to inspect the said documents. That opportunity too was not availed of. Instead a writ petition was filed alleging violation of natural justice which was dismissed. Being aggrieved the respondent preferred an appeal. An application was also filed. The appeal was disposed of. The application too was dismissed with the observation that the concerned Committee of the Board should consider the matter relating to the disciplinary proceeding in terms of rule 28 (8) of the Management Rules. The respondent had filed a detailed reply to the show-cause which indicated that all the documents relied upon in support of the charges were in his possession. The Administrator after considering the reply with reference to the relevant papers had arrived at a finding in support of his conclusion proposing punishment for removal of the respondent from service. The Administrator sought for the approval. The concerned Committee of the Board duly approved the proposed punishment for dismissing the respondent from service after considering the relevant papers documents and materials-on-record. According to him, the proceedings were initiated conducted and completed and the order of dismissal was passed in accordance with Rule 28 (8) of the Rules. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in Major U. R. Bhat v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1344 ; Nagar Palika Nataur v. U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and Ors. ,reported in 1998 (2) SCC 400 ; sfafe Bank of Patiala and Others v. S. K. Sharma, reported in 1996 (3) SCC 364 ; Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman and Disciplinary Authority and Ors. ,reported in 1998 (2) SCC 400 ; sfafe Bank of Patiala and Others v. S. K. Sharma, reported in 1996 (3) SCC 364 ; Tara Chand Vyas v. Chairman and Disciplinary Authority and Ors. , reported in 1997 (4) SCC 565 ; Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, reported in AIR 1991 SC 471 ; Managing Director, ECIL Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1074 ; Sfafe of U.P. v. Harendra Arora and Anr. , reported in 2001 (6) SCC 392 ; Board of Management of S. V. T. Educational institution and Anr. v. A. Raghupathy Bhat and Ors. , reported in AIR 1997 SC 1898 ; Sfafe of Orissa and Ors. v. Kalicharan Mohapatra and Anr. ,reported in 1995 (6) SCC 105 ; D. V. Kapur v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in AIR 1990 SC 1923 ; Sfafe of U. P. v. Shatrughan Lai and Anr, reported in AIR 1998 SC 3038 ; Narayan Dattatraya Ram Teer Thakhar v. State of maharashtra and Ors. , reported in AIR 1997 SC 2148 ; and the judgment of this Court in State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Gobinda Chandra Mukherjee, reported in 2001 (3) CHN 740 in support of his submission. (6.) MR. Jayanta Kumar Mitra, learned Senior Advocate ably assisted by Mr. Dipankar Dutta submitted that the documents which appear at page 116 of the Paper Book which was sought to be relied on during enquiry were not furnished to the respondent which prevented him from raising an effective and proper defence. No reason was assigned by the administrator as to why he insisted upon taking inspection of the documents instead of furnishing the copies of the same although the respondent who was indisposed had agreed to bear the expenses. Submission was made that in the order dated 27tn August, 1993 the administrator had observed that as the documents were institutional one the same could not be furnished. Taking into consideration the physical condition of the respondent, the action of the Administrator in affording opportunity to inspect the documents did not meet the procedural safeguards of affording reasonable opportunity for defending oneself as envisaged under Rule 28 (8) and as such the entire proceeding stood vitiated. Taking into consideration the physical condition of the respondent, the action of the Administrator in affording opportunity to inspect the documents did not meet the procedural safeguards of affording reasonable opportunity for defending oneself as envisaged under Rule 28 (8) and as such the entire proceeding stood vitiated. Although number of witnesses were listed in Annexure-IV of the charge-sheet by whom the charges were proposed to be established, none of them were examined. The contents of none of the documents listed in annexure-lll to the charge-sheet were proved. As the respondent never admitted the contents of the listed documents, none Of the charges could be said to have been proved since the respondent had described the charges as frivolous and malicious and never admitted the same. The administrator ought to have proved the charges through evidence led by the witnesses orally and through documents. Absence of reply to the charges ip so facto could not lead to the conclusion that the charges stood proved. The initiator is duty bound to prove the case before an order is passed in his favour. However, in the instant case nothing was done as required under the law. Thus, the order of the Administrator holding that the charges hold good and, thus proved to be true is a clear manifestation of the highest degree of perversity. The order dated 27th August,1993 passed by the Administrator holding the respondent guilty of the charges framed against him which in effect, is the enquiry report was never served on the respondent and his comments were not sought for. Had opportunity been afforded, the infirmities in the report could have been demonstrated. Submission was made that the approval granted by the Board during the first stage of the proceedings was totally mechanical. The blank portion of the printed pro-forma had been filled up after striking out certain entries. There was no application of mind. The Board cannot consider any document while granting approval either at the first or in the second stage, which has not been supplied to the charge-sheeted employee. The Enquiry report holding the charges to be proved could not be looked into since the same was not supplied to the respondent. Therefore, the approval of the first stage of proceeding stood vitiated and further action could not have been taken in pursuance thereof. The Enquiry report holding the charges to be proved could not be looked into since the same was not supplied to the respondent. Therefore, the approval of the first stage of proceeding stood vitiated and further action could not have been taken in pursuance thereof. Moreover, the Board had failed to live up to the expectation of the Court since it was directed that the Board shall consider and pass appropriate order in case no enquiry had taken place but the Board passed an order which manifestly suffers from gross jurisdictional errors. While seeking approval of the second stage of proceedings, the Administrator on 27lh September, 1994 proposed to remove the respondent from service but the Board by its order dated 18th january, 1995 dismissed the respondent from service. Thus, it was argued the entire exercise of initiating proceedings against the respondent and punishing him reflects closed and prejudged mind. It was mala fide, gross misuse of power and an order passed in total non-application of mind. It appears from the records that a higher punishment was imposed though the proposal was for a lesser one. These infirmities were overlooked by the Administrator as well as by the Board since they were bent upon to ensure termination of the service of the respondent by attaching stigma. Regarding the submission raised by the Special Officer in support of the appeal it was submitted that the principles of natural justice have been violated and procedural safeguards disregarded. For ailing health the respondent could not take inspection of the documents and request was made to supply copies. The same was declined without any reason. Since an appeal was filed before the Appeal Committee of the Board, a request was made to postpone the hearing but it was not acceded to. It was never brought to the notice ot the Appeal Committee by the Administrator that by an order dated 27th August, 1993 he had already held that the charges to be proved. The order of the Appeal Committee for Inspection was, thus, rendered futile because the finding of guilt had already been reached and inspection at that stage would not have served any fruitful purpose. The order of the Appeal Committee for Inspection was, thus, rendered futile because the finding of guilt had already been reached and inspection at that stage would not have served any fruitful purpose. It was submitted as the findings of the Administrator are not final but are subject to the approval of the Board at the first stage and then again at a subsequent stage it should have been furnished to the delinquent for enabling him to exercise his right to represent and controvert the findings of the charges. After such representation the quantum of punishment is to be considered. In the present case the documents were not furnished to the respondents. Thus, it was against the principles of natural justice as the Board cannot look into the documents which were not furnished to the delinquent employee. Reliance was placed on the judgments of the Apex court in M/s. Bareilly Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen and Ors. , reported in AIR 1972 SC 330 ; Managing Director, ECIL. , Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, reported in AIR 1994 SC 1074 and the judgment of this Court in Shri Swapan Ray v. Indian Airlines Limited and Ors. , reported in 1996 (1)CHN 147 ; Sujit Das v. The West Bengal Board of Secondary Education and ors. , reported in 1997 (2) CLJ 497 and the judgment of the Special Bench of this Court in Arun Kumar Hait v. State of W4est Bengal and Ors. , reported in 1999 (1) CHN 521 in support of his contentions. (7.) THE learned Advocates have also submitted their respective written notes of arguments and the same are on record. (8.) THE issue which arises for consideration is whether in the facts and circumstances and in view of the procedure laid down under Rule 28 (8) of the Rules, the learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside the order of dismissal. (9.) THE rule while conferring power upon the committee subject to the prior approval of the Board to remove or dismiss permanent and temporary teachers and other employees empowers to draw formal proceedings and issue charge-sheet to the delinquent and offer him "reasonable facilities for defending himself. The question is what are those "reasonable facilities". The rules, we find, are far from specific. So far as reasonableness is concerned there is no straight jacket formula. The question is what are those "reasonable facilities". The rules, we find, are far from specific. So far as reasonableness is concerned there is no straight jacket formula. In our view, it should be in conformity with the facts and circumstances. Now the question is whether the absence of these reasonable facilities lead to the non-compliance of the principles of natural justice to the delinquent. Therefore, what is natural justice. It means justice which is normal. It is neither far fetched nor acquired. It is a happening which is spontaneous. Hence, natural justice itself encompasses reasonableness. Thus, the terms natural justice and reasonable facilities are synonymous. They are inseparable-one cannot exist without the other. Hence in a case of departmental enquiry the authorities should ensure that the delinquent employee should be given the opportunity to deal with or rebut with the documents or evidence particularly relied on by the authorities. Non-compliance of such opportunity shall lead to the failure of natural justice. Thus, in a case where one is faced with a departmental or administrative enquiry or proceedings while defending himself, he should have (a) the right to inspect or have extracts or copies of the documents upon which the authority relies on; (b) the right to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the committee or the Administrator and the right to examine witnesses in his favour and (c) the right to examine himself and the right of audience. These are the reasonable facilities and denial shall automatically lead to the non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. (10.) THEREFORE, let us scan the facts as it appears from the records and find out whether while conducting the proceedings these principles were adhered to by the Administrator or the Board. (11.) IN the present case, the charge-sheet was handed over to the writ petitioner/respondent. Along with the charge-sheet a list of documents and a list of witnesses were also furnished. To give reply, the respondent who was ill and recuperating, repeatedly sought for the documents and that too at his own cost. The same was denied. However, inspection of the documents was allowed. Being aggrieved the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appeal Committee of the Board and during its pendency, prayed before the Administrator to stay all proceedings. What followed requires close scrutiny. The same was denied. However, inspection of the documents was allowed. Being aggrieved the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appeal Committee of the Board and during its pendency, prayed before the Administrator to stay all proceedings. What followed requires close scrutiny. By a letter dated 14th October, 1993 issued on behalf of the Secretary of the Board addressed to the Secretary of the institute the decision of the Appeal Committee was intimated. It was as under: -"i am directed to forward herewith the entire decision of the appeal Committee of the Board taken in its meeting held on 13. 9. 93: perused the petition. The grievance of the appellant is that copies of the relevant documents, upon which a charge-sheet was framed against him, have not been supplied to him. The respondent may be directed to supply copies of all the relevant documents, on which the charge-sheet is based, to the appellant at a very early date. " (12.) HOWEVER, at a later stage the Appeal Committee upon perusal of a letter dated 17th November, 1993 addressed by the Administrator reversed its earlier order and dismissed the appeal. However, inspection of the documents was allowed. The Administrator in the said letter had stated that the copies could not be supplied as these were institutional documents. (13.) AS already noted, though during the pendency of the appeal a stay of proceedings before the Administrator was sought for, the administrator by an order dated 27th August, 1993 (page 514 of the Paper book) came to a finding that the respondent had committed financial malpractices and activities which were fraudulent in nature. It was also held since there was "no order of restraint from the Court of law or the learned Appeal Committee of the Board", there was "no bar or prohibition for proceeding further in this regard". The reasons for passing the order appear from the order itself, which is extracted hereunder: - "now the fact stands as follows: -(i) Sri Mukhopadhyay failed to reply to the charges framed against him. (ii) Sri Mukhopadhyay failed to avail of the opportunity extended to him for inspection of documents and other connected matters. (iii) Sri Mukhopadhyay failed to inspect and take notes of the documents relied upon, though opportunities were offered to him. (iv) Sri Mukhopadhyay failed to avail of the opportunity of being heard for his defence. (ii) Sri Mukhopadhyay failed to avail of the opportunity extended to him for inspection of documents and other connected matters. (iii) Sri Mukhopadhyay failed to inspect and take notes of the documents relied upon, though opportunities were offered to him. (iv) Sri Mukhopadhyay failed to avail of the opportunity of being heard for his defence. (v) Sri Mukhopadhyay, thus failed to defend himself though sufficient opportunities were given to him. Hence the undersigned has to affirm that: - (i) Sri Mukhopadhyay is guilty of the charges framed against him, by the ways he moved to avoid the replies to the charges levelled against him. (ii) There are reasons to believe that Sri Mukhopadhyay had nothing to defend himself as all the documents and records relied upon were prepared and maintained by him. (iii) The charges hold good and thus proved to be true. " (14.) IT is apparent the Administrator while rejecting the prayer of the respondent abruptly came to a finding though the decision of the Appeal committee was awaited. How the charges held were good and thus proved to be true is beyond all logic since it was not in accordance with the basic principles of the law of evidence and was certainly not on evidence which can be acted upon in view of the proposition of law as laid down by the supreme Court in M/s. Bareilly Electric Supply Ltd. (supra). It is to be noted that most of the documents by which the articles of charges were framed were not prepared by the respondent. This amply demonstrates and as correctly held by the learned Single Judge that the Administrator had made up his mind. Therefore, in our view the permission to inspect document was an empty formality. It was at this juncture the first stage under the Rule ended. (15.) ON 7th June, 1994 the second stage as envisaged under the rule began. The respondent by a notice was called upon to shqw-cause why the punishment as proposed in the letter should not be imposed. The respondent replied alleging that the Administrator was proceeding with a closed mind. There was denial of natural justice. Challenging the said notice the respondent moved a writ petition. On 2nd September, 1994, the writ petition was dismissed. Appeal was preferred. The respondent replied alleging that the Administrator was proceeding with a closed mind. There was denial of natural justice. Challenging the said notice the respondent moved a writ petition. On 2nd September, 1994, the writ petition was dismissed. Appeal was preferred. The Appeal Court on 6th December, 1994 while disposing of the appeal observed as under: - "we are confident that the Board finds that no enquiry has been taken, certainly, the Board will consider the same and will pass appropriate order. In any event, when the Board is in sesin of the matter and when the learned Trial Judge has recorded the statements of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Board that the Board shall consider the grievances of the petitioner strictly in terms of sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of the Management Rules, we are of the view that all the grievances of the petitioner including the grievances that were being ventilated before us at this stage will also be considered by the Board. It is desirable that the Board will pass a speaking order so as to indicate that the Board has applies its minds with regard to the validity of the procedure that has been followed by the Managing Committee. We make it clear that the petitioner will not be without any remedy in case any adverse decision is taken against the petitioner by the School Authorities on the basis of the approval given by the board. We also observe that we have not adjudicated any of the points on its merit, but we direct the petitioner to agitate all points which are being taken in the writ application. In the appeal and also the points that may be available before the Board. " (16.) PURSUANT to the order, the respondent submitted his reply to the letter dated 7th June, 1994. The allegations were denied. The grievances were in spite of repeated requests copies of the documents were not supplied and no formal inquiry was at all held. The action of the Administrator spoke of malice, vindictive attitude and conspiracy. Thereafter, the Administrator by an order dated 27th September, 1994 came to a finding that the respondent should be removed from service subject to the approval of the Board (Pages 526 to 532 of the Paper Book) and by letter dated 7th October, 1994 prayed for approval of the Board for dismissing the petitioner. Thereafter, the Administrator by an order dated 27th September, 1994 came to a finding that the respondent should be removed from service subject to the approval of the Board (Pages 526 to 532 of the Paper Book) and by letter dated 7th October, 1994 prayed for approval of the Board for dismissing the petitioner. On 23rd March, 1995 the Secretary of the Board intimated that the committee had unanimously resolved that the proposal of the Administrator of the school for dismissing the respondent from service under the provision of Rule 28 (8) was approved. It appears from the said letter (Page 200-202 of the Paper Book) that the sole document which fell for consideration prior to the recommendation for dismissal was the special audit report which was one of the documents not supplied though it was repeatedly sought for by the petitioner. In our view as already noted in the judgment enquiry should have been conducted in the manner established. The Administrator ought to have provided the respondent the copies of the documents which were relied upon in coming to a finding and an opportunity should have been given to cross-examine the witnesses. Thereafter, the respondent should have been heard. These are the infirmities which are writ large on the order itself. (17.) ON behalf of the Administrator, a contention has been raised that the respondent is not entitled to seek documents when the law does not provide. In this context, reference can be made to Paragraph-25 of the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the Administrator, the respondent No. 6. The relevant portion of the said affidavit is extracted hereunder: - "25. it is stated that the petitioner is not entitled to ask for any thing in connection with the disciplinary proceedings when the law in this regard does not provide for the same. There is prescribed procedures following which a discfplinary proceeding is conducted against a teaching or non-teaching staff. I strictly adhere to such procedures in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner is purportedly attempting to raise certain allegations to save himself but such purported allegations are totally unsupported by law and afterthought. There is prescribed procedures following which a discfplinary proceeding is conducted against a teaching or non-teaching staff. I strictly adhere to such procedures in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner is purportedly attempting to raise certain allegations to save himself but such purported allegations are totally unsupported by law and afterthought. I further deny that it was incumbent upon the administrator to supply the petitioner with a copy of the report of enquiry and offer an opportunity to record his objections and/or to make a representation against the findings on the charges or that show-cause notice adversely affect the petitioner as alleged. " (18.) THIS particular stand had all along been taken by the administrator if one peruses the letter dated 2. 3. 2003 (page 119 of the paper Book) in which it was stated "that there is no scope for furnishing copies of the documents in Annexure-lll. But, the charge-sheeted headmaster may inspect the documents if he so desires, after however, submitting his reply to the charges. " (19.) IN our view, therefore, nothing can be more brazen and more palpable revealing the attitude of the respondent No. 6. It only shows that the Administrator had a pre-determined mind while recommending dismissal. The Board also in its turn failed to discharge the confidence the Division Bench had placed to enquire whether any enquiry was held or not. In our view, the Board had woefully failed to discharge its duties by not looking into the gross violation of the rudimentary principles -violation of natural justice. We cannot also be oblivious to the findings of the learned single Judge who upon perusal of the records found, that "from the said record it does not appear that any enquiry was held and any witnesses was examined to prove the charges". Moreover, the entire action is contrary to the principles of law laid down by the Special Bench of this Court in the judgment in M. A. T. No. 765 of 1998, Arun Kumar Hait v. State of West bengal and Ors. (supra), where the issue for consideration was what was the procedure to be followed by the Managing Committee under Rule 28 of the 1969 Management Rules. The Special Bench in its judgment had the occasion to consider the judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing director. (supra), where the issue for consideration was what was the procedure to be followed by the Managing Committee under Rule 28 of the 1969 Management Rules. The Special Bench in its judgment had the occasion to consider the judgment of the Supreme Court in Managing director. ECIL v. B. Karunakar (supra), and the judgment of this Court in sujit Kumar Das (supra). It was held as under: - "36. Briefly speaking these would include as far as the first stage is concerned, the giving of a clear charge-sheet; provisions of facilities for inspection and/or taking copies of the documents upon which the Managing Committee relies; granting an opportunity to the delinquent to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the managing Committee and the right to examine witnesses in his favour. 37. The implicit procedure also includes the right of the managing Committee to delegate the function to hold the enquiry after the charges have been framed and served on the delinquent to an independent person. 38. However, when the matter is so delegated, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of the enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer before the disciplinary authority takes any decision on the question of guilt of the delinquent. " (20.) IN the present case neither the respondent who was indisposed and convalescing, was allowed to have copies of the documents upon which the Administrator relied nor any opportunity was granted to cross-examine the witnesses. The respondent was denied the right to examine the witnesses in his favour. Even the copy of the enquiry report was not furnished which was in contravention of the principles of law laid down in managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar (supra). In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances and in view of the judgment of the special Bench in Arun Kumar Hait (supra), the judgments cited on behalf of the appellant are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. (21.) THUS, the entire action of the respondents from the stage of enquiry up to the order of dismissal is contrary to the established principles of law -the law of evidence, the principles of natural justice, the judgment of the Special Bench in Arun Kumar Hait (supra) and the observations of the Division Bench as already noted. (22.) THUS, the appeal is dismissed. (23.) NO order as to costs. (24.) THE principal appeal, being MAT. (22.) THUS, the appeal is dismissed. (23.) NO order as to costs. (24.) THE principal appeal, being MAT. No. 2643 of 1998, was disposed of earlier. It was contended that the other connected appeal, being M. A. T. No. 2589 of 1998 and the cross-objection, being C. O. T. No. 3019 of 1998, though was heard, was not disposed of. It appears from the order disposing of the principal appeal that no order was passed in relation to the other appeal and the cross-objection. This matter was mentioned, accordingly, it was placed and the matter has been heard on the other appeal, being m. A. T. No. 2589 of 1988 and the cross-objection, being C. O. T. No. 3019 of 1998. (25.) THE principal appeal was dismissed and the order of the learned single Judge was not interfered with. The learned Single Judge was pleased to set aside the disciplinary proceedings with liberty to proceed afresh within three months from the date the decision of the learned Single judge was rendered in 1998. In view of the pendency of the appeal, the appellant did not proceed with the disciplinary proceedings. Initially, there was a stay for a limited period, however, after sometime the stay stood vacated or lapsed. (26.) THE fact remains that the disciplinary proceedings was not proceeded with despite there being no interim order prohibiting from continuing with the disciplinary proceedings, the respondent/cross-objector retired in 2002. It was stated by Mr. Datta that since the appeal has been dismissed, therefore, the cross-objection has to be allowed so far as it relates to the continuation of the disciplinary proceedings after retirement. According to him, sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of the Management of Recognised non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) Rules, 1969 (herein after referred to as the 1969 Rules) postulates a disciplinary proceeding only against a teacher in service. There is no provision in sub-rule (8)which authorizes continuation of disciplinary proceedings after retirement of a teacher. He relied on the decision in Biswanath Seth v. State of West bengal and Ors. , 2005 (1) CLT 541 (HC), delivered by one of us (Soumitra pal, J.) sitting singly wherein such a view was taken relying on the decisions in Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O. S. F. C. and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 1841 ; Hindusthan Copper Ltd. v. Krishnendu Narayan Ghosh and Ors. , 2005 (1) CLT 541 (HC), delivered by one of us (Soumitra pal, J.) sitting singly wherein such a view was taken relying on the decisions in Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O. S. F. C. and Ors. , AIR 1999 SC 1841 ; Hindusthan Copper Ltd. v. Krishnendu Narayan Ghosh and Ors. , 2001 (3) CHN 122 , of this Court. According to him Paragraph-19 (5) of the West bengal Recognised Non-Government Educational Institutions employees (Death-cum-Retirement) Benefit Scheme, 1981 does not permit continuation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee after retirement. It only provides for the contingency as to what would happen if any disciplinary/judicial proceeding is/are continued against a retired employee. It does not authorize continuation of disciplinary proceedings as such. According to him, the Pension Scheme is an executive action and has no statutory force and it cannot over-ride the Management for the recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided) Rules, 1969. He also lelies on the Recognised Non-Government Educational secondary Institutions Pension Rules, effective from 1st of April, 1966 and contends that this Rule, being a statutory rule and beino still effective and having not been repealed and there being no provision in the said rule for continuing disciplinary proceedings against a retired employee, the Scheme cannot simply, by reason of its reference in Paragraph-19 (5), conferring of jurisdiction as to the continuation of disciplinary proceedings against a retired employee. According to him, this Rule also does not provide as to who will continue with the disciplinary proceedings unlike Rule 10 of the West Bengal Service (Death-cum-Retirement) Benefit rules,1971 wherein a specific jurisdiction has been conferred by recognising the disciplinary proceedings within the meaning of the said rules to be continued by the authority by which the proceedings was so initiated before retirement. Therefore, according to him, there is no provision under which disciplinary proceedings can be proceeded with against a retired teacher, as was held in Biswanath Seth (supra). Therefore, according to him, this Court should direct payment of all retirement benefits in terms of Paragraph-19 (5) of the Pension Scheme and direct that the service of the respondent/cross-objector should be treated as in service till retirement and entitled to all service benefits accordingly. (27.) MR. Ghosh,. the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, opposes the contention of Mr. (27.) MR. Ghosh,. the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, opposes the contention of Mr. Datta on the ground that a disciplinary proceeding can be continued under Paragraph-19 (5) of the pension Scheme. There is nothing in sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of the 1969 rules which prohibits continuation of disciplinary proceedings against an employee initiated before his retirement. According to him, the proceedings could not be proceeded with in view of the pendency of the appeal challenging the order passed by the learned Single Judge which was the subject-matter of the appeal. He also contends that if such a proposition is accepted in that event it would be difficult for the Management to realize any amount defalcated, as in the present case. (28.) BOTH the learned Counsel had relied on certain decisions to which reference would be made at appropriate stage. (29.) RULE 28 (8) of the 1969 Rules provides that a disciplinary proceeding can be initiated for removal or dismissal against a permanent or temporary teacher after obtaining sanction from the Board submitting the charge-sheet, explanation and other papers. After the disciplinary proceeding is concluded, in order to inflict any punishment of dismissal or removal, all papers and documents whereof are to be placed before the board for its approval. Therefore, the very coinage of sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of 1969 Rules itself indicates that even if any punishment to the extent of removal or dismissal is to be passed against a teacher, the same is to be passed after obtaining approval of the Board. If a teacher is retired, there is no question of removal or dismissal after retirement and at the same time, there is no scope of obtaining prior permission or approval from the Board for such removal or dismissal after retirement. Therefore, no punishment of dismissal or removal could be passed after retirement since there cannot be any question of retrospective removal or dismissal. (30.) SO far as sub-rule (8a) of Rule 28 of the 1969 Rule is concerned, it deals with punishment other than removal or dismissal which is specified as stoppage of one to three increments of pay, reduction of pay in the time scale and censor. (30.) SO far as sub-rule (8a) of Rule 28 of the 1969 Rule is concerned, it deals with punishment other than removal or dismissal which is specified as stoppage of one to three increments of pay, reduction of pay in the time scale and censor. Again, these three punishments can be inflicted only with the prior approval of the Board after holding a disciplinary proceeding, observing the procedure laid down in sub-rule (8) of Rule 28 of the 1969 rules. Therefore, in any event after retirement, none of the three punishments, mentioned above, could be passed. There cannot be any reduction in pay in the time scale or stoppage of increment after retirement. It would be preposterous to censor a person who is not in employment or active service. Nothing, therefore, appears from sub-rule (8) or (8a) of rule 28 of 1969 Rules to indicate that a disciplinary proceeding could be continued after retirement, as was rightly held in the decision of Biswanath seth (supra) following the Apex Courts decision. (31.) MR. Datta had also relied on the decision in Chandra Singh and ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. , 2003 (6) SCC 545 wherein the said principle has been again acknowledged by the Apex Court with the following expression: - "we also cannot accept the contention of Mr. Rao that in the case of Mata Deen Garg, the departmental proceedings could be kept pending despite the passing of the impugned order. The High court had not passed any order in the departmental proceedings. It sought to invoke the jurisdiction which was conferred on the High court and the State by reason of a statutory rule. A departmental proceeding can continue so long as the employee is in service. In the event, a disciplinary proceeding is kept pending by the employer the employee cannot be made to retire. There must exist specific provision in the pension rules in terms whereof, whole or a part of the pension can be withheld or withdrawn wherefor a proceeding has to be initiated. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In the absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant Mata Deen Garg could continue. " (32.) THE principle appears to be well settled. Furthermore, no rule has also been brought to our notice providing for continuation of such proceeding despite permitting the employee concerned to retire. In the absence of such a proceeding, the High Court or the State cannot contend that the departmental proceedings against the appellant Mata Deen Garg could continue. " (32.) THE principle appears to be well settled. We need not elaborate. (33.) NOW the question arises as to whether by reason of Paragraph-19 (5)of the Pension Scheme the disciplinary proceeding could be continued. Admittedly, unlike Rule 10 of the West Bengal Service (Death-cum-Retirement) Benefit Rules, no authority has been conferred to continue a disciplinary proceeding after retirement specifically neither any authority has been recognized as to who has been empowered to continue with the disciplinary proceedings after retirement of an employee. Therefore, in a case where Rule 28 (8) and (8a) of the 1969 Rules did not provide for continuation of disciplinary proceedings after retirement, we are of the view that without any specific authorization or creation of a disciplinary authority or recognition of a disciplinary authority, it is very difficult to accede to the contention of Mr. Ghosh that by reason of paragraph-19 (5) of the Pension Scheme, a disciplinary proceeding could be continued. Unless an authority is conferred the jurisdiction, and an authority is created or recognized by the Pension Scheme, no disciplinary proceeding could be continued for the purpose of inflicting any kind of punishment in terms of Rule 28 (8) and (8a) of the 1969 Rules. (34.) IN any event, such a disciplinary proceeding could not continue for the purpose of Pension Scheme. If it is so, in that event, the Pension scheme has to make appropriate provision therefor. In the absence of appropriate provisions, it is not for the Court to fill up the gaps for remedy the lacuna or supplement the Rules. Then again, the Pension Scheme does not appear to be statutory rule, on the other hand, it seems to be an executive exercise without having a statutory force. It is not necessary to decide as to whether the Pension Scheme, referred to by Mr. Datta, is a statutory rule. In any event, that would not lead us anywhere since the pension Scheme does not provide anything from which it can be held that the disciplinary proceeding can be continued after retirement. It is not necessary to decide as to whether the Pension Scheme, referred to by Mr. Datta, is a statutory rule. In any event, that would not lead us anywhere since the pension Scheme does not provide anything from which it can be held that the disciplinary proceeding can be continued after retirement. (35.) ON the other hand, a plain reading of Paragraph-19 (5) of the pension Scheme, makes it clear that the eligibility and the entitlement to pension are circumscribed to the extent that it can be reduced or withheld on certain grounds and certain provisions have been provided therein for determining as to whether the pension should be withheld or be reduced. (Sub-paragraph (4) of Paragraph-19 of the Pension Scheme provides that corruption is one of the charges on which pension can be denied. However, such corruption has to be proved. Admittedly, in the absence of any disciplinary proceedings being concluded in the present case, the alleged charges of corruption cannot be said to have been proved. It is again the board, in its order of approval, had found that the charges for defalcation was not proved and the punishment of dismissal was upheld or approved only on the other charges for not maintaining the books of accounts properly, etc. However, by reason of the order of the learned Single Judge, this order also stands set aside. Thus, there is no possibility of proof of corruption at this stage. (36.) THE only provision that can be attracted in the present case is sub-paragraph-(5) of Paragraph-19 of the Pension Scheme which permits withholding or reduction of pension if a departmental/judicial proceeding is instituted/continued against an employee. In case of retired employee it is provided that if the departmental or judicial proceeding is instituted or is continued in that event, the retired employer would be entitled to provisional pension till the final order is passed in the proceedings against him to the extent not exceeding the maximum pension admissible to him of his qualifying service upto the date of retirement. Thus, it seems, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Datta, that the limb of sub-paragraph-5 provides for a contingency if any departmental/judicial proceeding is instituted or continued against a person who has retired. Thus, it seems, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Datta, that the limb of sub-paragraph-5 provides for a contingency if any departmental/judicial proceeding is instituted or continued against a person who has retired. By no stretch of imagination this provision can be said to have conferred any power of jurisdiction on the Managing Committee or any other authority and even the competent authority under the Pension Scheme to continue with the departmental proceeding nor had it recognized either the competent authority or the managing Committee to proceed with such departmental proceedings neither had it provided for any procedure to be followed for such purpose. (37.) EVEN if we accede to the contention of Mr. Ghosh that in such event, Rule 28 (8) is to be followed even then such a procedure cannot be followed in respect of a person since retired. It is an admitted position that a judicial proceeding, containing the selfsame allegations, is pending as against the respondent/cross-objector. We, however, refrain from expressing any opinion and make no observation with regard thereto. The same shall be decided in accordance with law by the appropriate authority as early as possible preferably within two years from this date. Whatever benefit would be due to the respondent/cross-objector, the same shall be governed by the order passed in the said judicial proceeding and be subject to the result thereof, till then, in view of Paragraph-19 (5) of the Pension scheme, the respondent/cross-objector will be entitled to provisional pension in terms thereof. (38.) FOR all these reasons, we are of the view that the Pension scheme does not provide any provision under which a departmental proceeding can be continued against a teacher after retirement. The respondent/cross-objector shall be treated to be in service for all the period since the date of suspension till the date of his retirement and he shall be entitled to all the service benefits payable to him from the date of suspension treating him in service till his retirement. He will also be entitled to provisional pension in terms of Paragraph-19 (5) of the Pension Scheme. The appropriate authorities shall determine such provisional pension within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order and shall continue to pay such pension to him regularly till the judicial proceeding continues however, subject to the result of the said judicial proceedings. The appropriate authorities shall determine such provisional pension within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order and shall continue to pay such pension to him regularly till the judicial proceeding continues however, subject to the result of the said judicial proceedings. The appropriate authority shall also pay the arrear pension to the respondent/cross-objector. The appropriate authority shall also calculate the arrears of pay payable to the respondent/cross-objector after adjusting all amounts, if any received by the respondent/cross-objector, within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. However, no gratuity shall be paid to him until the judicial proceeding is concluded and the provisional pension paid to him shall be subject to the decision in the judicial proceeding. (39.) IT would be open to the authority concerned under the Pension scheme to take appropriate decision in relation to the question of reduction or withholding or payment of pension to the respondent/cross-objector after the judicial proceedings is concluded on the basis of the decision given on such proceedings. In case the question of exercising option under the ROPA, 1996 has not been exercised by the respondent/cross-objector on account of having been suspended from service, in that event it would be treated that the respondent/cross-objector had exercised his option under ROPA, 1996. (40.) IN the circumstances, the cross-objection, being C. O. T. No. 3019 of 1998 stands allowed to the extent indicated above. The order appealed against stands affirmed and modified to the extent indicated above. (41.) IN view of the order passed in the principal appeal, being M. A. T. No. 2643 of 1998, the other appeal, being M. A. T. No. 2589 of 1998 stands dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.