ORDER T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the memorandum dated 16-7-2005 issued by the respondent No. 2 cancelling the Notice Inviting Tender (for short 'NIT) No. PT-1/EE/RDSD/05-06 dated 19-2-2005 for purchase of GC Sheet and for directing the respondents to finalise the contract arising out of the said NIT in favour of the petitioner. 2. I have heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner. I have also heard Mr. U.B. Saha, the learned senior Government Advocate, assisted by Mr. J. Majumder, learned Counsel appearing for the State-respondents. As agreed to by both the parties, the writ petition is heard and being disposed of at the motion stage. No affidavit-in-opposition is filed by the respondents. 3. To appreciate the controversy involved in the writ petition, the material facts of the case may be noticed at the very outset. The petitioner is a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956 and having its registered Office at 505, Chiranjib Tower, Nehru Place, New Delhi-11 or 19 and its factory at Badharghat Industrial Estate, P.O. Siddhi Ashram, Agartala, Tripura. There is no dispute that this petitioner-Company is also registered as a Small Scale Industrial Unit for manufacturing galvanized corrugated sheets ('GCI Sheet' for short) and galvanized ridges, commercial production whereof was started on 4-4-2002 and that the products of the petitioner have also been granted ISI mark certification by the Bureau of Indian Standard. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner-Company is entitled to price preference under the Tripura Incentive Scheme, 2002 on all purchase by the State Government on its products manufactured in Tripura to the extent of 10%. According to the petitioner, it has been satisfactorily supplying GCI sheets and galvanized ridges to the State Government from time to time on the basis of the supply orders awarded after tender process. 4. It is the case of the petitioner-Company that the respondent No. 2 issued the NIT dated 1-2-2005 for procurement of, among others, GCI sheets and galvanized ridges, for which 28-4-2005 was fixed as the last date. The petitioner and two other concerns submitted tenders for supply of ISI marked GCI sheets under item No. 13 of the NIT while if singly submitted the tender for galvanized ridges in respect of item No. 11, with which we are not concerned herein. The petitioner and two other concerns submitted tenders for supply of ISI marked GCI sheets under item No. 13 of the NIT while if singly submitted the tender for galvanized ridges in respect of item No. 11, with which we are not concerned herein. The tenders were stated to have been opened on 28-4-2005 wherein the tender submitted by the petitioner was found to be the lowest, i.e. in respect of item No. 13. According to the petitioner, the tenders submitted by it and the two other concerns were considered by the Supply Advisory Board, Government of Tripura, which ultimately in its recommendation showed the tender of the petitioner to be the lowest. It is the further case of the petitioners, much to its consternation, the respondents issued the impugned memorandum cancelling the NIT in respect of supply of GCI sheets and on the same day issued the letter dated 16-7-2005 addressed to M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Pvt. Ltd., Gauhati and M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. requesting each of them to offer the latest rates of different steel items including GCI sheets referred to in item No. 13 of the NIT. It is specifically averred that M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Company had actually participated in the aforesaid tender but failed to quote the lowest rate. It is contended by the petitioner that the NIT was cancelled by the respondents to award the supply orders to M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Company, which was unsuccessful in its bid and M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd., which did not even participate in the tender. It is further contended by the petitioner that the impugned memorandum is mala fide and is issued with the oblique motive of favouring the said two concerns. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the respondents could not pick and choose a supplier by discarding the tender process and that the impugned memorandum and letter are illegal, unfair and against public policy and public interest and are liable to be quashed. 5. The scope of judicial review in a matter of awarding contracts/supply orders by the Government is no longer res integra. It is true that the Government should take a decision in a fair and reasonable manner and not arbitrarily. The Government cannot, without adequate reason, exclude a person from dealing with it or take away largess arbitrarily. 5. The scope of judicial review in a matter of awarding contracts/supply orders by the Government is no longer res integra. It is true that the Government should take a decision in a fair and reasonable manner and not arbitrarily. The Government cannot, without adequate reason, exclude a person from dealing with it or take away largess arbitrarily. It has no absolute right to enter into contract with any person as it pleases. The Government is still a Government even when it enters into a contract. In spite of the authoritative pronouncement made by the Apex Court in this field in Tata Cellular case : AIR 1996 SC 11 , the litigation with regard to the same issue keeps on coming up for adjudication and thanks to the legal skills of the legal fraternity, the very same issue is now presented before this Court in a different shade, as if it were arising for the first time. The law is now firmly settled that no lowest bidder or tenderer can insist that his offer should be accepted by the State. The State is entitled to reject even the lowest offer or tender, as the case may be, for reasons to be recorded, after all public interest is the paramount consideration even in the matter of awarding a contract or refusing to award contract by the State and what is required is that the State should not exercise its power even in the matter of awarding contract for a collateral purpose or in a mala fide manner. The right to choose a person with whom a contract is to be entrusted and the exercise of that right itself cannot be said to be an arbitrary exercise of power. The Apex Court summed up the legal positions in Sterling Computers Limited v. M & N Publications Limited : AIR 1996 SC 51 as follows :- 12. At times it is said that public authorities must have the same liberty as they have in framing the policies, even while entering into contracts because many contracts amount to implementation or projections policies of the Government. But it cannot be overlooked that unlike policies, contracts are legally binding commitments and they commit the authority which may be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in many cases for years. But it cannot be overlooked that unlike policies, contracts are legally binding commitments and they commit the authority which may be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution in many cases for years. That is why the Courts have impressed that even in contractual matters, the public authority should not have unfettered discretion. In contracts having commercial elements, some more discretion has to be conceded to the authorities so that they may enter into contracts with persons, keeping an eye on the augmentation of the revenue. But even in such matters they have to follow the norms recognized by Courts while dealing with public property. It is not possible for Courts to question and adjudicate every decision taken by an authority, because of the Government undertakings which in due course have acquired the monopolist position in matters of sale and purchase of products and with so many ventures in hand, they can come out with a plea that it is not always possible to act like 'a quasi-judicial authority while awarding contracts. Under some special circumstances a discretion has to be conceded to the authorities who have to enter into contract giving them liberty to assess the overall situation for purpose of taking a decision as to whom the contract be awarded and at what terms. If the decisions have been taken in bona fide manner although not strictly following the norms laid down by the Courts, such decisions are upheld on the principle laid down by Justice Holmes, that Courts while judging the constitutional validity of executive decisions must grant certain measure of freedom of play in the joints to the executive. 6. It is, however, the contention of Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the impugned memorandum cancelling the tender process is merely a ruse to award the contract in favour of third parties, one of them being an unsuccessful bidder in this bid, through backdoor. Once the petitioner has been found to be the lowest bidder, continues the learned senior counsel, the respondents can neither cancel the tender process nor can they decide to purchase from third parties. Once the petitioner has been found to be the lowest bidder, continues the learned senior counsel, the respondents can neither cancel the tender process nor can they decide to purchase from third parties. It is further submitted by the learned senior counsel that the petitioner-Company is a registered small scale unit and its products have the imprint of ISI mark and that through its consistent dealing with the respondents in the past, it has proved its worth and can supply the materials being procured by the respondents, having the same quality, even if not better than the ones being procured from third parties. In any case, the abrupt action of the respondents in cancelling the tender process without giving the petitioner of an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract with the respondents and in deciding to purchase directly from third parties behind its back is unfair and violates principles of actual justice. It is thus contended by the learned senior counsel that the impugned memorandum be quashed and a direction be passed for finalizing the contract between it and the respondents. He relies on the following decisions, (1) R.D. Shetty v. I.A.A.I., (1979) II LLJ 217 SC, (ii) Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 and (iii) Noble Sales Agency v. State of Assam, in support of his contentions. On the other hand, Mr. U.B. Saha, the learned senior counsel for the respondents submits that no concluded contract exists between the petitioner and the respondents and, therefore, no right to the contract has accrued in favour of the petitioner. He contends that the cancellation of the tender process was made in exercise of the powers conferred by the tender clause itself and the petitioner cannot force the respondents to enter into contract with it. Drawing my attention to the tender file placed before me, he vehemently contends that the cancellation of the tender and the subsequent decision taken by the respondents to explore the possibility of making direct purchase from third parties were done for valid commercial consideration and in overwhelming public interest for, which the interference of this Court is not called for. He, therefore, submits that since the impugned memorandum does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or Wednesbury unreasonableness, it should be upheld. He, therefore, submits that since the impugned memorandum does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness or Wednesbury unreasonableness, it should be upheld. Strong reliance is placed by upon the following decisions :- (1) Tata Cellular Case : AIR 1996 SC 11 (supra), (ii) Air India v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. : [2000] 1 SCR 505 and (iii) Santosh Kr. Guha v. State of Assam : 1998 (2) GLT 440. 7. Although generally when the State largesse is decided to be concerned, resort should be had to invitation of public tenders from the people. That would be a sure method of ensuring fairness and transparency and of guaranteeing compliance with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Though the Government cannot escape its liability to show its actions to be fair, reasonable and in accordance with law, yet wherever challenge is thrown to any of such action, the initial burden of showing prima facie existence of violation of the mandate of the Constitution lies upon the petitioner. Non-floating of tenders would not in all cases be deemed to be the result of the exercise of an executive power in an arbitrary manner. So is the case in the matter of rejection of bids or cancellation of the tender process. A common thread running through the decisions cited at the bar is that the Government or public authorities are expected to honour the outcome of the tender but in suitable cases, such authorities are not powerless either to reject the lowest bid or the highest, as the case may be, or to cancel the tender process itself on valid grounds consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. For example, making an exception to the general rule of open tender or cancellation thereof, when no concluded contract exists between the. parties, can be justified by the State executive, if challenged in appropriate proceedings. As observed by the Apex Court in Netai Bag v.State of W.B. : AIR 2000 SC 3313 , the Constitutional Courts cannot be expected to presume alleged irregularities, illegalities or unconstitutionality nor can the Courts substitute their opinion for the bona fide opinion of the State executive. After all, judicial review is not directed against the merit of the decision but against the decision-making process of the public authorities. 8. After all, judicial review is not directed against the merit of the decision but against the decision-making process of the public authorities. 8. It is against the backdrop of the aforesaid well-established judicial principles that I propose to examine the validity of the actions of the respondents under challenge herein. The admitted position of the parties is that the petitioner, having been found to be the lowest tenderer, was considered by the Supply Advisory Board (SAB) along with the two other tenderers, one of which is Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (the second lowest tenderer). It may be seen from Note No. 4 of the tender file that the petitioner was asked to further lower down its quoted rate but the request was turned down. From Note 8, it is revealed that the bid was not favourably considered by SAB for four reasons :- (i) the market rates of the end/finished products of steel have been reduced by SAIL at the rates ranging from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 2,000/- per M.T. w.e.f. 1-6-2005, which was found to be quite substantial; (ii) the petitioner was requested to further reduce his quoted rates but he refused to do so, (iii) SAIL was ready to extend more credit facility so that Government works do not suffer for shortage of materials and that SAIL would maintain the same price throughout the financial year since the date of rate offered/quoted by them and (iv) the Memorandum No. F.10(19)-FIN(G)/69(Petitioner-1) dated 9-9-1986 permits the Department to procure GCI sheets and steel materials from Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL) and TISCO directly without inviting tenders. The Departmental notes also disclose that no decision has actually been taken to procure the materials from SAIL and the Department was authorized to obtain the latest rates from SAIL and TISCO. It thus appears that the Department is to take a decision to purchase the materials only after comparing the rates of SAIL with the rates quoted by the petitioner. One thing is clear, SAIL has already reduced its steel prices at the rates ranging from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 2,500/-. The SAB was also impressed by the quality control standard, dependability of products and reasonableness of rates of SAIL, which is also a Government of India Undertaking. One thing is clear, SAIL has already reduced its steel prices at the rates ranging from Rs. 500/- to Rs. 2,500/-. The SAB was also impressed by the quality control standard, dependability of products and reasonableness of rates of SAIL, which is also a Government of India Undertaking. Taking all these factors into consideration, the respondents took the decision to cancel the tender process and to explore the feasibility of purchasing the materials directly from SAIL. The question to be considered then is whether the impugned decision of the respondents is sustainable in law? 9. It is settled law, even at the risk of repetition, that the Government has the power to cancel the tender process and purchase materials directly from manufacturer or dealers subject to the condition that the same is done in public interest and is based on some valid principle which in itself is not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. This is the law which originated from Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. I.A. Authority of India : (1979) II LLJ 217 SC, a decision cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. The Government is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments and policy decisions which may be necessary or called for under the prevalent circumstances. The Court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by Government merely because it feels that another decision would have been finer or wiser or more scientific or logical. The Apex Court has observed that even when some defect is found in the decision making, the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene. See Air India Ltd. : [2000] 1 SCR 505 (supra). The reasons which prompted the respondents to cancel the tender process have been discussed earlier. No specific allegation of mala fide has been made against the respondents. Nor is there any evidence to show that the tender was cancelled to make way for TISCO. In fact, it is SAIL which is being contacted by the respondents for price quotation. The reasons which prompted the respondents to cancel the tender process have been discussed earlier. No specific allegation of mala fide has been made against the respondents. Nor is there any evidence to show that the tender was cancelled to make way for TISCO. In fact, it is SAIL which is being contacted by the respondents for price quotation. The respondents in cancelling the tender process did not take any irrelevant factors into consideration or failed to take any relevant factors into consideration. It will be very difficult to visualize the various factors like commercial aspects of the contract, prevailing market conditions, etc. which would have to be taken in cancelling the bid. It would be risky for this Court to venture on a guesswork as compared to the rate assessment that is made, correctness of which is not disproved by cogent materials. In such a case, unless the Court is satisfied that the allegations levelled are unassailable and there could be no doubt as the unreasonableness, mala fide, collateral considerations alleged, it will not be possible for this Court to come to the conclusion that the impugned action of the respondents is arbitrary or illegal or is vitiated. 10. Coming now to the decisions cited by the learned senior counsel in Ramana D. Shetty : (1979) II LLJ 217 SC (supra), the 1st respondent did not reject the tenders outright and enter into direct negotiation with the 4th respondent. The process of awarding a contract by inviting tenders had not then been terminated or abandoned by the 1st respondent by rejecting all the tenders but in furtherance of the process, the tender of the 4th respondent was accepted by the 1st respondent. The contract was not given to the 4th respondent as a result of direct negotiation. Tenders were invited and out of the tenders received, the one submitted by the respondent No. 4, who was not eligible, was accepted and the contract was given to him. It is thus clear that the Apex Court therein made a distinction between a case where the tender process was abandoned for holding direct negotiation with a third party and a case where the tender process was not terminated but in furtherance of the process, the tender of a party who did not fulfil the eligibility condition was awarded the contract in the same tender process. The latter course of action was not approved by the Apex Court. In so far as the first case is concerned, there is nothing to indicate that such an exercise is impermissible if there is rational principle for cancelling the tender process, as would be evident from the following observation (Para 12):- ************ The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the Government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory. Instead of helping the case of the petitioner, this decision flies in the face of his contention that the tender process cannot be cancelled at all. Moreover, the facts of the case therein are different. 11. The next case referred to by the learned Senior counsel for the petitioner is Ram and Shyam Co. case, (supra). In this case, in an auction for grant of lease, the highest bid of "A" was accepted by the Presiding Officer but the Government refused to confirm the sale. Afterwards, the lease was granted to "B" who had offered some more money on the order of the Chief Minister. It was held by the Apex Court that a unilateral offer made not correlated to any reserved price made by B after making false statement in the letter was accepted without giving any opportunity to "A" either to raise to bid or to point out the falsity of the allegations made by "B" in the letter as also the inadequacy of his bid and, therefore, "A" suffered an unfair treatment by the State in discharging its administrative functions thereby violating the fundamental principle of fair play in action. Reading and re-reading of the judgment especially paragraph No. 18 will show that the two elements which clinched the issue appears to be (i) the allegations made against the highest bidder were not verified and (ii) the highest bidder was not given an opportunity to raise his own bid when privately a higher price was received. Reading and re-reading of the judgment especially paragraph No. 18 will show that the two elements which clinched the issue appears to be (i) the allegations made against the highest bidder were not verified and (ii) the highest bidder was not given an opportunity to raise his own bid when privately a higher price was received. I do not see how this case can be of any assistance to the petitioner. The petitioner in the instant case was given an opportunity to lower his quoted price/rate keeping in view the substantial reduction of steel prices by manufacturers, when the request was turned down, the respondent decided to cancel the tender so as to enable them to purchase the materials at lower rate elsewhere. This decision of the respondents cannot be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. On the contrary, the decision is based on rational principle and in public interest, i.e., to save substantial amount of public money. The third case cited by the petitioner, i.e. M/s. Noble Sales Agency v. State of Assam, (supra) cannot also help the case of the petitioner inasmuch as in this case, the petitioner was not given an opportunity to lower down the rates quoted by him. Moreover, in this case, there was no termination of the ongoing tender process and the contract for supply of country liquor was awarded to the respondent No. 4, who was the 11th lowest tenderer. The facts in that case are clearly distinguishable. 12 The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the impugned actions of the respondents do not suffer from any infirmity which warrants the interference of this Court. Resultantly, this writ petition, being devoid of merits, is liable to be dismissed, which I hereby do. However, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed