CYRIAC JOSEPH, C. J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra claims to be a society registered under the societies Registration Act, 1860 and wedded to the empowerment of the rural poor and the protection of environment. The pe titioner has filed this writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for a writ "in the nature of quo warranto declaring respondent No. 2 to be ineligible for holding the office of State Chief Information Commissioner of Uttaranchal and further that he is an usurper of Office of the state Chief Information Commissioner uttaranchal". There is also a prayer for permanently restraining the second respondent from holding or discharging any functions or duties of the office of State Chief information Commissioner, Uttaranchal. ( 2 ) ACCORDING, to the petitioner, the second respondent Sri R. S. Tolia is a member of the Indian Administrative Service of 1971 batch and he was allotted to the Uttar pradesh cadre. On bifurcation of the State of Utter Pradesh and creation of the State of uttaranchal, he was allotted to the uttaranchal cadre. While he was working as the Chief Secretary of the State of uttaranchal, he was transferred and posted as Director General, Uttaranchal Administrative Academy, Nainital as per annexure-2 Order dated 3-10-05. He joined the office of Director General, Uttaranchal Administrative Academy on 3-1-05 itself and on the same day he submitted his resignation as director General, Uttaranchal Administrative Academy. The resignation of the second respondent was accepted by the government with effect from the forenoon of 18-10-05. In the meanwhile, as per Annexure-3 Order dated 3-10-05 issued by the Government of Uttaranchal, the second respondent was appointed as the State Chief Information commissioner. The said order was issued by the Government of Uttaranchal in exercise of its power under Section 15 (3)of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). According to annexure-3 Order the appointment of the second respondent as State Chief Information Commissioner shall take effect on the date he assumes office. The second respondent assumed office of state Chief Information Commissioner on 18-10-05. According to annexure-3 Order the appointment of the second respondent as State Chief Information Commissioner shall take effect on the date he assumes office. The second respondent assumed office of state Chief Information Commissioner on 18-10-05. ( 3 ) THE contention of the petitioner is that the resignation of the second respondent was accepted by the Government of uttaranchal in violation of Rule 16 (2) of the all India Services (Death-cum- Retirement benefits) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) as the second respondent had not given three months' previous notice to the State Government, before submitting his resignation. According to the petitioner, the requirement of three months' notice is mandatory and there is no provision for waiver of such notice. It is contended that, by accepting the resignation of the second respondent the State Government acted beyond its powers conferred under the All india Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. It is also contended that since the acceptance of the resignation of the second respondent was illegal and non est in law, the second respondent should be deemed to have been in service of the state Government and holding an office of profit on 3-10-05 when Annexure-3 Order was issued and also on 18-10-05 when the second respondent assumed the office of state Chief Information Commissioner. On that basis it is contended that the appointment of the second respondent as State chief Information Commissioner and his continuance as State Chief Information commissioner are in violation of sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the right to Information Act, 2p05 which provides that the state Chief Information Commissioner shall not hold any other office of profit. According to the petitioner, the second respondent is disqualified and disentitled to hold the office of the State Chief Information Commissioner in view of Section 15 (6) of the act. It is further contended by the petitioner that there were serious allegations of corruption and irregularities against the second respondent but no enquiry was conducted by the government in the matter as he was holding the office of Chief Secretary and was able to influence the decision makers. According to the petitioner, a person whose integrity is doubtful cannot be allowed to hold an important office like that of State Chief Information Commissioner, as it will defeat the very purpose of the Right to Information Act. According to the petitioner, a person whose integrity is doubtful cannot be allowed to hold an important office like that of State Chief Information Commissioner, as it will defeat the very purpose of the Right to Information Act. It is also contended that the second respondent managed to get himself appointed as the state Chief Information Commissioner by influencing the authorities concerned and, therefore, his appointment as State Chief Information Commissioner is vitiated by mala fides. ( 4 ) THE technical nature of a writ of quo warranto and the conditions to be satisfied for issuing a writ of quo warranto were explained by this Court in the judgment in writ petition No. 137 of 2005 (S/b) Vijay Kumar srivastava v. State of Uttaranchal reported in 2005 (2) UD 160. Paragraph-12 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder :- "12. A writ of quo warranto is generally regarded as an appropriate and adequate remedy to determine the right or title to a public office and to oust an incumbent who has unlawfully usurped or intruded into such office or is unlawfully holding the same. A proceeding in quo warranto against a public officer is for the purpose of determining whether he is entitled to hold the office and discharge its functions. In a quo warranto proceeding, the function of the Court is only to determine whether there has been usurpation of a public office and not to search the conscience of the appointing authority to ascertain his motive. The question of the motive of the appointing authority in appointing a person to a public office is irrelevant in a quo warranto proceeding. Quo warranto is a discretionary relief and is not granted as a matter of course. Quo warranto is not a matter of right. The Court has discretion to grant or refuse it according to the facts and circumstances of the case. If it is vexatious and has been filed for vindication of personal prejudice, writ can be refused. If the applicant had an alternative remedy but it was not availed of or if the applicant is guilty of delay or if the application is barred by res judicata, writ may be refused. The Court will not issue a writ of quo warranto if it would be futile, as where the alleged defect in the original appointment can be cured by immediate reappointment. The Court will not issue a writ of quo warranto if it would be futile, as where the alleged defect in the original appointment can be cured by immediate reappointment. However, the Court has the right to adjudicate and decide on the validity of appointment even if the applicant is not a rival applicant to the office and has no personal interest in the issue of a writ of quo warranto. A petition for a writ of quo warranto is maintainable at the instance of any person whether any fundamental or other legal right of such person has been infringed or not, provided he is not a man of straw set up by some one else. Any member of the public, acting in good faith, whose conduct did not disentitle him to relief, could apply for a writ of quo warranto, without alleging the violation of any specific legal right. The procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointment to the public offices against the relevant statutory provisions. It protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It also protects the public from usurpers of public offices. The person holding the public office is called upon to show the authority under which he is occupying the same. If the Court is satisfied that the appointment or reappointment of the person was not made in accordance with the provisions of the statute, it can interfere. The Court has to be satisfied that the person holding the office is a usurper. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person is called upon to show whether he possesses the necessary qualification prescribed for that office and whether the authority which he produces is by a person who is authorised to make appointment to the office which he holds. If he shows that he possesses the necessary qualification and that there is no legal impediment in the way of his appointment to the office and that the person who issued the order of his appointment is authorised by law to do so, no writ of quo warranto can be issued against him, because, in such a case he cannot be said to be a usurper. Though an applicant for a writ of quo warranto can ask the Court to examine whether a person holding a public office has been validly appointed under the statute concerned, he will not be permitted to challenge the validity of the statutory provisions. In other words, in a quo warranto proceeding the validity of the statutory provision under which the disputed appointment has been made cannot be examined. " ( 5 ) IN this context it is also useful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda rao, (AIR 1965 SC 491) wherein a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has held that, before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by the usurper without legal authority and that it necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. The relevant portion of the decision of the Supreme Court is extracted hereunder :- "broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public oifice or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office. In some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. " ( 6 ) THUS, in a petition praying for a writ of quo warranto the enquiry by the Court is limited to four aspects only: (i) Whether the office in question is a public office? (ii) Whether the person holding the public office has got an order issued by the competent authority appointing him to the office? (iii) Whether he is qualified and eligible to hold the office? (iv) Whether his appointment was made in accordance with the provisions of the statute? whether the appointment was ill-motivated; whether it was made for extraneous reasons or under undue influence; whether the person appointed is a desirable person; and whether there are better persons available are questions beyond the scope of enquiry in a petition for writ of quo warranto, though such reasons may be considered in a petition for a writ of certiorari and for quashing the appointment. The subtle dis-tinction between a writ of quo warranto and the other writs has to be borne in mind by the Court. ( 7 ) IN this case, it is not disputed that the office of State Chief Information Commissioner is a public office and hence this Court is entitled to examine whether the second respondent is usurper of that office. ( 7 ) IN this case, it is not disputed that the office of State Chief Information Commissioner is a public office and hence this Court is entitled to examine whether the second respondent is usurper of that office. The court can examine whether the second respondent is holding the office on the strength of proper authority; i. e. on the basis of an order issued by the competent authority appointing him to the office, whether he is qualified and eligible to hold the office and whether his appointment was made in accordance with the provisions of the statute. ( 8 ) THE appointment of the State Chief information Commissioner is governed by the provisions of Section 15 of the Right to information Act. Section 15 of the Act reads thus : "15. Constitution of State Information commission.- (1) Every State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a body to be known as the (name of the State) Information Commission to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to, it under this Act. (2) The State Information Commission shall consist of - (a) the State Chief Information Commissioner, and (b) such number of State Information commissioners, not exceeding ten, as may be deemed necessary. (3) The State Chief Information Commissioner and the State information Commissioners shall be appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee consisting of - (i) the Chief Minister, who shall be the chairperson of the committee; (ii) the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly; and (iii) a Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister. Explanation.- For the purposes of removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that whether the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative assembly has not been recognised as such, the Leader of the single largest group in opposition of the Government in the Legislative Assembly shall be deemed to be the Leader of Opposition. (4) The general superintendence, direction and management of the affairs of the state Information Commission shall vest in the State Chief Information Commissioner who shall be assisted by the State Information Commissioners and may exercise all such powers and do all such acts and things which may be exercised or done by the State information Commission autonomously without being subjected to directions by any other authority under this Act. (5) The State Chief Information Commissioner and the State information Commissioners shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance. (6) The State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any state or Union territory, as the case may be, or hold any other office of profit or connected with any political party or carrying on any business or pursuing any profession. (7) The headquarters of the State Information Commission shall be at such place in the State as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify and the State Information Commission may, with the previous approval of the State Government, establish offices at other places in the State. " ( 9 ) FROM the provisions contained in Section 15 it is clear that the appointment of the State Chief Information Commissioner has to be made by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Chief Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly and a Cabinet minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister. The petitioner has no case that the second respondent was not appointed by the governor on the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Chief Minister, the leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly and a Cabinet minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister. On the other hand the petitioner himself has produced annexure-3 Notification dated 3-10-05 which shows that the appointment of the second respondent as State Chief Informa-tion Commissioner was made by the Governor under Section 15 (3) of the Act. Hence it cannot be said that the second respondent has not got an order issued by the competent authority appointing him to the office of State chief Information Commissioner. ( 10 ) AS per Section 15 (5) of the Act the state Chief Information Commissioner shall be a person of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance. ( 10 ) AS per Section 15 (5) of the Act the state Chief Information Commissioner shall be a person of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance. It cannot be disputed that the second respondent who was a member of the Indian Administrative Service and has held several posts including the post of Chief Secretary of the State, is a person of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience at least in administration and governance. Therefore, it cannot be said that he is not qualified or eligible to hold the office of State Chief Information Commissioner. The petitioner also has not contended that the second respondent does not possess the qualification and eligibility for appointment to the office of state Chief Information Commissioner. On the contrary, the petitioner's case is that the second respondent was disqualified under section 15 (6), as he was holding another office of profit on the date of his appointment. At the same time the petitioner himself has stated that the second respondent's resignation was accepted by the Government on 18-10-05 with effect from the forenoon of that day. Therefore, the second respondent ceased to be in Government service with effect from 18-10-05 forenoon. He was appointed as State Chief information Commissioner as per Annexure-3 Notification dated 3-10-05 and the appointment was to take effect only from the date he assumed office. Even according to the petitioner, the second respondent assumed office of the State chief Information Commissioner only on 18-10-05. Thus, on the date on which he assumed the office of State Chief Information commissioner the second respondent was not holding any other office of profit. Hence there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the second respondent was disqualified to hold the office of State Chief information Commissioner. It is contended by the petitioner that the acceptance of the resignation of the second respondent was illegal and non est in law and, therefore, the second respondent should be deemed to have been continuing in service of the Government and, therefore, he was holding another office of profit and hence was disqualified for appointment as State Chief Information Commissioner. It is contended by the petitioner that the acceptance of the resignation of the second respondent was illegal and non est in law and, therefore, the second respondent should be deemed to have been continuing in service of the Government and, therefore, he was holding another office of profit and hence was disqualified for appointment as State Chief Information Commissioner. According to the petitioner the acceptance of resignation was illegal and non est in law as the second respondent had not given three months' previous notice in writing to the State Government as required in Rule 16 (2) of the All india Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. The second respondent submitted the resignation on 3-10-05 and it was accepted on 18-10-05. The question whether the acceptance of the resignation of the second respondent was illegal or not, is not a question coming under the purview of the enquiry by this Court in a petition for a writ of quo warranto. What is being enquired is whether the appointment of the second respondent as State Chief Information Commissioner was lawful or not and whether on the date of his assumption of office he suffered any disqualification under Section 15 (6), as alleged by the petitioner, on account of the admitted acceptance of the second respondent's resignation by the State Government with effect from 18-10-05. He ceased to be in the service of the Government with effect from the forenoon of 18-10-05 and hence he was not holding any other office of profit on 18-10-05 and, therefore, he did not suffer any disqualification under Section 15 (6) of the Act to hold the office of State Chief Information commissioner. There is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the Government could not have accepted the resignation of the second respondent unless three months' previous notice was given. Rule 16 (2) of All india Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958 reads thus : "16 (2 ). A member of the Service may, after giving at least three months' previous notice in writing, to the State Government concerned, retire from service on the date on which such member completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. Provided that no member of the service under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the Central Government. Provided that no member of the service under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the Central Government. " In our view Rule 16 (2) only casts an obligation on the member of the service to give at least three months' previous notice, but it does not prohibit or prevent the Government from accepting a resignation even if three months' previous notice is not given. No specific provision providing for waiver of the notice is required to enable the Govern-ment to accept a resignation even if three months' previous notice is not given. The fact remains that the resignation of the second respondent was accepted by the Government with effect from the forenoon of 18-10-05 and consequently the relationship of master and servant between the Government and the second respondent stood terminated with effect from the forenoon of 18-10-05. Therefore, we cannot uphold the contention that the acceptance of the second respondent's resignation was illegal and non est in law. Hence we are of the view that the second respondent was qualified and eligible to hold the office of State Chief Information commissioner on the date of his assumption of office. ( 11 ) THE next question is whether the appointment of the second respondent was made in accordance with the provisions of the statute. The petitioner has not raised any contention or placed any material to show that the appointment was not made in accordance with the provisions of the Act, though the petitioner has contended that the appointment was ill-motivated and that it was made due to undue influence and that there were allegations of corruption and irregularities against the second respondent. As observed earlier, they are not matters coming under the purview of the enquiry in a petition for a writ of quo warranto. Though the petitioner has alleged that the second respondent's integrity is doubtful and that a person whose integrity is doubtful cannot be allowed to hold an important office like that of State Chief Information Commissioner, it is still only an allegation which has not been established in any enquiry. This court cannot proceed on the basis of any unsubstantiated allegations by the petitioner. ( 12 ) WE may also observe that even if the petitioner's contention is correct it will be futile to issue a writ of quo warranto in this case. This court cannot proceed on the basis of any unsubstantiated allegations by the petitioner. ( 12 ) WE may also observe that even if the petitioner's contention is correct it will be futile to issue a writ of quo warranto in this case. According to the petitioner the second respondent had not given three months' pre vious notice before resigning from the service of the Government and hence the acceptance of his resignation was illegal and consequently he is holding another office of profit and thereby is disqualified to hold the office of State Chief Information Commissioner. Even if the second respondent is ousted from office by issuing a writ of quo warranto on the above mentioned ground nothing can prevent the Government from accepting the resignation on expiry of a period of three months from the date of its submission and thereafter appointing the second respondent again as State Chief Information Commissioner. Thus the alleged defect in the original appointment of the second respondent can be cured by another appointment on expiry of the period of three months from 3-10-05. In such circumstances the Court will not issue a writ of quo warranto which would become futile. ( 13 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the petitioner has not made out a case for issuing a writ of quo warranto against the second respondent. Hence We hold that there is no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .