D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) IN this case, on an alleged breach or violation of an order passed by the learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge was pleased to come to a finding that "the Court was of the opinion that it is a fit case for taking action for contempt. I hold the contemners guilty of contempt. However, in order to give contemners an opportunity to purge the contempt before I pass the sentence, I adjourn the matter for three weeks to enable the contemner Nos. 2, 3 and 4, namely, the Managing Director of the contemner No. 1, the Vice-President (Marketing) of the contemner No. 1 and the Company Secretary of the contemner no. 1 to delete the said brown cup/mug from the disputed advertisement and to report compliance before August 17, 2005, failing which this Court will proceed to pass appropriate orders in respect of the contempt. The contemner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 shall remain present at the next hearing on august 17, 2005 to inform this Court whether or not the order has been complied with. If not, the contemners will run the risk of being sentenced. The office is directed to put up this matter on August 17, 2005 under the heading 'for Orders'. " 1]. This order has been challenged in this appeal filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Submission on behalf of the appellant: ( 2 ) MR. Sarkar, learned Senior Counsel, ably assisted by Mr. Pratap Chatterjee and Mr. I. P. Mukherjee, submitted that no order of punishment having been passed, the appeal would not lie under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts act in answer to the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Anindya Mitra, learned senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondent, with regard to the maintainability of the appeal being appealable under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. According to Mr. Sarkar, no rule was issued in terms of the Contempt rules of the High Court at Calcutta and the procedure prescribed in the Rules have not been followed. According to Mr. Sarkar, no rule was issued in terms of the Contempt rules of the High Court at Calcutta and the procedure prescribed in the Rules have not been followed. It is only on the basis of an allegation that there was contempt the matter was heard and the alleged contemners were asked to appear in the proceedings though they were not parties to the original proceedings and had ultimately found them guilty of contempt and issued the said direction. There being no order of punishment and no rule having been issued, according to Mr. Sarkar, the Court did not pass the order or decision in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt in order to be appealable under section 19 (1) of the contempt of Courts Act. He relied on various decisions to which we shall be referring to at appropriate stage. 1]. On the merit, Mr. Sarkar had pointed out that the interim order that was granted restraining the respondent company of which the alleged contemners are office bearers in terms of prayer (b), namely, " (b) An order of injunction restraining the respondents and each of them and their servants, agents or assigns from publishing by telecast or otherwise the aforesaid advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 herein or any advertisement or publicity similar thereto and in any from reflecting adversely on the plaintiff's/petitioner's product "horlicks" in any manner whatsoever". However, the learned Court was pleased to add that, "this order will not prevent the defendant No. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter 'h' in the said advertisement. " Mr. Sarkar submits that his clients have understood the said order that they can continue with the publication of the advertisement substituting the letter 'h' by letter 'x' which they had done. Without issuing any rule as against the alleged contemners and without hearing them on the question of the alleged contempt, it was held that they were guilty of contempt. In the facts, according to Mr. Sarkar, the violation is not deliberate and is an outcome of an understanding of the order; and as such there was no contempt and, therefore, the Court could not have assumed jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Thus in this case, there was no assumption of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In the facts, according to Mr. Sarkar, the violation is not deliberate and is an outcome of an understanding of the order; and as such there was no contempt and, therefore, the Court could not have assumed jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Thus in this case, there was no assumption of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Therefore, the appeal could not be maintainable under section 19 (1) of the contempt of Courts Act. Accordingly, the present appeal under Clause 15 of the letters Patent has been filed. Therefore, he submits that the order appealed against be stayed till the disposal of the appeal. Submission on behalf of the respondent: ( 3 ) MR. Anindya Mitra on the other hand, pointed out that the power to punish for contempt by the High Court is not dependent on the provisions contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. It is inherent in the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The Court can assume jurisdiction to punish for contempt even without the Contempt Rules. The power conferred by Article 215 cannot be restricted or curtailed or in any way eclipsed by reason of any rules framed by the High Court. Therefore, when the Court passes an order in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the same becomes amenable to section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. As soon the order comes within the scope and ambit of section 19 (1), the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the letters Patent is ousted. In this case, the appeal being one under section 19 (1), clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot be invoked. Since this Court lacks determination to hear appeals under section 19 (1), therefore the appeal cannot be heard by this Bench. Even though the order might be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent but still then the order having been passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt, it attracts section 19 (1), the determination whereof is conferred on the other Bench and the matter should be referred to the said Bench. 1]. Mr. Mitra relied on various decisions and made various submissions to which we shall be referring at appropriate stage. The confine : ( 4 ) WE have heard the respective learned Counsel at length. Mr. Sarkar and mr. 1]. Mr. Mitra relied on various decisions and made various submissions to which we shall be referring at appropriate stage. The confine : ( 4 ) WE have heard the respective learned Counsel at length. Mr. Sarkar and mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant and Mr. Mitra on behalf of the respondent had captivated the Court for some time and had attempted to make a threadbare discussion with regard to the decision cited by the respective counsel and thrash out the proposition in support of their respective contentions. At the present moment we may deal with the merit of the case as contended by mr. Sarkar only for the purpose of examining as to whether this appeal comes within the determination of this Bench or not namely whether the order that has been appealed against was passed by the learned Single Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and thus appealable under section 19 (1) triable by the other Division Bench and not by this Division Bench. We will confine ourselves only to that question. Only if we come to the conclusion that the order appealed against does not come within section 19 (1) then only we can treat this appeal as an appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as has been described on behalf of the appellant and may enter into the merit of this case. Interim order : ( 5 ) SINCE this question was being argued right from the beginning and requires a little investigation and research, therefore pending hearing we had passed on 16th August, 2005 an order of stay of operation of the order under appeal for a period of two weeks which is still subsisting. The nature of the order : Whether an order within the meaning of section 19 (1): ( 6 ) IN the context aforesaid we may now deal with the question posed before us. Before we embark upon deciding the question of law we may first refer to the nature of the order appealed against. It is the nature of the order which will determine the question. As quoted above the learned Single Judge was pleased to hold the alleged contemners guilty of contempt but before passing the sentence the matter was adjourned in order to enable the alleged contemner nos. It is the nature of the order which will determine the question. As quoted above the learned Single Judge was pleased to hold the alleged contemners guilty of contempt but before passing the sentence the matter was adjourned in order to enable the alleged contemner nos. 2, 3 and 4 being the Managing Director, Vice-President (Marketing) and the Company Secretary respectively of the alleged contemner No. 1 company to delete the brown cup/mug from the disputed advertisement and to report compliance on 17th August, 2005 failing which the Court would be pleased to proceed to pass appropriate orders in respect of the contempt. It was further clarified that if the order is not complied with then the alleged contemner would run the risk of being sentenced and ultimately the matter was directed to appear for orders on 17th August, 2005. 1]. This order was passed on the background that there was an interim order in terms of prayer (b) namely the injunction restraining the respondent, which did not include the alleged contemner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 though however these alleged contemners were servants or agent of the respondent company, from publishing by telecast or otherwise the advertisement referred to in paragraph 10 of the application or any advertisement or publicity similar thereto in any form reflecting adversely on the plaintiffs product 'horlicks' in any manner whatsoever. It seems that the order was a blanket order which prohibited publishing of the advertisement altogether. But in the order dated 3rd September, 2004 it was mentioned that the respondent were the appellant herein advertising/publishing the said advertisement showing a cup with the letter 'h'. The Court however in the said order dated 3rd September, 2004 was pleased to clarify that the interim order in terms of prayer (b) would not prevent the defendant No. 1 namely the company from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with the letter 'h' shown in the said advertisement. The advertisement was continued with the cup marked with the letter 'x' not with the letter 'h' and the colour of the cup and the colour of the liquid also remained the same. The alleged contemners mentioned that there was no restraint order on airing the said advertisement with the cup/ mug marked with the letter 'x' in the said advertisement and the interim order was so understood by them. 2]. The alleged contemners mentioned that there was no restraint order on airing the said advertisement with the cup/ mug marked with the letter 'x' in the said advertisement and the interim order was so understood by them. 2]. The order that has been passed is an order holding the appellants guilty of contempt. However no punishment has since been imposed. The alleged contemners have been given an opportunity to purge and report compliance. Upon such compliance report the Court would be pleased to proceed to pass appropriate order and in default the alleged contemners would run the risk of sentence. The matter was adjourned. Thus this order is not in the nature of punishment. The order has definitely been passed in the exercise of contempt jurisdiction. When section 19 (1) provides appeal only against any order or decision passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt the appeal has to be confined only to such order that implies an order in the nature of punishment. 3]. The assumption of contempt jurisdiction has different stages. It is a matter between the Court and the contemner. At the first stage a Rule is issued to give an opportunity to show cause. This relates to the initiation of the proceedings by assuming contempt jurisdiction when brought to its notice upon a prima facie satisfaction. This is not in the exercise to punish for contempt. Inasmuch as the punishment follows finding of guilty of contempt. At this stage the Court does not proceed on the assumption that the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt. The Court is not supposed to proceed to punish at that stage, since the Court cannot prejudge the issue or presume guilt at the outset. 4]. After the alleged contemners appear and submit their affidavit the Court proceeds to find out as to whether there is any contempt. It is in fact a stage of determination of guilt or in other words a stage of investigation and finding. This is also not a stage when the Court proceeds to punish for contempt, but to ascertain whether there is a contempt. If at this stage the alleged contemner is found not guilty of contempt then this order will not be appealable under section 19 (1 ). There is no two opinion about the proposition. This is also not a stage when the Court proceeds to punish for contempt, but to ascertain whether there is a contempt. If at this stage the alleged contemner is found not guilty of contempt then this order will not be appealable under section 19 (1 ). There is no two opinion about the proposition. But if the Court finds the contemner guilty of contempt and gives an opportunity to purge the contempt and adjourns the matter for passing appropriate order, then can this order acquire a status different from an order finding of no guilt. The answer would be simple and in the negative. Inasmuch as it is the second stage of the proceedings. The order at the end of the second stage cannot assume different characteristics on the ground of finding of guilt or no guilt. Only after such finding the Court enters the third stage. 5]. The third and final stage after the finding of guilt starts when the Court decides to punish for the contempt so found. Now, the contempt jurisdiction so long exercised passes on to the stage of passing order of punishment. This is where the Court passes on to the stage of exercising jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Any order or decision passed at this stage would be an order within the meaning of section 19 (1 ). Now let us examine in the backdrop of the law governing the field as to whether the order appealed against is an order coming under section 19 (1 ). Section 19 (1) : Order or decision passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt: ( 7 ) IN this background the alleged order is required to be considered. Now let us examine in the backdrop of the law governing the field as to whether the order appealed against is an order coming under section 19 (1 ). Section 19 (1) : Order or decision passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt: ( 7 ) IN this background the alleged order is required to be considered. Before we pass on to the question as to whether this order could be said to have been passed in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and the learned Court could have assumed such jurisdiction when there was no contempt in view of the fact that there was no deliberate violation of the order and that the advertisement was published because of the reason that the alleged contemners had understood the said order in such manner and then there was scope for understanding the same in such manner and that the order cannot conclusively be said to have restrained the publication of the advertisement with a cup of same colour containing same liquid marked 'x'. Therefore there was no scope for assuming the jurisdiction to punish for contempt in such circumstances particularly when no rule was issued. We may pass on to the other question as to whether even on the basis of the order that has been passed could it be said to be an order within the meaning of section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 1]. Mr. Mitra had relied on the decision in Arun Kumar Gupta and Ors. vs. Jyoti Prasanna Das Thakur and Ors. , 1996 (2) CLJ 89 (FB) by this Court. Admittedly in the said decision the decision in Baradakanta Mishra vs. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, C. J. , AIR 1974 SC 2255 and D. N. Taneja vs. Bhajan Lal, 1988 (3) SCC 26 were discussed and D. N. Taneja (supra) was distinguished being one arising out of a criminal contempt. Following baradakanta Mishra (supra) the Full Bench had held that as soon the Court issues the rule it assumes the jurisdiction to punish for contempt and therefore in respect of civil contempt an order which may not be in the nature of punishment would still be subject to appeal under section 19 (1 ). Admittedly we are bound by the Full Bench decision. 2]. Admittedly we are bound by the Full Bench decision. 2]. But however it is pointed out on behalf of the appellant that in case the full Bench is in conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court or if it can be shown that the Full Bench did not follow the Supreme Court and had overlooked other judgments or there were some other judgments delivered after the Full bench, in that event it is open to this Bench to examine the decision and come to its own conclusion as to whether the decision by the Full Bench would be binding in the facts and circumstances of the case or not. 3]. In fact so far as the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) is concerned, the said decision arose out of an appeal under section 19 (1) preferred by the person, who was the petitioner in the contempt proceedings, brought the fact before the Court challenging the refusal of the Court to initiate the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. In that situation the Apex Court in baradakanta Mishra (supra) consisting of a three-Judges quorum held that when the Court does not issue the rule and reject the motion it does not intend to punish for contempt. Only in order to distinguish the rejection of the motion, the analogy was drawn. In Baradakanta Mishra (supra) the Apex Court had no occasion to deal with the question as to whether without an order of punishment it could be an order within the scope of section 19 (1) or not. All the reasonings that were put forward in the said decision were to make the decision clear. The reasoning is to be appreciated in that context. When there are two co-equal Benches dealing with matters ancillary and having some similarity then the decisions which deals with the matter closer to the facts are to be accepted than those which did not have occasion to deal with or scrutinize the fact in the context in which we are supposed to answer the question. When there are two co-equal Benches dealing with matters ancillary and having some similarity then the decisions which deals with the matter closer to the facts are to be accepted than those which did not have occasion to deal with or scrutinize the fact in the context in which we are supposed to answer the question. At the same time the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) was considered in the decision in D. N. Taneja (supra) and despite the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) the decision in D. N. Taneja (supra) had laid down that it is only an order which is in the nature of punishment would attract the provision of section 19 (1) for being appealable. Until the Court imposes punishment the Court does not exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 4]. We may beneficially quote paragraphs 7, 8 and 12 of the decision in d. N. Taneja (supra) to make the distinction as quoted hereinafter and those from paragraphs 7 and 8 of the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) one after the other, so far as relevant for our present purpose. Re : D. N. Taneja (supra)"7. Mr. Sibal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has taken a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal under section 19 (1) of the Act. It is contended by him that as no punishment was imposed on the respondent by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Section 19 (1) is inapplicable and the appeal is incompetent. Section 19 (1) provides as follows : 19 (1 ). An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of a High court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt -a) Where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court, b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court : provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. ""8. The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. ""8. The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the provision of Article 215 of the Constitution which provides that every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 confers on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words, the High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution. As has been noticed earlier, an appeal will lie under section 19 (1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly, that the high Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. ""12. Right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration. In this connection, it may be noticed that there was no right of appeal under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It is for the first time that under section 19 (1) of the Act, a right of appeal has been provided for: A contempt is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemner. Any person who moves the machinery of the Court for contempt only brings to the notice of the Court certain fact constituting Contempt of Court. It is for the first time that under section 19 (1) of the Act, a right of appeal has been provided for: A contempt is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemner. Any person who moves the machinery of the Court for contempt only brings to the notice of the Court certain fact constituting Contempt of Court. After furnishing such information he may still assist the Court, but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt proceeding there are only two parties, namely, the Court and the contemner. It may be one of the reasons which weighed with the legislature in not conferring any right of appeal on the petitioner for contempt. The aggrieved party under section 19 (1) can only be the contemner who has been punished for contempt of Court. "re : Baradakanta Mishra (supra)"the exercise of contempt jurisdiction being a matter entirely between the court and the alleged contemner, the Court though moved by motion or reference, may in its discretion, decline to exercise its jurisdiction for contempt. It is only when the Court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. That is why the terminus a quo for the period of limitation provided in section 20 is the date when a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the court. Where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not therefore, fall within the opening words of section 19, sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. This of course does not mean that there is no remedy available where the High Court on an erroneous view of the law or unreasonably and perversely refuses to take action for contempt on a motion or a reference. This of course does not mean that there is no remedy available where the High Court on an erroneous view of the law or unreasonably and perversely refuses to take action for contempt on a motion or a reference. Though no appeal lies under section 19, sub-section (1) as of right against such order or decision of the high Court, the Advocate General or any other person who has with the consent in writing of the Advocate General moved the High Court can always come to this Court by a petition for special leave to appeal and the power of this Court to interfere with such order or decision in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 is unfettered. This Court can always in suitable cases set right any order or decision of the High Court refusing to take action for contempt against the alleged contemner, if the larger interests of administration of justice so requires. ""8. It is, therefore, clear that the order made by the Full Bench of the Orissa high Court in the present case rejecting the motion made by the appellant and refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt against the Chief Justice and other Judges was not appealable under section 19, sub-section (1 ). We may point out that in the present case it is unnecessary to consider whether an appeal under section 19, sub-section (1) is confined only to a case where the High Court after initiating a proceeding for contempt finds the alleged contemner guilty and punishes him for contempt as contended by the learned additional Solicitor General or it extends also to a case where after initiating a proceeding for contempt, the High Court finds that the alleged contemner is not guilty of contempt and exonerates him, or even if he is found guilty of contempt, declines to punish him. A question may well arise whether in the latter case the Advocate General or any other person who has, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General, move the High Court can appeal as of right against the order or decision of the High Court. A question may well arise whether in the latter case the Advocate General or any other person who has, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General, move the High Court can appeal as of right against the order or decision of the High Court. That question does not arise in the present case and we need not, therefore, express any opinion upon it, though we may point out that in England a right of appeal is given to a disappointed applicant under section 13, sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960. "5]. A comparison of the said two decisions clearly shows that decision in baradakanta Mishra (supra) was delivered in a context where the motion was rejected and the ratio and the comparison was confined to that only. Whereas after considering the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) the Apex Court in D. N. Taneja (supra) came to the above conclusion holding that the view which was taken in D. N. Taneja (supra) by the Apex Court finds support, as observed in paragraph 11 of D. N. Taneja (supra), viz. "the view which we take finds support in the decision of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra vs. Mr. Justice gatikrushna Mishra, C. J. , AIR 1974 SC 2225. 6]. That apart from paragraph 8 of the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) it appears that the question that was answered in the decision in D. N. Taneja (supra) was kept open and was not answered on the ground that in the context of that case the Court was not called not upon to answer the same. A decision is to be read in the context of the facts out of which the question arose and the answer is given. It cannot be said that it had examined and answered the question which was not involved in that case. The Apex Court in baradakanta Mishra (supra) had no occasion to consider the expression used in section 19 (1) in the light of the question that was answered in the decision in d. N. Taneja (supra ). The distinction between criminal contempt and civil contempt is of no relevance, since section 19 (1) applies in both, inasmuch as there is no other provision for appeal for one or the other. 7]. The distinction between criminal contempt and civil contempt is of no relevance, since section 19 (1) applies in both, inasmuch as there is no other provision for appeal for one or the other. 7]. Then again the ratio decided in D. N. Taneja (supra) and Baradakanta mishra (supra) was reiterated by another three-Judges Bench in J. S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Duggar, 1996 (6) SCC 291 , which was later in point of time, namely delivered on September 11, 1996 from that of the Full Bench in Arun Kumar gupta (supra), delivered on 23rd February, 1996. In this decision it was held that an appeal would lie under section 19 when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the contemner has been passed. The finding that the respondent did not wilfully disobeyed the order was not an order punishing the respondent for violation of the order of the High Court. Therefore, appeal would not lie though it might be an appeal under the Letters patent in relation to the direction given by the Court in connection with the contempt petition. Though this decision referred to Baradakanta Mishra (supra)but did not refer to the decision in D. N. Taneja (supra), yet it has not deviated from what has been held in D. N. Taneja (supra), which was delivered after taking into consideration Baradakanta Mishra (supra ). 8]. Another decision of the Apex Court of two-Judges quoram in the State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Anr. , 1996 (4} SCC 411, decided on 10th April, 1996, namely, after 23rd February, 1996 on which date the Full Bench of this Court gave the decision in Arun Kumar Gupta (supra ). The Apex Court again considered the decision in Baradakanta Mislira (supra) and D. N. Taneja (supra) and held as follows : 3. The preliminary question which has to be examined is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case an appeal is maintainable against an order dropping the proceeding for contempt. It is well-settled that an appeal is a creature of a statute. Unless a statute provides for an appeal and specifies the order against which an appeal can be filed, no appeal can be filed or entertained as a matter of right or course. It is well-settled that an appeal is a creature of a statute. Unless a statute provides for an appeal and specifies the order against which an appeal can be filed, no appeal can be filed or entertained as a matter of right or course. On a plain reading section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for Contempt of Court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words "any order" has to be read with the expression 'decision' used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. "any order" is not independent of the expression 'decision'. They have been put in an alternative form saying 'order' or 'decision'. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression "any order" is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the high Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result. 4. It is well-known that contempt proceeding is not a dispute between two parties, the proceeding is primarily between the Court and the person who is alleged to have committed the Contempt of Court. The person who informs the court or brings to the notice of the Court that anyone has committed contempt of such Court is not in the position of a prosecutor, he is simply assisting the court so that the dignity and the majesty of the Court is maintained and upheld. It is for the Court, which initiates the proceeding to decide whether the person against whom such proceeding has been initiated should be punished or discharged taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. It is for the Court, which initiates the proceeding to decide whether the person against whom such proceeding has been initiated should be punished or discharged taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. This Court in the case of Baradakanta Mishra vs. Justice gatikrushna Misra, CJ. of the Orissa H. C. said: (SCC p. 542, para 7)". . . . WHERE the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Such a decision would not, therefore, fall within the opening words of section 19, sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. "again in the case of D. N. Taneja vs. Bhajan Lal it was said : (SCC pp. 29-30, para 8)"the right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In this connection, it is pertinent to refer to the provision of Article 215 of the Constitution which provides that every high Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 confers on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words, the High Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt from Article 215 of the Constitution. As has been noticed earlier, an appeal will lie under section 19 (1) of the Act only when the High Court makes an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent and, in our opinion rightly, that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes a punishment for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. "no appeal is maintainable against an order dropping proceeding for contempt or refusing to initiate a proceeding for contempt is apparent not only from sub-section (1) of section 19 but also from sub-section (2) of section 19 which provides that pending any appeal the Appellate Court may order that - (a) the execution of the punishment or the order appealed against be suspended: (b) if the appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged his contempt. Sub-section (2) of section 19 indicates that the reliefs provided under clauses (a) to (c) can be claimed at the instance of the person who has been proceeded against for Contempt of Court. 5. But even if no appeal is maintainable on behalf of the person at whose instance a proceeding for contempt had been initiated and later dropped or whose petition for initiating contempt proceedings has been dismissed, he is not without any remedy. In appropriate cases he can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and this Court on being satisfied that it was a fit case where proceeding for contempt should have been initiated, can set aside the order passed by the High Court. In suitable cases, this Court has to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution in the larger interest of the administration of justice. 9]. However, Mr. Mitra wanted to distinguish these decisions on the ground that in each of these cases the Court refused to pass any order of punishment, on the other hand, had dropped the proceedings or did not held that the alleged contemners were guilty of contempt. 9]. However, Mr. Mitra wanted to distinguish these decisions on the ground that in each of these cases the Court refused to pass any order of punishment, on the other hand, had dropped the proceedings or did not held that the alleged contemners were guilty of contempt. Whatever might be the position but the apex Court in all these decisions had laid down the principles in no uncertain terms, may be in a case where no finding of guilt of contumacious conduct was arrived at or no order on the contempt petition was passed. Despite the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra), the Apex Court considering the same had been consistently taking the view that it is only against an order of punishment or against an order in the nature of punishment appeal would lie stepping further ahead of the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) where it had stopped and kept the question open. 10]. The consistent view that has been taken in Baradakanta Mishra (supra), followed in D. N. Taneja (supra) and circumscribing the scope repeated in J. S. Parihar (supra) and followed in Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Anr. (supra)leads us to hold that the decision by the Full Bench of this Court and the distinction sought to be made out of D. N. Taneja (supra) pitted against these decisions does not seem to bind us. This is more so because section 19 in no uncertain terms says that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In Mahboob S. Allibhoy and Anr. (supra), any "order" or "decision" was held to be dependent on each other and one cannot be read independent of the other but in either case it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. The punishment for contempt is specified in section 12 of the Contempt of Courts act. Section 12 prescribes that the contempt is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or with fine not exceeding Rs. 2,000/- or with both. In the proviso it was provided that an accused may be discharged or the punishment may be remitted on an apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court which is explained to be an apology made bona fide though might be qualified or conditional. 2,000/- or with both. In the proviso it was provided that an accused may be discharged or the punishment may be remitted on an apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court which is explained to be an apology made bona fide though might be qualified or conditional. Thus the distinction has been made in respect of punishment and discharge or remission on apology being tendered. Therefore the expression 'to punish' has to be read that an exercise imposing or inflicting punishment for contempt. If no punishment is inflicted or imposed, the jurisdiction exercised may be a jurisdiction in exercise of power to contempt. 11]. Section 19 made a distinction in exercise of power vested in the High court under Article 215 relating to contempt and in exercise of that jurisdiction for contempt to inflict punishment. The distinction between the exercise of the jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act or the exercise of the power of contempt on the one hand and such jurisdiction exercised to punish for contempt appears to be distinct. In the exercise of jurisdiction of contempt, Court might pass several orders and ultimately may find one guilty of contempt and may issue various directions that would be an exercise of jurisdiction of contempt and in exercise of such jurisdiction when the Court imposes or inflicts punishment then such jurisdiction is exercised to punish properly. This stand out differently in view of the fiction created in section 19 confining the scope of appeal under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act as has been laid down by the Apex Court. 12]. Mr. Mitra had relied upon various decisions. He relied on Arun Kumar gupta (supra) which we have already discussed hereinbefore and needs no elaboration. He has also relied on the decision in Ashoke Kumar Rai vs. Ashoke arora and Anr. , 96 CWN 278 being the decision of this High Court. The said decision referred to Baradakanta Mishra (supra) as well as D. N. Taneja (supra ). With respect we are unable to follow the same view for the reasons stated above and that decisions did not take into consideration the 1996 decision in j. S. Parihar (supra) and Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra ). Therefore this decision does not help us in the present context. Mr. Mitra had also relied on the decision in Md. With respect we are unable to follow the same view for the reasons stated above and that decisions did not take into consideration the 1996 decision in j. S. Parihar (supra) and Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra ). Therefore this decision does not help us in the present context. Mr. Mitra had also relied on the decision in Md. Kasim Ali Mondal vs. Ajay Rande, 2000 (1) CHN 543 . This decision also does not help us since in the said decision it was held that section 19 permits appeal not only from an order enabling jurisdiction for punishment but also from an order passed in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction. This decision has also considered the decision in Baradakanta Mishra (supra) and D. N. Taneja (supra) including J. S. Parihar (supra) and Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra ). For the reasons as discussed hereinabove we are also unable to subscribe to the said view in order to make distinction in view of all the decisions cited before us. The reliance on Shantha V. Pai vs. Vasanth Builders, Madras. 1991 Criminal law Journal 3026 also does not help us for the simple reason that in the said case the appeal was held not to be maintainable under section 19 (1) since the order that was challenged was an order refusing to commit contemner for alleged contempt of Court. 13]. Mr. Mitra had also relied on Ran/it Chowdhury and Anr. vs. Ram Badan choubey, 85 CWN 1003, which considered Baradakanta Mishra (supra ). However, this decision was rendered before D. N. Taneja and the other decisions. Therefore, this decision will not be of any assistance to us. He next relied on the decision in Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P)Ltd. and Anr,, 1996 (4) SCC 622 . This decision has not dealt with the question with which we are concerned now and as such we do not find that this decision is of any help for our present purpose. Mr. Mitra next relied on the decision in r. N. Dey and Ors. vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Ors. , 2000 (4) SCC 400 . This decision has not dealt with the question with which we are concerned now and as such we do not find that this decision is of any help for our present purpose. Mr. Mitra next relied on the decision in r. N. Dey and Ors. vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Ors. , 2000 (4) SCC 400 . This decision had held that where after initiation of the proceedings for contempt the Court passed an order without discharging the rule issued in the proceedings would be a decision or order in the exercise of Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt and appeal would be maintainable under section 19 (1 ). This decision was rendered on 19th April, 2000, after the decision in D. N. Taneja (supra), J. S. Parihar (supra) and Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra) by a two-Judges quoram. This decision was rendered relying on Purushottam Das Goyel vs. D. S. Dhillon, 1978 (2) SCC 370 but this did not consider the decision in D. N. Taneja (supra), j. S. Parihar (supra) nor Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra), out of which two were rendered by three Judges quoram and as such this decision being in conflict with the said decisions and which did not notice the said decisions, does not seem to have laid down the correct proposition so as to be precedent binding the High Court in view of the conflict with the earlier decisions not noticed. The decision in Mohammad Idris and Anr. vs. Rustam Jehangir Bapuji, AIR 1984 SC 1826 is not relevant for our present purpose. In the said decision it was held that once an appeal was filed against an order of the learned Single judge of a High Court before the Division Bench, the statutory right of appeal gets exhausted and there is no further right of appeal to the Supreme Court distinguishing the decision in Purushottam Das Goyel (supra ). The said decision being in a different context is not relevant for our present purpose. 14]. On the other hand, Mr. Sarkar relied on an unreported decision by a division Bench of this Court in Praful Kayal vs. Arun Kr. Roy, A. S. T. No. 1346 of 2004, passed on 9th August, 2004, comprising of one of us (Hon'ble D. K. Seth, J.) sitting with Hon'ble R. N. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was ). On the other hand, Mr. Sarkar relied on an unreported decision by a division Bench of this Court in Praful Kayal vs. Arun Kr. Roy, A. S. T. No. 1346 of 2004, passed on 9th August, 2004, comprising of one of us (Hon'ble D. K. Seth, J.) sitting with Hon'ble R. N. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was ). In the said decision a distinction was made between an order passed in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and an order passed in exercise of contempt jurisdiction in a case where though the alleged contemner was found guilty of contempt and they were asked to appear for receiving punishment but no order of punishment having been imposed, since held to be appealable after considering of the decisions in Mohd. Kasim Ali Mondal (supra), R. N. Dey (supra)that such an appeal would be maintainable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. However, there is no doubt that the order that has been passed is a judgment under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and is appealable as such. As was held in Dulal Chandra Bhar and Ors. vs. Sukumar Banerjee and Ors. , AIR 1958 Calcutta 474 and Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar, 2002 (3) SCC 705 , where it was held that even if it is not appealable even then an appeal can be preferred under the letters Patent. The power of the Letters Patent, unless by statutory enactment excludes the appeal under Letters Patent, cannot be excluded. Mr. Sarkar pointed out that there is no enactment excluding the application of Letters patent in such a case. Other questions : Not answered : ( 8 ) SO far as the contention that section 19 (1) excludes Clause 15 of the Letters patent is concerned, we need not answer the said question. Similarly, the question raised by Mr. Sarkar that an order which is appealable under section 19 (1), an appeal against such order under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent can very well be maintained, we need not answer this question in the facts and circumstances of the case. Similarly, the question raised by Mr. Sarkar that an order which is appealable under section 19 (1), an appeal against such order under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent can very well be maintained, we need not answer this question in the facts and circumstances of the case. Conclusion : ( 9 ) IN the circumstances, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case where the rules were not followed and no contempt rule was issued and that the alleged contemners were not parties to the proceedings and that though there was scope for holding that the alleged contemners had understood the order which could have been understood in view of the expression used in the order dated 3rd September, 2004 and that the action alleged does not conclusively be held to be an act in breach or violation of the order dated 3rd September. 2004 and where no order of punishment has been passed and the order is not in the nature of punishment, we hold that the order appealed against is not an order appealable under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Being a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent the said order is appealable as such. Whether the Court could assume jurisdiction for contempt or not is not necessary to be gone into in the present case. However, we are of the view that the jurisdiction for contempt is conferred on the Court under article 215, which can never be circumscribed by any other enactment and as such even if the Rule framed by the High Court under the Contempt of Courts act is not followed or a contempt rule is not issued, still then the Court can assume jurisdiction for contempt and exercise the same and that an exercise to that end to punish would be appealable under section 19 (1 ). Order: ( 10 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, we hold that the appeal is maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and this Court has determination to decide the same. 1]. Let this matter appear as 'for Orders' on 25th August, 2005 for the purpose of deciding the merits of the appeal. 2]. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking. 1]. Let this matter appear as 'for Orders' on 25th August, 2005 for the purpose of deciding the merits of the appeal. 2]. All parties are to act on a xerox signed copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking. Maharaj Sinha, J. : ( 11 ) I have had the advantage of hearing the judgment delivered in Court by my Lord Justice Seth just after the conclusion of hearing on the question of maintainability of this appeal. Although I agree with the view expressed by his Lordship that the appeal is maintainable under clause 15 of the Letters patent and as such this Court has determination to entertain the same on merits but since the point of maintainability as raised by the learned Senior counsel Mr. Mitra on behalf of the respondent is, in my opinion, both interesting and a point of some substance, I wish to express my view on the point or points raised regarding maintainability of this appeal by adding a few words of my own. ( 12 ) ON the basis of the above objection as raised on behalf of the respondent as to the maintainability of this appeal, the sole question, in my opinion, is, whether the order under appeal is a judgment and, therefore, appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent or the order under appeal is squarely covered by the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act and as such the appeal against the said order will lie only under the provisions of the said sub-section of section 19 of the said Act and the said provisions of the said Act alone and not under "clause 15" of the Letters Patent. ( 13 ) WHEN the appeal was, in fact, moved before us, Mr. Mitra on behalf of the respondent raised the above point of maintainability and said that having regard to the nature of the order under appeal the appeal could not be maintained under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent but the appeal would only lie under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and under that sub-section alone. ( 14 ) MR. ( 14 ) MR. Sarkar, learned Senior Counsel in moving the appeal, however, expressed doubt as to whether the appeal against the order in question would lie at all under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 or rather the same would be maintainable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. He, however, said that since no punishment was imposed by the order under appeal by the learned judge and since the learned Judge at the same time held that the alleged contemners were guilty of contempt and since the learned Judge also gave an opportunity to the alleged contemners to purge the contempt and since it could not be said with certainty from the order itself that punishment would be imposed upon the alleged contemners in future and since at the same time the learned judge by the said order decided the issue or issues which affected the valuable rights of the appellants, it should be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and therefore appealable thereunder. And the scope for preferring the appeal from such an order under the provisions of section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, was, therefore, virtually non-existent. This is the way, however, I understood the submissions of Mr. Sarkar when he moved the appeal before us against the order of the learned Single Judge. ( 15 ) AT this stage, 1 think, the material portions of the order or rather the findings of the learned Judge and certain directions upon the alleged contemners should be examined for deciding the question of maintainability of this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The above portions of the order dated 27th July, 2005 are in the following terms :"on 3rd September, 2004 I have passed an order in terms of prayer (b) of the application with the clarification that the said order would not prevent the defendant No. 1 from publishing the said advertisement of its product without showing the cup marked with letter 'h' in the said advertisement. It is not open to the contemners to give a wrong interpretation to the order and then justify their conducts on the basis of such wrong interpretations. In the ultimate analysis, the view so taken by the contemners is not found to be legally sustainable. It is not open to the contemners to give a wrong interpretation to the order and then justify their conducts on the basis of such wrong interpretations. In the ultimate analysis, the view so taken by the contemners is not found to be legally sustainable. In my view, the interpretation is not bona fide one. It is not a case of bona fide wrong interpretation of the order. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this is a fit case for taking action for contempt I hold the contemners guilty of contempt. However, in order to give contemners an opportunity to purge the contempt before I pass the sentence, I adjourn the matter for three weeks to enable the contemner Nos. 2, 3 and 4, namely, the Managing Director of the contemner No. 1, the Vice-President (Marketing) of the contemner No. 1 and the Company Secretary of the contemner no. 1 to delete the said brown cup/mug from the disputed advertisement and to report compliance before 17th August, 2005, failing which this Court will proceed to pass appropriate orders in respect of the contempt. The contemner Nos. 2, 3 and 4 shall remain present at the next hearing on 17th August, 2005 to inform this Court whether or not the order has been complied with. If not, the contemners will run the risk of being sentenced. " ( 16 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the appellant - (a) that the alleged contemners were, as a result of the above, aggrieved by the said order as the learned Judge came to the finding that the interpretation of the order or orders of the learned Judge by the alleged contemners was not bona fide. " ( 16 ) IT was submitted on behalf of the appellant - (a) that the alleged contemners were, as a result of the above, aggrieved by the said order as the learned Judge came to the finding that the interpretation of the order or orders of the learned Judge by the alleged contemners was not bona fide. Secondly, the learned Judge held the alleged contemners guilty of contempt, though the learned Judge did not use the expression 'alleged contemners' in His Lordship's order, but at the same time the learned Judge gave opportunity to the alleged contemners "to purge the contempt before the learned Judge passed the sentence" then the learned Judge further gave certain directions to the alleged contemners and observed that if the said directions were not complied with the Court would proceed to pass appropriate orders in respect of contempt and then it was further directed that the alleged contemners should inform the Court on the next date of hearing as fixed by the learned judge whether or not 'order' had been complied with, if not. the contemners would run the risk of being sentenced. (b) Since no order of punishment was imposed by the said order dated 27th july, 2005 and since from the nature of the order it is absolutely uncertain whether any punishment will at all be imposed by the learned Judge in future and since at the same time the learned Judge held that the contemners were guilty of contempt the said order should definitely be construed as a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. ( 17 ) SINCE the learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant could not complete his submission on the question of maintainability of the appeal and since it was found that the appellant was entitled to a limited stay of the said order under appeal, a limited stay was granted. On the next date of hearing as Mr. Sarkar was unable to be present in Court to address us on the question of maintainability of the appeal, his ld. Junior Mr. I. P. Mukherjee submitted in continuation of the submissions of his learned Senior Mr. On the next date of hearing as Mr. Sarkar was unable to be present in Court to address us on the question of maintainability of the appeal, his ld. Junior Mr. I. P. Mukherjee submitted in continuation of the submissions of his learned Senior Mr. Sarkar that the appeal against the order in question was perfectly maintainable under Clause 15 of letters Patent and the appeal under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts act against the order could not possibly lie as no punishment was imposed upon the alleged contemners by the said order under appeal and it could not be said that the punishment, in any event, would be imposed upon the alleged contemners having regard to the nature of the order under appeal. ( 18 ) IN support of his submissions Mr. Mukherjee relied on a few decisions of the Supreme Court and a Division Bench decision of this Court as well. Since the decisions of the Supreme Court cited in support of the maintainability of this appeal by the learned Counsel Mr. Mukherjee on behalf of the appellant are, in my opinion, extremely relevant as the said decisions lay down in clear terms as to when and under what circumstances an appeal would lie under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and since all these decisions are fully binding on us, I propose to consider the said decisions to decide the question of maintainability of this appeal in its present form, namely under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The following decisions of the supreme Court were referred to and relied on : ( 19 ) BARADAKANTA vs. Mishra C. J. , Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 2255 ; D. N. Taneja vs. Bajan Lal, 1988 (3) SCC 26 ; State of Maharashtra vs. Mahoob S. Allibhoi and Anr. , 1996 (4) SCC 411 ; J. S. Parihar vs. Ganpat Dugger and Ors. , 1996 (6) SCC 291 ; Vanita M. Khanolkar vs. Pragna M. Pai, AIR 1998 SC 424 ; sarada Devi vs. State of Bihar, 2002 (3) SCC 705 ; Dulal Chandra vs. Sukumar banerjee and Ors. , AIR 1958 Cal 474 and an unreported decision of In Re: A. S. T. No. 1347/04 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. , AIR 1958 Cal 474 and an unreported decision of In Re: A. S. T. No. 1347/04 of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. ( 20 ) IN the case of Baradakanta (supra) the Supreme Court, in short, was dealing with a case where the allegation was made by the appellant Baradakanta against the Chief Justice and other Judges of the High Court concerned, who decided the disciplinary inquiry against the appellant, Baradakanta, were guilty of criminal contempt of their own High Court in their personal capacities. The motion of the appellant was heard by a Special Bench of three-Judges and the said Special Bench was in the opinion that there was no Contempt of Court committed by the Chief Justice and other Judges and since, in any event, the appellant did not obtain the consent of the Advocate General concerned before initiating the proceeding in the contempt jurisdiction against the Chief Justice and the other Judges of the High Court, the said Special Bench declined to take any action on the motion of the appellant. ( 21 ) THE appellant Baradakanta moved the Supreme Court under the provisions of section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act. In the said appeal before the Supreme Court a preliminary objection was taken by the learned additional Solicitor General on behalf of the alleged contemners that no appeal lay under section 19 (1) against the refusal of the High Court to take action on the motion made by the appellant. ( 22 ) IT was further argued in that case that it was only when the High Court suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General took action and initiated proceeding for contempt against the alleged contemner and on arriving at a finding of guilt, punished him for contempt, only then the alleged contemner had a right of appeal under section 19 sub-section (1) of the Contempt of Courts act. Even if a proceeding for contempt was initiated, it was argued, against the alleged contemner but the alleged contemner was found not guilty and was exonerated, there was no right of appeal. Even if a proceeding for contempt was initiated, it was argued, against the alleged contemner but the alleged contemner was found not guilty and was exonerated, there was no right of appeal. The appeal on that principle also could not be preferred by the Advocate General concerned nor the person who had with the consent in writing of the Advocate General moved the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction. ( 23 ) THE Supreme Court, however, made it clear in the above decision that the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. The Supreme Court, however, said that where the Court rejected the motion or a reference and declined to initiate a proceeding for contempt it refused to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and as such the same could not be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and on that basis such decision would not be covered or would not fall within the ambit of section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act and would, therefore, not be appealable under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 19. The only remedy in such a situation was that a person or the Advocate general who was aggrieved by the said decision could always approach the supreme Court by a petition for special leave to appeal and the power of the supreme Court to interfere with such order under Article 136 was unfettered though the person or the Advocate General as the case might be as of right could not prefer any appeal under section 19 (1) of the 1971 Act. ( 24 ) ACCORDING to the Supreme Court when the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt what it does is it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and as such, such decision could not be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and, therefore, section 19 sub-section (1) cannot be availed of for preferring the appeal against such decision. ( 25 ) SUPREME Court, however, made one position clear in the Bardakanta's case (supra) that in the facts of the case before it, it was unnecessary to consider whether an appeal under section 19 (1) was confined only to a case where the high Court after initiating a proceeding for contempt found the alleged contemner guilty and punished him for contempt or it would extend also to a case where after initiating a proceeding for contempt, the High Court found that the alleged contemner was not guilty of contempt and exonerated him or even if he was found guilty of contempt, declined to punish him, whether in such a situation an alleged contemner being aggrieved by such order could prefer appeal as of right against such decision under section 19 sub-section (1)of the Act also. So, since the above questions did not arise in the case of baradakanta it was not necessary for the Supreme Court to express any opinion on such questions. ( 26 ) THEREFORE, the decision in Baradakanta's case (supra) cannot be regarded as an authority, in my opinion, for the proposition that unless and until punishment is imposed upon the alleged contemner by the High Court concerned in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt no appeal would lie against the order under section 19 (1) of the said Act even though the High Court holds the alleged contemner guilty of contempt. But what is striking in Baradakanta's case (supra) is that though the Supreme Court did not express any opinion that unless punishment was, in fact, imposed no appeal would lie under sub-section (1) of section 19 but yet it did not also say that where the High Court found the alleged contemner guilty of Court but did not impose punishment or declined to impose punishment such an order was appealable under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the said 1971 Act. ( 27 ) IN the case of D. N. Taneja (supra) where the High Court concerned dismissed a contempt application in exercise of its jurisdiction under the contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Supreme Court held that an order by which the High Court dismissed the application for contempt did not amount to exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt within the meaning of section 19 (1) of the said Act and, therefore, the appeal was not maintainable. The Supreme Court again pointed out that the only remedy in such a situation was an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme court found in Taneja's case that the learned Single Judge of the High Court concerned considered the contempt application on merits and thereafter took the view that it wa. s not a fit case on which Court should exercise its jurisdiction under the said 1971 Act and as such the High Court dismissed the application and discharged the rule nisi. The Supreme Court also found that if the allegations made in the contempt application were proved it would amount to a criminal contempt as defined in section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The supreme Court after setting out the provisions of section 19 of the said Act observed that the right of appeal under that section namely, sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act would be available only against any decision or order of a high Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Supreme Court also referred to Article 215 of the Constitution of India as the said Article confers on the High Court the power to punish for contempt of itself. The High Court as observed by the Supreme Court derives its jurisdiction to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution and the Supreme court also accepted the submission advanced on behalf of the respondent in taneja's case that the High Court exercises its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution when it imposes punishment for contempt and when the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. "the jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish when no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution". (See para 8' at page 30' of the report ). "the jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish when no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution". (See para 8' at page 30' of the report ). ( 28 ) WHILE considering the decision in Taneja's case (supra) and since the said decision, in my opinion, has a direct bearing on the question of maintainability of the present appeal as raised on behalf of the respondent herein, I am tempted to quote the following observations of the Supreme Court in Taneja's case (supra) :"right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the question whether there is a right of appeal or not will have to be considered on an interpretation of the provision of the statute and not on the ground of propriety or any other consideration. In this connection, it may be noticed that there was no right of appeal under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It is for the first time that under section 19 ( 1) of the Act, a right of appeal has been provided for. A contempt is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemner. Any person who moves the machinery of the Court for contempt only brings to the notice of the court certain facts constituting Contempt of Court. After furnishing such information he may still assist the Court, but it must always be borne in mind that in a contempt proceeding there are only two parties, namely, the Court and the contemner. It may be one of the reasons which weighed with the legislature in not conferring any right of appeal on the petitioner for contempt. The aggrieved party under section 19 (1) can only be the contemner who has been punished for Contempt of Court. "[see para 12 at page 32 of the judgment 1988 (3) SCC]. It may be one of the reasons which weighed with the legislature in not conferring any right of appeal on the petitioner for contempt. The aggrieved party under section 19 (1) can only be the contemner who has been punished for Contempt of Court. "[see para 12 at page 32 of the judgment 1988 (3) SCC]. ( 29 ) ALTHOUGH the Supreme Court in Tanya's case was primarily concerned with an appeal against an order where the High Court concerned was pleased to dismiss the contempt application holding that no contempt was, in fact, committed and though the Supreme Court was concerned with a case of criminal contempt even then the decision in Taneja's case (supra), in my opinion, is an authority also for the proposition that an appeal under section 19 (1) of the said act is maintainable and maintainable only as of right by the party who has been punished for Contempt of Court and the alleged contemner can thus only be aggrieved when he has, in fact, been punished for Contempt of Court as the alleged contemner becomes a 'contemner' in law when he is, in fact, punished for Contempt of Court and not before. Therefore, once the alleged contemner is not only held guilty of Contempt of Court but is, in fact, punished therefor, he becomes the contemner and, therefore, being aggrieved by such order of punishment he, as of right can prefer or maintain an appeal under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the said Act, namely, Contempt of Courts Act and not before. ( 30 ) IN other words, it may thus be said with sufficient certainty on the basis of Taneja's case that "punishment" by the High Court in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction is the precondition for invoking the jurisdiction under section 19 (1)of the said Act for preferring or maintaining an appeal by the contemner. ( 30 ) IN other words, it may thus be said with sufficient certainty on the basis of Taneja's case that "punishment" by the High Court in exercise of its contempt jurisdiction is the precondition for invoking the jurisdiction under section 19 (1)of the said Act for preferring or maintaining an appeal by the contemner. ( 31 ) IN the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoi (supra) in dealing with an appeal against an order of the High Court where the High court after considering the merits of the contempt application directed that a complaint should be filed against the alleged contemner and the High Court refrained from taking any action against the alleged contemner under the contempt of Courts Act, the State of Maharashtra was aggrieved as by the said order or rather by the latter part of the order the High Court dropped the contempt proceeding. Therefore, the preliminary question that arose before the Supreme Court was whether in the facts and the circumstances of that case an appeal was maintainable against an order dropping the contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court, needless to mention, dismissed the appeal as the Supreme court held that no appeal would lie under the provisions of section 19 of the contempt of Courts Act where the High Court either dropped the contempt proceeding or refused to initiate contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court, however, said that a person aggrieved by such order dropping or refusing to initiate contempt proceeding by the High Court could invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court exercised by it under Article 136 of the Constitution. ( 32 ) IN considering the above case before it the Supreme Court said that unless it could be shown that by the order under appeal the High Court imposed punishment upon the alleged contemner in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt no appeal would lie against such an order and in dealing with section 19 of the said Act the Supreme Court said the followings :"on a plain reading section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for Contempt of Court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for Contempt of Court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words "any order" has to be read with the expression 'decision' used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. "any order" is not independent of the expression 'decision'. They have been put in an alternative form saying 'order' or 'decision'. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression "any order" is read independently of the decision then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding, for contempt by the high Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result". ( 33 ) IN the case of J. S. Parihar (supra) the Supreme Court found that the division Bench of the High Court concerned had already exercised its power for correcting the mistake committed by the learned Single Judge of the High court in passing his order and the said correction was made by the Division bench by treating the order of the learned Single Judge a "judgment". Since the order of the learned Single Judge was found to be corrected by the Division bench already, the Supreme Court found it was unnecessary for the State to file an appeal in the Supreme Court against the judgment of the learned Single judge. In that case the learned Single Judge of the concerned High Court found that the respondents or the alleged contemners had not wilfully disobeyed the orders of the Court but the learned Judge gave certain directions in disposing of the contempt application which the State had to follow and the State had filed the appeal against those directions given by the learned Single Judge in the contempt application filed against the State and/or the State officials. A preliminary objection was taken as to the maintainability of the appeal preferred by the State and the Division Bench of the High Court concerned held that the appeal under section 19 was not maintainable but yet an appeal would be maintainable "as a Letters Patent appeal" as the directions issued by the learned single Judge amounted to a "judgment" within the meaning of the provisions of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, set aside the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in his contempt jurisdiction. The State preferred an appeal against the order of the division Bench to the Supreme Court. ( 34 ) IN dealing with the said appeal the three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme court constituting the Bench said that an appeal would lie under section 19 of the said Act "when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the contemner has been passed. In this case, the finding was that the respondents had not wilfully disobeyed the order. So there is no order punishing the respondent for violation of the order of the High Court. Accordingly, an appeal under section 19 would not lie". ( 35 ) THE above decision in the J. S. Parihar (supra), as I venture to read the same, again made it clear that in an appeal against an order passed by the high Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt the order of imposition of punishment made by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt is a necessary precondition for maintaining and/or preferring such appeal under section 19 sub-section (1) of the said Act. And an order passed by the High Court failing short of an order of punishment for contempt would not satisfy the requirement of section or rather sub-section (1)of section 19 of the said Act and, therefore, an appeal against such order of high Court would not be maintainable under section 19 (1) of the Act. And an order passed by the High Court failing short of an order of punishment for contempt would not satisfy the requirement of section or rather sub-section (1)of section 19 of the said Act and, therefore, an appeal against such order of high Court would not be maintainable under section 19 (1) of the Act. ( 36 ) ON the above basis it was submitted or rather argued on behalf of the appellant that since by the order under appeal the learned Single Judge did not impose any punishment and since it was absolutely uncertain as to whether any such punishment would at all be imposed or inflicted on the alleged contemners and since at the same time the alleged contemners were held guilty of Contempt of Court and they were further directed to satisfy the Court that they had complied with the order and since the order of punishment depended on a future event, namely, if the contemners were unable to satisfy the Court that they had complied with the order they would run the risk of being sentenced and furthermore since the alleged contemners were given opportunity to purge the contempt before passing of the sentence, the said order reading as a whole cannot be construed to mean that the same was passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of his jurisdiction to punish for contempt as contemplated in section 19 sub-section (1)of the said Act and in any event, on the basis of the interpretations of the said section given by the Supreme Court in the above decisions. ( 37 ) BUT since the contemners were held guilty either rightly or wrongly of contempt, as the learned Single Judge used the following expressions - "i am, therefore, of the opinion that it is a fit case for taking action for contempt I hold the contemners guilty of contempt", the order under appeal should, in any event, be treated to be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters patent and, therefore, appealable under the said clause of the Letters Patent and though the said order was passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction, namely, in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt but since no punishment, in fact, was imposed and everything is so uncertain at this stage whether such punishment would at all be imposed or the alleged contemners would be exonerated even if the learned Judge maintains that the alleged contemners were or are guilty of contempt or even if the learned Judge finds the alleged contemners were in Contempt of Court but considering the situation that though the alleged contemners were guilty of contempt but subsequently the breach of the order has been closed by them and on that consideration if no punishment or punishments are imposed or made on or against the alleged contemners, the order cannot be said to be made appealable in future under section 19 (1) of the said Act, but nonetheless the same may amount to judgment and, therefore, appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and at the moment the order under appeal is, in any event, to be construed as a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, the present appeal is maintainable in its present form. ( 38 ) THERE is no provision in section 19 or elsewhere in the Contempt of courts Act, 1971 by which the applicability of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent or the Letters Patent as a whole has been excluded. ( 39 ) IN support of the above the decision in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar (supra), can be referred to and relied on. ( 39 ) IN support of the above the decision in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar (supra), can be referred to and relied on. In that case the Supreme Court in dealing with the nature and scope of the Letters Patent said in no uncertain terms that "a Letters Patent is the charter under which the High Court is established, the powers given to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin to the Constitutional powers of a High Court. Thus, when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single judge, the right to entertain the appeal would not get, excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent". ( 40 ) AS I said above that there is no exclusionary clause in the said section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, however, once the Court is satisfied that an appeal is maintainable or lies against an order passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt by the High Court, then, an appeal will only lie under the provisions of the said section and the said section alone and in that case Clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot apply because of the specific provisions of the appeal, in the statute itself. But where on a true construction of the order under appeal, it appears that such order cannot come within the ambit of the section which confers the right of appeal upon an aggrieved person, namely the alleged contemner, then, if such aggrieved person satisfies the test as required to be satisfied for treating the order to be a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, then such appeal is perfectly maintainable under the said clause and there cannot be any second opinion about it. ( 41 ) ON the basis of the above authorities of the Supreme Court one thing is rather clear that in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court in appeal exercised by the High Court under section 19 (1) of the Act it has to be shown that the order under appeal was passed in exercise of jurisdiction of the High court to punish for contempt and in so doing it has to be further shown that the order under appeal has, in fact, imposed such punishment as only such order or orders of the High Court which impose punishment, in fact, on the alleged contemners or against them in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt can come within the ambit of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the said act and not other order or orders which fall short of such requirements. ( 42 ) IN other words, an appellant preferring an appeal against an order passed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt must of necessity show that by the order under appeal a punishment has, in fact, been imposed on the alleged contemner or against him and, therefore, an appeal would lie 'as of right' only under the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the said Act alone and not under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. ( 43 ) IN support of the above, namely, the superior nature of the Letters Patent and in this case Clause 15 thereof, one more decision was referred to and relied on, namely, the decision of the Supreme Court in Vanita M. Khanolkar (supra ). Since the three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Sharda Devi (supra)made the authoratative pronouncement regarding the superior nature of the letters Patent, the other decision of the Supreme Court mentioned above need not, therefore, be specifically dealt with, the said decision of the Supreme Court also approved and acknowledged the superior nature of the Letters Patent including Clause 15 thereof and said that the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court "functions" would not get excluded unless statutory enactment concerned expressly excluded appeals under Letters Patent. ( 44 ) IN the case of Dulal Chandra (supra), the Hon'ble Chief Justice Phani chakraborty of this Court speaking on behalf of the Division Bench said in considering the case before the Division Bench that where the order of the learned Judge concerned who made the order for committal was based upon his opinion that certain acts or words of the respondent constituted violation of an order by which certain rights of the petitioner had been declared and that because such rights were still not being conceded by the alleged contemner, he should be punished, the order clearly dealt with the matter touching the merits of the controversy between the parties and, therefore, such an order was a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and was, therefore, appealable thereunder. (See para 13 at page 480 of the report ). ( 45 ) MR. Mitra, in order to substantiate his point of objection as to the maintainability of this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent firstly, referred to the sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act and said that the provisions in section 19 sub-section (1) made the position clear that an appeal would lie as of right from any order or decision of the learned Single Judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction to punish for contempt and since the order under appeal as made by the learned Judge was also in the exercise of His Lordship's jurisdiction to punish for contempt as the alleged contemners were already held guilty of contempt of Court and that the learned Judge only gave the alleged contemners time to purge the contempt committed by them and the learned Judge was only to impose actual punishment after having held them guilty for committing contempt of Court, which would be evident from the order itself, an appeal under section 19 (1) would only lie under the said section or the sub-section and not under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. ( 46 ) HE also relied on certain decisions in support of his above contention which I think need be referred to in brief for ascertaining the substance of the above point of objection on the question of maintainability of this appeal in its present form. The following decisions were referred to and relied on : ( 47 ) RANJIT Chatterjee and Anr. The following decisions were referred to and relied on : ( 47 ) RANJIT Chatterjee and Anr. vs. Rambadan Chowbay, Vol. 85 CWN 1003; ashoke Kr. Rai vs. Ashoke Arora and Anr. , Vol. 96 CWN 278; Arun Kumar Gupta and Ors. vs. Jyoti Prasanna Das Thakur and Ors. , 1996 (2) CLJ 89 (FB); Supreme court Bar Association vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1895; Delhi Development authority vs. Skipper Consultancy Co. Put. Ltd. , 1996 (4) SCC 622 ; Md. Kasem all Mondal vs. Ajoy Rande, 2000 (1) CHN 544; R. N. Dey and Ors. vs. Bhagabati pramanik and Ors, 2000 (4) SCC 400 ; Md. Idris and Anr. vs. Rustam Jahangir bapuji, AIR 1984 SC 1826 ; Shantha V. Pai vs. Vasant Builders (Madras), 1991 cr. LJ 3026. ( 48 ) IN the case of Ranjit Chatterjee, way back in the year 1981, to be precise on 23rd July, 1981, a Division Bench of this Court held after considering section 19 (1) of the Act that an appeal would lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The division Bench was hearing an appeal from an order of the learned Single judge passed in the contempt jurisdiction where after issuing a rule nisi, the learned Judge also directed the contemners to return some seized coal, machinaries and other implements for extracting coal to the respondents. In entertaining the appeal against the order in question the Division Bench observed that there was no prohibition in section 19 of the Act from preferring an appeal against an interlocutory order, as an appeal would lie as of right under the said section 19 (1) from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction To punish for contempt. ( 49 ) IN my opinion, this judgment is not of great help today as the Division bench did not have the occasion to consider the subsequent decisions of the judgments of the Supreme Court which judgments have been referred to by me above, where the Supreme Court categorically held that an appeal would lie under section 19 (1) of the Act when the Court, namely, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction punishes the contemner and when no order of punishment was made an appeal under section 19 (1) of the Act would not lie. ( 50 ) THE Supreme Court also said in the decision of Mahoob S. Allibhoi and anr. (supra) that if it were to be held that under section 19 (1) of the Act an appeal would lie even against an interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt that would lead to a ridiculous result. In other words, the Supreme court said that an appeal against an interlocutory order passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction by the High Court would not lie under section 19 (1)of the Act. ( 51 ) THE decision in Md. Idris and Anr. (supra) of the Supreme Court is, in my opinion, not relevant for our present purpose as the Court was not considering a case whether an appeal under section 19 (1) against the order in question was maintainable. In that case the learned Single Judge of the High Court concerned gave some directions to close the breach committed by the alleged contemner or contemners of the order in question and that direction or directions were made in addition to the order for punishment of the alleged contemner for violation of the order of the learned Single Judge. ( 52 ) THE decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ashoke Kr. ( 52 ) THE decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ashoke Kr. Rai (supra)is, in my opinion, also not of great help today as the said decision was not in a position to consider in December, 1991 the subsequent decisions of the Supreme court (referred to above) where the Supreme Court following D. N. Taneja's case held in no uncertain terms that when the High Court in exercise of its power to punish for contempt, imposed punishment on the alleged contemner, only then, the order imposing such punishment in exercise of such jurisdiction would, as of right, be appealable under section 19 (1) of the Act. ( 53 ) THE Division Bench in Ashoke Rai (supra) found that the Supreme Court in Baradakanta case (supra) (1974) proceeded on the basis that exercise of the high Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt "commences with the initiation of the proceeding for contempt. But the 1988 decision repudiates the same in effect by holding that so long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt and the High Court can exercise such jurisdiction only by punishing for contempt". "the Division Bench again observed in para 24 at page 297 of the report in Ashoke Rai," if we were to follow the decision in Taneja, we are required to dismiss the present application under section 19 of the Act in limine. simply because the impugned order is not an order imposing punishment for contempt and therefore, cannot be said to have been passed in exercise of the high Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt. On the other hand, if we were to follow 1974 decision in Baradakanta's case, we must then find that the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt had already commenced with the initiation of the proceeding for contempt and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Following the 1974 decision in Baradakanta's case, once we find, as we must, that the present application is not liable to be dismissed in limine for it not being an order of punishment for contempt". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Following the 1974 decision in Baradakanta's case, once we find, as we must, that the present application is not liable to be dismissed in limine for it not being an order of punishment for contempt". ( 54 ) SINCE I have dealt with the decision in the Baradakanta, 1974 (supra), I do not think it unnecessary to refer to the same once again for the purpose of appreciation of the decision of the Division Bench in Ashoke Rai. But I have little or no hesitation to say that if the case of Ashoke Kr. Rai (supra) were to be decided in the light of the above Supreme Court decisions today, then, it could safely be said that the order of the learned Single Judge with which the Division bench was dealing with would be held to be not appealable under section 19 (1)of the Act, needless to mention in view of the above Supreme Court decisions, but the same would definitely be held to be appealable under Clause 15 of the letters Patent. ( 55 ) THEN comes the decision of the Full Bench (or should it more appropriately be called a Special Bench) in Arun Kr. Gupta's case (supra), much emphasis was led on this decision on behalf of the respondent that the decision in the so-called full Bench in Arun Kr. Gupta conclusively decided the question before us that the appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was not maintainable against the order in question and only an appeal could possibly be maintained under section 19 (1) of the Act. As far as I am concerned, I find the same difficulty in dealing with the decision of the so-called Full Bench in Arun Gupta's case as the judgment of the Full Bench was delivered on 23"1 February, 1996 whereas the judgments of the Supreme Court (referred to hereinabove) were all subsequent judgments and since those were the subsequent judgments, naturally, therefore, the Full Bench had no occasion to consider the views and the decisions of the Supreme Court in those cases after D. N. Taneja's case (supra ). In that view of the matter even the decision of the Full Bench in Arun guptas case (supra) really cannot held to be a decisive authority on the point with which we are concerned herein and cannot, therefore, be followed by us. ( 56 ) THE order in question before the Full Bench was an order of a learned single Judge of this Court whereby the contempt application was disposed of on merits after affidavits were exchanged by the parties and it was held that the contemners were guilty of contempt but instead of imposing any punishment by way of fine or imprisonment the learned Judge directed that the order passed by His Lordship should be complied with "forthwith". The Full Bench in holding that such an order was appealable under section 19 (1) of the Act proceeded, in my opinion, on the basis of the plain reading of the words used in sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act and also relied on the provisions of section 19 (2a) of the Act. ( 57 ) IF, however, a contempt petition is disposed of even by holding the contemners guilty but instead of imposing punishment on the alleged contemners if the Court directs that the alleged contemners must comply with the order in question in order to purge themselves of Contempt of Court, that by any stretch of imagination cannot be regarded as a punishment, as what punishment or punishments can be imposed by Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt are provided in section 12 of the said Act and the legislature has not regarded a direction passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt by the High Court to comply with the order in question upon the alleged contemner or contemners in a given case as an order imposing punishment in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt. ( 58 ) ALTHOUGH the above Full Bench recognized that in the case of D. N. Taneja (supra), the Supreme Court unequivocally recorded that when the High court did not impose any punishment on the alleged contemner it did not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the Full Bench further observed that when the court acquitted the contemner it did not exercise the jurisdiction for contempt and as such appeal under section 19 (1) of the Act would not be maintainable. But even thereafter, it appears, that since the Full Bench was concerned with a case of civil contempt "the ratio propounded by the Supreme Court in D. N. Taneja" was not attracted in the case before the Full Bench. With greatest of respect, section 19 (1) of the Act does not, however, make any distinction between a criminal contempt and a civil contempt nor the Supreme Court in the said decision of Taneja, in my opinion, intended to make any distinction between a case of criminal contempt and a case of civil contempt so far as, the question of appealability of an order passed by the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt under section 19 (1) of the Act was concerned. ( 59 ) THE legislature, needless to mention, did not make any such distinction in section 19 (1) of the Act. The subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove also did not make any distinction between a criminal contempt and a civil contempt so far the appealability of an order passed by the high Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt was concerned. The Full Bench, as said above, was not in a position to consider the subsequent supreme Court decisions on the point as the Full Bench decision was rendered before the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the question of appealability of an order under section 19 (1) of the Act. The Full Bench, as said above, was not in a position to consider the subsequent supreme Court decisions on the point as the Full Bench decision was rendered before the above pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the question of appealability of an order under section 19 (1) of the Act. ( 60 ) BEFORE I part with the said Full Bench decision I must say that in view of the subsequent Supreme Court decisions and also the decision in the case of D. N. Taneja which decisions were rendered by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of D. N. Taneja and in the case of J. S. Parihar (supra) and also the Division Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in mahaboob S. Allibhoi (supra), this Division Bench of ours is bound by those decisions of the Supreme Court though otherwise we would have been bound by the above Full Bench decision in Arun Gupta. ( 61 ) SINCE the decision of the Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar association (supra) was not concerned with the question as to what order or orders would be appealable under section 19 (1) of the Act with which we are presently concerned herein, the said decision, in my opinion, need not be dealt with. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court in that decision dealt with the nature and types of punishment that could be imposed upon the alleged contemner by a Court an exercise of its contempt jurisdiction. (See paragraphs 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 at pages 1905 and 1906 of the report ). ( 62 ) THE decision in Md. Kasem Ali Mondal (supra) of the Division Bench of this Court where the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove were also referred to, namely, the decisions in Baradakanta, D. N. Taneja, J. S. Parihar and the decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Mahaboob S. Allibhoi, yet it does not appear that the Division Bench dealt with the observations of the Supreme Court in those decisions where the Supreme Court on each occasion made it clear that unless punishment was imposed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt the order would not be appealable under section 19 (1) of the Act. The Division Bench observed that some of the high Courts had held that no appeal was maintainable unless the contemner had been punished and then the Division Bench observed that "with greatest of respect to the learned Judges we are of the opinion that such an extreme view is not comprehended, some of the said decisions have also been rendered in different facts situations". (See paragraph 22 at page 552 of the report ). ( 63 ) WITH the greatest of respect to the decision of the Division Bench in Md. Kasem Ali Mondal (supra), since in my opinion, the views of the Supreme Court in the cases I have referred to above are very clear, I think it would be improper on my part or rather on our part to assume that the Supreme Court meant that appeal would be maintainable under section 19 (1) when the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt did not, in fact, impose or inflict any punishment on the alleged contemner. ( 64 ) IN my opinion, from the said decisions of the Supreme Court it is clear that so lang as alleged contemner is not punished by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, he cannot be regarded as a "contemner" and so long he is not a contemner, because no punishment has been imposed on him, he cannot prefer an appeal under section 19 (1) of Act "as of right", as such right does not accrue in his favour or he cannot avail of such "right" until and unless he is punished by the "court" for committing Contempt of Court. But he can still be aggrieved by an order passed by the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction and if he is he can invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the High court exercised by it under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provided, as aforesaid, he satisfies the condition prescribed in the said clause. ( 65 ) IN any event, in the present case from the order under appeal none knows whether punishment would at all be imposed or not and from the order itself it appears that everything has remained extremely tentative so far except the observation of the learned Judge when the learned Judge said in the order "i hold the contemners guilty of contempt". ( 66 ) THE Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Shanta V. Pai (supra)was dealing with a case where the Trial Court refused to commit the contemner for alleged Contempt of Court. The Division Bench found that no appeal lay as of right against such an order under section 19 (1) of the Act. While dealing with the question of appealability, Dr. A. S. Anand, Chief Justice, (as His lordship then was) speaking on behalf of the Division Bench also made it clear that an order refusing to commit the contemner for the alleged contempt by the "trial Court" did not determine any right of the applicant nor imposed any liability on him and as such the same could not be said to be a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. But the following observations of the Division Bench in the said judgment, in my opinion, are extremely important and relevant for our present purpose. The Division Bench said "we accordingly hold that except to the extent of the field occupied by section 19 (1) of the Act, an appeal would be competent under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provided, it satisfies the condition prescribed in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent itself. The Division Bench also recognized that the Letters Patent did not define 'as to what a judgment is'". ( 67 ) BUT, however, after considering the judicial pronouncements on the subject the Division Bench said that the expression 'judgment' in Clause 15"has to be given rather liberal construction and that an order of a Single Judge will amount to a judgment if that order finally determines some claim or right of the aggrieved party, irrespective of the fact whether the said order is made in the main cause or suit or in the proceedings extended or ancillary thereto. " an order would still be a 'judgment' "if it determines some vital rights of the parties in regard to the matter in controversy and decides some bone of contention as between the parties. " ( 68 ) I have no hesitation to observe, having considered the judgment of the division Bench in Shanti V. Pai (supra), that the decision, in fact, helps the case sought to be made out by the appellant herein including the maintainability of the present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. " ( 68 ) I have no hesitation to observe, having considered the judgment of the division Bench in Shanti V. Pai (supra), that the decision, in fact, helps the case sought to be made out by the appellant herein including the maintainability of the present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. (See paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20 at pages 3031, 3032, 3033, 3034 and 3035 of the report ). ( 69 ) LAST but not the least the decision of the Supreme Court in R. N. Dey and ors. (supra) was also relied on behalf of the respondent. The most interesting point that has to be mentioned before considering the said decision is that the supreme Court in that case did not have the occasion to consider the decisions of the Supreme Court (referred to hereinabove) on the question of the appealability of the order of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. ( 70 ) FROM a plain reading of the judgment it appears that Supreme Court also proceeded on the basis of the plain reading of the said section 19 (1) of the act. The Supreme Court in that case was considering an order wherein the high Court concerned did not discharge the rule issued in the contempt application and at the same time directed the appellant to deposit the "payment" with the Registrar. It was held by the Supreme Court that contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all since an unconditional apology was tendered and on that basis further proceedings ought to have been dropped. ( 71 ) SINCE the Supreme Court in the above decision did not have the occasion to consider the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court (referred to above)whereby the Supreme Court said that unless punishment was imposed by the high Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt such an order would not be appealable under section 19 (1) of the Act, the above decision of the Supreme Court cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that even when the High Court in exercise of its power to punish for contempt does not impose any punishment but pass some other order as was passed in the instant case that could also come within section 19 (1) of the Act. The Supreme court also found that the applicant in that case was trying to execute a "decree" by invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 72 ) SINCE the decree holder, namely, the applicant had other remedies under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to execute the decree, the Supreme court found the invocation of contempt jurisdiction of the High Court for the purpose of executing the decree was wholly unnecessary. But the following observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 13 of the report at page 405 thereof made the position clear when the Supreme Court said "in the present proceeding the question whether appeal under section 19 is maintainable or not is not required to be decided finally as, in our view, facts of this case are grossly inadequate and contempt proceedings were not required to be initiated at all. In any case, the unconditional apology tendered could have been accepted and further proceedings dropped and the rule ought to have been discharged. " ( 73 ) ON the basis of the above observation it can safely be said that the above decision of the Supreme Court is not an authority for the proposition that even in a case where the High Court does not impose any punishment but passes some other order or orders that can also come within the ambit of section 19 (1)of the Act. ( 74 ) HOWEVER, the Supreme Court, in the above case was fully entitled to interfere with the order before it, if not under section 19 (1) of the Act, but under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Supreme Court thought it was not necessary in that case to decide the question of appealability under section 19 (1) of the Act in the first place. ( 75 ) IN my opinion the decision in Shanta V. Pai' s case (supra), the Division bench of Madras High Court on the other hand makes the position absolutely clear, it says that except to the extent of the field occupied by section 19 (1) of the Act an appeal would be competent under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provided it satisfies the condition prescribed in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent itself. In view of the above decisions of the Supreme Court it can and should, I think, also be said that the field occupied by section 19 (1) of the Act is very limited. ( 76 ) THE unreported decision in "a. S. T. 1346 of 2004" of the Division Bench of this Court where my noble and learned brother Justice D. K. Seth, spoke on behalf of the Division Bench in entertaining the appeal under Clause 15 of the letters Patent, though passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt under the Act and though by the said order under appeal the Court having found the alleged contemner guilty of contumacious conduct directed him to appear in Court on a fixed date to impose punishment on him, need not be specifically dealt with by me since the same has be'en dealt with by my learned brother Justice Seth himself in His Lordship's judgment. ( 77 ) FOR these reasons, as well as the reasons given by His Lordship Justice seth in His Lordship's judgment on the question of maintainability of this appeal of the order under appeal, that an appeal at this stage under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 cannot lie against the said order and this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is, therefore, perfectly maintainable as the said order, in my opinion, is a "judgment" within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appeal should, thus, be set down for hearing on merits immediately. Appeal maintainable and be heard on merits.