Judgment :- D. Murugesan, J. 1. The parties are referred to as per the cause title in O.A. No.315/2004. The averments in brief that led to the present reference are as follows: The first respondent viz., The State Bank of Hyderabad, Indira Nagar Branch, Madras had filed C.S. No.993/1993 before this Court for a judgment and decree against the defendants 1 to 13 therein including the 2nd and 3rd respondents herein jointly and severally to pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs.2,95,05,577/- together with interest at the rate of 24.05% p.a. from the date of plaint, till the date of realisation and other reliefs. The Suit was filed on the ground that the first respondent sanctioned over draft facility to a limit of Rs.200 lakhs to the defendants 1 to 4 for construction of residential flats at Virugambakkam, Madras. The terms of sanctions were subject to various conditions specified therein denoting disbursement of loan in various stages, inter alia , the loan was to be secured by collateral security by various equitable mortages including the equitable mortgage of landed property bearing S.F. No.218 situate at Virugambakkam, Madras measuring 83394 sq.ft. belonging to Mrs. Deepa Udayakumar, Miss Priya Dharshini (the petitioners), A.S. Balachandar and Smt. Kavitha Ravichandran. The 2nd respondent executed an on demand promissory note promising to pay the defendants. 2 to 8 or order at the State Bank of Hyderabad for the value received with interest. It was also alleged in the plaint that on the same day, all the defendants 1 to 8 therein endorsed on the reverse of the promissory note for payment to State Bank of Hyderabad. It was further alleged in the plaint that the defendants 9 to 13 executed a equitable mortgage through their power of attorney by name Mr. A. Muthuvelu, the 3rd respondent herein in respect of the properties mentioned in the schedule as security. It was also alleged in the plaint that after availing of the said over draft facility, as the defendants therein were very irregular in repayment, they were compelled to file the Suit for recovery of Rs.2,95,05,577/- together with interest at the rate of 24.05% p.a. from the date of plaint, till the date of realisation and other reliefs. 2. The said Suit was decreed on 10.8.1994 on the basis of a compromise memo. 2. The said Suit was decreed on 10.8.1994 on the basis of a compromise memo. Based on the said decree and in view of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) came into force on 24.8.1993 and the Debt Recovery Tribunal-I was constituted at Madras on 31.10.1996. The plaintiff filed Application in O.A. No.159/1998 before the Tribunal for issue of recovery certificate showing the appellants as respondents. A recovery certificate was also issued in respect of the schedule mentioned properties in the Suit including the property said to belong to the petitioners herein. Pursuant to the recovery certificate, possession of the property was taken, auction was conducted and the same was confirmed in favour of the 4th respondent, M/s Sabari Foundations. As the petitioners came to know about this, approached this Court by filing Suit in C.S. No.318/2004 for the following relief: (a) for a declaration that the judgment and decree passed in C.S. No.993/1993 dated 10.8.1994 based on the compromise memo is illegal, invalid and non-est in law and not binding on the plaintiffs in respect of their right, title and interest in the Suit property; (b) for a declaration that the Recovery Certificate issued in O.A. No.159/1998 by the Debt Recovery Officer II, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chennai dated 24.4.2000 and consequential sale proceedings in respect of the Suit property are illegal, invalid and non-est; (c) for a declaration that there is no valid equitable mortgage in favour of the first defendant in respect of Suit A Schedule binding the plaintiff and affecting their rights. (d) for a mandatory injunction directing the bank to deliver all the title deeds pertaining to the A schedule property to the plaintiffs: 3. The said Suit was filed on the ground that the first respondent Bank in active collusion with the 3rd respondent viz ., Mr. A. Muthuvelu, had maneuvered to create equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds without getting the word or consent from the petitioners/plaintiffs who are the real owners. The Suit was also filed on the ground that the 3rd respondent was given a limited power and on the strength of the said power of attorney, he cannot represent the petitioners on their behalf so as to bind them in any kind of transaction. The Suit was also filed on the ground that the 3rd respondent was given a limited power and on the strength of the said power of attorney, he cannot represent the petitioners on their behalf so as to bind them in any kind of transaction. It was also alleged in the plaint that there cannot be any valid charge or mortgage over the properties belonging to the plaintiffs for the loan or amounts advanced to the respondents 1 and 2. The petitioners also filed Applications in O.A. Nos.315 and 316/2004 for the grant of an order of interim injunction restraining the respondents herein from alienating or dealing with the Suit property, more fully described in the schedule. This Court had granted interim injunction as per order dated 7.4.2004. By a further order dated 26.4.2004 this Court protected the possession of the 4th respondent, M/s Sabari Foundations subject to the condition that the 4th respondent shall not exploit the property handed over to him in any manner until further orders. 4. The first respondent-State Bank of Hyderabad, Indira Nagar Branch, Chennai has also filed O.A. No.30 62/20 04 seeking the prayer, for dismissal of the Suit by rejecting the plaint. 5. A learned Single Judge of this Court has passed the following order on 26.4.2004. “For all matters provided for under Section 17 of the Act, the Tribunal alone has jurisdiction and to that extent, the jurisdiction of other Courts stands ousted under Section 10 of the Act. The power of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India under Articles 226 and 227 alone is protected. When a cause of action is based on a debt due to the bank and financial institutions, under the Act, as already stated, the Tribunal, alone has the jurisdiction. The question is, whether the relief of declaration prayed for in this case to dec lare the earlier decree as null and void is an issue, which comes within the purview of Section 17 of the Act. The earlier decree is attacked on several grounds namely, the plaintiffs, in the present Suit are not parties to the decree and that they are not debtors to the plaintiff. As stated by Mr. The earlier decree is attacked on several grounds namely, the plaintiffs, in the present Suit are not parties to the decree and that they are not debtors to the plaintiff. As stated by Mr. Sriram Panchu, learned Senior Counsel whether there exists a debt or not, is definitely an issue covered under Section 17 of the Act and therefore, this Court cannot go into that question in the Suit as filmed. But however, the declaratory relief prayed for on the ground that the plaintiffs in the present Suit are not parties to the earlier Suit and the decree, would not be a matter covered under Section 17 of the Act. The declaratory relief, on the validity of the decree, is also on the basis that the power of attorney, who is stated to have made an endorsement in the memo of compromise binding the present plaintiffs, was not holding any power with him to do so . Therefore, whether the earlier decree passed by this Court is valid or not on the two grounds referred to above , would not be a claim by a bank or other financial institutions on a debt within the meaning of the word “debt” defined in the Act. The above grounds raised, in attacking the earlier decree, appear to have escaped the attention of the learned trial Judge while the learned Judge held that Section 18 creates a bar on this Court to entertain a Suit of this nature.” 6. In view of the above conclusions, the learned Judge referred the following question for reference: “Would a declaratory Suit before a Civil Court to declare an earlier decree as invalid on the ground that the parties seeking the relief were not parties to the earlier Suit and that their alleged representation in the memo of compromise by a power agent, who held no power at all, would be hit by Section 18 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.” 7. The reference arose in view of the fact that in respect of some other properties covered under the decree in C.S. No. 993/93, a Suit in O.S. No. 599/2003 was filed on the same ground for declaration that the said decree was illegal and invalid. Along with the Suit, Application Nos.704, 705 and 3597 of 2003 were also filed. The reference arose in view of the fact that in respect of some other properties covered under the decree in C.S. No. 993/93, a Suit in O.S. No. 599/2003 was filed on the same ground for declaration that the said decree was illegal and invalid. Along with the Suit, Application Nos.704, 705 and 3597 of 2003 were also filed. While disposing of those Applications, the learned Judge by placing reliance on Section 18 of the Act held that this Court would have no jurisdiction to try the issue raised in those Applications after the Act had come into force. 8. For answering the reference, we must necessarily dwell upon as to the purpose for which the Act was enacted. As per the statement of objects and reasons, the procedures that were in existence prior to the introduction of the Act for recovery of debts due to Ranks and Financial Institutions, had blocked a significant portion of their funds in unproductive assets and the value of which deteriorated in passage of time. As it was felt that to work out a suitable mechanism through which the dues to the banks and financial institutions could be realised without delay, the Act was enacted to provide for establishment of Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The said Act came into force on 24.6.1993 and provisions were not made applicable whore the amount of debt due to any bank or financial institution or to a consortium of banks or financial institutions is less than ten lakh rupees or such other amount being not less than one lakh rupees as the Central Government may by notification specify. As a necessary corrolary the provisions of the Act shall apply in respect of recovery where the amount of debt due is more than ten lakhs or such other amount more than rupees one lakh as specified by the Central Government by notification. As a necessary corrolary the provisions of the Act shall apply in respect of recovery where the amount of debt due is more than ten lakhs or such other amount more than rupees one lakh as specified by the Central Government by notification. Section 2(g) of the Act defines the debt thus: “debt’’ means any liability (inclusive of interest) which is claimed as due from any person by a bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions during the course of any business activity undertaken by the bank or the financial institution or the consortium under any law for the time being in force, in cash or otherwise, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any Civil Court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on, and legally recoverable on, the date of the Application.” 9. Chapter II deals with Establishment of Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal: In terms of Section 3 the Central Government shall by notification, establish one or more Tribunals to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such tribunal or under the Act. The Central Government shall also specify in the notification, the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the Applications filed before it. In terms of Section 8, the Central Government shall, by notification, establish one or more Appellate Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such tribunal by or under the Act. The Central Government shall also specify in the notification in relation to which the Appellate Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction. In terms of Section 2(c) “appointed day” in relation to a Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal, means the date on which such Tribunal is established under sub-section (1) of Section 3 or as the case may be, subsection (1) of Section 8. The Debt Recovery Tribunal-I was established in Chennai on 31.10.1996. Hence, the “appointed day” in relation to a Tribunal means the date on which the Tribunal was established and not the date on which the Act came into force. The judgment and decree in question was undo in C.S . No.993/1993 on 10.8.1994. 10. Chapter III deals with jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals. Hence, the “appointed day” in relation to a Tribunal means the date on which the Tribunal was established and not the date on which the Act came into force. The judgment and decree in question was undo in C.S . No.993/1993 on 10.8.1994. 10. Chapter III deals with jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals. In terms of sub-section (1) of Section 17, a Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide Applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. In terms of sub-section (2) of Section 17, an Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain Appeals against any order make or deemed to have been made by a Tribunal under the Act. Section 18 bars the jurisdiction of the Court or other authority. It contemplates that on and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court and a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution) in relation to matters specified in Section 17. 11. Chapter IV deals with procedure of Tribunals. In terms of Section 19 where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person it may make an Application to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. On receipt of Application and after affording opportunity to the defendants to file written statement, pass final orders by issuing certificate under sub-section 9 of Section 19. The Tribunal is empowered to make interim orders of injunction, stay or attachment as the case may be in terms of sub-section 12 of Section 17. The Tribunal may also direct conditional attachment of the property. In terms of sub-section 22 of Section 19, the Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate on the basis of the order of the Tribunal to the recovery officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate. 12. The Tribunal may also direct conditional attachment of the property. In terms of sub-section 22 of Section 19, the Presiding Officer shall issue a certificate on the basis of the order of the Tribunal to the recovery officer for recovery of the amount of debt specified in the certificate. 12. To avoid long drawn procedures, Section 22 contemplates that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and subject to the other provisions of the Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have the powers to regulate their own procedure for disposal of matters. 13. Chapter V deals with recovery of debt determined by the Tribunal, in terms of Section 25, the Recovery Officer shall on receipt of the copy of the certificate under sub-section (7) of Section 19, proceed to recover the amount or debt specified in the certificate by attachment and sale of movable or immovable property of the defendant, arrest of the defendant and his detention in prison and appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the defendant. 14. Section 31-A in Chapter VI relates to the power of Tribunal to issue certificate of recovery in case of decree or order. The said Section reads thus: (1) where a decree or order was passed by any Court before the commencement of the Recovery of Debts to Banks and Financial Institutions (Amendment) Act, 2000 and has not yet been executed, then, the decree-holder may apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of the amount. (2) On receipt of an A pplication under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may issue a certificate for recovery to a Recovery Officer. (3) On receipt of a certificate under sub-section (2) the Recovery Officer shall proceed to recover the amount as if it was a certificate in respect of a debt recoverable under this Act. 15. (2) On receipt of an A pplication under sub-section (1), the Tribunal may issue a certificate for recovery to a Recovery Officer. (3) On receipt of a certificate under sub-section (2) the Recovery Officer shall proceed to recover the amount as if it was a certificate in respect of a debt recoverable under this Act. 15. A combined reading of the above provisions shows that in the matter of claim of debt by bank or a financial institution or by a consortium of banks or financial institutions from any person, the Tribunal shall be established in terms of Section 3 of the Act and the Appellate Tribunal shall be established in terms of Section 8 of the Act. The Bank or financial institutions or by consortium of banks or financial institutions as the case may be, may make an Application before the Tribunal under Section 19 in respect of a debt from any person, whether secured or unsecured, or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any Civil Court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on and legally recoverable on the date of the Application. On receipt of the Application, the Tribunal, is empowered to pass interim orders, conditional attachment order and pass final orders on the Application as well to give directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. As the object of the Act is only ensure speedy recovery as the existing procedures for recovery of debts duo to the banks or financial institutions had blocked a significant portion of their funds in unproductive assets it was intended for implementation of the same by simplifying the procedures as could be seen from Section 22 of the Act. The enquiry under Section 19 has all trappings of judicial proceedings. The Tribunal has also the powers of every Courts and infact could also adopt its own procedure for disposal of disputes. Such power includes the power to fix the liability of person or persons and to decide as to from whom the debt is to be recovered. The legislation is comprehensive enough to deal with the liability of any person to the bank or financial institutions as the case may be. 16. Such power includes the power to fix the liability of person or persons and to decide as to from whom the debt is to be recovered. The legislation is comprehensive enough to deal with the liability of any person to the bank or financial institutions as the case may be. 16. Section 31 of the Act deals with transfer of pending oases before the Court immediately before the establishment of the Tribunal. In fact Section 31-A also contemplates a provision empowering the decree holder to apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of the amount where a decree or order was passed by any Court before the commencement of the Act. 17. In Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Association, 2002 (2) CTC 106 : 2002 (4) SCC 215, the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the said Act. The Supreme Court also repelled the contention that provisions of Section 18 of the Act had eroded the independence of judiciary since the jurisdiction of Civil Court had been blocked and vested in the Tribunal and therefore has observed as follows: “The manner in which a dispute is to be adjudicated upon is decided by the procedural laws which are enacted from time to time. It is because of the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure that normally all disputes between the parties of a civil nature would be adjudicated upon by the Civil Courts. There is ho absolute right in any one to demand that his dispute is to be adjudicated upon only by a Civil Court. The decision of the Delhi High Court proceeds on the assumption that there is such a right. As we have already observed it is by reason of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that the Civil Courts had the right, prior to the enactment of the Debts Recovery Act, to decide the Suits for recovery filed by the banks and financial institutions. This forum, namely, that of a Civil Court, now stands replaced by a Banking Tribunal in respect of the debts due to the bank. This forum, namely, that of a Civil Court, now stands replaced by a Banking Tribunal in respect of the debts due to the bank. When in the Constitution Articles 323-A and 323-B contemplate establishment of a Tribunal and that does not erode the inde pendence of the judiciary, there is no reason to presume that the Banking Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals so constituted would not be independent, or that justice would be denied to the defendants or that the independence of the judiciary would stand eroded.” 18. In Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Limited v. U.P. Financial Corporation, 2003 (2) SCC 455 , while considering the jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals as contemplated under Section 17 and the Bar of jurisdiction under Section 18 , the Supreme Court has held as follows: “It is clear from Section 17 of the Act that the Tribunal is to decide the Applications of the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to them. We have already referred to the definition of “debt” in Section 2(g) as amended by Ordinance 1 of 2000. It includes “claims” by banks and financial institutions and includes the liability incurred and also liability under a decree or otherwise. In this context Section 31 of the Act is also relevant. That Section deals with transfer of pending Suits or proceedings to the Tribunal. In our view, the word “proceedings” in Section 31 includes “execution proceedings” pending before a Civil Court before the commencement of the Act. The Suits and proceedings so pending on the date of the Act stand transferred to the Tribunal and have to be disposed of “in the same manner” as Application under Section 19. 21. In our opinion, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in regard to adjudication is exclusive. The RDB Act requires the Tribunal alone to decide Applications for recovery of debts due to banks or financial institutions. Once the Tribunal passes an order that the debt is due, the Tribunal has to issue a certificate under Section 19(22) (formerly under Section 19(7) to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the debt specified in the certificate. The question arises as to the meaning of the word “recovery” in Sec tion l7 of the Act. Once the Tribunal passes an order that the debt is due, the Tribunal has to issue a certificate under Section 19(22) (formerly under Section 19(7) to the Recovery Officer for recovery of the debt specified in the certificate. The question arises as to the meaning of the word “recovery” in Sec tion l7 of the Act. It appears to us that basically the Tribunal is to adjudicate the liability of the defendant and then it has to issue a certificate under Section 19(22). Under Section 18, the jurisdiction of any other Court or authority which would otherwise have had jurisdiction but for the provisions of the Act, is ousted and the power to adjudicate upon the liability is exclusively vested in the Tribunal. (This exclusion does not however apply to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or a High Co urt exercising the power under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution). This is the effect of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act.” 19. In the above judgment, the Supreme Court has authoritatively held that under Section 18, jurisdiction of any other Court or authority which would otherwise have had jurisdiction but for the provisions of the Act is ousted and the power to adjudicate upon the liability is exclusively vested in the Tribunal. The Supreme Court has also held that such power includes the execution proceedings. 20. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, 2001 (6) SCC 569 , the Supreme Court even while considering the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India or the Civil Suit has held in para 6 as follows: “The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions There is a hierarchy of Appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an Appeal under Section 20 and this fast-track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a Civil Suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the Appeal mechanism provided by the Act.” 21. On the above settled law by the Supreme Court, the reference should be considered. The learned Judge was persuaded to refer the matter on the ground that Section 18 will not create a bar on the Court to entertain a Suit where the Suit is filed for declaration to declare the earlier decree is null and void and on the ground that there was no debt due by the petitioners/plaintiffs to the first respondent-bank. In view of the reference, the question that arises for our consideration is whether the first respondent-bank could enforce the decree against the petitioners when the petitioners were not parties to the decree and when the decree was allegedly passed on collusion between the first respondent and the 3rd respondent. In our opinion, the word “debts” defined under Section 2(g) includes any liability whether secured or unsecured or assigned, or whether payable under a decree or order of any Civil Court or any arbitration award or otherwise or under a mortgage and subsisting on and legally recoverable on the date of Application. Further, liability is state of being liable and for which some one is liable especially a financial obligation. Admittedly, there is a decree and the same could be enforced in terms of Section 31-A of the Act by issue of recovery certificate. Whether the certificate of recovery could be issued on the basis of a decree or order could also be the subject matter of the Tribunal in terms of sub-section (25) of Section 19 of the Act inasmuch as it empowers the Tribunal to make such orders giving such direction as may be necessarv or expedient to give effect to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice. In our considered view, the question as to whether the decree was obtained behind the brick of the petitioners and fraudulently by entering into compromise memo by the 3rd respondent with the first respondent as alleged by the petitioners, can also be the subject matter for adjudication before the Tribunal as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is completely ousted after the constitution of the Tribunal and the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal as the case may be, is vested with the power to entertain and decide, the issue as to the liability including interest. Equally, the issue as to whether the compromise decree binds only those persons who are parties to the same or to the petitioners as well is also a matter which could be considered by the Tribunal. The debt means only the liability and the liability of the petitioners had arisen under th e decree, which has been executed in terms of Section 31-A of the Act. As we have held that even the issue as to the liability can be the subject matter before the Tribunal, the Suit is barred under Section 18 of the Act. We answer the question for reference in the affirmative. Post the Applications for disposal accordingly. SCHEDULE-A All that piece and parcel of land measuring an extent of 47.9 cents comprised in Survey No.218, bounded on the North by — Plaintiffs land in S.No.218; South by — Land belonged to Freezing plant in S.No.211; East by — Land in S.No.216; West by — 40 ft. road, Plot No.15 Vembuli Amman Koil Street situate within the Sub Registration District of Virugambakkam and Registration District of South Madras. All that piece and parcel of land measuring an extent of 47.9 cents comprised in Survey No.218, bounded on the North by — Surey No.218 South by — Land belonged to Freezing plant in S.No.211. East by — Bangaru Colony in Survey 217 West by — Land belongs to Deepa Udayakumar situate within the Sub Registration District of Virugmbakkam and Registration District of South Madras. SCHEDULE-B All that piece and parcel of land measuring an extent of 47.9 cents comprised in Survey No.218, bounded on the North by — Plaintiffs land in S.No.218; South by — Land belonged to Freezing plant in S.No.211. East by — Land in S.No.216; West by — 40 ft. SCHEDULE-B All that piece and parcel of land measuring an extent of 47.9 cents comprised in Survey No.218, bounded on the North by — Plaintiffs land in S.No.218; South by — Land belonged to Freezing plant in S.No.211. East by — Land in S.No.216; West by — 40 ft. Road, Plot No.15 Vembuli Amman Koil Street situate within the Sub Registration District of Virugambakkam and Registration District of South Madras. SCHEDULE-C All that piece and parcel of land measuring an extent of 47.9 cents comprised in Survey No.218, bounded on the North by — Survey No.218 South by — Land belonged to Freezing plant in S.No.211. East by — Bangaru Colony in Survey 217 West by — Land belongs to Deepa Udayakumar situate within the Sub Registration District of Virugambakkam and Registration District of South Madras. Dated at Chennai this the 5th day of April 2004. sd/- ........... Counsel for Appellants.