( 1 ) DEFENDANT Nos. 1 and 3 in O. S. No. 30 of 1986 on the file of learned Subordinate Judge, Kovvur had preferred the appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 1-11-1994 in the aforesaid suit. The respondent herein, the plaintiff in the suit instituted the suit for recovery of Rs. 34,042-83 together with interest at 14% per annum on Rs. 27,184-50, being the value of the tobacco sold to the defendants by the plaintiff in the month of february, 1983. The trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence of P. W. I and d. W. 1 and Exs. A. l and A. 2 and Ex. B. 1, ultimately decreed the suit as against the 1st defendant - company and 3rd defendant personally for Rs. 30,042-83 Ps. with subsequent interest at the rate of 14% per annum on the principal amount of Rs. 27,184-50 Ps. from the date of suit till the date of realization and the suit against the 2nd defendant was dismissed without costs. Hence this appeal. ( 2 ) SRI P. Radha Krishna, learned counsel representing the appellants-defendant nos. 1 and 3 - would contend that the 1st defendant is a company and the 3rd defendant is the Managing Director of the said Company. The defence is one of discharge. Learned Counsel also would submit that in the light of evidence of d. W. 1 and also Ex. B. 1, receipt, the stand taken by the appellants-defendant Nos. 1 and 3 - should have been accepted by the trial Court and the suit should have been dismissed in toto. Learned Counsel would also submit that it is no doubt true that when the element of fraud is there, there can be lifting of corporate veil for fastening the liability. But without deciding the said question, the 3rd defendant was also personally made liable and hence the said finding cannot be sustained. Learned Counsel would also submit that initially the 3rd defendant was not impleaded as a party; and by the order dated 26-7-1989 in LA. But without deciding the said question, the 3rd defendant was also personally made liable and hence the said finding cannot be sustained. Learned Counsel would also submit that initially the 3rd defendant was not impleaded as a party; and by the order dated 26-7-1989 in LA. No. 915 of 1989, the 3rd defendant was impleaded as a party and there is no specific order while allowing the application, the suit is deemed to have been instituted even as against the 3rd defendant within the period of limitation and in the absence of the said order, the limitation is not saved; and even on the ground of limitation, the suit as against the 3rd defendant may have to fail. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel representing the respondent-plaintiff had taken this Court through the findings recorded by the trial court and would maintain that it is a case where the 3rd defendant played fraud and who had made to initiate action for recovery of amount in relation thereto and hence the trial Court had recorded correct findings relating to the involvement of element of fraud and lifting of corporate veil and ultimately decreed the suit. ( 4 ) HENCE both the Counsel and perused the oral and documentary evidence available on record and the findings recorded by the trial Court. The parties hereinafter will be referred to as plaintiff and defendant Nos. l and 3. As already referred to supra, the suit was dismissed as against the 2nd defendant. ( 5 ) THE suit O. S. No. 30 of 1986 on the file of learned Subordinate Judge, Kovvur, was filed for recovery of an amount of rs. 30,042-83 Ps. It was pleaded in the plaint that the plaintiff is a tobacco grower. He sold tobacco worth Rs. 27,184-50 Ps. , to the 1st defendant in the month of february, 1983. The 1st defendant issued a voucher. The 1st defendant gave a letter authorizing the 2nd defendant to pay the said amount to the plaintiff. The 2nd defendant undertook to pay the said amount. But the 2nd defendant did not pay the amount. A notice was issued to the defendants on 22-12-1984 demanding the said amount. But there is no reply from the defendants. The 3rd defendant is the sole Proprietor of the 1st defendant. He defrauded the creditors in the name of the 1st defendant. But the 2nd defendant did not pay the amount. A notice was issued to the defendants on 22-12-1984 demanding the said amount. But there is no reply from the defendants. The 3rd defendant is the sole Proprietor of the 1st defendant. He defrauded the creditors in the name of the 1st defendant. Hence the Corporate veil has to be lifted. ( 6 ) THE 1st defendant filed a written statement stating that the amount of rs. 27,184-50 Ps. , had been paid to the plaintiff in full settlement on 27-6-1986. The 2nd defendant filed the written statement pleading that the undertaking to pay the amount is only a condition and the tobacco was not sold. ( 7 ) ON the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled: 1. Whether the plaintiff sold tobacco to the first defendant as alleged by the plaintiff? 2. Whether the suit against the second defendant is premature? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim interest? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover the suit amount? 5. To what relief? ( 8 ) SUBSEQUENT thereto, the 3rd defendant was impleaded as a party by the order dated 26-7-1989 in LA. No. 915 of 1988. The following additions issues were framed: 1. Whether the third defendant is personally liable for the suit claim? 2. Whether the discharge pleaded by the third defendant is true? ( 9 ) ON behalf of the plaintiff P. W. 1 was examined and Exs. A. l and A. 2 were marked. Ex. A. 1 is the letter addressed to the 2nd defendant and Ex. A. 2 is the office copy of the registered notice dated 22-11-1984. On behalf of the defendants d. W. I was examined and the receipt dated 27-6-1986 was marked as Ex. B. 1. ( 10 ) ON the strength of the respective pleadings of the parties and the evidence available on record, the following points arise for consideration in the present appeal. (1) Whether the findings recorded by the trial Court fastening the liability as against the 1st and 3rd defendants be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case? (2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled to? ( 11 ) POINT No. 1: The respective pleadings of the parties have already been referred to supra. (1) Whether the findings recorded by the trial Court fastening the liability as against the 1st and 3rd defendants be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the case? (2) If so, to what relief the parties would be entitled to? ( 11 ) POINT No. 1: The respective pleadings of the parties have already been referred to supra. The plea of the defendants is one of discharge through the receipt-Ex. B. 1. The suit was filed on 19-2-1986 and hence the alleged payment should have been made, if at all to be true, more than four months after filing of the suit. The 1st defendant was served with summons by registered post on 2-3-1986 and the appearance was made on 24-4-1986, but ex. B. l was not filed into Court soon after 27-6-1986, the date of alleged payment, that on 9-9-1986 the 1st defendant was called absent and set ex pane and the exparte order was set aside on 29-6-1989; that the 3rd defendant was impleaded on 26-7-1989, a subsequent date as referred to supra. The evidence of P. W. I and D. W. 1 had been appreciated in detail and on taking all the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration, Ex. B. l was disbelieved and in the light of the evidence recorded by the trial Court in relation to Ex. B. 1, the plea of discharge pleaded by the 1st defendant definitely cannot be sustained and the said findings are hereby confirmed. It is not in serious controversy if the element of fraud is established, the corporate veil can be lifted and the 3rd defendant also can be made liable depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Reliance was placed on this regard vide Tata E. andl. Co. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 40 . However, though the 1st defendant was shown to be Kisan Tobacco Growers, represented by its Managing Director Sri v. S. S. Prakasa Rao, the said V. S. S. Prakasa Rao was not impleaded in his personal capacity while instituting the suit. Apart from decreeing the suit against the 1st defendant-Company, the suit was also decreed and the 3rd defendant was made personally liable. The 3rd defendant was impleaded as a party on 26-7-1989 in IA no. 915 of 1989. Apart from decreeing the suit against the 1st defendant-Company, the suit was also decreed and the 3rd defendant was made personally liable. The 3rd defendant was impleaded as a party on 26-7-1989 in IA no. 915 of 1989. As can be seen from the date of supply of tobacco in the year 1983 and the date when an order was made impleading the party - third defendant, it is needless to say that the suit for recovery of amount is clearly barred by limitation as against the 3rd defendant. Section 21 of the limitation Act, 1963 (Act No. 36 of 1963) dealing with the effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant reads: 21. Effect of substituting or adding new plaintiff or defendant: (1) Where after the institution of a suit, a new plaintiff or, defendant is substituted or added, the suit shall, as regards him, be deemed to have been instituted when he was so made a party: provided that where the Court is satisfied that the omission to include a new plaintiff or defendant was due to a mistake in good faith it may direct that the suit as regards such plaintiff or defendant shall be deemed to have been instituted on any earlier date. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit or where a plaintiff is made a defendant or a defendant is made a plaintiff. ( 12 ) IT is not in serious controversy that no specific order was made while allowing the application to implead the 3rd defendant to the effect that the suit is deemed to have been instituted within the period of limitation as on the date of institution of the suit itself. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of a Division bench of the Calcutta High Court in Usha beltron Ltd. v. Nand Kishore Parasramaka, air 2001 Cal. 137 (DB ). Apart from this aspect of the matter, the Apex Court in ramalingam Chettiar v. P. K. Pattabiraman, air 2001 SC 1185 , while dealing with this aspect specifically observed that no order was passed by Court under proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that impleadment of newly added party viz. 137 (DB ). Apart from this aspect of the matter, the Apex Court in ramalingam Chettiar v. P. K. Pattabiraman, air 2001 SC 1185 , while dealing with this aspect specifically observed that no order was passed by Court under proviso to Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that impleadment of newly added party viz. , state shall take effect from the date of institution of suit, that limitation begins to run from the date of impleadment of State in the suit and hence the suit on the said date stood time barred. In view of the same, it is highly doubtful whether the suit claim as against the 3rd respondent making him personally liable is within the limitation in the absence of any specific order being made in this regard while allowing the application - I. A. No. 915 of 1988. Though the other findings are confirmed, on the question of limitation, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is a matter for remand and the following issues are framed:"whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the suit as against the 3rd defendant, who was impleaded by an order dated 26-7-1989 in LA. No. 915 of 1988, can be said to be within limitation? Hence for the limited extent of deciding this issues, it would be just and proper to remand the matter to the trial Court. " ( 13 ) IN the light of the findings recorded above, though the other findings are confirmed, on the question of limitation so far as the personal liability of 3rd defendant is concerned, the matter is hereby remanded to the trial Court. The appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. Each party to bear their own costs. It is needless to say that this is an old matter, the trial Court to make an endeavour to dispose of the matter at the earliest point of time.