D. K. SETH, J, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is preferred against an order dated 23rd of May, 2003 passed by the learned Single Judge in C. R. 14596 (W) of 1984 setting aside the order of the learned Tribunal and granting permission in terms of section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for removal of the employee pursuant to a finding of guilt, unconnected with the dispute pending before the learned tribunal, with a direction for payment of subsistence allowance from the date of suspension, namely, 23rd of September, 1972, till the date preceding the date of the order of removal. Submission of the Appellant/employer: ( 2 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant points out that the approval contemplated under section 33 (2) (b) does not postulate any further action or direction on the part of the learned Tribunal except grant of approval on the action already taken. If the learned Tribunal cannot pass such order except granting of approval or refusing approval, in a writ proceeding against an order passed by the learned Tribunal, the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction and pass any other order if it approves the action. The question that subsistence allowance has not been paid has not been established and was not a ground agitated before the learned Tribunal, therefore, the same cannot be a fact to avail of any direction from the High Court. 2. 1. The learned Counsel for the appellant also draws our attention to the order of the learned Tribunal that the learned Tribunal had refused approval on two grounds, first that there was a conciliation before the Conciliation Officer in relation to another dispute in which no application under section 33 (2) (b)was made before the said Conciliation Officer and second that no order of removal was passed by the order dated 21st of May, 1973 on the ground that the order was supposed to take effect on 24th of May, 1973. On both these grounds the learned Tribunal was wrong and it was rightly held so by the learned Single judge while setting aside the order of the learned Tribunal, except however, the direction for payment of subsistence allowance and to remove the respondent from service upon payment of subsistence allowance, which means, passing of a fresh order at a future date which cannot come within the contemplation of section 33 (2) (b ). Submission of the respondent/workman : ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent/workman, on the other hand, points out that the learned Single Judge was wrong in granting approval under section 33 (2) (b) in respect of an order which is yet to take effect. According to him, no order of removal was passed on the date when the application was made and unless an order of removal is passed simultaneously with the filing of the application, the compliance of section 33 (2) (b) cannot be satisfied. Therefore, there was no application of the provision contemplated under section 33 (2) (b ). If one of the ingredients, as has been held by the Apex Court, is not satisfied in that event, the approval would be wholly unwarranted. He also contends that absence of any application under section 33 (2) (b) before the conciliation Officer is also a valid ground for refusing approval by the learned tribunal. He further contends that the removal was proposed to be effective from 24th of August, 1973 but this was pointed out to be a misprint in the paper book: the order of removal was to take effect from 24th of May, 1973 which is available from other papers on record in the paper book. According to him, since the approval is being accorded by the High Court at such a late stage, the workman is entitled to subsistence allowance till the order becomes effective. Absence of application under section 33 (2) (b) before the Conciliation officer : The effect: ( 4 ) AFTER having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, it appears from the record that after holding an enquiry in relation to a charge unconnected with the dispute, an order of removal was passed on 21st of May, 1973, effective from 24th of May, 1973. Simultaneously wages for one month was sent by money order to the workman along with which an application for approval under section 33 (2) (b) was made before the learned Tribunal. These things are available from pages 46 to 50 of the paper book. The learned Tribunal was wrong in refusing approval, despite having found prima facie that there was misconduct and there was enquiry and that prima facie there was no infirmity in the disciplinary proceedings and that an order of punishment has been passed, and that the order of removal has been passed out of a charge unconnected with the dispute pending before the learned Tribunal, on the ground that no application under section 33 (2) (b) was made before the Conciliation Officer in connection with another dispute pending before the Conciliation Officer. Inasmuch as, the learned Tribunal is concerned with an application under section 33 (2) (b) in relation to the dispute pending before it. The learned Tribunal cannot exceed its jurisdiction beyond the dispute pending before the learned Tribunal. Whether any application has been made before the Conciliation Officer is altogether a different question. A case of absence of any such application before the conciliation Officer would give rise to a cause of action to the workman to raise a dispute either under section 10 or under section 2a if the Industrial Disputes act on account of non-compliance of section 33 (2) (b) in relation to the said dispute. But that cannot form a consideration for grant or refusal of approval under section 33 (2) (b) in relation to the application made before the learned tribunal which is confined only to the dispute pending before it. Section 33 (2) (b): Scope of: Order of punishment: Prospectively: If bad: ( 5 ) SO far as the second ground on which the learned Tribunal refused approval, namely that no order of removal was passed appears to be a misconceived finding of fact. The order at page 47 of the paper book reads thus: " I have decided to impose the following punishment on you in accordance with clause 30 (2) of the certified standing orders of Durgapur Steel Plant" "removal from services of the company with effect from 24. 5. 73" (wrongly printed as 24. 8. 73.)5. 1. The order at page 47 of the paper book reads thus: " I have decided to impose the following punishment on you in accordance with clause 30 (2) of the certified standing orders of Durgapur Steel Plant" "removal from services of the company with effect from 24. 5. 73" (wrongly printed as 24. 8. 73.)5. 1. Thus it appears that there was a decision to impose punishment of removal from the service of the Company with effect from 24th of May, 1973 which clearly indicates that an order of punishment has been imposed. No punishment can be imposed retrospectively; but there is no bar in imposing, punishment prospectively. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no effective order of removal imposed on 21st of May, 1973 simply because the order of removal was supposed to take effect from 24th of May, 1973. 5. 2. Section 33 (2) (b) empowers an employer to discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, a workman on account of any misconduct unconnected with the dispute pending before the Conciliation Officer or the learned Tribunal only upon satisfying the conditions laid down in the proviso thereto. The requirements are that the workman should be paid wages for one month and an application for approval of the action taken by the employer is made before the authority where the dispute is pending. Therefore, the two things are to be complied with along with passing of the order of removal, namely, payment of wages and making of an application under section 33 (2) (b ). The three things are to coincide and as held by the Apex Court and now a settled proposition of law, it has to be transacted in the same process of transaction, may be simultaneously or one after the other but in the same process. Therefore, even if it is proposed that the order of removal should take effect prospectively even then the application and the payment is to be made simultaneously with the passing of the order. Admittedly, the order was passed on 21st of May, 1973, the money order was made on the same date and the application was also made on that very day. This is apparent from the order itself viz. : the payment and the making of the application, which are on record, were done in the same transaction. Admittedly, the order was passed on 21st of May, 1973, the money order was made on the same date and the application was also made on that very day. This is apparent from the order itself viz. : the payment and the making of the application, which are on record, were done in the same transaction. Absence of application under section 33 (2) (b) before Conciliation officer: Effect: ( 6 ) THE learned Single Judge, on facts, has found that no dispute was pending before the Conciliation Officer when the order was passed. Even if it is pending the same will not affect the authority of the learned Tribunal, if all the ingredients of section 33 (2) (b) is satisfied, to grant approval. The learned Single judge had found that these ingredients have been complied with and, therefore, was pleased to giant permission to remove the respondent upon payment of subsistence allowance from the date of suspension, namely, 23th of September, 1973, preceding the date of removal. 6. 1. Section 33 (2) (b) is clear and the law is clearly settled. It contemplates granting of approval upon an application so made simultaneously with the issue of order of removal or punishment, as the case may be. But such approval shall be effective from the date of effectivity of the punishment. Section 33 (2) (b) never contemplated that the order of punishment would be effective only after the approval is granted or that the order of punishment is dependant on the approval. In case the approval is refused in that event the order of punishment is deemed to be inchoate and there is no order of punishment and the workman shall be deemed to be continuing in service. But as soon as approval is granted, it is the approval of the action taken and would be effective from the date when the action was contemplated to take effect. Therefore, there is no scope under section 33 (2) (b) to grant permission to remove. Section 33 (2) (b) only contemplates approval of the action already taken. It does not confer jurisdiction to the learned Tribunal to do anything else except grant or refuse approval. Therefore, there is no scope under section 33 (2) (b) to grant permission to remove. Section 33 (2) (b) only contemplates approval of the action already taken. It does not confer jurisdiction to the learned Tribunal to do anything else except grant or refuse approval. Therefore, while dealing with such an order, the High Court cannot assume jurisdiction de hors section 33 (2) (b) to modify the scope of the order so passed and such an order which does not come within the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction conferred upon the learned Tribunal under section 33 (2) (b ). It is not a permission to take an action but an approval of an action already taken. Conclusion: ( 7 ) IN the circumstances, we find that the learned Single Judge was right in setting aside the order of the learned Tribunal and the learned Single Judge ought to have granted approval to the action already taken. Order: ( 8 ) IN the circumstances, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned single Judge is modified to the extent of grant of approval of the action already taken in terms of section 33 (2) (b ). The alleged permission and direction for payment of subsistence allowance is hereby set aside. 8. 1. However, this order will not prevent the workman from raising any dispute either on the ground that the punishment/removal was bad on merit or otherwise or on the ground that section 33 (2) (b) was not complied with in relation to the conciliation pending before the Conciliation Officer and claiming that the punishment was inflicted in relation to a charge connected with the said conciliation proceedings or from challenging the order that the order of removal was passed without payment of subsistence allowance from the date of suspension, namely, 23rd of September, 1972, till 24th of May, 1973 or that the punishment was disproportionate. 8. 2. The scope of jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal and the Court being confined within the ambit of section 33 (2) (b), it cannot go into the merits of the case which are still open to be agitated in appropriate case before the appropriate forum and the workman shall be at liberty to do so, if he is so advised. 2. The scope of jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal and the Court being confined within the ambit of section 33 (2) (b), it cannot go into the merits of the case which are still open to be agitated in appropriate case before the appropriate forum and the workman shall be at liberty to do so, if he is so advised. The delay in pursuing this remedy will not prevent the authority from refusing the relief to the workman, if any dispute is raised by the workman or his Union, as the case may be. 8. 3. The appeal is thus allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge is thus modified to the extent indicated above. 8. 4. There will be no order as to costs. ( 9 ) URGENT certified copy, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis. Appeal allowed.