Judgment :- J.B. Koshy, J. On 16.10.1991, the appellant was intercepted by the officers of Special Customs, Preventive Unit, Calicut at Calicut Airport, when he arrived from Bombay by flight. On search of the baggage, Indian Currency of Rs.15,50,000/- and some incriminating documents were seized by the Customs Officers. On interrogation, the appellant stated that the amount of Rs.15,50,000/- was received by him at K.K. Hotel & Jamayat, Bombay as per the arrangement of his uncle’s son Abdul Salam in Sharjah and out of this amount, Rs.5,00,000/- was to be paid to one Abdullakutty of Everest Apartments. Tellicherry and Rs.10.5 lakhs to K.P. Musthafa, Sara Manxil, Payyangandi. Since the transaction attracted the provisions of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA, 1973), the matter was transferred to Enforcement Directorate, Calicut for investigations under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973. He was issued with summons to appear on 19.10.1991. The appellant was examined under section 40 of FERA, 1973 and his statements were recorded on 19.10.1991 and 21.10.1991 by the Enforcement Officer, Calicut. He was arrested on 21.10.1991 and produced before the Magistrate as can be seen from remand report. The incriminating documents seized from him included paper slips containing name, address and telephone number of Abdullakutty and K.P. Musthafa. After issuing show cause notice, case was finally adjudicated by Special Director of Enforcement. He found that the appellant had contravened the provisions of Sections 9(1)(b) & 9(1)(d) read with 64(2) of FERA, 1973. Sections 9(1)(b) & 9(1)(d) read as follows: “9. Restrictions on payments.- (1) save as may be provided in and in accordance with any general or special exemption from the provisions of this sub-section which may be granted conditionally or unconditionally by the Reserve Bank, no person in, or resident in , India shall- (a) xx xx xx (b) receive, otherwise than through an authorized dealer, any payment by order or on behalf of any person resident outside India. Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, where any person in, or resident in, India receives any payment by order or on behalf of any person resident outside India through any other person (including an authorized dealer) without a corresponding inward remittance from any place outside India, then, such person shall be deemed to have received such payment otherwise than through an authorized dealer; (c) xx xx xx (d) make any payment to, or for the credit of, any person by order or on behalf of any person resident outside India;” The currency seized from the appellant amounting to Rs.15,50,000/- was confiscated and he was imposed with a penalty of Rs.1,00,000/-. Appellate Authority, Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, upheld the findings, but, reduced penalty from Rs.1,00,000/- to Rs.50,000/-. This appeal is filed challenging the above order. 2. First contention is that statements were taken from persons namely Abdulla Kutty, K.P. Mustafa, B. Mohd. Hazi and C. Prabhakaran, but, they were not made available for cross examination. They did not state anything against the appellant. They only stated that they were expecting money from their relatives abroad. Copies of the statements were given. Therefore, non-examination of them did not cause any prejudice to the appellant. In this connection, we refer to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur (AIR 963 SC 375). 3. Second contention is that the statements given by the appellant on 19.10.1991 and 21.10.1991 cannot be relied on. They are retracted admissions and those statements were made while he was under illegal custody. For that he relied on the bail order granted by this court in Crl.M.C.No,1335 of 1991. While granting bail on 8.11.1991, this court noted the contention of the appellant that recovery has already been effected and he was in custody from 16th October, 1991. But, that will not prove that he was detained from 16.10.1991 and statements were taken while he was under illegal custody. According to the respondent, the appellant was not arrested and detained from 16th October. Of course, he was searched on 16th and currency and documents were seized. He was issued with summons to appear on 19.10.1991 and later on 21.10.1991. He was subsequently arrested, produced before the Magistrate and remanded to custody. Therefore, those statements were not taken while he was under illegal custody. Of course, he was searched on 16th and currency and documents were seized. He was issued with summons to appear on 19.10.1991 and later on 21.10.1991. He was subsequently arrested, produced before the Magistrate and remanded to custody. Therefore, those statements were not taken while he was under illegal custody. Apart from the above, he has not denied that contents of the statements or what is stated therein are untrue. His statements that he has no money to complete that construction of his house, case against him while he was in Gulf etc., were not denied in the retracted statement. He only denied his acquaintance with Abdullakutty and K.P. Mustafa. If that be so, why their names and addresses were being carried by the appellant, has not been explained by the appellant. The seized document provide necessary corroboration to the retracted statement that they are the persons to whom the money was to be paid as stated in the statement otherwise there was no reason for the appellant to carry the slips with him when he was neither knowing nor was having any transaction with them, coupled with this, the seized amount too by itself provide necessary corroboration of the said statement. The appellant failed to give any explanation as to how he came into possession of such huge amount while his own financial position was not sound enough. With regard to retracted confession, a four member Bench of the Apex Court in Pyare Lal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1963 SC 1094) held as follows: “7. The second argument also has no merits. A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only a rule of prudence. A retracted confession may form the legal basis of a conviction if the court is satisfied that it was true and was voluntarily made. But it has been held that a court shall not base a conviction on such a confession without corroboration. It is not a rule of law, but is only a rule of prudence. It cannot even be laid down as an inflexible rule of practice or prudence that under no circumstances such a conviction can be made with out corroboration, for a court may, in a particular case, be convinced of the absolute truth of a confession, and prepared to act upon it without corroboration; but it may be laid down as a general rule of practice that it is unsafe to rely upon a confession, much less on a retracted confessions, unless the court is satisfied that the retracted confession is true and voluntarily made and has been corroborated in material particulars. The High Court having regard to the said principles looked for corroboration and found it in the evidence of Bishan Swaroop, P.W.7, and the entry in the Dak Book, Ex PA, 4 and accepted the confession in view of the said pieces of corroboration. The finding is one of fact and there is no permissible ground for disturbing it in this appeal.” Here, the statement are supported by currency notes and slips found from the pocket of the appellant. He was not able to give any convincing reason for possession of such a huge amount and slips. He failed to establish any legitimate source. Hence, there is no material to discard his own statements submitted before the authority. The learned counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla ((1998) 3 SCC 410). In that case, it was held that personal diary kept cannot be taken as ‘book of account’ regularly kept in the ‘course of business’. The above decision has no application in this case as authority has not treated the slips from the pocket of the appellants as books of account regularly kept in the course of business under section 34 of the Evidence Act. Next decision cited is the decision of the Apex Court in K.T.M.S. Mohd, v. Union of India ((1992) 3 SCC 178). Next decision cited is the decision of the Apex Court in K.T.M.S. Mohd, v. Union of India ((1992) 3 SCC 178). The question considered in that case was that when a statement given before the Enforcement Officer is retracted, whether it will attract offences punishable under section 193 of the Indian penal Code. It was held that statements were taken under section 39 of FERA and not under section 40 and hence it is not a judicial proceeding attracting the provisions of section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Here, statements were taken under section 40 of FERA. In the above decision, it is also held that statements recorded under section 40 is a judicial proceeding. In any event, court was not considering in this case whether the appellant has committed offences under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. Further, when the appellant was produced before the Magistrate for remanding, he did not complain regarding obtaining statement under coercion or improper means. 4. Thirdly it was submitted that in a similar case in Appeal No.244 of 1993 of Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board wherein, one Yahutti, who was intercepted on the same day, was found guilty. But, his case was remanded by the appellate authority and he was finally acquitted. Rs.6,10,000/- was seized for Yahutti. He did not claim that it is his own money. He proved the source of money with materials. It was properly accounted. It was the money collected for job visas to be returned to the travel agent. Facts are entirely different. In this case, burden of the department was proved by the statement of the accused corroborated by currency and a slip containing names and conduct of the appellant himself. Considering the principles in section 106 of the Evidence Act, it was for the appellant to give a reasoned explanation of the source of huge amount of money and reasons for carrying slips with the name and address of unknown persons in his pocket. After primary burden is discharged, it is for the accused to offer reasoned explanation especially in view of section 71(1) of FERA which reads as follows: “71. Burden of proof in certain cases. After primary burden is discharged, it is for the accused to offer reasoned explanation especially in view of section 71(1) of FERA which reads as follows: “71. Burden of proof in certain cases. (1) where any person is prosecuted or proceeded against for contravening any of the provisions of this Act of any rule, direction or order made there under which prohibits him from doing an act without permission, the burden of proving that he had the requisite permission shall be on him.” 5. Here, the appellant was concurrently found guilty of economic offences by adjudicating authority and appellate authority. His statements were not recorded while he was under illegal custody and his confession before the authorities (though retracted late) were fully corroborated by seizure of money and the slip of paper containing the addresses of the persons who, according to the appellant in his retracted statement, have no previous acquaintance with him. He failed to establish the source of huge amount and keeping the addresses of unknown persons. No reasonable explanation was given by the appellant. Statements recorded under section 39 or 40 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 by an Officer of Enforcement (Gazetted Officer) during the course of investigations under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act will not be hit by the provisions of section 24, 25 or 26 of the Indian Evidence Act, (See Badaku Jot Savant v. State of Mysore (AIR 1966 SC 1796), Percy Rustomji Basta v. State of Maharastra (AIR 1971 SC 1087). This court in C.K. Madhavan v. Director of Enforcement (Writ Appeal No. 1019 of 1969) held that Enforcement Officers are not Police Officers for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act. In P.S. Barkatli v. Director of Enforcement (AIR 1981 Ker 81) this court held as follows: “……an Enforcement Officer is not a police officer, as he does not enjoy all the powers of the latter, and the Act does not confer on him the power to lodge a report before a competent Magistrate under section 173 of Criminal Procedure Code, but statement recorded before Enforcement Officer cannot be freely relied upon like any other piece of evidence in adjudication proceedings under the Act. The Court will not readily infer that any unfair means have been used to record a statement unless there is some material or circumstance, which would lend strength to such a case. The Court will not readily infer that any unfair means have been used to record a statement unless there is some material or circumstance, which would lend strength to such a case. It must be established that the statement was obtained by such means and is not voluntarily made.” Apex court explained the same in Ramesh Chandra v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1970 SC 940). Since the confession made were corroborated by seizure and non-explanation of possession of huge amount in the retracted statement, we are of the opinion that there is nothing wrong in relying on the statements made by the appellant to the Enforcement Officer notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. On the facts of this case, we see no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings. The appeal is dismissed.