ORDER S.R. Nayak, J.—In both the writ petitions preferred by the Union of India and its authorities, a common question arises for decision-making. Hence, both the writ petitions were clubbed, heard together and they are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The contesting Respondents in both the petitions are the employees of the Department of Central Excise and at the relevant point of time, they were serving in Dandeli Range of Central Excise, coming under Uttara Kannada Division of Belgaum Central Excise Commissionerate and they were residing in residential accommodations provided by M/s. West Coast Paper Mills Limited, Dandeli, which is a public limited company. 3. The Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, issued a letter F. No. 27014/10/1991 Ad. II A, dated 10.2.1992 addressed to all units directing that the officials who have been provided with residential accommodation by public sector factories and manufacturers of excisable goods are not eligible for House Rent Allowance and to recover House Rent Allowance already paid from the concerned employees. When the above directions were sought to be enforced, Applications were filed before the Tribunal assailing the correctness of the action of the Department. The Department opposed the Applications and sought to justify its action on the ground of instructions contained in the letter of the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue dated 10.2.1992. Alternatively, it was also contended by the Department that the applications were liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The Tribunal having not found merit in the above defences of the Department and placing reliance on its own judgment in O.A. Nos. 759 of 1994 and 766 to 786 of 1994 and also the judgment of Patna Bench of the Tribunal in the case of P.N. Prasad and Ors. v. Union of India, (1993) 25 ATC 806, allowed the Applications and held that the Applicants are entitled to House Rent Allowance notwithstanding that they are provided with residential accommodations by the West Coast Paper Mills. The correctness of the above finding recorded by the Tribunal is assailed in these writ petitions. 4. The learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Case of Director, Central Plantation Crops Research Institute, Kesaragod and Ors. v. M. Purushothaman and Ors, 1995 Supp. The correctness of the above finding recorded by the Tribunal is assailed in these writ petitions. 4. The learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Case of Director, Central Plantation Crops Research Institute, Kesaragod and Ors. v. M. Purushothaman and Ors, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 633 would contend that since the management of the West Coast Paper Mills Limited has provided accommodations to the Respondent -employees in the factory premises in terms of Rule 229 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, they are not entitled to House Rent Allowance. Learned Counsel for the Union of India would also point out that the rent payable to the Management of West Coast Paper Mills Limited by the Respondent -employees does not exceed 10% of their basic salary and therefore, none of them can have even the advantage of the proviso of Rule 229 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. Learned Counsel for the contesting Respondent s, per contra, while supporting the impugned judgments of the Tribunal, would contend that Rule 229 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 does not enable the Department either to stop House Rent Allowance or to recover the House Rent Allowance already paid. According to the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondent s, Rule 229 only obligates the person manufacturing or storing goods on which excise duty is liable to be levied, to provide accommodation to the employees of the Excise Department and from that provision, it could not be said that there is no obligation on the part of the Department to pay House Rent Allowance to the employees concerned, simply because, they are provided with accommodations in the factory premises. 5. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, the short question that arises for decision is whether the contesting Respondents are entitled to House Rent Allowance and whether the impugned action taken by the Department is justified and legal ? 6. Before us, the authority of the Union of India (Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue) to issue the directions as contained in its letter F. No. 27014/10 / 1991 Ad. II A dated 10.2.1992, by virtue of the power under Fundamental Rule 45 read with Fundamental Rule 44 is not questioned and cannot be questioned. 6. Before us, the authority of the Union of India (Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue) to issue the directions as contained in its letter F. No. 27014/10 / 1991 Ad. II A dated 10.2.1992, by virtue of the power under Fundamental Rule 45 read with Fundamental Rule 44 is not questioned and cannot be questioned. The impugned action taken by the Department is on the basis of the instructions contained in the letter F. No. 27014/10 / 1991 Ad. II A dated 10.2.1992. Therefore, the contesting Respondents could not resist the impugned action taken by the Unit Head to implement the instructions contained in the letter dated 10.2.1992 without assailing those instructions successfully. Fundamental Rule 45 empowers the Central Government to make Rules or issue orders laying down principles governing the allotment of accommodation to the officers serving under its Administrative Control for use by them as residences and all such buildings owned or leased by it, or such portions thereof. In the instant case, the Management of West Coast Paper Mills Limited in performance of its obligation, flowing from Rule 229 of Central Excise Rules, 1944, has provided accommodations to all the contesting Respondents in the factory premises. When we made enquiry with the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, we were told that the rent payable by these Respondent -employees to the management of the West Coast Paper Mills Limited is not more than 10% of their basic salary. In that view of the matter, the contesting Respondents cannot be permitted to have the advantage of accommodation in the factory premises by paying rent at the rate below 10% of the basic pay as well as the House Rent Allowance admissible to the posts held by them, if they are not provided with official accommodation. House Rent Allowance in its very nature is not a source of income and it is undeniably a compensatory allowance. There is no need for us to dilate on this aspect further because of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Director, Central Plantation Crops (supra) referred to above. In that case, the Respondent s-employees were occupying various posts in the Appellant-Organisation. Orders allotting official quarters to employees who were entitled were passed by the Appellant-Organisation. However, the employees declined to occupy the same for one reason or the other. In that case, the Respondent s-employees were occupying various posts in the Appellant-Organisation. Orders allotting official quarters to employees who were entitled were passed by the Appellant-Organisation. However, the employees declined to occupy the same for one reason or the other. On their refusal to occupy the quarters, the Appellant-Organisation issued orders denying them the benefit of H.R.A. which they were still drawing. The Respondent s-employees challenged those orders before the High Court. Their writ petitions subsequently were transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal by its order dated 5.5.1988 held that the employees could not be compelled to occupy the official quarters and that because of their refusal to occupy the same, they could not be denied the benefit of House Rent Allowance. In arriving at that conclusion, the Tribunal has given two reasons. The first is that under the relevant provisions, it was only those employees who had applied for official accommodation and who refused to occupy the same are liable to forfeit the benefit of House Rent Allowance and not the others. The second reason given by the Tribunal was that the House Rent Allowance is a part of wages and no deduction from the wages could be made merely on account of refusal to occupy the residential accommodation. The Apex Court while disapproving both the reasons, in Paras-7 and 8 of the judgment, observed/held thus: 7. We are also afraid that the Tribunal is not right in including HRA in the definition of wages. The Fundamental Rule 9(21)(a) which is applicable to the Respondent -employees defines 'pay' as follows: 9. 21(a) Pay means the amount drawn by a government servant as (i) the pay, other than special pay granted in view of his personal qualifications, which has been sanctioned for a post held by him substantively or in an officiating capacity, or to which he is entitled by reason of his position in a cadre; and (ii) overseas pay, special pay and personal pay; and (iii) any other emoluments which may be specially classed as pay by the President. It is obvious from this definition that HRA is not a part of 'pay'. Further, Fundamental Rule 44 defines "compensatory allowance" as follows: 44. It is obvious from this definition that HRA is not a part of 'pay'. Further, Fundamental Rule 44 defines "compensatory allowance" as follows: 44. Compensatory allowance.-Subject to the general rule that the amount of compensatory allowance should be so regulated that the allowance is not on the whole a source of profit to the recipient, the Central Government may grant such allowances to any government servant under its control and may make rules prescribing their amounts and the conditions under which they may be drawn. 8. HRA would be covered by the definition of compensatory allowance. It is compensation in lieu of accommodation. This definition itself further makes it clear that compensatory allowance is not to be used as a source of profit. It is given only to compensate for the amenities which are not available or provided to the employee. The moment, therefore, the amenities are provided or offered, the employee should cease to be in receipt of the compensation which is given for want of it. We wish the Tribunal had perused the definition of 'pay' and "compensatory allowance" given in the Fundamental Rules before pronouncing that HRA is a part of the wages or pay and, therefore, cannot be disturbed. 7. The dictum that the House Rent Allowance is not a source of profit to the recipient squarely applies to the facts of this case. If the Respondent s-employees are to be paid House Rent Allowance at a rate admissible to the post held by them if they are not provided with official accommodation, in addition to providing official accommodation in the factory premises at a rate which is less than 10% of the basic pay, it is trite, would tantamount to allowing the employees to make profit to which they are not entitled in law. In that view of the matter, we cannot sustain the orders of the Tribunal impugned in these writ petitions. 8. The writ petitions are allowed and the orders of the Tribunal impugned in both the writ petitions are set aside and Original Applications filed by the contesting Respondents are dismissed. No costs.