V. S. Sirpurkar, Asit Kumar Bisi ( 1 ) IN this appeal the Judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court allowing the writ petition filed by the present respondent is called in question. By that Judgment, the learned Judge set aside the order passed by the Principal Secretary, Urban Development department whereby he had turned down the application for mutation made by present respondent Shree Ramniwas Goyal Memorial Trust. Few facts would be necessary to understand the controversy. ( 2 ) ON 6. 3. 1986, a lease was executed by the State Government in favour of one Sri Anil Kumar Bhattacharya of the Government land measuring about five and half cottah for residential purpose. A lease deed was brought into existence for that purpose. In 1992, Sri bhattacharya made a Will of the above land giving away 50% to one Smt. Geeta Devi Agarwal and 50% to one Smt. Kanta Devi Agarwal. After the demise of Sri Anil Kumar Bhattacharya, the two ladies, viz. , Geeta Devi and Kanta Devi obtained probate of the above Will and were in possession thereof. They were of course the joint lessees. In 1995, Geeta Devi and kanta Devi applied for the mutation in their favour. There was delay in deciding the application, and, therefore, a writ petition has been filed in the High Court wherein the Court directed the authorities to consider the prayer for inutation. On 29. 9. 1995, the mutation in their favour was refused by the authorities. Therefore, a further writ petition came to be filed being C. O. No. 20041 (W) of 1995. That writ petition succeeded and the learned single Judge of this Court directed the authorities by a mandatory and peremptory order to mutate the names of the writ petitioners in the concerned property within a specified period. It is liable to be seen here itself that the said Judgment of the learned single Judge dated 8. 12. 1998 remained unchallenged. In that judgment the learned single Judge had given a very clear finding that there was nothing wrong if Sri Anil Kumar Bhattacharya, the original lessee had willed away in favour of the two ladies. It is liable to be seen here itself that the said Judgment of the learned single Judge dated 8. 12. 1998 remained unchallenged. In that judgment the learned single Judge had given a very clear finding that there was nothing wrong if Sri Anil Kumar Bhattacharya, the original lessee had willed away in favour of the two ladies. Before us the objection raised in that case was that there was a transfer made in favour of the two ladies by the original lessee without obtaining the consent or permission from the State Government, and, therefore, the said transfer was void and as such the mutation could not be made. The learned Judge answered this issue by saying that the disposal by will does not amount to a transfer. On that ground the Judgment became final. Ultimately, the concerned authorities executed the order by mutating the property in the name of Geeta Devi and Kanta Devi as joint lessee having 50% undivided interest in the plot. On 8. 11. 2000, geeta Devi expired but before that she had executed a Will whereby she had given her undivided share of 50% in favour of the present respondent Trust, Shree Ramniwas Goyal Memorial Trust. It is also an accepted position that a probate to this Will was obtained and the trust thus became lessee of 50% of the property. On 23. 5. 2001, Kanta devi Agarwal executed a registered deed of gift of her 50% undivided share again in favour of the present respondent. ( 3 ) THE Trust thereafter applied for the mutation in its favour by an application dated 7. 11. 2001. However, finding that there was hardly any reaction on the part of the authorities, another writ petition came to be filed wherein it was directed to consider the said application in accordance with law. In pursuance of that an order came to be passed by the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department whereby the Principal Secretary refused to effect the mutation. Hence a further writ petition came to be filed whereby the order passed by the Principal secretary, Urban Development Department came to be set aside and a direction was given by the learned single Judge to effect the mutations. It is this order which is assailed in the present appeal. Hence a further writ petition came to be filed whereby the order passed by the Principal secretary, Urban Development Department came to be set aside and a direction was given by the learned single Judge to effect the mutations. It is this order which is assailed in the present appeal. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the of the appellant State took us firstly through the lease deed and the conditions thereof and thereafter too us through the earlier order passed by Justice N. K. Mitra dated 8. 12. 1998 whereby the original mutations in favour of Geeta Devi and kanta Devi were finalized and ordered. The learned counsel further took us through the impugned Judgment thoroughly. The main contentions of Sri Chatterjee are firstly being a property belonging to the State government and being a leased property could not have been transferred by Sri Anil Kumar Bhattacharya by Will in favour of Kanta Devi and geeta Devi. According to the learned counsel the original disposition by Will itself amounted to transfer without the consent of State government and that having been done without the consent of the State government was in total derogation to the essential condition of the lease at Clause 8. He, therefore, secondly as a sequel to his earlier argument argues that Geeta Devi could not have transferred by Will her 50% of undivided share in favour of the Trust for the same reasons that the disposition of the Will was again a transfer and that having been done without the consent of the State Government was not binding upon the State Government. Thirdly, the learned counsel contends that even if this Will is held not to be a transfer as has been held by the learned single Judge, still the question remained about the transfer by Kanta Devi Agarwal of the 50% of undivided share in favour of the Trust. This according to the learned counsel was a gift and hence a transfer and that was also done without the consent of the State government and as such the State Government was justified in refusing to mutate the property fully in favour of the respondent Trust. ( 5 ) AS against this the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent points out that the disposition by Will cannot be viewed as a transfer inter-vivos. ( 5 ) AS against this the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent points out that the disposition by Will cannot be viewed as a transfer inter-vivos. The learned counsel points out that disposition of the Will by Anil Kumar could never be a transfer. He pints out that there was no embargo on the right of the lessee to will away the property. He pointed out that the question of this transaction being a transfer was already finalized in the earlier Judgment by the learned single judge wherein the question of the mutation in favour of Geeta Devi and kanta Devi was raised. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the learned Judge of this Court in clearest possible terms has held that the valid rights passed from Anil Kumar Bhattacharya in favour of Geeta devi and Kanta Devi and as such Geeta Devi and Kanta Devi were held entitled to have their names mutated in the Revenue records. The learned counsel, therefore, contends that, there was no question of denial of the title at least so far as Geeta Devi and Kanta Devi were concerned. The learned counsel further argues that, therefore, Geeta devi had every right to will away her rights or as the case may be her 50% of the undivided share in the property in favour of the Trust which she did. Insofar as the transfer by Kanta Devi to the Trust is concerned, the learned counsel points out that this was not transfer of the "land" and it was, in fact, a transfer of undivided 50% shares which was not prohibited by the lease deed. On these rival submissions it is to be considered as to whether the learned Judge was right in setting aside the order passed by the Principal Secretary, Urban Development department. As has been pointed out by the parties, the learned single judge has given almost the same logic as the earlier learned Judge of this Court Hon'ble Justice N. K. Mitra went. The learned Judge has specifically held that by way of the transfer by Kanta Devi of her 50% of the undivided share in favour of the Trust the Trust had become the lessee of the whole property and, therefore, there was no question of refusing to mutate the Trust's name in respect of the whole property. The learned Judge has specifically held that by way of the transfer by Kanta Devi of her 50% of the undivided share in favour of the Trust the Trust had become the lessee of the whole property and, therefore, there was no question of refusing to mutate the Trust's name in respect of the whole property. The learned Judge has also relied on clause 2 sub-clause 9 which is as under :-"in the case of a lease in favour of two or more individual lessees jointly, any one of such joint lessees Will have the right to transfer his/her share to the other co-shares or co-sharers. " ( 6 ) THE learned Judge has given a finding that since Geeta Devi agarwal had willed away her 50% in favour of the respondent Trust the respondent Trust had become the joint lessee with Kanta Devi and, therefore, under the aforementioned clause of the lease Kanta Devi had a right to transfer her share in favour of the Trust which she has done. The learned Judge, therefore, found in favour of the respondent trust and declared that the mutation was bound to be made recognizing the ownership of the Trust. ( 7 ) SRI Chatterjee tried to fall back on clause 2 sub-clause (8) and urged that Kanta Devi could not have transferred by gift her 50% share. The argument is not correct for the simple reason that prohibited the assignment or transfer of the "demised land and/or the structure erected" thereupon. There is nothing in the whole lease deed prohibiting the transfer of the undivided share in the land. What has been transferred of the undivided share and not the land actually. It is an admitted position on facts that the original property has not been partitioned by metes and bounds by the two ladies Geeta Devi and Kanta devi amongst themselves. Therefore, what is transferred by Kanta Devi is only an undivided share and there was no prohibition as per the clauses of the lease deed. We are, therefore, not impressed by the argument of Sri Chatterjee that the transfer dated 23. 5. 2001 by Kanta devi Agarwal in favour of the Trust of her 50% undivided share was a bad transfer, it being without obtaining the consent of the State government. In our opinion that was not necessary. We, therefore, reject that argument. We are, therefore, not impressed by the argument of Sri Chatterjee that the transfer dated 23. 5. 2001 by Kanta devi Agarwal in favour of the Trust of her 50% undivided share was a bad transfer, it being without obtaining the consent of the State government. In our opinion that was not necessary. We, therefore, reject that argument. ( 8 ) ALMOST by way of a desperate argument Sri Chatterjee tried to urge that under section 50 sub-section 1 (a) of the West Bengal Land Reforms act, there could be the mutation only if there was a transfer. We have recorded this argument merely to reject it because a close look of the provision suggests that the section applies to the transfer as well as to the inherited properties. This was clearly an inheritance by Will. We have already found that the learned single Judge was correct in holding that because of the gift deed dated 23. 5. 2001, the Trust had perfected its title over the whole leased property. Since it had already become owner of the 50% of the undivided share which came to it from Geeta devi by a Will, with remaining 50% having been gifted in favour of the trust, the Trust had become the owner of the rest of the property. Thus the Trust had become the owner. The Trust had the rights in respect of the whole property in question. In that view, there was no question of refusing the mutation to the Trust. In that view we are not impressed by the appeal at all and the appeal has to be dismissed. It is, accordingly, dismissed. All the interim orders passed stand vacated. Appeal dismissed.